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Abstract 
 
The emergence between 1965 and 1973 of a crisis of over-accumulation and over-capacity, rooted 
in international manufacturing yet affecting the overall private business economies of the advanced 
capitalist countries, inaugurated a developmental context whose profound contradictions were 
brought home by the Great Recession of 2008-9 and the continuing Long Depression. The 
intervening period has seen profound economic, political and social crisis in the advanced capitalist 
world and has simultaneously been treacherous for under-developed economies forced to navigate 
rocketing energy costs and international commodity price and currency exchange rate turbulence 
under the continual threat of debt-levered expropriation. The struggle to locate the causes – 
proximate and ultimate – of the present crisis is at the same time a battle to map the basic economic 
and political coordinates of the continuing long downturn. In this connection it is contended that 
efforts have been undermined by the epistemological underdevelopment conditioned by a crisis of 
knowledge-formation which has unfolded in parallel with the long downturn. The dominance of 
neoclassical economics (‘unworldly’ since the marginal revolution) on the right and the 
displacement of Marxism on a structurally weakened and autodidactic left in the context of the 
ascent of postmodernism as an intellectual and cultural dominant has opened a space between the 
material and discursive realities of global capitalist development. 
 
This work is an attempt to deploy the method developed by the classical Marxist tradition to 
approach the significance of the state and law in the historically-conditioned reproduction of 
capitalist social relations. It is contended in the first place that the dualism which obtains between 
national and global spheres in much theorisation of neoliberal ‘globalisation’ obscures the 
dialectical interrerelation of state and world market – the institutional and regulatory environment 
of international trade, money and finance being both the creation of states and the developing 
context which frames their – necessarily path-dependent and reflexive – projects of domestic 
economy making. As against popular notions of state decline, following Gowan the state-political 
content of the centring of private financial markets in the mediation of international monetary 
relations is recalled, while the embeddedness of the state in circuits of capital accumulation is 
emphasised (Tony Smith), the concept of ‘regime of accumulation’ being deployed to capture the 
nexus of monetary, fiscal and regulatory policy which articulates historically-conditioned 
development strategies. In this respect, we depart from the work of the Bolshevik jurist Pashukanis, 
who despite significantly advancing the materialist analysis of the juridical form, identified in his 
most significant work a largely derivative role for the state. It is argued that the methodological 
weakness represented by Pashukanis’ disproportionate emphasis on commodity exchange – his 
failure to proceed from the basis of the capitalist economy as a contradictory unity of production 
and circulation – prevents him from fully apprehending the role of the state in the production and 
reproduction of capitalist social relations.  
 
As the discussion unfolds, there is developed in conversation principally with Gramsci an 
understanding of the state as the specific material condensation of a relationship of forces among 
classes and class fractions. Upholding the notion of the ‘integral state’ as a differentiated unity of 
civil society and political society upon which terrains the capitalist class forms alliances with 
proximate classes as the prerequisite for and correlate of its domination of labour, the 
developmental context represented by neoliberalism is conceived in terms of the transition of 
interest-bearing capital from leading to dominant fraction of the capitalist class in parallel with its 
tendential contradictory disaggregation from productive capital. Such a process has necessitated a 
transformation in the character of bourgeois political supremacy involving a dismantling of the 
civil rights and social protections accumulated during the period bookended by Americanism and 
the welfare state and increasing dependence upon an expanded machinery of coercion. Proceeding 
from this basis, it is considered how in specific developmental contexts the state by way of the 
legal form maps the social totality, achieving distinctive couplings (and de-couplings) of wealth 
production and social reproduction. There is asserted the second-order integration of public and 
private spheres in terms of the fundamental unity of capitalist reproduction, the first-order 
public/private metabolism being evaluated in view of the facilitation and rationalisation of social 
reproduction in the context of a productive economy structured around dissociated private 
producers. The legal form is further interrogated in view of its role in structuring the productive 
antagonism between capital and labour, a relation which on the basis of its form comes to expresses 
various contents – from consensual integration to casuistic assimilation – as domestic social 
relations are (in-)validated by the operation of the law of value at the level of the world market. In 
this connection, the unproductive theoretical polarisation obtaining between approaches which 
consider law to be epiphenomenal and those which pursue its relative autonomy is enriched by a 
historicised conception in terms of which law, concretising specific relationships of forces within 
particular regimes of accumulation, appears as ‘sword’, as ‘shield’ and as ‘fetter’. This framework 
is particularly useful for evaluating the opportunities for the deployment of legal strategies by 
labour and groups oppressed under capitalism – a question in relation to which Pashukanis, 
following Lenin, demonstrated a remarkable political astuteness.    
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The conjunctural moment characterised by the ‘strange non-death of neo-liberalism’ (to borrow the 
title of Colin Crouch’s 2011 work1) appears paradoxical. No one doubts that the causam proximam 
of the Great Recession can be located in the failings of the financial system, while there is some 
consensus that the accumulated bad debt of the financiers operates as a substantial impediment to 
exit from the continuing Long Depression. More precise diagnoses vary from a generous 
understanding of the crash as arising unpredictably from a convergence of unfortunate policy 
decisions and statistically unlikely events2, through sub-paradigmatic reflections on the instabilities 
endemic to financial accumulation3, to a more wide-reaching recognition of financial turbulence as 
expressive of fundamental contradictions of the capitalist totality of production and circulation4. 
Whatever story one ascribes to however, it must be seen as perplexing that irrespective of the 
humbling of finance and the related fracturing of free-market ideology, financial markets and actors 
have retained or even deepened their dominance, while the medicinal prescriptions for continuing 
economic maladies have been nothing other than the standard neoliberal orthodoxy of fiscal 
retrenchment, privatisation of public assets and labour-market deregulation. Despite Alan 
Greenspan’s acknowledgement that “a critical pillar to market competition and free markets, did 
break down”, regardless of the chief executive of Deutsche Bank Josef Ackermann’s admission 
that “I no longer believe in the market’s self-healing power”5, in the face of what David Colander 
has described as “a systematic failure of the economics profession”6, it seems that if anything, the 
crisis has drawn us into a closer orbit around the irresistible centre of gravity that is international 
finance and crystallised a yet deeper (at least European) policy consensus around neo-liberalism, 
radically reincarnated in terms of ‘austerity’. States have been placed in fiscal jeopardy by their 
rescuing of beached financial institutions, whilst in a different configuration the power of 
international finance has been brought to bear on the weaker economies of the eurozone, in which 
socio-economic destabilisation and the undermining of democratic process has been regarded as a 
1 C. Crouch, The Strange Non-Death of Neo-liberalism (London: Polity, 2011) 
2 N. N. Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable (London: Penguin, 2008); A. 
Greenspan, ‘The crisis’ (2010) (available at: 
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/projects/bpea/spring%202010/2010a_bpea_greenspan.pdf) [accessed 18 
March 2013] 
3 C. M. Reinhart & K. S. Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2009) 
4 Cf. A. Kliman, The Failure of Capitalist Production: Underlying Causes of the Great Recession (London: 
Pluto, 2012); M. Roberts, The Great Recession: Profit Cycles, Economic Crisis A Marxist View (Raleigh, 
N.C.: Lulu.com); G. Carchedi, Behind the Crisis: Marx’s Dialectics of Value and Knowledge (London: 
Haymarket, 2012); A. Callinicos, Bonfire of Illusions: The Twin Crises of the Liberal World (Cambridge: 
Polity, 2010); Toussaint, É., ‘Banks versus the people: the underside of a rigged game!’ (online series 
available at: http://www.cadtm.org/Banks-versus-the-People-The) [accessed 18 February 2013]; C. 
Lapavitsas, ‘Crisis and Financialised Expropriation’ (2009) 17 Historical Materialism 114 
5 M. Skapinker, ‘The market no longer has all the answers’ Financial Times, 25 March 2008 (available at 
http://www. ft.com) [accessed 18 March 2013]. Referenced in Callinicos, Bonfire of Illusions, p. 12 
6 D. Collander et al., ‘The financial crisis and the systematic failure of academic economics’ (2009) Kiel 
Institute for the World Economy Discussion Papers No. 1489 (available at: http://www. ifw-
kiel.de/publications) [accessed 18 March 2013] 
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price worth paying for market stabilisation. Indeed, the combustion of the late twentieth century 
regime of finance-driven accumulation may be said to have ushered in a period not of 
circumscribed financial activity and the disciplining of the financiers, but rather of an apparently 
narrowing state policy horizon, the disciplining of public sector workforces and retrenchment of 
welfare provision. Thus we might recognise not a closer supervision of finance capital by 
government, but an increasing regulation of state fiscal policy by un-regulated financial markets 
and actors, either as externally imposed and institutionally mediated by the troika, or internalised in 
such forms as the UK’s Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR).  
 
Many intelligent commentators from across the political spectrum have argued vehemently against 
austerity as a policy orientation, recalling the logical insight that reducing public spending during a 
downturn will necessarily diminish aggregate demand and deepen the recession7. The consequence 
for public finances would be falling tax revenues coupled with an increasing welfare bill as 
unemployment rises, these dynamics having a negative impact upon the public fiscal balance and 
levels of sovereign debt, thus exacerbating the very problems which austerity seeks ostensibly to 
resolve. In Greece, the contraction of public spending has had a predictably devastating impact, 
catalysing a deep recessionary spiral which has claimed 22 percent of GDP and some seven 
hundred and fifty thousand jobs since the intervention of the troika in 20108. Unemployment had 
reached 27.5 percent by 2013, while wages declined by approximately the same proportion 
between 2010 and 2014 and journalists9 began to report a situation resembling a humanitarian 
crisis in urban areas blighted by homelessness and increasing reliance on hand outs. Moreover, 
inasmuch as it was intended to ensure the sustainability of sovereign debt, the Greek austerity 
programme must be recognised as a resounding failure. Public debt rose from 330bn euro in 2010 
to a peak of 355bn in 2011 – when a restructuring of privately-held debt reduced the total to 304bn 
– before rising once more above 320bn by 2014. The profundity of the problem is still clearer when 
we consider the ratio of debt to GDP, which rose from 130 percent in 2009 to 177 percent in 
201410. Of course, none of this seems to have impressed the troika (later rebranded ‘the 
7 Chief economics commentator at the Financial Times Martin Wolf has consistently opposed the Cameron 
government’s austerity programme and the ECB’s handling of the crisis in the euro zone. See ‘The sad 
record of fiscal austerity’, Financial Times, 26 February 2013; ‘Austerity loses an article of faith’ Financial 
Times, 23 April 2013 (available at www.ft.com). Interestingly, Wolf has been joined by neoliberal standard-
bearer the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in calling for a balance between fiscal retrenchment and 
demand stimulus in the UK (in the IMF’s words, ‘greater near-term flexibility in the fiscal adjustment path’) 
– World Economic Outlook, April 2013: Hopes, Realities, Risks (Washington: International Monetary Fund, 
2013), p. 19. Less surprisingly, the Keynesian Nobel Prize winner Paul Krugman has called for counter-
cyclical spending, while he has been joined in vocal opposition to austerity by such esteemed colleagues as 
Joseph Stiglitz and the fashionable Nouriel Roubini. P. Krugman, End This Depression Now! (New York: W. 
W. Norton & Co., 2013).  
8 H. Flassbeck & C. Lapavitsas, Against the Troika: Crisis and Austerity in the Eurozone (London: Verso, 
2015), p. 96 
9 A. Politaki, ‘Greece is facing a humanitarian crisis’ The Guardian, 11 February 2013. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/feb/11/greece-humanitarian-crisis-eu [accessed 10 March 
2015] 
10 Flassbeck & C. Lapavitsas, Against the Troika: Crisis and Austerity in the Eurozone, p. 97 
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institutions’), who have in negotiations with a Syriza government elected with an anti-austerity 
mandate demonstrated a remarkable intransigence in insisting on the continuity of the bailout 
conditions which have strangled the Greek economy. More broadly, the results of the Greek test 
case do not seem to have had an impact on the broader political trajectory of the Eurozone, whose 
dominant players continue to prefer a beggar-thy-neighbour policy of enforcing internal 
devaluation on the periphery to addressing profound trade imbalances and developmental 
unevenness through resource pooling and fiscal transfers. 
 
Introducing the thesis 
 
It is in this puzzling and contradictory conjuncture that the present thesis seeks to make an 
intervention. The struggle to locate the causes – proximate and ultimate – of the present crisis and 
to construct a convincing critique (or indeed effective rationalisation) of the policy responses 
thereto is at the same time necessarily a battle to map the basic economic and political coordinates 
of neoliberal capitalism. It is only through a detailed interrogation of this developmental context 
that we may hope to understand the stratospheric (and retrospectively, unsustainable) rise of 
finance and the continued post-crash propagation of policy orientations which are driven by and 
serve the interests of the financiers. This same context informs the general prostration of social 
democratic and Marxist responses to austerity policies which proceed apace despite their patent 
social destructiveness and keenly observed exacerbation of recessionary dynamics. It is only by 
familiarising ourselves with the stumbling, uneven development of the global capitalist economy 
and the antagonism of the vested interests it generates that we may understand how a crisis which 
has so starkly revealed the instabilities and contradictions of financial accumulation can possibly 
have deepened the dominance of free-market ideas and entrenched the power of high finance over 
state policy formation; how a crisis of neoliberalism can have further generalised the neoliberal 
policy consensus.  
 
The present thesis seeks therefore to develop a preliminary account of the development of the 
global capitalist economy following the maturation of the contradictions of the post-war period in 
the crises of the early 1970s. Upon this foundation it becomes possible to introduce an account of 
the emergence and consolidation of neoliberal political projects, understood as both a response to 
and driver of economic and political crisis. These projects are interrogated as the political 
condensation and ideological systematisation of the insights and strategic objectives of capital, 
emerging from a particular matrix of civil society power relations which has developed in 
interrelation with changing global macroeconomic conditions and the (in-)validation of 
fundamental productive relations by the operation of the law of value in the world market. It will be 
discussed how these projects are path-dependent and more or less degenerative in nature, how the 
privileging of short-term financial profitability can jeopardise the competitiveness of exports and 
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entrench industrial decline. How these economic problematics affect the exercise of political power 
in national political systems will further be investigated, it being demonstrated how the erosion of 
the material concessions undergirding consent with the emergence of structural unemployment and 
secular wage repression has necessitated the tendential transformation of the character of bourgeois 
supremacy. The institutions and processes which constituted this ‘materiality’ of consent are 
appraised not only from a political perspective, but economically in terms of their development in 
the post-war context as a machinery of state subvention undergirding the private business economy. 
The latter lens permits certain neoliberal reforms to be understood not only as reversals for the 
organised labour movement, but as a crucial dismantling of systems of (partially) rationalised 
social reproduction and the disintegration of a national transport and utilities infrastructure which 
once underpinned industrial development. The matter of how such policies came to be formulated, 
and continue to be adopted, is once more explained in reference to the transformation of the 
balance of domestic political forces in conversation with changing global macroeconomic and geo-
political conditions and the crystallisation of those transformed relations in a recomposed 
‘historical bloc’ leading/dominating society.  
 
Moreover, the retrenchment and recommodification of public services is investigated in terms of 
the changing form of integration of labour into the process of value production in the context of a 
shifting balance between productive and unproductive labour as finance as the dominant fraction of 
the capitalist class re-orients away from industrial investment toward the mediation of labour 
revenues and the extraction of rents in international financial markets. In this light, neoliberal 
reforms are cognised not in terms of the victory of economics over politics or of market over 
society, but rather as the decoupling/recoupling of wealth production and social reproduction 
within ‘regimes of accumulation’ which institutionalise specific strategies of accumulation which 
are different from those which prevailed in the ‘welfarist’ period. To better understand this, there is 
developed a critique of the public/private dichotomy insofar as it is understood as delimiting the 
market or ‘capitalist’ space of the private business economy from a realm of ‘institutionalised 
altruism’ animated by democratically generated imperatives and operating as a boundary or limit to 
market activity. A deconstruction of the boundary is pursued from the perspective of capital 
accumulation, which reveals the organic and second order unity of capitalist production and social 
reproduction, below which the public/private dichotomy is revealed a first order distinction which 
facilitates the reproduction of the social conditions grounding capital accumulation. This move 
permits the consideration of how the state, by way of the legal form, maps the social totality, 
organising social reproduction in a manner facilitative of the extraction and realisation of surplus 
value. The re-drawing of the public/private boundary can then be recognised as an expression of 
both the balance of political forces and the nature of the production-reproduction coupling 
operative within the attendant regime of accumulation. This discussion leads on to a broader 
consideration of how the state through the machinery of law has historically driven social 
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transformation through the institutional mediation of social relations, especially that of the 
fundamental productive antagonism obtaining between capital and labour. It is recalled how legal 
coercion is deployed to create a market of free labour powers in the process of primitive 
accumulation – both historically and as regards the commodification of labour in regions 
characterised by mixed modes of production – and further to devalue labour power where 
periodically necessary to ensure competitiveness in global commodity markets. This function of the 
law-state is compared and contrasted with the opportunities which arise in different macro-
economic and class-relational contexts for labour and groups oppressed under capitalism to 
operationalise the relative institutional insulation of law, deploying its own structures and logic to 
embed political victories and impose limits on their subjection by capital. From the perspective of 
the latter, understood in aggregate as total social capital, this process can stabilise accumulation 
through securing the sustainable reproduction of a healthy and sufficiently content working 
population. In this way, labour movements, perhaps intersecting with bourgeois reformist currents 
underlain by notions of ‘civilised morality’, may offset the tendency for individual capitals in a 
competitive environment to myopically increase the rate of exploitation to such a degree as the 
erode the foundation for future exploitation. At this point, the pertinence of the discussion to the 
diagnosis of neoliberalism is apparent insofar as state organisation of rent-seeking through the 
regulatively incentivised expropriation of both the socialised and non-socialised portion of the 
wage speaks to the increasing inability of the state to represent the interests of total social capital or 
of long-term accumulation (or rather of such interests to be heard within a historical bloc 
dominated by finance capital). The final perspective from which the role of law in mediating the 
capital-labour relation is assessed is that of the legal form’s structural interconnection with the 
commodity form and its consequent historical contingency. Given that legal relations are the 
institutionalised form of the antagonistic interaction of dissociated private commodity owners, they 
form part of the total ensemble of social relations of production which come to act as a brake on the 
further development of the forces of production. The specifically legal form of social regulation, as 
opposed to modes of normative social control more generally, therefore outlives its usefulness in 
the transition to more advanced forms of economic and political organisation.  
 
As is apparent from the above, the substantive and methodological pivot of the thesis is the 
capitalist state, its form, and the character of its activities in different developmental contexts, 
especially those represented by the post-war ‘Keynesian’ compromise and neoliberalism. The state 
is theorised both in terms of the changing structure of the inter-state system and its interrelation 
with the development of the world market, and as regards its operation domestically in 
representing, concretising and regulating civil society relations in reflexive response to global 
macroeconomic and geopolitical conditions. These facets are considered to be deeply intertwined 
insofar as the present work seeks to recover an understanding of the dialectical unity in opposition 
of state and world market, the latter being both the product of the competitive interaction of rival 
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state-capitals and the continually developing context which frames their reflexive projects of 
domestic economy-making. An accurate appreciation of the state form is indispensible if we are to 
understand the present conjuncture and hope to offer appropriate guidance for political intervention 
therein. The consequences of misdiagnosis are profound, such that the thesis serves partly as a 
corrective to those theoretical approaches which would recognise the spectre of undead 
neoliberalism and the contradictory quality of austerity programmes as confirming some of the 
stronger popular narratives of the decline or decentring of the state in the neoliberal period. Some 
may find it hard to accept that national governments would adopt austerity measures deepening 
recessionary dynamics if it weren’t for the threat public deficits and mounting sovereign debts 
posed to creditworthiness in international financial markets. It may be tempting to view the transfer 
of public wealth through bailouts and quantitative easing to financial institutions whose speculative 
activities were the immediate cause of the economic crisis as symptomatic of the prostration of 
state managers in view of a boundless, disembodied technocratic process of financialisation which 
develops outwith their control. The argument presented in this thesis unfolds in contradistinction to 
such accounts which assert the declining significance of the boundaries and institutions of the 
nation-state as against the rising power of Multi-National Corporations (MNCs) and mobile 
financial capital. As I explore in depth, such understandings commonly neglect the extreme 
inequities of power and influence within the state-system (states exist only in the plural), fail to 
recognise the crucial state-content of financialisation internationally and further make strong 
assumptions about what states are, consequently privileging particular institutions and activities as 
state institutions/activities and recognising particular policy orientations as demonstrative of state 
‘strength’ or integrity. 
 
While austerity programmes are necessarily contradictory, these contradictions do not arise 
primarily and for most states at the level of policy formation, either due to the process being 
constrained by the disciplinary force of financial markets or distorted by an evangelical 
commitment to free markets. Rather the contradictions are real contradictions attending the 
interaction of different scales of economic activity in a global economy characterised by uneven 
development and a changing international division of capital (and labour). The story is a familiar 
one of macro-scale irrationalities issuing cumulatively from micro-rational behaviours in an 
unplanned system of production structured around the association of dissociated private producers. 
As competition for stagnating markets intensifies within a structural context of over-capacity, 
individual capitals (and at a further remove, state-capitals) will seek rationally to improve their 
cost-positions through labour devaluation. With the long-term outlook uncertain and retained 
earnings more likely to be channelled towards financial investments than productive ones, 
increasing the rate of exploitation by squeezing wages will be the primary mode of shoring up 
profitability. Fiscal retrenchment represents in large part the expropriation of the socialised portion 
of the wage, while the hollowing out of welfare provision increases the disciplinary pressure on 
12 
 
those remaining in work. Workers are more likely to accept labour intensification and detrimental 
changes to pay and conditions as the alternative of living on welfare becomes progressively 
bleaker. In the UK, the downwards pressure exacted on the wage rate by welfare reform is most 
viscerally apparent in the retail sector, where it is personified by workers ‘employed’ under the 
coalition ‘Workfare’ regime who labour to retain their entitlement to unemployment benefit 
alongside (and sometimes in the place of) minimum-wage workers. The bargaining position of the 
latter in relation to management seeking to reduce costs in a recession is dramatically undermined 
by the availability of effectively free labour, while the fraternisation of these two groups of workers 
will doubtless quickly reveal the realities of life on increasingly austere state benefits. So far, so 
rational in view of the imperatives of capital accumulation. Yet the cumulative effect of the 
individually-rational policies of state-capitals locked into a competitive project of labour 
devaluation is to reduce the overall demand for wage goods in the biggest markets of the global 
economy, which when coupled with stagnant demand for capital goods as investment dries up, 
deepens the recession. Austerity as a policy orientation is therefore highly contradictory, insofar as 
it involves balancing long-term structural adjustment (wage devaluation) against the (hopefully 
short-term) entrenchment of recessionary dynamics – in other words the privileging of profit over 
growth. However, the standard Keynesian appeal for counter-cyclical spending (which has 
unfortunately been too un-critically articulated by parts of the far left as a ‘solution’ to the crisis) is 
no less contradictory, since it would from the perspective of capital privilege the imperative of 
growth over that of profit. Every capitalist crisis is one of over-production and under-consumption, 
twin features which if they could be sublated by force of will would not operate as drivers of crisis. 
State productive investment would promote labour valorisation in opposition to the project of 
labour devalorisation, inasmuch as an increase in employment decreases the disciplinary power of 
mass of the unemployed, while state contracts would potentially enable firms to survive at cost-
positions not validated by global commodity markets. The threat to the newly-‘Keynesian’ state-
capital’s overall cost-position in relation to state-capitals pursuing austerity would be severe. The 
problem would be particularly acute for state-capitals (such as the UK) occupying fundamentally 
weak industrial cost-positions and recording sizeable trade in goods deficits, in which case 
productive investment would likely feed those trade deficits and benefit more competitive export 
economies as free riders. Moreover, the pursuit of Keynesian deficit spending engenders a 
particular tension between growth and the profit of finance capital specifically, since on the basis of 
the experience of the 1970s, the former is likely to generate inflationary dynamics which endanger 
returns on financial assets. Thus, the dominance of finance capital (which for reasons we will 
explore is as likely to be entrenched as unseated by the economic crisis) would militate against the 
pursuit of deficit spending, even in the event of such projects being theoretically in the interests of 
total social capital. These contradictions find their ultimate expression in the coercive pressure of 
an international financial regime which punishes deficit spending by states which have neither the 
freedom of a current account surplus nor the privileges of international monetary seigniorage.       
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 Given the above discussion, we must be careful to avoid the temptation to characterise austerity 
programmes as ‘ideological’ in a strong sense which infers a theoretically-generated disjuncture 
between state policy and objective economic conditions – i.e. neoliberal governments are blinded 
to reality by unquestionable faith in the free market. The sense in which austerity is ‘ideological’ 
(apart from the obvious manner in which its implementation involves political choices such as, say, 
the prioritisation of housing benefit cuts over those in the military) is altogether different. Austerity 
politics represents a discursively-generated policy consensus driven fundamentally by the real-
world structural imperatives of capital (led itself crucially by finance capital in the neoliberal 
context) in dialogue with proximate classes and in partial consort with organised sections of labour 
as the dominated class. The ideological moment is thus the process by which the insights of 
capitalists enslaved by the coercive pressures of competitive accumulation in a deteriorating macro-
economic context receive systematised articulation – institutionally mediated and state-inscribed – 
in a narrative of the unfolding crisis and the appropriate responses thereto. The authentically 
political moment is the moment of totalisation or hegemonic universalisation whereby the 
particular interests of a specific social group are presented (and received) as being in the national-
popular interest. This is of course to state the matter in the very simplest of terms, such that we 
would do well to recall that austerity, like the neoliberal project as a whole, is not one singular 
monolithic programme, but a collection of differentiated policy packages deployed in divergent 
national contexts and united often as much by legitimating reference to a hegemonic conjunctural 
narrative as by substantive homology. However, while austerity comes in a wide variety of 
flavours, the most fundamental distinction internal to the project is that which obtains between 
austerity measures as externally imposed upon a state and those independently undertaken, which 
we might term respectively punitive and elective forms of fiscal austerity. While these categories 
might be fuzzy around their edges, there is no doubting the qualitative distinction obtaining 
between the form of elective social rationalisation (from the perspective of capital) being pursued 
in the UK and the type of wholesale punitive re-engineering being imposed in Greece under the 
supervision of the troika. The difference, which might be playfully described in terms of 
purportedly ‘creative’ versus decidedly ‘wilful’ forms of destruction, will be familiar to anyone 
who sought to contrast the 1980s IMF ‘structural adjustment’ programmes in Latin America with 
the altogether more modest (though nonetheless painful) retrenchment and re-commodification of 
the welfare state that occurred in the ‘advanced capitalist’ world. While all austerity programmes 
have a domestic class inflection, in the punitive forms this is fused with a strong international class 
– indeed imperial – dynamic. In an environment structured by stagnating or contracting demand in 
international commodity markets and a monetary tightness prefigured by the emergence of the true 
extent of asset-price over-valuation in the world’s financial centres, any state-capital would 
naturally concern itself with fiscal consolidation. The latter is however far from a technocratic 
process devoid of political content and receives divergent forms of implementation reflecting 
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different domestic balances of class forces and different degrees of external coercion. There is a 
particular tension operative between the interests of foreign creditors in the timely repayment of 
debts and that of (sections of) domestic capital in the long-term re-structuring of the economy, 
including principally the improvement of its international cost-position. The relative force of these 
interests will depend upon the particular state’s trade balance, its public fiscal balance and the 
terms of its access to liquidity, the latter determined crucially by its form of integration into the 
international monetary system and its consequent degree of insulation from (or form of mediated 
articulation with) the raw coercive power of international financial markets. Further, as we shall 
explore, financial markets form an integral part of the inter-state system, such that foreign 
bondholders act in parallel with corresponding states, the two forming ‘militant consortia’11 which 
seek quite rationally to reconfigure the nature of the economic interrelation of the creditor and 
debtor state-capitals, in lieu of or in addition to the repayment of debts. 
 
Structure and methodology  
 
The thesis proceeds by way of the following structure. In the opening chapter there is developed an 
account of the long historical context of post-war capitalism’s descent into crisis. This chapter 
prepares the ground for discussion of the specificities of neoliberalism, providing an elementary 
framing within which consideration of the nature and function of ‘the state’ in financialised late 
capitalism may be advanced. The argument begins by recalling the position of interest-bearing 
capital in Marx’s account of accumulation, its embeddedness in the real economy and its 
indispensability for reproduction on an expanded scale. This is necessary to ground the discussion 
in view the seemingly abstracted and alchemical character of financial accumulation which arises 
from its fetishised form and whose mystical properties are inadequately interrogated by 
neoclassical economists and the mainstream media. While Marx is clear that finance is integral to 
productive expansion, a theme which runs throughout his analysis is an understanding of the 
manner in which interest-bearing and productive capital can under certain conditions become 
disaggregated, the spheres of production and circulation being decoupled as capital is gripped by a 
speculative euphoria, seeking to bypass the sphere of production and make money directly out of 
money. The discussion proceeds then to consider why financial activities and profits have 
experienced such rapid expansion since the late 1970s, the crucial move being to locate this process 
historically in conversation with Giovanni Arrighi’s Braudelian long-run historiography of the 
development of the capitalist world system. The importance of this step inheres in the fact that it is 
only by so broadening the space-time horizon of our observations that we may discern whether, 
11 The phrase is borrowed from Hobsbawm’s analysis of the response of the British state and its capitals to 
the defaults of their foreign debtors during the so-called ‘Great Depression’ of 1873-1896. The parallels with 
the present crisis in terms of the tendential verticalisation of relations (marking a transition from fraternity to 
fratricide) between associated state-capitals – driven by debt obligations as a lever of expropriation – in a 
context of intensifying competion for stagnating markets should be clear. E. Hobsbawm, Industry and 
Empire: From 1750 to the Present Day (London: Penguin, 1999), pp. 108-9   
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behind the seeming radical novelty of the contemporary process of financial expansion, there 
emerge familiar and recurrent patterns. Drawing on Arrighi’s discussion in The Long Twentieth 
Century, it is argued that we should not treat either the protracted crisis represented by the 
continuing long downturn nor the contemporary financial expansion as radical departures from 
previous patterns of development. Rather it becomes clear that the history of the capitalist world 
system is characterised by the alternation of relatively short phases of generalised expansion along 
a definite developmental path (‘continuous change’) with long periods of ‘discontinuous change’ 
entailing crisis, restructuring and reorganisation. Similarly, financial expansion, far from a 
contemporary anomaly, has been a recurrent tendency of historical capitalism from its earliest 
beginnings, emerging typically at the moment of exhaustion of phases of material expansion of the 
global economy and prefiguring its structural reorganisation.  
 
Arrighi’s methodology is particularly apposite in view of the fundamental questions the thesis 
seeks to address, insofar as it illuminates this interrelation between the creation and reproduction of 
a system of national states and the development of a stuttering, crisis-ridden, yet tremendously 
adaptive capitalist world economy. Arrighi, following Braudel, periodises of the history of 
capitalist development into four distinct but overlapping ‘systemic cycles of accumulation’, each 
consisting in a pattern of major capitalist development of systemic significance, yet centred on a 
distinct geographical location and overseen by a dominant bloc of governmental and business 
agencies led by a hegemonic state. This interpretative scheme permits the recovery of the agency of 
state-capitals in the development of the world market, each cycle of accumulation proceeding 
through a complex apparatus of institutions and practices (a ‘regime of accumulation’) by which 
the leading state-capital formation promotes, organises and regulates the expansion of the global 
economy. The insight that the exercise of ‘world hegemony’ has always involved fundamental 
transformative action, that the modern state system has developed through profound restructurings 
led by successive hegemonic states in organising systemic patterns of accumulation, is crucial in 
understanding the present conjuncture and responding to contemporary anxieties as to the 
decentring of the state. This is particularly the case when we consider the present financial 
expansion in view of Arrighi’s assertion that such phenomena typically express the ‘autumn’ phase 
of a systemic cycle of accumulation, at which point the primary agent of world-scale accumulation, 
in response to intensified international competition, leads a ‘reversal to eclecticism’, tendentially 
withdrawing from trade in search of profits in the sphere of circulation. The result is a temporary 
‘efflorescence’ of vertiginous profitability for the dominant state-capital formation, which 
nevertheless ultimately signals the decline of its hegemony as its interests become decoupled from 
the further material expansion of the global economy. The idea which emerges is that the 
contemporary financial expansion and the interconnected reconfiguration of the monetary and 
financial architecture of the inter-state system has been crucially driven by the strategic action of 
the dominant state-capital formation, led by the US, in an attempt to secure its global hegemony in 
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reflexive response to a growing challenge in the sphere of production. This notion is developed and 
revisited throught the chapter and in the remainder of the thesis. 
 
Similarly as in Arrighi’s analysis the intensification of inter-state competition catalyses the 
transition from a phase of generalised expansion to a period of discontinuous change involving 
crisis, restructuring and reorganising, Robert Brenner explains the exhaustion of the post-war boom 
and the emergence of the subsequent long downturn through precisely this dynamic. It is in 
conversation with his argument in The Economics of Global Turbulence that there is presented in 
the next part of the first chapter a detailed exposition of the fundamental global macroeconomic 
context which informed the development of neoliberalism as a set of reflexive political projects. 
The discussion continues to be informed by Arrighi’s guiding explanatory framework, the long 
downturn being examined as a particular example of the exhaustion of a (in this case US-led) phase 
of generalised material expansion through the eruption of intensified inter-capitalist competition. 
Engagement with Brenner’s account deepens and enriches Arrighi’s analysis insofar as it permits 
an empirically informed examination of the precise mechanics of the process whereby such 
increased competition drives the emergence (and persistence) of overcapacity and a consequent 
reduction in profitability. Instructively, Brenner grounds his understanding of the trajectory of the 
profit rate in the historical pattern of uneven development of the global economy and the 
corresponding structure and intensity of international competition. His analysis is deployed to 
explain how in the period 1965-73 the intensification of competition between earlier-developing 
and dominant blocs of capital in the US and the UK and later waves of productive investment in 
Japan and Germany led to the emergence of overcapacity in the international manufacturing sector, 
making for sharply declining profitability system-wide and propelling the global economy from 
long boom to long downturn. Building on Brenner’s argument, it is demonstrated how the 
persistence of such chronic over-capacity, rooted in manufacturing but affecting the overall private 
business economies of the advanced capitalist economies, has been responsible for the maintenance 
of secularly reduced growth in GDP, investment, productivity and wage growth since the 1970s. 
Certain key aspects of Brenner’s analysis are foregrounded in explaining the failure of earlier-
developing higher-cost capitals to adjust to stiffened competition by withdrawal or diversification 
in line with Schumpeterian theories of ‘competitive shakeout’. Explaining that firms possessing 
fixed capital investments will rather generally find it rational to remain in a product line provided 
they continue to realise the average rate of profit on their circulating capital, Brenner sketches a 
theory of a ‘malign invisible hand’ which describes a self-generating series of steps resulting from 
the rational actions of individual capitals leading not towards, but away from adjustment.  
 
The third and final key methodological move which structures the discussion in the first chapter is 
the introduction of Peter Gowan’s description of the development of the ‘Dollar-Wall Street 
Regime’ (DWSR) as a mode of cognising the transformation of the inter-state system’s monetary 
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and financial architecture. The discussion purposefully nests Gowan’s theory within Arrighi’s 
broader framework as a precise structural exploration of how the US has been able to achieve a 
‘wonderful moment’ in the autumn of its systemic cycle of accumulation through “massive, 
system-wide redistributions of income and wealth from all kinds of communities to the agencies 
that control mobile capital”12. It is also productively dovetailed with Brenner’s analysis of the 
shifting burden of chronic overcapacity in the development of the long downturn, providing a 
complementary explanation of how the US secured and deepened the policy freedom and structural 
advantages which it has so successfully deployed to redistribute the costs of the crisis. Following 
Gowan, we are able to understand how the twin monetary and oil price crises of the early 1970s 
were operationalised to entrench US control over the ‘dominant’ monetary pole of the global 
economy as against the relative erosion of its power in the ‘determining’ productive sphere. The 
dollar price emerged as a potent weapon of political and economic statecraft as the US was 
liberated from balance of payment constraints by the transition to the dollar standard, while the 
relative competitiveness of US capitals was improved by an oil price hike which harmed European 
and Japanese exporters and for which the US had intensively lobbied OPEC. At the same time, a 
new pre-eminence was secured for international financial markets (centred around Wall St and 
London as the largest and most liquid) in absorbing Middle Eastern petrodollars and recycling that 
liquidity to finance the trade deficits of oil-importing states and weaker economies struggling to 
deal with the effects of a gyrating dollar on commodity prices. It is explored how the regime 
secured paradoxical strengthening through the eruption of localised financial crises (prefigured by 
the evolving context of monetary turbulence) and how the facade-cosmopolitan agencies of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank were deployed to capitalise on such crises as 
opportunities for financially-levered expropriation. 
 
The remainder of the first chapter explores in conversation with Brenner and Gowan the continuing 
development of the long downturn, noting the recurrent shifting of the burden of over-capacity 
among the G7 economies around the pivot constituted by rates of exchange within a broader 
unchanged context of over-capacity in international manufacturing. This latter environment is 
understood as prefiguring the entrenchment of a sustained asymmetry between the dynamism of the 
services sector and the stagnation of production in the advanced capitalist economies. The decision 
of state managers to embrace this pattern, taking decisive action to alter the character and volume 
of flows of value in the sphere of circulation, and indeed the balance between the latter sphere and 
that of production, is a key moment in the emergence of neoliberalism as the preferred (set of) 
political solution(s) to the ongoing crisis. Crucially and in sum, the first chapter by way of an 
original coupling of the theoretical approaches developed by Arrighi, Brenner and Gowan, charts 
the fundamental developmental coordinates of the crises of post-war capitalism, locating these 
12 G. Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of our Times (London: Verso, 
2010), 
pp. 373 
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within the broader historical patterning of world capitalist development and framing the subsequent 
interrogation of neoliberalism. It does so moreover in a manner which avoids resorting to 
speculative accounts of epochal transformation, grounding analysis instead in the unfolding of the 
fundamental competitive relations pertaining between rival state-capitals under changing 
macroeconomic conditions. The recognition that the animating logic of such relations is 
transformed from one of fraternity (or relatively collaborative competition) to outright fratricide in 
the transition between rising or high overall returns and those which are falling or ‘intolerable’, is 
crucial and is returned to throughout the thesis.   
 
Chapter Two deepens the explanatory framework presented in the first chapter by developing an 
account of the elementary coupling which underlies an analysis of the global economy as the 
product of the competitive interaction of rival state-capitals – the functional interrelation of states 
and capitals. If the first chapter theorises the development of the global economy by surveying the 
interaction of state capitals as its atoms, the second interrogates the nuclear force of these 
elementary particles. Dismantling the liberal conception of the fundamental opposition obtaining 
state and market, the discussion seeks to recover an understanding of the ‘instituted’ nature of 
market relations, emphasising the structural interdependence of states and capitals and the 
immanence of state functions to the production and circulation of value. The discussion builds on 
Tony Smith’s unpacking of the dichotomy between particular and universal interests, which 
grounds the widely-held understanding of the state as an institutionalised order established to 
pursue the ‘universal’ interest in the production of public goods and the avoidance of public bads. 
Smith reminds us that the animating logic of capitalist society is the accumulation of capital, its 
organising principle the self-valorisation of value and its fundamental subject capital itself (in fact a 
‘bizarre pseudo-subject’). This is a crucial corrective to the humanist social ontology which, in 
underlying much conventional state theory, ultimately powers the assumption that when the state 
ceases to promote certain ‘human’ goals, this necessarily expresses a loss of integrity or essential 
weakening relative to other economic and political agencies. Concretising this conceptual work, the 
discussion details the functional interrelation between states and capitals, emphasising the role of 
the state in the articulation and enforcement of the property rights presupposed and generated by 
commodity production and circulation, in the institution of a regime of wage labour and in securing 
the availability of labour-powers in sufficient quantity and with the skills and capacities appropriate 
to the extant degree of development of the forces of production. Invoking Aglietta’s account of the 
role of the state as bearer of the monetary constraint, it is discussed how the effects of the latter are 
modified and temporarily displaced by the state in ensuring the coherence of the attendant regime 
of accumulation, while the centrality of public expenditure (and the accumulation of sovereign 
debt) in leading fixed capital formation and in modulating business cycles is emphasised. There is 
further detailed the suite of subventionary activity carried on by the state in even the most 
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‘liberalised’ of regimes, while the role of the state in underwriting the surplus profits obtained 
through technological innovation by the administration of intellectual property rights is recalled. 
 
In detailing the structural interrelation of states and capitals and the indispensability of state 
functions to the accumulation of capital, it is emphasised throughout chapter two that these 
irreducible activities not only survive the developments in the world market which have been 
commonly cognised in terms of ‘globalisation’, but in certain respects assume greater significance 
under such conditions. A crucial step in developing this argument is to challenge empirically and 
methodologically accounts of globalisation which emphasise the mobility of capital and the 
unbounded character of international financial and monetary flows. Arguing that such accounts are 
typically ‘all motion and no matter’, the discussion seeks to re-embody an apparently weightless 
globalised economy through investigation of the materiality and territorial embeddedness of 
international production chains. Through this re-materialisation of production, continuing corporate 
dependence on state apparatuses is revealed, the latter operating as the glue which holds together 
the multi-dimensional social space required for the regular extraction and realisation of surplus 
value. The empirical researches carried out by Kevin Doogan and Alan Rugman are deployed to 
concretise the operation of transnational capital within specific processes of domestic economy 
making and regional integration, the operations of TNCs being revealed as strikingly rooted in the 
domestic economies of their host states and where internationalised, following the contours of a 
‘triadised’ global economy. The role of states as the architects of global economic development is 
reasserted, while as against the accounts developed by Santos and Twinning of the relativisation of 
state power in view of the rise to prominence of transnational capital, the functional 
interdependence and mutuality of interest of TNCs and their related state managers is reiterated.  
 
Chapter One revealed in dialogue with Gowan the creation of a market-based system for the 
maintenance of US political power underpinned by the interpenetrating interests of Wall Street and 
Washington. As we shall see, Chapter Three proceeds subsequently to investigate the unfolding 
within national political systems of the contradictions inherent in hitching state policy to the 
imperatives of financial accumulation. Within this broad discursive progression, the second chapter 
interjects to provide a general theoretical underpinning and conceptual clarification of the process 
by which the intensification of international competition brings about an ever greater strategic and 
organisational coalescence of states and national capitals. This is pursued in conversation with 
Nikolai Bukharin’s classical account of the changing structure of capitalism under conditions of 
inter-imperialist competition. Bukharin’s insight that the internationalisation of economic life and 
the intensification of competition in the world market leads to a progressive nationalisation of 
capital is invoked as a useful corrective to accounts (developed by Santos and Chimni) of the 
emergence of a ‘transnational capitalist class’ whose interests circumscribe the power of states and 
whose activity fundamentally drives the globalisation of the economy. It is argued that in a global 
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economy characterised by entrenched uneven development, the bourgeoisie is necessarily cut 
across by national stratifications, while these divisions are deepened in a context of secularly 
reduced returns as states intervene increasingly aggressively to support the profitability of their 
respective capitals. In this manner there is further developed the idea emerging from Chapter One – 
that the extant restructuring of the global economy represents not the decentring of states or 
sublation of the state-form, but rather expresses a coercive redistribution of power within the inter-
state system as its dominant agent deploys its resources to structurally modulate the outcome of 
economic competition. These insights are further explored in the second chapter in the specific 
context of the emergence of a proto-constitutional regime of rules regulating foreign investment, 
usefully theorised by Schneiderman. While recognising that the robust protection of the interests of 
investors restricts the policy horizons of states signatory to regional trade agreements and bilateral 
investment treaties, it is contended that Schneiderman draws conclusions which are both too strong 
and of an imprecise character when he, following Santos and Twinning, consequently subsumes 
states within a broader category of ‘globalising actors’. Schneiderman, it is argued, essentialises the 
contextually-significant redistributive functions of capitalist states and flattens the class 
antagonisms obtaining domestically in under-developed states (within which there are powerful 
‘collaborator’ class interests) in effectively contending that social democratic policy options are 
primarily debarred by juridical means and are so ruled out against the ‘interests’ of states. It is 
further pointed out that Schniederman seeks to deduce ‘global’ transformations from an account of 
economic globalisation which analytically privileges North-South relations, the latter shifting the 
centre of gravity of the global economy and being more generally unsound given the historical 
political heteronomy of the South. At this point there is introduced the pronounced heterogeneity of 
a neoliberal experience which has entailed social ‘rationalisation’ (from the perspective of capital) 
attended by a relative resilience of welfare regimes in the core economies as compared with the 
super-exploitation of labour and imperialistic expropriation of public resources in peripheral 
regions – an asymmetry which continues to structure the account of austerity presented here. In 
light of the insight that neoliberalism has largely been for “dummies”, the constitutionalisation of 
investment rules attains an alternative significance, not as expressing a fundamental ceding of 
power from states to TNCs but as reflecting the increasingly imperialistic character of regional 
associations of state capitals under conditions of secular over-accumulation and over-capacity.  
 
In Chapter Three the discussion proceeds to consider the contradictory patterns of economic and 
political development which have unfolded in the advanced capitalist economies in conversation 
with the global macroeconomic conditions of the long downturn. While Chapter One revealed the 
state-political content of the rise to prominence of international financial markets and actors, the 
third chapter interrogates the social and political content of financialisation within national 
economies, assessing how the fiscal, monetary and regulative policies of state managers have come 
to privilege financial profits and entrench the developmental asymmetry obtaining between finance 
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and industry. The predominance of such policy orientations is explained in view of the shifting 
balance of forces attending inter- and intra-class relations whose contradictory reproduction has 
been problematised by the persistence of a chronic crisis of over-accumulation and profitability 
centred on international manufacturing. It is explained how the relative dynamism of the sphere of 
circulation, prefigured by the redesigning of the financial and monetary architecture of the inter-
state system and increasingly enabling domestic regulatory environments, has propelled finance 
capital to political predominance within national political systems. The consequences of this 
rearrangement of the ruling strata are explored in terms of social polarisation and fragmentation 
and the shifting character of the political power which has come to be reproduced in management 
of a fracturing body politic. In all of this, it should be emphasised that the relationship between the 
analysis set out in Chapters One and Three is not one of linear discursive progression from the 
‘global’ to the ‘national’, but rather one of dialectical unity in determination. The development of 
the world market prefigures the balance of forces attending domestic civil society relations insofar 
as it informs rates of return for capital (both fractionally and in aggregate) and 
incentivises/disincentivises productive investment, the latter in turn crucially informing the rate of 
employment and structurally underpinning the bargaining power of organised labour. In turn, the 
national political settlements which emerge as the condensation and concretisation of developing 
civil society relationships generate imperatives for state managers who deploy state diplomatic, 
juridical, geo-political and military power to re-modulate competitive relations in the world market.  
 
The argument in the third chapter is advanced by first recalling that the expansion of credit and the 
formation of fictitious capital has always an irreducible political content insofar as the rate of 
interest and stock prices are both fundamentally ‘irrational expressions’. While embedded within 
the process of capital accumulation, these indexes do not ultimately refer to embodied labour 
values (like commodity values) expressing purely a relationship of force between creditor and 
debtor informed by the context of supply and demand. The key insight developed here is that the 
interplay of supply and demand does not take place in a vacuum, rather unfolding in the structural 
context created by state regulative activity. The discussion in Chapter One is here recalled in a 
different light, it being examined how the supply of and demand for credit internationally has been 
informed by the redesigned financial and monetary architecture of the inter-state system, effecting 
a significant system-wide transfer of value to the agencies controlling money capital. In the third 
chapter it is examined how an analogous process has developed domestically, active shifts in state 
regulatory orientation modulating the supply of and demand for money capital and underwriting 
vertiginous financial profitability. Specifically, the retrenchment of affordable public housing 
provision, the privatisation of transport and utilities and the re-commodification of further and 
higher education has increased demand for credit as workers attempt to gain access to basic social 
necessities in a broader context of falling real wages. At the same time, the deregulation of 
consumer lending increases supply and drives the inflation of house prices and the valorisation of 
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financial instruments based on the securitisation of these underlying assets. At this point, it may be 
useful to foreground a methodological homology which characterises the development of the 
argument in the thesis as a whole. Crucial insights into the patterning of historical capitalist 
development can be gained through an interrogation of the unfolding of the exploitative relation 
between capital and labour, the functional and fractious interrelation of productive and financial 
capital and the competitive interaction of state capitals. The content of these relations is embedded 
in the process of accumulation in the form of the fundamentally irrational expressions: the value of 
labour power; the rate of interest, and; the tendential gravitation of market prices towards prices of 
production. The determination of these three pivots is a simultaneously economic, political and 
legal process, while states have in each case a crucial role insofar as their regulative frameworks 
form the structural context within which these relations of force play out. The legal modulation of 
the reproduction of the capital-labour relation is discussed at length in Chapter 5, while the role of 
the state in reconfiguring the relationship between production and circulation is examined 
internationally in Chapter 1 and domestically in Chapter 3. The role of the state in 
mediating/displacing the operation of the law of value in the determination of market prices 
appears more implicitly and is only partially developed, although it is discussed how the loosening 
of the monetary constraint in the transition to the Dollar standard has permitted the US to 
circumvent the weakening of its capitals’ fundamental cost position, while it is elsewhere 
summarily considered how the competitiveness of the core EU export economies has been 
institutionally entrenched in the development of the Eurozone.    
 
Chapter Three presents the neoliberal policy consensus as emerging from the reconfiguration of the 
‘historical bloc’ leading-dominating each of the advanced capitalist societies, the latter 
transformation being both prefigured by and entrenching the asymmetry obtaining between the 
dynamism of the services sector and the stagnation of industry in the context of a secular crisis of 
over-accumulation. The concept of the ‘historical bloc’ is understood – as developed in Gramsci’s 
carceral writings and as usefully clarified in Peter Thomas’ recent penetrating exegesis – as the 
network of alliances obtaining between capital and proximate classes which is the prerequisite for 
and correlate of its domination of labour. It is argued that the position of finance capital within this 
formation has progressed from one of leadership to one of domination as the interests of industrial 
and financial capital have tended to disaggregate in view of the changing character of financial 
activity. In conversation with Costas Lapavitsas and Paulo dos Santos, it is described how over the 
past three decades large enterprises have become less dependent on banks for credit, investing out 
of retained earnings in a context of low productivity growth, or else looking to open markets to 
obtain finance. In response, banks have re-oriented their activities towards consumer lending and 
mediating access to financial markets by both corporations and individuals, a move so successful as 
to increase the national significance of their profits even as they are ejected from the sphere of 
production. Dos Santos’ empirical research is deployed to locate the source of a startling proportion 
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of financial profits (which have at first glance a seemingly ethereal character) in the direct 
appropriation of labour revenues. Further, his explication of the particularly exploitative character 
of the relations banks have come increasingly to enter into with wage-earners locates these 
interactions in the broader context of wage repression, fiscal retrenchment and welfare (re-
)commodification while revealing their irreducible class character. Most significantly however, it is 
explained by way of a highly innovative application of several determinations and concepts 
developed by Marx in Capital – the distinction between productive and unproductive labour, the 
rate of profit and the production of surplus value by the relative mechanism – how the changing 
character of financial activity speaks to an antagonism between productive and interest-bearing 
capital which lies at the heart of the neoliberal project. It is described how the rents extracted from 
the financial mediation of labour revenues and the monopoly profits appropriated by the operators 
of privatised public services reappear as costs of production, the increasing price of wage goods 
raising the floor of necessary paid labour time for the productive worker and jeopardising the 
competitiveness of exports. This effect is compounded when state managers favour financial 
profitability in the development of fiscal and monetary policy, in which case currency devaluation 
ceases to be the automatic response to internal price rises, this precise dynamic being described by 
Jim Cuthburt in his analysis of the chronic mismanagement of the British economy. These insights 
are used to develop an account of finance-driven regimes of accumulation as path-dependent and 
degenerative, financial profits being grounded not in the production of new values through a 
dynamic process of productive investment and productivity growth, but on state-inscribed 
expropriations of values initially realised by labour as wages in their socialised and non-socialised 
forms. These expropriations represent capital feeding upon the fruits of the last healthy cycle of 
accumulation and militate against the recovery of the productive sector. Furthermore, the form of 
financial expansion described, entailing a disaggregation of the spheres of production and 
circulation and an expansion of fictitious capital in abstraction from the production of new value, 
embeds profound crisis tendencies. Indeed, the financial crisis which erupted in the autumn of 
2008, triggered by the collapse of the securitised US sub-prime mortgage market, represented in 
this light the violent re-assertion of the integral unity of production and circulation.  
 
Having outlined these fundamental economic contradictions at the heart of finance-driven regimes 
of accumulation, the third chapter proceeds to consider the problematisation of social reproduction 
by de-industrialisation and the insufficient material integration of the working population into 
processes of financial accumulation. Drawing on Arrighi’s analysis – who himself builds on the 
work of Kevin Phillips – it is recalled how financial expansions have historically produced 
corresponding patterns of social polarisation, the social basis of banking and money-dealing being 
necessarily narrower than that of manufacturing, transport and trade. Particularly useful is Arrighi’s 
description of the ‘paradigm case’ of late fourteenth and early fifteenth century Florence, when 
cloth production collapsed and Florentine merchant banks reoriented towards the financial 
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intermediation of the power struggle maturing in Western Europe. Crucially, this process effected 
not only a transfer of power from the merchant oligarchy to a rent-seeking aristocracy which 
reimposed monarchical rule, but also prefigured a fragmentation of wage labour as the interests of 
the upper and lower strata diverged. Such historical examples frame the subsequent discussion of 
the patterns of structural unemployment, increasing inequality and pronounced geographical 
unevenness which have characterised contemporary finance-driven economic development. It is 
discussed how in Britain the dismantling of the cross-border coal, steel and rail industries 
represented the collapse of the crucial material basis for the territorial integrity of the British state 
and the unity of the British working class, prefiguring processes of economic and political 
regionalisation. It is further described how the demise of these industries has formed the civil 
society basis for the labour movement’s tendential marginalisation in political society, labour-
powers migrating from these ramparts of organisational strength to relatively unorganised jobs in 
the service sector. A more general point is made regarding the fundamental weakening of organised 
labour in the context of structural unemployment, while it is further argued that the increasing 
weight of unproductive labour in the advanced capitalist economies has transformed the lived 
experience of work, presenting particular challenges for the trade union movement. 
 
It is next examined in Chapter Three how the disempowerment of labour under conditions of 
structural unemployment and the shifting balance of productive and unproductive labour has 
problematised the leveraging of wage growth by labour-powers in the workplace and the 
maintenance at a national political level of a regime of progressive taxation. The redistribution of 
the tax burden resulting from a tax revolt staged by capital and the salaried bourgeoisie is 
understood in terms of the tendential withdrawal of capital from funding directly the mass 
reproduction of labour powers in line with its changing productive requirements under shifting 
strategies of accumulation. There is thus theorised a de-coupling and re-coupling of accumulation 
and domestic labour reproduction as the relationship between the public sector and the private 
business economy is transformed, the former ceasing to provide low-cost productive inputs 
undergirding industrial profits, becoming instead the terrain for the extraction of state-mandated 
monopoly rents from the privatisation of public services and the financial mediation of 
consumption. While the rationality of these transformations from the myopic perspective of 
financial profitability is asserted, the argument next advances to consider how the unravelling of 
the Keynesian compromise of productivity-linked wage growth, progressive taxation and the 
expansion of publicly-funded social provision has necessitated a corresponding transformation in 
the character of bourgeois political supremacy. In order to understand this transformation there are 
productively employed certain of the determinations developed by Antonio Gramsci in his carceral 
writings – specifically those of the integral state, civil society and political society, hegemony and 
domination, passive revolution, transformism and counter-reformation. This conceptual apparatus 
is deployed to interrogate the character of the political crisis which afflicts bourgeois hegemonic 
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projects in the advanced capitalist states in the neoliberal context. The advantage of Gramsci’s 
approach is that it allows us to dialectically integrate the structural transformations obtaining in 
civil society in changing macro-economic and class-relational contexts with the shifting character 
of the attendant regimes of bourgeois supremacy, the latter understood as the mediated political 
condensation/concretisation of the former civil society transition. By proceeding from an 
understanding of bourgeois supremacy as an unstable synthesis of hegemony and domination and 
of the integral state as a unity in diversity of civil society and political society, it becomes possible 
to obtain crucial insights into the political patterning of historical capitalist development. The 
changing nature and intensity of bourgeois parliamentary democracy, which can appear in other 
analyses to arise ex nihilo, may then be explained in terms of the shifting equilibrium of consent 
and coercion and the developing depth and character of the interpenetration of civil and political 
society. The discussion develops in conversation with Peter Thomas’ analysis in The Gramscian 
Moment insofar as the latter provides a detailed account of the development of each of the 
determinations throughout The Prison Notebooks, emphasising the systematicity and internal 
coherence of the latter as against assertions of their fragmentation and linguistic encoding. 
Moreover, Thomas’ account was selected because it situates Gramsci’s thought within the classical 
Marxist tradition and crucially: emphasises Gramsci’s Leninist categorical heritage; identifies the 
integral state as his novel contribution to Marxist political theory; recognises that Gramsci 
theorised the particularities of the state in the West and East not in terms of a binary opposition, but 
rather as differences of degree within the more fundamental unity of the international capitalist 
state-form, and; describes the complementarity (rather than alternity) of the war of position and the 
war of manoeuvre as interpenetrating strategies in the overthrow of the bourgeois integral state. 
More generally, a Gramscian approach is preferred insofar as it was necessary to develop an 
interpretation of the political transformation of the advanced capitalist societies in the neoliberal 
period in a manner which could be methodologically integrated with the foregoing Marxist analysis 
of the chronic crisis of over-accumulation and the disaggregation of the interests of financial and 
productive capital. It is, as Umberto Cerroni has recognised, only with Gramsci that twentieth 
century Marxist political theory achieved a sufficiently articulated formulation to be able to 
compete with official political theory, while moreover such development occurred in a relationship 
of dialectical preservation and renewal with the classical Marxist tradition13.    
 
Having introduced the conceptual apparatus mentioned above, it is argued in Chapter Three that in 
the context of the long downturn and the crystallisation of finance-driven regimes of accumulation, 
there may be recognised a shift in the balance of consent and coercion underpinning bourgeois 
supremacy in the advanced capitalist economies and an interrelated re-configuration of the 
structural interconnection of civil and political society. Capital comes increasingly to dominate 
13 U. Cerroni, Teoria Politica e Socialismo (Rome: Editori Riuniti, 1976), p. 151. Referenced in C. N. 
Coutinho, Gramsci’s Political Thought (P. Sette-Câmara trans.) (Leiden: Brill, 2012), preface at xv-xvi 
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without leading as its ability to consensually integrate the working masses declines in conversation 
with the erosion of the materiality of consent represented by the cessation of productivity-linked 
wage growth, the retrenchment/re-commodification of public services and the weakening of social 
security provision. The demise of the mass social-democratic parties, the secular decline in voter 
registration and turnout and the collapse in trade union membership represent the de-socialisation 
of politics, while the class-particularity of bourgeois economic and political initiatives – once 
posited as being in the ‘universal’ interest – is starkly revealed. Dictatorial forms of supremacy 
come to predominate over hegemonic forms (the political apparatus of the state becoming 
increasingly preeminent as against its civil society correlate) as the machinery of coercion is 
multiplied and intensified. This latter process is evidenced in the British context in the final part of 
the third chapter, which thoroughly documents the accumulation of the material means of coercion 
available to the police and the qualitative transformation of the legal framework within which they 
are applied. It is further and more tentatively advanced in the third chapter that the shifting 
character of bourgeois supremacy in the post-war welfarist and later neoliberal periods may be 
productively approached through the respective application of the Gramscian notions of passive 
revolution and counter-reformation. While it is admitted that it may not be possible to subsume 
these developmental periods entirely within this conceptual apparatus, it is asserted that the 
determinations highlight certain of their attendant dynamics.  
 
A crucial methodological strength of the discussion in the third chapter is that it identifies policy 
orientations as arising from the interests of classes and class fractions and recognises the 
contradictions in such policy frameworks as concretisations of inter- and intra-class antagonisms, 
rather than as expressing the conceptual failures of state managers. Thus neoliberalism is presented 
as the policy expression of the ascendant financial fraction of the capitalist class, its contradictory 
character embedding the disaggregation of the interests of finance and production and the declining 
influence of the latter in the context of chronic overproduction in international manufacturing. This 
approach avoids therefore attempting to explain the dismantling of the welfare state or the tax 
revolt of the salaried bourgeoisie by resort to specious notions of the political inscription of a 
suddenly-predominant individualistic-egoistical philosophy, or of the historical victory of greed 
over altruism. The analysis further rejects by implication explanations of the emergence of the 
neoliberal policy consensus as the result purely of a process of iterative techno-managerial 
reflection and adaption or indeed of an objective theoretical advancement in free market thought 
which propelled the latter to victory over its Marxist and Keynesian interlocutors. It is in this latter 
epistemological domain that Chapter 4 makes its intervention, attempting to establish preliminary 
connections between the political and economic structure of neoliberal capitalism and the 
methodological shape and substantive content of the economic and social theory which has 
underwritten its reproduction. Thus, similarly as Chapters 1 and 2 form a couplet, the third and 
fourth chapters exist in a complementary relation. While Chapter 3 explores the emergence of 
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neoliberalism as a function of the shifting balance of forces between capital and labour and among 
the competing fractions of the capitalist class, Chapter 4 explores how this contradictory structure 
of class relations has reproduced as its mediated expression ideological forms – free market and 
postmodern – which have rationalised and redeemed neoliberal reform. The fourth chapter 
therefore makes certain basic arguments about ideology – about how ideas emerge, gain purchase 
and shape/redeem political action. It asserts the material embeddedness of ideology and makes 
preliminary connections between emergent global macroeconomic irrationality and the waning 
theoretical visibility of the totality, between the structural weakening and political marginalisation 
of organised labour and the postmodern fracturing of left critique. 
 
The discussion in Chapter 4 proceeds firstly by contending with Poulantzas that primary or 
‘spontaneous’ forms of the dominant ideology are secreted by the social division of labour and are 
directly embodied in the state apparatuses and the material practices of power. These ‘primal’ 
ideological forms are integrated, systematised and elevated to a properly ‘theoretical’ level by the 
organic intellectuals of the bourgeoisie, whose function in formally articulating this ‘second-order 
ideology’ is, as Gramsci contended, an essential aspect of their role in the aggregation of a relation 
of hegemony and the formation of the historical bloc. By way of this discussion there emerges an 
understanding of the organic existence of the dominant ideology, of its immanence to the social 
relations of production and the material practices of power by which these relations are reproduced. 
Having introduced these methodological considerations, the argument moves on to consider the 
pivotal role of the organic intellectual Friedrich Hayek in the crystallisation of an ideology suitable 
both to bind together an historical bloc transformed by the domination of finance capital and to 
rationalise the forms of state intervention required to ‘liberate’ capital from the binds of the 
Keynesian compromise which had begun to chafe intolerably in the context of an emergent crisis of 
over-accumulation. Presenting the rise of the Nobel prize-winning Hayek as an index of the 
centring of a previously peripheral laissez-faire radicalism, and noting his invocation in the re-
orientation of the Conservative Party under Thatcher, the chapter proceeds to interrogate Hayek’s 
theoretical position as articulated in an influential 1968 lecture at the University of Kiel. It is 
established that Hayek’s free-market position is based crucially on the contention that the ‘truth’ of 
the economy is to be found at the micro-level, in the embedded information which becomes 
available to individuals only through the process of market competition, and whose detail and 
complexity cannot be anticipated or fully comprehended at the macro-level. Hayek therefore posits 
the primacy of microeconomic theory over macroeconomic theory, arguing that the latter cannot be 
properly called a theoretical science, being necessarily limited to the derivation of very general 
statements and pattern predictions which represent an obscure image of reality. In consequence of 
this macro-level data-deficiency, economic planning must necessarily be inefficient, while further 
it can only serve a uniform hierarchy of objectives in contrast the diversity of individual interests 
embodied by a market economy (or ‘catallaxy’).  
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 The discussion considers the implications of Hayek’s theory for policy makers, whose role is 
reduced to securing the conditions under which individuals can effectively pursue their interests, 
and for economic theorists, who must limit themselves to observing and approximating micro-level 
interactions if they are to remain within the bounds of properly scientific inquiry. It is further 
recognised that the acceptance of Hayek’s position is entirely incompatible with Marx’s 
understanding of capitalism’s macro-irrationality (issuing from the micro-rational behaviour of 
competing capitals), which becomes not only unprovable, but fundamentally nonsensical. In an 
attempt to recover the possibility of scientifically comprehending capitalist society in the 
aggregate, and of rationally intervening therein, the argument next advances a methodological 
critique of Hayek’s position. In this connection, it is emphasised that Hayek establishes a linear 
relation between the micro and the macro, whereby the ‘fine’ structure of the economy in its 
inexhaustible complexity operates as the cause producing effects at the macro-level, the latter 
‘coarse’ structure exhibiting no regularities beyond those which result from the former micro 
processes. As against this conception, it is argued that the relationship between micro and macro 
levels should be recognised as one of mutual interpenetration and constitution, the activity of 
capitals at the micro level unfolding reflexively in the developing context of the macro, the latter 
comprising the mediated unity of micro-situations. There is thus recovered an understanding of the 
movement of capital as the competitive interaction of a plurality of capitals, the truth of the two 
levels obtaining in the unity-in-contradiction of both. On this basis, it is insisted that macro-level 
theorisation can reveal information unavailable to individual economic actors, theoretical 
reconstruction built on real abstractions being capable of identifying the essential contradictions 
which drive the development of concrete reality. Indeed, the most profound misunderstandings can 
result from the attempt to analyse the micro whilst failing to map the macro – from studying the 
organ whilst disavowing the organism. It is then postulated however that it is precisely this type of 
dislocation which has plagued the development of social theory in capitalist society, as a result of 
its being structurally underlain by the division of labour, systematising the partial and contradictory 
conceptions which emerge from a class-inflected social reality. Indeed, it is tentatively advanced 
that the particular disorientation characterising economic and political thought in the neoliberal 
period has been conditioned by the political marginalisation of labour, which has discursively 
dislocated capital from its integrally-opposed other, and by the functional disaggregation of the 
finance and industry, which veils their fundamental interdependence.  
 
As has been outlined, the first part of Chapter 4 investigates through a discussion of the work of the 
influential Friedrich Hayek the methodological shape of a free market ideology capable of 
rationalising the neoliberal strategies employed in attempt to restore profitability in the context of 
the long downturn. Hayek’s theory provides a fertile imaginary within which to justify attacks on 
working class corporatist power, the dismantling of the structures and institutions of ‘Keynesian’ 
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economic management, and even, taking the argument to its logical conclusion, the deconstruction 
of the whole suite of state subventionary activity which underpinned productive profitability during 
the long boom. It further argues, as we have seen, that organic intellectuals such as Hayek have 
played a crucial role in cohering an historical bloc dominated by finance capital, in aggregating its 
relation of hegemony. The discussion in the next part of the chapter considers in an interrelated 
manner how the emergence of postmodernism as an intellectual and cultural dominant expresses 
the disaggregation of labour and has operated to disarm left critique in the face of neoliberal 
reforms. This is explained through examination of the logical interpenetration of certain guiding 
neoliberal and postmodern ideas. Specifically it is argued that there is a clear parallel between 
Hayek’s dismissal of macroeconomic theory and postmodernism’s animating logic of ‘incredulity 
towards metanarratives’, this compatibility grounding the analogy obtaining between Hayek’s 
deprecation of the activities of economic managers and the postmodern critique of modern 
totalising theorists. It is further considered how Fredric Jameson’s incisive critique of 
postmodernism could be equally read as a reply to Hayek insofar as it laments the loss of the 
visibility of the global dimension and resistance to the concept of totality. Just as for Hayek the 
truth of the economy is to be found in the fine detail of micro-economic interactions which can 
only be disfigured by macroeconomic theorisation, for the postmodernist the ‘real’ is to be found in 
the variety of authentic local experiences which are constantly threatened by assimilation by the 
collective and the political. The combined effect of both approaches is to transform economics into 
the practice of guaranteeing the autonomy of individual actors and to decompose politics into an 
interminable series of neighbourhood struggles. 
 
The description of the methodological compatibility of certain guiding free market and postmodern 
ideas is buttressed by an examination of the concrete historical emergence of a constellation of 
social forces comprising an ascendant class of financiers, the disempowerment of organised labour 
and the development of a redemptive postmodern cultural dynamic of differentiated consumerism 
and individual libertarianism. The emergence of this formation is located, following Harvey, in 
New York’s 1970s fiscal crisis, the management of which subsequently provided a blueprint both 
for Reagan’s domestic policy and the ‘development model’ implemented by way of the IMF in the 
1980s. In conversation with Harvey’s account of how democratic New York became ‘delirious’ 
New York, it is considered how neoliberal ideas have often penetrated common sense in 
postmodern coding and how the development of an environment of postmodern cultural and 
intellectual experimentation has operated to redeem neoliberal structural transformations. While it 
is asserted that this compensatory dynamic can never be wholly adequate, its integrative power is 
considered, in conversation with Habermas’ discussion of Joachim Ritter, in terms of the market-
mediated recovery of the continuity of social-historical existence. Following this discussion, the 
final section of Chapter 4 returns to a basic – and profoundly political – source of compatibility 
between neoliberal and postmodern thought, which inheres in their shared anti-Marxism. Corey 
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Robin’s account of the primarily anti-Marxist and anti-socialist character of the Austrian school is 
deployed, while the class particularity of Hayek’s intellectual assault on corporatism is revealed 
behind the supposed neutrality of his theory, which had hitherto been examined in its best light. 
Postmodernism’s fusion with anti-Marxism is described in view of Alex Callinicos’ account of the 
‘tight nexus of knowledge and power’ underpinning the postmodern turn among the previously 
marxisant French intelligentsia and his broader theorisation of postmodernism’s rootedness in the 
political odyssey of the disillusioned children of ’68. Finally, there is re-asserted the irreducibly 
political dynamic animating the triumph of neoliberalism and the assent of postmodernism as a 
cultural and intellectual dominant. Neither body of ideas has been followed to its logical 
conclusion, being rather operationalised in service of concrete political imperatives – disciplining 
very particular forms of corporatist project, disabling projects of national-economy making in quite 
specific locales and targeting only certain particularly troublesome forms of theoretical 
‘totalisation’.  
 
The final chapter of the thesis considers theoretically and historically how the state, by way of the 
legal form, maps the social totality and structures the contradictory reproduction of capitalist social 
relations in different developmental contexts. It therefore builds upon the foundations prepared in 
Chapter 2, which problematised the liberal conception of the opposition obtaining between state 
and market and unpacked the humanist social ontology underpinning much conventional state 
theory. The second chapter also identified the role of the state in the institution and reproduction of 
a regime of free wage labour and more broadly in the systematisation and enforcement of the 
property rights corresponding to the system of generalised commodity production. These functions 
are subjected to detailed historical investigation and further conceptual clarification in Chapter 5. 
There further obtains a crucial interrelation with Chapter 3, which examined how the global 
macroeconomic environment of the long downturn prefigured a shift in the balance of forces from 
labour to capital and between industry and finance, the interests of the latter being crystallised in a 
state policy nexus which facilitated the financial mediation of labour revenues and the 
expropriation of the socialised wage. This conjunctural account of the institutionalisation of 
particular set of class-relational dynamics, the latter developing in conversation with the 
fundamental validation/invalidation of domestic social relations at the level of the world market, is 
a particular example of a process which is subjected to broader theoretical and historical discussion 
in the final chapter.  
 
The discussion in Chapter 5 is framed by the introduction of three ideal-typical accounts of the 
development of the law-state – Kelsen’s legal positivist state-law identity theory, Weber’s analyses 
of the emergence of the modern bureaucratic state and legal domination from the process of 
modern specialisation and rationalisation, and Pashukanis’ historical materialist commodity-form 
theory of law. These operate as extremely useful points of reference insofar as they present three 
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distinct methodological approaches which productively contextualise the ensuing discussion. 
Kelsen’s account posits both the immediate and definitional identity of the state and law and the 
absolute autonomy of the state as a relatively centralised legal order from developments obtaining 
in other spheres of social life. Such a complete insulation of law from ethical and political 
influence was for Kelsen – railing against the influence of natural law theory which he saw as 
encumbering positive law with content of ambiguous metaphysical, theological and political 
origins – the only direction of development of legal science appropriate to the study of modern law. 
By contrast, in Weber’s analysis the unfolding of independent legal and political rationalities is the 
result of a specific historical process. Under the initial impetus of the emergence of a specific 
Western type of ‘sober bourgeois capitalism’ entailing the rational organisation of free labour, law 
and politics develop – from an initial close coupling with economic forms as traditional practices – 
relative forms of autonomy on the basis of the unfolding of their specific rationalising logics. This 
process culminates in the emergence of a legally legitimised modern bureaucratic state and a 
formalised, rationalised codified legal system, while the coupling of formal rational law and legal 
domination builds in a particular tension, their very affinity being the source of an instability 
whereby the legal sphere tends to collapse into political imperative. In the final branch of the 
typology there is introduced Pashukanis’ historical materialist account of the deep structural 
interconnection of the legal form with the social relations pertaining to capitalism as a system of 
generalised commodity production. For him, the legal form emerges quite directly out of the civil 
society relations of commodity exchange which represent its real foundation, the property 
relationships constituting the kernel of the legal system being so closely contiguous with the 
economic structure of society that they are in fact the very relationships of production expressed in 
legal language. Pashukanis’ understanding of the state-form is more ambiguous, receiving differing 
treatments at various stages of his intellectual development, yet in his most important work the 
state apparatus is afforded an essentially secondary and derivative role, state power operating only 
to inject ‘clarity and stability’ into a legal structure whose preconditions are more deeply rooted.  
 
Having outlined these distinct approaches to the development of the law-state, the relative merits of 
each are discussed in view of their suitability for the interrogation of the questions addressed in the 
remainder of the chapter. Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law is discounted on the basis that it doesn’t 
explain the emergence of the state and law (or indeed, the state as law) or interrogate its 
interrelationship with economic and political relations, the former being simply presumed and the 
latter disavowed or otherwise considered outwith the proper bounds of legal theory. Weber’s 
analysis is considered to be more promising, especially on account of the relationship he 
establishes between the increasing sophistication of formal rational law and the rational 
organisation of free labour. His understanding of the destabilisation of the boundary between 
politics and law is also important, though it is observed that his account of the historical divergence 
of law and economics – from an original close coupling – prevents him for acknowledging the 
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context-driven economic imperatives driving political intrusions into the legal. Ultimately, Weber 
is unable to grasp the continuing historical contingency and fundamental instability of the 
autonomy of the legal and political spheres, which tend to collapse into the overriding imperatives 
of capital accumulation as bourgeois rule is thrown into organic crisis by the operation of the law 
of value in the world market. Pashukanis’ more sophisticated account of the interpenetration of the 
legal form with capitalist relations of production, together with his precise delineation of the legal 
form of social regulation from broader conceptions of normative control, make his theory the 
obvious choice moving forward. However, Pashukanis’ ambivalent treatment of the state, which is 
discussed in historical context and as a function of specific debates within Soviet legal philosophy, 
is an important weakness, preventing him from appreciating the role of the state in the 
reconfiguration of domestic class relations in response to the changing dynamics of global 
capitalist development. Further, it is argued that his largely derivative theory of the state highlights 
a tendential collapse within his analysis of the dialectic of form and content, whereby an initial 
account of the emergence of the legal form as the form of the content of capitalist social relations 
later entails the obliteration of particular contents. In the third part of the chapter there is pursued a 
re-animation of this dialectic, insofar as preliminary attempts are made to recouple Pashukanis’ 
appreciation of the legal form with the historical patterning of the content of legal relations, the 
latter operating as an index of the social and political struggles which drive the contradictory 
reproduction of capitalist society.  
 
While the first part of Chapter 5 introduces competing approaches to the state-form, the second 
section interrogates the operation of a dichotomy which both structures the internal articulation of 
the capitalist state and facilitates its mapping of the social totality – that obtaining between public 
and private. The discussion proceeds in contradistinction to dominant legal theoretical approaches 
which postulate the ‘public’ as existing independently of and prior to a ‘private’ sphere which it 
constitutes and demarcates. In this regard the argument is very usefully framed by the introduction 
of Kelsen’s legal positivist approach in the opening part of the chapter, the latter conceiving the 
state as a centralised legal order whose normative pronouncements regulate human behaviour but 
which remains itself autonomous from developments in other spheres of social life. Further, the 
discussion in this section should be seen as a further interrogation – within which the juridical 
moment is specifically foregrounded – of the liberal opposition between state and market which 
was problematised in Chapter 2. The argument unfolds in conversation with Marx’s account of the 
capital accumulation, by way of which it is recalled that the reproduction of labour-powers of a 
quantity and quality appropriate to the stage of development of the forces of production is essential 
to the capital circuits of individual firms, yet remains outside of their immediate organisational 
sphere. In this context there is developed an understanding of the operation of the public-private 
dichotomy as a first-order distinction – within a broader second-order unity of capitalist (re-
)production – which facilitates the rationalised reproduction of labour powers in an economy 
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structured by the association of dissociated private producers. This process is situated historically 
by the introduction of the process of so-called ‘primitive accumulation’ (preparing the ground for a 
fuller elaboration in the following section) and through discussion of how the British state 
restructured social reproduction in the wake of industrial revolution, in response to the developing 
requirements of military conflict in the early twentieth century and in conversation with the 
accelerated productive growth and labour scarcity of the post-war long boom. In the final part of 
this section there is further elaborated the legal mechanism underpinning the functional role of the 
public/private dichotomy thus described. In this connection, Pashukanis’ understanding of the 
primacy of legal relations over legal norms is deployed in the development of builds upon 
Pashukanis’ understanding of the primacy of legal relations is deployed in the development of an 
innovative understanding of the process by which the constitutive distinction between public and 
private persons grounds the derivative opposition of public and private law.  
 
The final section of Chapter 5 demonstrates how legal relations come to embody particular political 
contents representing the condensation of class struggles unfolding in diverse developmental 
contexts. This represents the culmination of the discussion introduced in the opening section 
insofar as it develops a theory of the law-state which retains Pashukanis’ crucial appreciation of the 
legal form while attempting to overcome the obliteration of content occasioned by the collapsing of 
his dialectic. There is thus developed an understanding of the patterning of particular contents 
which legal relations come to embed on the basis of the historical unfolding of the very legal form 
which Pashukanis correctly identifies. The argument proceeds through the introduction of three 
literary metaphors which each capture from different perspectives the legal modulation of the 
wage-labour relation. It is emphasised that these are neither clearly delineated nor mutually 
exclusive – rather they interpenetrate one another, while at different social and historical 
conjunctures one or other is brought more sharply into focus. The first figure, law as sword, 
illustrates the coercive operation of the law-state in instituting the wage labour relation and in 
further remodulating it through the devaluation of labour power where necessitated by the 
operation of the law of value in the world market. This is explored through a detailed discussion of 
the agricultural revolution in England, during which the direct producers were forcibly severed 
from the means of subsistence and coercively domesticated into the developing regime of free 
wage labour. The second figure, law as shield, conceptualises the opportunities which arise in 
different macro-economic and class-relational contexts for labour and groups oppressed under 
capitalism to operationalise the relative institutional insulation of law, deploying its own structures 
and logic to embed political victories and impose limits on their subjection by capital. In this 
context the paradoxical coupling of law’s restricting and enabling functions leads to the result that 
struggles within the law may defend labour against the most brutal effects of its exploitation by 
capital whilst strengthening the foundation upon which future exploitation rests. The final figure, 
law as fetter, recalls that law on account of its structural interconnection with capitalist social 
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relations embeds the contradiction between their reproduction and the further development of the 
forces of production. This fundamental aspect of the law-state underpins the process by which 
crisis (as the eruption of this contradiction between the developing forces of production and 
capitalist social relations) frames the re-emergence of law as sword and further informs the 
fundamentally unstable character of its operation as shield. In sum, the argument in this concluding 
part of Chapter 5 may be seen to circumvent the unproductive theoretical polarisation obtaining 
between approaches which consider law to be epiphenomenal and those which pursue its relative 
autonomy, developing an enriched account of the historical contingency of law’s autonomy, the 
latter expanding and contracting in conversation with the developing macroeconomic and class-
relational context. 
 
Key Theorists and Methodological Couplings 
 
Having outlined the structure and methodology of the thesis, it will be useful at this stage to 
elaborate a little further on the selection of specific theorists and the couplings of different 
approaches insofar as they may appear unconventional. Thereafter, it will be beneficial to clarify a 
number of key concepts which are either deployed in a specific manner or whose meaning is not 
immediately apparent. In the first connection, arguably the most contentious move is the 
establishment of an interface between Arrighi and Brenner, in view of the sustained and weighty 
critique of the development of world systems theory which has been registered by Brenner and 
other proponents of political Marxism. The debate first emerged in the 1970s when Brenner 
articulated a critique of the first volume of Wallerstein’s The Modern World-System, a foundational 
text in the development of the world-systems perspective. Brenner argues that Wallerstein’s 
approach to capitalist development is of a fundamentally Smithian character insofar as it explains 
the emergence of capitalism in terms of the expansion of trade, the development of an international 
division of labour and the interrelated specialisation of production, the latter driving labour 
productivity. Wallerstein, in defining capitalism as production for profit via market exchange, and 
deriving the transformation of domestic structures of class relations from world-systemic processes 
of commercialisation, dissolves the specificity of capitalism as a mode of production and fails to 
properly account for its emergence14.  
 
Brenner, Wallerstein and Arrighi 
 
For Brenner, following Marx, capitalism is defined by the pursuit of profit through the investment 
of surplus in the development of the forces of production, thereby increasing the productivity of 
labour and cheapening commodities. He argues that the generalisation of this dynamic cannot be 
14 R. Brenner, ‘The origins of capitalist development: a critique of neo-Smithian Marxism’ (1977) 104 New 
Left Review 25 
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inferred from the development of a trade-based division of labour, since it requires the instantiation 
of a specific set of property relations, entailing the ‘freeing’ of the direct producers from ownership 
in the means of agricultural production and subsistence. Brenner argues that the survival of pre-
capitalist property forms operates as a fetter to the development of the forces of production insofar 
as these relations prefigure the strategies employed to increase surplus in response to market 
opportunities, disincentivising the extraction of surplus by the relative mechanism and incentivising 
the absolute methods of coercive extension and intensification of labour15. Brenner posits the 
primacy of class-relational approaches to labour productivity (and hence to economic growth) over 
those emphasising the division and specialisation of labour, arguing that beyond the basic advances 
which can be achieved by separation of function, sustained patterns of increasing productivity have 
been historically grounded in the innovation of the means of production in conversation with the 
development of cooperative labour – the integration of work activities within units of production. 
Pre-capitalist relations of production based on the property of the direct producers in the means of 
production prevent the socialisation of production, ensuring the continued predominance of 
individualised and unspecialised labour processes. Further, the proletarianisation of the direct 
producers is, according to Brenner, an essential precondition for the crystallisation of the 
town/country division of labour and the specialisation of production between agriculture and 
industry which features so prominently in Smith’s account. Without systematic investment in the 
forces of production, agricultural productivity will limit the growth of the urban population, while 
the sufficient urban migration of producers will only be procured in the context of the removal of 
their access to the means of subsistence and the abolition of the property relations tying them to the 
countryside16.  
 
For Brenner then, the historical problem of the emergence of capitalist economic development 
becomes a matter of the origin of the system of free wage labour, which following Marx he locates 
and explains in the transformation of the class structure of agricultural production in sixteenth 
century England. Only through such a detailed interrogation of historically-developed and 
geographically-situated structures of class relations, which open up or foreclose different patterns 
of development17, can it be explained why capitalist production developed when and where it did. 
The generalisation of the capitalist mode of production cannot be assumed, nor subsumed within a 
broader analysis of the development of the world-market, it being necessary to explain the failure 
of capitalism to develop under the influence of previous trade expansions. Brenner locates the 
specificity of early-modern England in the particular ‘rules for reproduction’ of its attendant 
agricultural property relations – that is, in a dynamic internal to feudalism which accounted for its 
15 Brenner, ‘The origins of capitalist development’, p. 36 
16 Brenner, ‘The origins of capitalist development’, pp. 33-37 
17 Brenner, ‘The origins of capitalist development’, p. 38 
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dissolution18. In England there obtained an exceptional concentration of land ownership – owner-
occupiers holding no more than 25-30 percent of the land – while the tenants who worked the land 
were subject to conditions of tenure comprising rents responsive to market conditions19. Further, 
landlords themselves were unusually subject to market imperatives, being increasingly dependent 
on the productivity of tenants in the absence of the extra-economic powers to squeeze surplus out 
of them by coercion. In stark contrast to the contemporary experience in France, where landlords 
sought to claim increasing shares of a constant or declining output, in England land owners could 
obtain increasing rents by raising productivity through cooperation with tenants in realising capital 
improvements on large farms20. It was in this context, of the historically unprecedented dependence 
of direct producers and landlords on markets for their own self-reproduction, that there emerged a 
self-sustaining dynamic of productivity growth and the reconfiguration and further concentration of 
land ownership – the very dynamic of agrarian capitalism21. 
 
Brenner’s critique of Wallerstein’s The Modern World-System is well-founded, any attempt to infer 
or abstractly derive the emergence of a specific structure of class relations from the expansion of 
international trade, or in Skocpol’s words to “[reduce]...socio-economic structure to determination 
by world market opportunities and technological production possibilities”22, being fundamentally 
unsound. Marx is clear on this in Capital III when he asserts that “every development in 
commercial capital gives production a character oriented ever more to exchange-value, 
transforming products more and more into commodities. Even so, this development, taken by itself, 
is insufficient to explain the transition from one mode of production to the other”23. Wallerstein’s 
later attempts to finesse his account of the transition from feudalism to capitalism remain 
unconvincing insofar as they draw a relatively straight line from the disintegration of the ‘European 
historical system’, through the imperatives of the ‘desperate’ seigniorial classes, to their self-
transformation into capitalist entrepreneurs24. It is perhaps understandable that Wallerstein 
continues to struggle to explain the origins of capitalism inasmuch as he remains profoundly 
conflicted as to what constitutes its differentia specifica, the only thing he finds incontestable being 
its ‘hyperbolic growth curves’25. In all of this, it should hardly need stating that the inverse 
position, which attempts to explain the crystallisation of the capitalist mode of production in 
national-political isolation from the development of international trade and finance, is equally 
18 R. Brenner, ‘Agrarian class structure and economic development in pre-industrial Europe’ (1976) 70 Past 
and Present 30. See also Ellen Meiksin Wood’s useful discussion in The Origin of Capitalism: a Longer 
View (London: Verso, 2002), pp. 50-53, Chapter 3 
19 Brenner, ‘Agrarian class structure and economic development in pre-industrial Europe’, p. 73 
20 Brenner, ‘Agrarian class structure and economic development in pre-industrial Europe’, p. 73 
21 Wood, The Origin of Capitalism, p. 53 
22 T. Skocpol, ‘Wallerstein’s world capitalist system: a theoretical and historical critique’ (1977) 5 American 
Journal of Sociology 1075 at 1078-9 
23 K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Vol. 3 (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 444 
24 I. Wallerstein, ‘The West, capitalism, and the modern world-system’ (1992) 4 Review (Fernand Braudel 
Center) 561. See the discussion in G. Arrighi, ‘Capitalism and the modern world-system: rethinking the 
nondebates of the 1970’s’ (1998) 1 Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 113 
25 Wallerstein, ‘The West, capitalism, and the modern world-system’, pp. 566-580 
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unproductive. As Perry Anderson reminds us “the idea of capitalism in one country, taken literally, 
is only a bit more plausible than that of socialism...English landowners could have never started 
their conversion to commercial agriculture without the market for wool in Flemish towns’26. While 
the development of the world market does not determine the transition to capitalist production, it 
most certainly conditions this process, circumscribing interaction and providing important 
incentives and disincentives, the trick being to “translate these forces into the more specific effects 
they will have on internal political and economic interactions”27. 
 
Crucially for the purposes of the present discussion, Arrighi confirms the fundamental salience of 
Brenner’s critique of Wallerstein, being at pains to insist that he has “long been convinced that 
class relations and conflicts are not reducible to core-periphery relations”28 – that is, to world-
systemic axial divisions of labour. Indeed, he argues that much of the comparative research carried 
out within the world-systems perspective substantiates the conclusion that world capitalism is not a 
mere outcome of the persistence of world economies, forcing practitioners to unpick Wallerstein’s 
equation of the two. For Arrighi, the dogmatic insistence of certain world-systems theorists that 
“almost everything” can be explained on the basis of world-systems phenomena is “one of the most 
disturbing features of the development or, rather, underdevelopment of the perspective”, speaking 
to the pathological character of the “nondebate” which developed in the 1970s, the latter becoming 
more about the defence of research programmes than the pursuit of theoretical advances or original 
syntheses29. More broadly, insofar as Arrighi’s approach demonstrates a mindfulness of the 
necessity to explain the emergence and reproduction of what Brenner would define as specifically 
‘capitalist’ class relations in a historically and geographically embedded manner, he is not open to 
the latter’s critique in the same manner as is Wallerstein. The methodological divergence obtaining 
between Arrighi and Brenner is of different character, relating to the emphasis placed on different 
analytical registers and the phenomena primarily associated with ‘capitalist’ development. Arrighi, 
following Braudel and unlike Wallerstein and other world-systems theorists, locates the origins of 
capitalism not in sixteenth-century England but in the emergence of a system of city-states – as a 
precursor to the system of nation-states – in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century Italy30. This speaks 
to a markedly different conceptualisation of capitalism, which for Arrighi inheres not in the 
emergent socio-economic structure of the leading locales of capitalist production, but in the 
‘interstitial’ organisation of long-distance trade and high finance, which had earlier structural 
analogues. Capitalism, argues Arrighi, originated in the extraterritorial business networks which 
connected larger territorial organisations to one another and their totality to other ‘worlds’, within 
26 P. Anderson, Spectrum: From Right to Left in the World of Ideas (London: Verso, 2007), p. 251 
27 R. A. Denemark & K. P. Thomas, ‘The Brenner-Wallerstein Debate’ (1988) 1 International Studies 
Quarterly 47 at 64  
28 G. Arrighi, ‘Capitalism and the modern world-system: rethinking the nondebates of the 1970’s’ (1998) 1 
Review (Fernand Braudel Center) 113 at 120 
29 Arrighi, ‘Capitalism and the modern world-system’ at 113-114, 120-1 
30 G. Arrighi, ‘The winding paths of capital’ (2009) 56 New Left Review 61, at 71 
38 
 
                                                            
which the Northern Italian city states emerged as the ‘centres of gravity’ of the European world-
economy, as extraordinary ‘containers’ of wealth and power in the interstices of the European 
political system31. These city states, to which the largest profits accrued, became models of state- 
and war-making for the larger territorial units through the coercive effects of competition for 
mobile capital, while the organisation of the inter-city-state system itself anticipated the emergence 
of the system of sovereign nation states instituted by the Treaties of Westphalia. Further and 
interestingly, Arrighi hypothesises in conversation with William McNeill that the inter-state 
politico-military competition pioneered by the Italian city-states continued to be the primary source 
of the technological and organisational advances which have powered the expansion of the 
capitalist world-system32.        
 
In view of the above, it may be advanced that the potential difficulty in coupling the analyses of 
Arrighi and Brenner is not one rooted in incompatible explanations of the same phenomena, as 
when Wallerstein describes the emergence of sixteenth-century agrarian capitalism as a function of 
the development of a trade-based division of labour, in contrast to Brenner’s explanation of the 
transformation of the underlying structure of property relations by class struggle under coercive 
market conditions. Rather, it is one of the emphasis of different phenomena, Arrighi focusing on 
patterns of commercialisation and territorialisation in the development of an interstitial network of 
trade and high finance, Brenner grounding his approach in proletarianisation as constituting the 
emergence of capitalism as a mode of production. In this regard, Arrighi’s lack of emphasis on the 
instantiation of a system of free wage labour should be understood in the context of the ‘third-
worldist’ bent of his comparative sociological researches, which through interrogation of the 
development of sub-Saharan Africa and East Asia have led him to problematise the correlation 
between proletarianisation and economic growth33.  
 
It is in general contended that Brenner’s approach to the specificity of capitalism is to be preferred 
inasmuch as it re-centres class struggle in capitalist development and foregrounds as its historical 
novelty the particular mechanism by which surplus is produced (the specific form in which surplus 
labour is extracted). While the development of networks of trade and high-finance is crucial to the 
emergence of capitalism and conditions its development, it is essential to ground the aggregations 
of wealth which anchor these networks in the specific class-relational processes by which their 
underlying value is produced, lest they become free-floating signifiers of power and influence. 
Further, patterns of underdevelopment characterised not only by the ‘survival’ of ‘pre’-capitalist 
31 Arrighi, ‘Capitalism and the modern world-system’, pp. 123-128 
32 Arrighi, ‘Capitalism and the modern world-system’, p. 128 
33 “The problem with the simple ‘proletarianization as capitalist development’ model is that it ignores not just 
the realities of southern Africa’s settler capitalism but also many other cases, such as the United States itself, 
which was characterized by a totally different pattern—a combination of slavery, genocide of the native 
population and the immigration of surplus labour from Europe” –Arrighi, ‘The winding paths of capital’, p. 
64.   
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relations of production but by the active reproduction of ‘non-capitalist’ social relations may well 
require a tempering of the most literal interpretations of Marx’s understanding of capitalist 
development as the bourgeoisie creating a world ‘after its own image’34. This does not however 
require a re-conceptualisation of capitalism if we understand the latter in terms of the 
predominance of the capitalist mode of production within a broader social formation comprising 
other modes of production and further sets of social relations irreducible to capitalist class 
relations. It should perhaps be unsurprising that the global economy, as a formation of formations 
characterised by entrenched uneven development patrolled by political and military power, is 
capable of reproducing non-capitalist relations of production (including indentured labour and 
production by independent small-holders) in interconnection with ongoing processes of 
proletarianisation. Nor is there cause to reconsider the centrality of the formation of a class of free 
wage labourers, albeit with local variations and particularities, to the cycles of productive 
accumulation which have underpinned the development of every major capitalist economy. Finally, 
Arrighi’s approach cannot ultimately be upheld on account of the difficulties presented by his 
identification of the ‘real home’ of capitalism in the ‘top layer’ of international trade and finance, 
an ‘anti-market’ layer where, in Braudel’s phrase, “the great predators roam and the law of the 
jungle operates”35. This layer is conceived, as Arrighi himself admits36, in a fundamentally static 
opposition to the middling layer of the world market economy, where a degree of automatic 
coordination linking supply, demand and prices characterises the horizontal communications 
between different markets. At the bottom of this three-tiered structure is the layer of the ‘non-
economy’, or rather of extremely elementary and mostly self-sufficient economies, which is 
sometimes confusingly referred to as the layer of ‘material life’37. Such a hypostatised 
understanding of the antithesis of market and anti-market is analytically impoverishing insofar as it 
fails to account for the dialectical process by which monopoly emerges from the free competition 
of capitals through the process of concentration and centralisation. Moreover, it cannot apprehend 
the continuing interpenetration of market and anti-market – monopoly rents representing the 
extraction of surplus-profits from non-monopolised sectors – nor the inability of anti-market 
structures to ultimately transcend the operation of the law of value38. A much better position is that 
which conceives capitalism as a contradictory unity of market and anti-market, the competitive 
interaction of rival capitals being structured to different degrees by market coordination and anti-
market rent-seeking in different developmental contexts. The resilience of anti-market dominance 
shouldn’t be confused with permanence, it being instructive to observe the profound contradictions 
34 Brenner, ‘The origins of capitalist development’, pp. 25-27 
35 F. Braudel, The Wheels of Commerce (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), pp. 229-230. Referenced in 
Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, p. 26 
36 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, p. 21 
37 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, pp. 10-11; Arrighi, ‘Capitalism and the modern world-system’, p. 
125  
38 See Ernest Mandel’s crucial discussion in Late Capitalism (J. De Bres trans.) (London: Verso, 1978), 
Chapter 17 
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inherent in the attempts even of the US (wielding the greatest resources for world-systemic control 
ever amassed) to structurally offset the erosion of its capitals’ market competitiveness.            
 
Despite the methodological limitations of Arrighi’s analysis in The Long Twentieth Century, it 
remains the most important contemporary work devoted to the longue durée of world capitalism 
and supplies crucial insights into the geo-historical patterning of international trade and high 
finance. Its foregrounding of the competition for mobile capital, the opportunities this presents for 
profit-making, and its particular significance in periods of transition following the exhaustion of a 
phase of material expansion, is invaluable. Understanding the present in the longue durée and 
recognising the contemporary financial expansion as symptomatic of a crisis of US hegemony – a 
simultaneously economic and geopolitical crisis – is essential to understanding the present 
conjuncture. Moreover, productive syntheses should be sought between Arrighi’s work and that of 
political Marxists like Brenner, it being possible, as Tom Reifer has suggested, to “imagine teasing 
out a series of geohistorical linkages” between the two bodies of scholarship39. Indeed, such an 
interface may significantly strengthen a political Marxism which, as Callinicos has rightly 
observed, has a tendency to attempt to explain social transformation as a result of class exploitation 
and struggle considered in abstraction from the structural conditions constituted by the 
contradiction between the development of the forces of production and the prevailing production 
relations40. Class struggle cannot explain its own intensification in periods of ‘organic crisis’ when 
the very viability of the extant social system is called into question by the maturation of these 
structural contradictions41. The world market, as the level at which abstract labour, value, money 
and capital are ultimately defined42, is the domain in which these fundamental contradictions 
emerge, its development conditioning the interplay of class forces. In providing an explanatory 
framework for the development of the world market, the world-systems perspective can help to 
elucidate the geo-historical unfolding of the structural contradictions in conversation with which 
class struggle drives social transformation. Finally, in any event and howsoever one views the 
broader potential for synthesis, the work of Arrighi and Brenner is eminently compatible for the 
more specific purposes in relation to which the coupling is primarily pursued in the present thesis. 
Both theorists understand the long downturn as driven by a reduction in the rate of profit 
conditioned by the intensification of competition in a context of emergent over-production or over-
accumulation. Brenner’s account in The Economics of Global Turbulence is deployed to augment 
Arrighi’s analysis, providing a more detailed exposition of the specific process by which such over-
production develops and is sustained. It has the additional advantages of resting on a richer 
39 T. Reifer, ‘Capital’s cartographer’ (2009) 60 New Left Review 119 at 128 
40 A. Callinicos, ‘The limits of ‘political Marxism’’ (1990) 184 New Left Review 110 
41 A. Callinicos, ‘The limits of ‘political Marxism’’, pp. 113-114 
42 See Tony Smith’s discussion in Globalisation: A Systematic Marxist Account (Chicago: Haymarket, 2009), 
pp. 189-194 
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empirical foundation and avoiding the methodological eclecticism which hinders Arrighi’s own 
theorisation.  
 
Of Long Downturns and Neoliberal Expansions 
 
Having contextualised the interface between Arrighi and Brenner and clarified the logic behind the 
integration of their analyses, it remains to be explained why Brenner’s account of the ‘long 
downturn’ – as a crisis emerging in the mid 1960s, crystallising in 1973 and remaining to be 
transcended – has been preferred to competing theories which emphasise one or more ‘recoveries’ 
in the ensuing period. David McNally, for instance, observes a ‘neoliberal expansion’ 1982-2007, 
entailing “a quarter-century cycle of capitalist growth that transformed and expanded the world 
economy”43. McNally argues that the ‘virulent’ form of capitalism which arrived in the wake of the 
Volker shock of 1979, involving attacks on living standards designed to restore corporate profits 
and debt-levered ‘invasions’ of the Global South, secured a ‘sustained wave of expansion’ which 
prevailed until 200744. While its growth pattern was based on soaring inequality, rising global 
poverty and increased human insecurity, it was a growth pattern nonetheless, registering in a rising 
trend line for profits, a tripling of size of the world economy and the emergence of China as a new 
centre of accumulation. While McNally admits that profits never recovered to the levels 
experienced during the post-war Great Boom, he stresses the abnormality of this period of 
‘unprecedented dynamism’ and argues that it should not be used as the definitive benchmark 
against which to judge the health of the capitalist system45. Indeed, McNally contends that by the 
neoliberal period compares favourably with every phase of capitalist history other than the ‘golden 
age’, while making the further methodological point that concentration on national macroeconomic 
indicators isn’t necessarily appropriate in the context of a growth pattern underpinned by wage 
repression and overseas investment46. Further, although McNally accepts that the neoliberal growth 
wave was a more uneven and volatile one than that of the Great Boom, he points out that its 
attendant business cycle approximated the ‘classic’ form – with recessions every seven to ten years 
rather than the every three or four of the preceding period –, while contending that the expansion 
had a real basis in the reorganisation of manufacturing, the introduction of new technologies and 
the development of new systems of labour organisation and intensification47. Crucially, McNally 
introduces a delineation within his understanding of the neoliberal expansion between the period 
1982-1997 – whose growth pattern he insists cannot be explained in terms of credit creation – and 
that obtaining after the onset of the East Asian crisis, when a decade-long credit ‘explosion’ 
43 D. McNally, Global Slump: The Economics and Politics of Crisis and Resistance (Oakland: PM Press, 
2011), p. 9, Chapter 2 
44 McNally, Global Slump, pp. 25-26 
45 McNally, Global Slump, p. 27 
46 McNally, Global Slump, pp. 37-38 
47 McNally, Global Slump, pp. 39-41 
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postponed the eruption of a general crisis driven by the emergence of a new pattern of over-
accumulation48.  
 
McNally is joined by Albo, Panitch and Gindin in understanding the crisis of the 1970s to have 
been resolved by the neoliberal ‘capitalist militancy’ of early eighties, the latter theorists arguing 
that capitalism subsequently went on an ‘incredible run’ which ended only with the emergence of 
the present crisis in 200749. For them, the era between the crisis of the 1970s and the Great 
Recession was one of capitalist dynamism incorporating significant technological revolutions and 
involving “not just the deepening and expansion of capital, but also the radical restructuring of 
corporations and firms and indeed of capitalist social relations and culture in general”50. Albo, 
Panitch and Gindin emphasise the revival of profit shares, profit rates and real investment from the 
1980s into the 1990s51 and note the favourability of extant GDP growth in long historical 
perspective, attributing this revival in fortunes fundamentally, like McNally, to a shift in the 
balance of class forces. The latter, they contend, has been effected by defeats for the organised 
labour movement and working class parties, dramatic technological change, industrial restructuring 
and the imposition of labour market ‘flexibility’, in the broader context of the intensification of 
competition occasioned by the incorporation of new regions into the world market52.  
 
Panitch and Gindin restate their position in The Making of Global Capitalism, reiterating that the 
profitability crisis of the late 1960s and 1970s came to an end after 1982, when both the US rate of 
profit and the profit share of national product assumed an upward trend, producing an overall 
doubling of the mass of non-financial profits 1983-199953. In a context of low productivity growth, 
profitability rested on a historically significant pattern of wage repression, there being effected a 
real terms reduction in private sector wages between 1968 and 199954. While recognising that 
rising profitability had this fundamentally expropriative character, the authors are keen to stress the 
strong recovery of real investment growth which averaged 6 percent 1983-1999 and the profound 
dynamism of a manufacturing sector which saw the emergence of entirely new products and 
technologies55. Indeed, US manufacturing recorded productivity growth in excess of the ‘golden 
age’ (in contrast to labour-intensive services expansion) driven by restructuring on an astonishing 
scale and underpinned by strong investment, the latter partially veiled by a reduction in the cost of 
capital goods56. Panitch and Gindin emphasise the centrality of financial expansion to such 
48 McNally, Global Slump, pp. 41 
49 G. Albo, S. Gindin & L. Panitch, In and Out of Crisis: the Global Financial Meltdown and Left 
Alternatives (Oakland: PM Press, 2010), p. 16 
50 Albo, Gindin & Panitch, In and Out of Crisis, p. 50 
51 Albo, Gindin & Panitch, In and Out of Crisis, p. 41 
52 Albo, Gindin & Panitch, In and Out of Crisis, p. 16 
53 L. Panitch & S. Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism (London: Verso, 2013), pp. 183-193 
54 Panitch & Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism, p. 184 
55 Panitch & Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism, p. 185-186 
56 Panitch & Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism, pp. 186-189 
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industrial reorganisation, the overseas capital attracted by the “broadening and deepening” of US 
financial markets ensuring the availability of cheap credit, with the ten-fold increase in 
disbursements from venture capital markets being particularly crucial in supporting innovative 
start-ups57. More generally, financialisation is given a different treatment by Panitch and Gindin 
than by McNally, with the consequence that the former theorists do not draw so sharp a line of 
demarcation between the between the neoliberal ‘recovery’ of the 1980s and 1990s and the 
financial expansion of the 2000s. For Panitch, Gindin and Albo, financial innovation has been 
crucial to the internationalisation of capital, the development of derivative markets having provided 
risk insurance in a complex global economy and meaningfully allowed corporations to compare 
alternative accumulation strategies across time and space58. Understanding financial expansion as 
crucially underpinning the productive growth they highlight in the neoliberal period, they 
subsequently insist that the financial crisis of 2007-8 was not expressive of a profitability crisis 
rooted in productive overcapacity, whether as sustained and reproduced since the 1970s (Brenner) 
or as newly emerging in the late 1990s (McNally). Rather, it should be approached as a product of 
instabilities internal to the pattern of finance-driven accumulation by which the crisis of the 1970s 
was resolved – the competitive dynamic obtaining between rival financial actors and markets 
driving a cycle of increased leverage, loose credit, asset price inflation and the formation of 
speculative bubbles59. 
 
The approaches of McNally and Albo, Panitch and Gindin have important strengths, especially as 
regards the recovery of an understanding of the dynamic process by which manufacturing has been 
re-structured, modernised and re-located from less nuanced narratives of industrial decline. The 
foregrounding of class struggle and the role of a shifting balance of class forces in prefiguring the 
economic outcomes of the neoliberal period is also crucial. However, Brenner’s account of the 
‘long downturn’ is preferred in the present work as it better captures the essential character of the 
era inaugurated by the eruption of crisis in 1973. That this has been a period of chronic and 
unresolved crisis is revealed by the fragile, partial and profoundly contradictory character of the 
relative ‘recoveries’ which have developed within it. As Brenner decisively illustrates, these have 
not been driven by new phases of expansion built upon the resolution of the underlying crisis, but 
represent rather primarily the displacement or redistribution of costs within an unchanged secular 
context of over-capacity and over-production. His analysis of the revival of US industrial fortunes 
from the 1980s makes clear that export growth was achieved at the direct cost of other advanced 
economies and resulted overwhelmingly from the devaluation of the dollar, while profitability 
relied crucially on the redistribution of revenues between the factors of production, i.e. upon 
practically non-existent real wage growth60. Indeed, the fact that US manufacturing profitability 
57 Panitch & Gindin, The Making of Global Capitalism, p. 188 
58 Albo, Gindin & Panitch, In and Out of Crisis, pp. 33, 123 
59 Albo, Gindin & Panitch, In and Out of Crisis, pp. 122-126 
60 R. Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence (London: Verso, 2005), Chapter 12 
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continued to fall substantially short of the levels of the post-war boom despite the high productivity 
growth and unprecedented real wage repression that Panitch and Gindin observe, speaks precisely 
to Brenner’s conclusion that a persistent crisis of over-production maintained constant downward 
pressure on prices. Within this international context of intensified competition, Brenner accurately 
depicts the dynamics of a zero-sum game, whereby competitive advantages for one economy have 
implied losses for others, the weaker among the developing economies – such as Mexico, 
Argentina and India – surviving in competition only by inflicting major reductions in living 
standards61. 
 
More broadly, Brenner’s account illustrates not only that rates of profit and growth remained in the 
long downturn persistently below those of the long boom, but that economic performance for the 
advanced capitalist economies, individually and in aggregate, worsened business cycle by business 
cycle from the 1970s through to the mid-1990s. This conclusion, which belies theorisation of the 
1980s ‘recovery’, is further supported by the work of Andrew Kliman, who records a persistently 
declining rate of profit from the early 1980s (albeit calculated differently to Brenner, using historic 
rather than current costs of capital investments) and emphasises insufficient destruction of capital 
as the underlying cause of the stagnation which has prevailed since the 1970s crisis62. Brenner 
observes that this downwards trend in economic performance is only checked from 1995, where 
unquestionable acceleration followed on from a dismal first half-decade in which US economic 
performance was worse than any other five-year period in the whole post-war era. As regards the 
mid-1990s uplift, Brenner rightly emphasises the centrality of the ‘wealth effect’ of the stock-
market bubble – which was responsible for a full quarter of total GDP growth 1995-2000 – while 
noting that even with this asset-price boost the US economy did no better than in the crisis decade 
of the 1970s63. Brenner’s understanding of the weak foundations of the late 1990s upswing 
explains why the latter could not result in the transcendence of the long downturn in the context of 
persistent chronic over-capacity in manufacturing. Indeed, his account of how the increasing 
penetration of international commodity markets by the East Asian economies worsened over-
production, driving a precipitous fall in manufacturing profitability from 1997 and underpinning a 
dramatic divergence between corporate returns and equity prices, is indispensible to understanding 
the stock market collapse of 2000-164. Brenner’s analysis of the contradictory, wealth- rather than 
income-driven trajectory of the new millenium’s cyclical upturn, which was underpinned by house 
price inflation as pressure shifted from the equity market to red-hot real estate, is equally on 
point65. More generally, his approach to financial expansion as expressive of the underlying 
61 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, p. 261 
62 A. Kliman, The Failure of Capitalist Production: Underlying Causes of the Great Recession, pp. 6-10, 74-
78  
63 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, preface at xxv 
64 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence , pp. 267-268, 291-296 
65 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, pp. 316-322 
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problems in the sphere of production66 and his understanding of financial innovation as primarily a 
response to interrelated economic turbulence, is to be preferred to Panitch and Gindin’s insistence 
that financial market developments have underpinned a new wave of finance-led productive 
accumulation. For while venture capital markets may have been crucial to industrial diversification 
in the US, this represents a specific coupling (conditioned by the ability of a dollar-price wielding 
US to temporarily straddle the contradictions between productive growth and financial 
deregulation) within a broader context of the tendential disaggregation of the spheres of production 
and circulation, corporations investing out of retained earnings and banks re-orienting toward the 
mediation of labour revenues. More specifically, Albo, Panitch and Gindin’s account of the 2007-8 
financial crisis as driven by competitive dynamics obtaining within and between financial markets 
represents only half an explanation. While this process is crucial to asset price inflation, we can 
only understand why the later phenomenon prefigures the eruption of crisis by reference to the 
weakness of the underlying economy and the rise of mortgage defaults in the context of stagnant 
real wages.      
 
Finally, with regard to the appropriateness of deploying the experience of the post-war long boom 
as a comparator in assessing the subsequent long downturn, McNally and Albo et al are of course 
correct in their identification of the historical abnormality of capitalism’s ‘golden age’. However, 
its suitability as a point of reference cannot be defeated on statistical grounds, while further the 
relevance of the comparison depends substantially on the theoretical tasks one is pursuing. Crises 
of capitalism do not unfold in the abstract, such that their severity and implications can be 
determined by reading growth and profit rates against those obtaining during earlier historical 
crises. Rather crises unfold in the structural context of the contradictory interrelation of the forces 
and relations of production as they developed in the previous period – their forms of 
institutionalisation and the political settlements and structures to which they gave rise. Howsoever 
‘abnormal’ were the rates of growth and profit attending the long boom, it is precisely the abnormal 
class settlements generated in this period, the peculiar political institutions structuring its 
development, which frame the emergence of neoliberalism. The long downturn is a crisis in and of 
the institutions of the ‘welfarist’ period. Indeed, an interesting consideration concerns whether the 
relative favourability of economic performance in the neoliberal period in long run historical 
perspective – emphasised by McNally – requires itself to be explained in reference to the preceding 
boom. It may be argued that given the fundamentally weak developmental foundation of the 
neoliberal period, such growth as has been achieved has relied primarily on the expropriation of the 
labour revenues which grew so propitiously in the prior phase of unprecedented national prosperity, 
66 See also Michael Roberts contention that a long-run decline in the rate of profit (around which the profit 
cycle revolves) expresses precisely the increasingly ‘unproductive’ character of financialised late capitalism 
–The Great Recession: Profit Cycles, Economic Crisis A Marxist View (Raleigh, N.C.: Lulu.com, 2009), pp. 
99-100 
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and on the mobilisation of its great aggregations of wealth and power in extracting rents from the 
global south. In any event, given that the present thesis seeks to interrogate the role of the capitalist 
state in structuring the contradictory reproduction of capitalist social relations precisely in the 
context of the unravelling of the Keynesian compromise, and further to investigate the restructuring 
of the global economy in view of the crisis of US hegemony entailed by the exhaustion of the long 
boom’s sustained material expansion, the comparison with capitalism’s ‘golden age’ is inherent 
and Brenner’s account indispensible.  
 
Key Concepts 
 
The final task remaining to be completed in this introduction is the clarification of a number of 
concepts in order to prepare the ground for the ensuing discussion. While these determinations will 
be further developed and refined throughout the thesis, it will be useful at this stage to set out 
working definitions. The first of these concepts is ‘passive revolution’, which is conceived 
following Gramsci as describing the particular character of bourgeois rule which obtains in a period 
of organic crisis, when the very foundations of bourgeois hegemony are in doubt. Such contexts 
necessitate a shift in the equilibrium between consent and coercion which underpins bourgeois 
supremacy, the ruling class coming to dominate without leading and to rely increasingly on 
dictatorial forms of rule. In these periods the bourgeoisie exercises a reduced but persistent 
capacity of initiative, being able to procure such socio-political transformations as are necessary to 
entrench both its supremacy and the subalternity of labour, but no longer being able to secure the 
proactive consent of proximate and opposing classes in an expansionary project. In this moment the 
integral state’s consensual networks of political and cultural elevation ossify into exclusionary 
defensive trenches as the technical sphere of the bourgeoisie becomes ‘saturated’, ceasing to 
expand and indeed starting to disintegrate. 
 
It should be noted that Gramsci initially formulated his understanding of ‘passive revolution’ in the 
context of the Risorgimento and its aftermath. However, he later afforded the concept a more 
general significance in describing the road to modernity trodden in those states which did not 
experience a radical-popular revolution, rather modernising through state reform from above. In 
approaching the experience of ‘Americanism’ or ‘Fordism’, Gramsci sought to deploy the notion of 
passive revolution to capture the complex dialectic of restoration and renewal in the attempts of 
these bourgeois projects to integrate/neutralise certain of the advances of the October revolution, 
including elements of the planned economy. It is in this latter sense that the present work seeks 
tentatively to deploy the concept of passive revolution to illustrate certain aspects of the 
development of the post-war ‘welfarist’ regimes in the advanced capitalist economies. In this 
regard, the argument is developed in conversation with Carlos Nelson Coutinho, who explores the 
restoration-renewal dialectic in terms of the presence of a conservative reaction to the prospect of 
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radical transformation from below and the answering of a certain number of popular demands 
through concessions and compromises from above. It is in this light that there are considered 
certain aspects of post-war social democracy, which entailed the crucial substitution of the 
interventionist policy of the capitalist state for the direct historical protagonism of the subaltern 
classes. Structural reforms were undertaken from above in fulfilment of the inherent necessity to 
achieve the organisation of a planned economy, whilst reproducing such objectively socialised 
production within the fundamental structure of private appropriation. In this manner, the 
bourgeoisie was able to entrench its own supremacy whilst reproducing the subalternity of labour, 
the latter imprisoned as an economic-corporative force within the integral state of the capitalist 
class. Consequently, capitalism was able to ride out an organic crisis occasioned by the inter-war 
economic collapse and the political challenge of the October Revolution, while the demands of a 
historically-powerful labour movement were passively integrated in the neutralised form of social 
rights, collective bargaining, mass consumption and direct state intervention in the economy. 
 
The second concept which may be usefully defined is ‘neoliberalism’, understood as inhering in a 
set of political projects aimed at displacing from capital to labour and from core to peripheral 
economies the costs of the crisis which erupted in 1973 and which is yet to be decisively resolved. 
In their national-political expression these projects have involved the pursuit of political 
interventions and legislative strategies aimed at securing labour devaluation through 
disempowering workers, disciplining the organised labour movement and coopting social 
democratic political parties. The extent to which this has proceeded through direct confrontations 
with trade unions and the adoption of legal restrictions on the right to organise and strike, or 
otherwise through the institutionalisation of labour demands within national agreements and the 
integration/assimilation of union bureaucracies, has been informed in each case by the particular 
structure of national labour markets and their attendant balance of class forces. In terms of their 
crystallisation in fiscal and monetary policy, together with the broader re-orientation of state 
subventionary activity, neoliberal projects display significant variation, as state-capitals have 
attempted – in what is often a profoundly path-dependent process – to maximise their competitive 
advantages and minimise their weaknesses in conversation with the developing global 
macroeconomic environment. In a certain sense therefore, neoliberalism as a set of nationally-
differentiated policy packages finds its coherence as much in its common legitimating reference to 
a hegemonic conjunctural narrative – which locates the cause of the 1970s crisis in unrestrained 
wage growth and unchecked working class corporatist power – as in its substantive homology.  
 
While bearing in mind the national particularity of neoliberal projects mentioned above, neoliberal 
governance has generally involved to a greater or lesser extent and in different combination, the 
following policy measures. Firstly, the tax burden has generally been shifted from capital to labour 
through reductions in corporation, capital gains and high-band income tax rates, the relaxation of 
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accounting standards and the permitted or indeed incentivised development of offshore tax havens, 
combined with the increasing taxation of consumption. Secondly, there may be observed the 
retrenchment and coercive restructuring of welfare provision captured by the shift from ‘welfarist’ 
to ‘workfarist’ approaches. Third, there has generally obtained a process of retrenchment and re-
commodification of public services including healthcare and education, coupled with the 
incentivised development of private provision. Fourthly, there has commonly been pursued the 
privatisation of transport and utility networks, the sale of public housing stock and the abolition of 
rent controls. Fifth, there has been effected a de-democratisation of monetary and fiscal policy 
through the privatisation of central banking functions and the creation of public spending auditors 
and watchdogs. Finally, there has been pursued the de-/re-regulation of finance, typically involving 
the abolition of capital controls, the removal or erosion of the regulative distinction between 
commercial and investment banking and the deregulation of consumer lending. The significance of 
each of the above measures in either expressing or prefiguring a shift in the balance of forces 
between capital and labour or otherwise operating to shore up corporate profitability, is explored in 
one way or another throughout the thesis. It may be said in general that the emergence of the 
neoliberal consensus expresses the rise to political predominance of finance capital, as the leading 
fraction of the capitalist class in a context of reduced returns in the sphere of production 
conditioned by chronic over-capacity in international manufacturing. However, certain of the 
policy measures outlined above, implemented in a certain manner, embed profound contradictions 
between financial profitability and productive accumulation, as is explored in Chapter 3. Such 
forms of implementation have tended therefore to be pursued only in contexts where finance capital 
has obtained an extraordinary political predominance, where the form of integration of the given 
state into the international monetary and financial system has permitted the straddling of these 
contradictions, or otherwise where such reforms have been implemented under significant external 
coercion. As regards the latter point, it may more generally be observed that there obtains a 
qualitative distinction between projects of neoliberal reform which have been pursued ‘electively’ 
(or in the relative absence of direct coercion) and those which have been ‘punitively’ imposed. 
While in all cases neoliberalism has a contradictory class character, the latter projects also embed a 
further contradiction between on one hand the interests of creditor states and capitals in securing 
repayment and in restructuring the indebted economy to their advantage, and on the other the 
interests of domestic capital in pursuing projects of national economy making.    
 
In its international dimension, neoliberalism has involved the extraction of elevated financial rents 
from states whose finances have been imperilled in the context of the period’s characteristic 
exchange rate and commodity price turbulence, such rents accruing to states and capitals in control 
of money capital. Such regularised rents are augmented by the episodic debt-levered expropriation 
of weaker economies, which has unfolded in operationalisation of developing local financial crises 
and which has been organised through the facade-cosmopolitan agencies of the IMF and World 
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Bank. These processes have been prefigured by the redesigning of the inter-state system’s 
monetary and financial architecture, which has transformed the mechanisms by which states gain 
access to liquidity as well as the terms of such access and the consequences of default (whether 
prospective or actual). Specifically, private financial markets have assumed a new predominance in 
inter-mediating international monetary and financial flows, the imperialistic content of this move 
inhering in the fact that Anglo-American markets predominate on account of being largest and 
most liquid. Further, given the status of the dollar as international reserve currency, the US has 
been able through the monetary policy of the Federal Reserve to control rates of interest effective 
internationally. The process as a whole may be understood as a coercive restructuring of the inter-
state system expressing the intensification of competition in the context of the long downturn.   
 
As is immediately apparent, neoliberalism is deeply interconnected with a further process which it 
is also necessary to define – ‘financialisation’. This may be understood most broadly in terms of 
the structural asymmetry between the dynamism of the sphere of circulation and the relative 
stagnation of that of production which has come to characterise the development of the advanced 
capitalist economies. This dynamic is borne out in the increasing proportion of GDP and corporate 
profits accounted for by financial services and is prefigured by the multiplication of financial 
actors, the dramatic expansion of their operations, and the increasing extent to which non-financial 
enterprises have augmented their activities with financial dealings. As is examined in the present 
work, a crucial dynamic which attends this process of financialisation is the functional 
disaggregation of banking and industrial capitals, informed by the latter’s tendency to increasingly 
invest from retained earnings in a context of low productivity growth or otherwise to look to 
private markets for liquidity. The response of banks has been to increasingly orient their activities 
to consumer lending and mediating individual and corporate access to financial markets. This 
process crucially represents the expropriation of labour revenues, an especially exploitative 
dynamic which embeds a profound contradiction between financial profitability and productive 
growth. 
50 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
From ‘feral’ markets to regimes of accumulation: the state-political content of 
financialisation 
 
In this opening chapter I will develop an account of the long historical context of post-war 
capitalism’s descent into crisis. By way of original coupling of the theoretical approaches 
developed by Arrighi, Brenner and Gowan – whose precise interrelation has been developed in the 
introduction – I chart the fundamental developmental coordinates of the crises of post-war 
capitalism, locating these within the broader historical patterning of world capitalist development. 
In terms of its significance as regards the thesis more broadly, the argument will prepare the ground 
for discussion of the specificities of neoliberalism, providing an elementary framing within which 
consideration of the nature and function of ‘the state’ in financialised late capitalism may be 
advanced. Crucially, the discussion will provide a corrective to what I consider to be ill-defined 
and under-substantiated analyses of the declining significance of the institutions and boundaries of 
the nation state. Indeed, it will be argued that central features of the political and economic regime 
partially revealed by globalisation theory should be understood in terms of the restructuring of the 
inter-state system by, and in the interests of, dominant state-capital formations. Through critique 
the common misreading of contemporary global economic and political developments as unfolding 
outside of, and in opposition to, the state system, it is revealed how fundamental doubts about the 
centrality of the state to social life are reflect more discursive discontinuities in the conception of 
the interrelation of the global, national and local, than they do contemporary material 
developments.  
 
The rise of popular anger against the Anglo-American financial system is exemplified by the 
“Occupy Wall Street” demonstrations which, beginning in September 2011, sparked the most 
significant anti-capitalist movement in the US since the fire which began in Seattle in 1999. Across 
the Atlantic, protestors bound initially for the London Stock exchange decamped instead to the 
grounds of St. Paul’s Cathedral, where for a number of weeks from 15 October they – partly as a 
result of an interesting and productive relationship with the Cathedral – were able to generate a 
huge amount of publicity and significantly influence public discourse1. Apart from attesting to the 
continuing social power of the church in an age and region often considered to be increasingly 
secular, these events made it clear where the responsibility for the economic crisis is thought to lie. 
1 Even David Cameron was led, on 2 November 2011 to acknowledge that the Archbishop of Canterbury 
Rowan Williams “Spoke for the whole country” in criticising the irresponsibility and excess of the City of 
London. The archbishop, writing in connection with the St Paul’s protest, commented that it reflected “...a 
widespread and deep exasperation with the financial establishment that shows no sign of diminishing”. J. 
Prickard & Elizabeth Rigby, ‘Cameron backs archbishop on bankers’ Financial Times, 2 November 2011. 
Available at: www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9694785c-0577-11e1-8eaa-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1kUEs1xb6 
[accessed 25 January 2012]; R. Williams, ‘Time for us to challenge the idols of high finance’ Financial 
Times, 1 November 2011. Available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/a561a4f6-0485-11e1-ac2a 
00144feabdc0.html#axzz1kUEs1xb6 [accessed 25 January 2012] 
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Of course, it is difficult not to be buoyed by the development of a generalised contempt for the 
speculative wizards of Wall Street. Indeed, as much agitational ammunition as possible should be 
derived from the wealth accumulated by financial capitalists since the crisis of 1973, not to mention 
the huge profits and spectacular bonuses which continue to be acquired and awarded by financial 
institutions, many of which are now publically owned. However, such propagandising will have a 
necessarily limited ideological and political impact if it is not coupled with a systemic analysis 
which appreciates the relationship between a bloated and class-parasitical financial system and a 
real economy suffering from chronic problems of over-accumulation and profitability. Further, a 
sub-paradigmatic analysis which conceives the present crisis – now widely considered to be the 
most profound since the Great Depression of the 1930s, if not the deepest crisis capitalism has yet 
faced – as the result purely of an unregulated financial system sabotaging an otherwise healthy 
capitalist economy is not merely politically disadvantageous, but theoretically barren. As David 
Harvey asks in The Enigma of Capital, how should the emergence of a consensus – first in the US 
and the UK, and later becoming hegemonic in the advanced capitalist world – around the virtues of 
expansive, liquid and unregulated financial markets be explained? While Alan Greenspan’s 
narrative of ‘infectious greed’ may be sufficient for a popular press which need not distinguish the 
social from the interpersonal and seeks to construct dubious analogies between state budgets and 
household finances, it has no place in any serious analysis2. 
 
First of all, it is important to remember that finance is embedded in circuits of industrial capital and 
is indispensible to capital accumulation, i.e. reproduction on an expanded scale. As Marx 
demonstrates using his – oft misunderstood and misused – reproduction schema in volume II of 
Capital, even under optimum conditions, accumulation requires the asynchronous intertwining of 
circuits of money, commodity and productive capital, entailing the necessary hoarding of money 
capital (and related temporary un-exchangeability of stocks of commodities) at different stages of 
the process3. Thus, the development of the credit system solved an inherent problem insofar as it 
helped to facilitate productive investment by mobilising stagnant money reserves. Moreover, as the 
development of the forces of production has increased the technical composition of capital, while 
the progressive concentration and centralisation of capital has produced corporations of massive 
scale, the initial capital outlay required for entry into many commodity markets has become 
substantial. Furthermore, the development of infrastructure such as roads, railways, energy supply 
networks and telecommunications requires large-scale investment in fixed capital with a very long 
turnover period. Such enterprises, usually carried out by states – or relatively recently, private 
consortia – would be impossible without the machinery of the credit system. It may thus be seen 
that finance, or interest-bearing capital has the potential to assume a powerful directing influence 
2 D. Harvey, The Limits to Capital (London: Verso, 2006), pp. 44-45 
3 Marx, K., Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Vol. 2 (London: Penguin, 1992), Chapter 21 
‘Accumulation and Reproduction on an Expanded Scale’ 
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over the operations of industrial capitals, especially insofar as the finance sector becomes 
dominated by large firms wielding monopolistic or oligopolistic power. However, it remains to be 
explained why finance experienced such a spectacular rise to power in the last few decades, such 
that when the economic crisis morphed from credit crunch to sovereign debt crisis via massive 
publicly-funded bail-outs of the banking sector, financial markets and institutions such as private 
ratings agencies appear able to bring democratically-elected governments to their knees. In relation 
to this latter point we return to the central focus of this section, in which we will attempt to 
deconstruct the narrative that conceives finance capital as escaping the political influence and 
regulatory purview of state apparatuses. I will attempt rather to situate the extant stage of 
development of the inter-state system in the context of Giovanni Arrighi’s Braudelian long-run 
historiography, and explain by deploying Peter Gowan’s understanding of the “Dollar Wall-Street 
Regime” the manner in which the US was able to re-design the international monetary and 
financial system. The resultant regime created a tense mutuality of interest between financial 
markets and US (and to some extant UK and EU) capitals and state managers and operates to 
reinforce US political hegemony against a backdrop of declining productive competitiveness 
relative to East Asia. Of course, this mechanism was from the offset deeply contradictory, and 
while the US was initially able to internalise its benefits and externalise its risks and consequences, 
the latter now threaten the very core of the regime. 
 
Systemic Cycles of Accumulation 
 
Giovanni Arrighi, in The Long Twentieth Century, develops an ambitious historiography charting 
the intertwined development of what Charles Tilly has called “the two interdependent master 
processes of the [modern] era: the creation of a system of national states and the formation of a 
worldwide capitalist system”4. Deploying the interpretative scheme of the second and third 
volumes of Fernand Braudel’s Capitalism and Civilization, Arrighi perceives in the history of 
capitalist development the emergence, maturation and eventual decline of four distinct but 
overlapping ‘systemic cycles of accumulation’. Each cycle occupies a successive ‘long’ century in 
the longue durée of capitalist expansion and consists in a pattern of major capitalist development 
which is of systemic significance, yet which is centred upon a distinct geographical location. 
During each cycle, the governmental and business agencies of the central power develop structures 
and deploy strategies aimed at reproducing and consolidating their wealth and power, whilst 
consequently (and indeed purposively) altering fundamentally the structure of the inter-state 
system. In other words, each systemic cycle of accumulation is characterised by “a fundamental 
unity of the primary agency and structure of world-scale processes of capital accumulation”5. 
Between these cycles which are, at least in their stable, continuous stages relatively short, there 
4 C. Tilly, Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons (New York: Russell Sage, 1984), p. 147. 
Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, preface at xi  
5 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, p. 6 
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erupt long periods of crisis, restructuring and reorganisation which result in the reconstitution of 
the world-economy on new and enlarged foundations6. It is primarily in an attempt to understand 
the development of one of the latter periods, the economic crisis of the 1970s and specifically the 
rise to prominence of its financial aspects in the 1980s, that Arrighi undertakes the study. 
 
Arrighi, in an approximate and preliminary periodisation, identifies four systemic cycles of 
accumulation: a Genoese cycle, spanning the fifteenth to early seventeenth centuries; a Dutch 
cycle, unfolding from the late sixteenth through most of the eighteenth century; a British cycle 
encompassing the latter half of the eighteenth century until the early twentieth, and; a US cycle, 
beginning in the late nineteenth century and continuing into the extant period of financial 
expansion7. Each cycle, whilst progressively shorter than the preceding one, nonetheless lasts 
longer than a century (hence the notion of the ‘long century’), whilst Arrighi’s analysis seeks to 
discover through comparative analysis both patterns of recurrence and evolution and anomalies 
which may lead to a disjuncture with previous tendencies. The progression of these cycles 
describes the alternation of phases of continuous change with phases of discontinuous change, 
reflected in fundamental breaks in the strategies and structures of world-scale processes of capital 
accumulation8. Arrighi refers cumulatively to these latter institutions and practices by which 
leading state-capital formations promote, organise and regulate the expansion and restructuring of 
the global capitalist economy as ‘regimes of accumulation’. These regimes, in themselves 
emerging, consolidating and ultimately disintegrating, are the motors of – and leave their indelible 
imprint upon – the development of capitalism as world system, such that the latter must be 
understood as absolutely dependent for its emergence and expansion on state power. Indeed, 
capitalism could not have gotten off the ground as a putative world system had not the coalescence 
of dispersed commercial and mercantilist capital been facilitated by the fusion of state and capital 
in Europe9. Further, Arrighi emphasises that it is specifically inter-state competition and the 
consequent emergence of concentrated power in the hands of particular blocs able to form a 
hegemonic alliance with rising states which has operated to propel the capitalist economy through 
phases of material expansion10.  
 
Arrighi’s reading of the changing shape of the inter-state system through the cycles of 
accumulation he describes is based upon the recognition that historically, the governance of a 
system of sovereign states – the exercise of ‘world hegemony’ – has necessarily involved 
fundamental transformative action, a significant structural re-modulation of the system itself11. In 
order to achieve such a feat, the hegemonic state-capital formation must be hegemonic in the dual 
6 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, p. 1 
7 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, pp. 5-6 
8 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, pp. 6, 9 
9 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, p. 12 
10 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, p. 13 
11 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, p. 28 
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sense of being dominant and of exercising sufficient ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ to project 
the realisation of its own interests as being the motor force of universal expansion. The history of 
the modern state system has thus been one of formation and expansion on the basis of recurrent 
fundamental restructurings led and governed by successive hegemonic states12. According to 
Arrighi, the force driving such transformation is the recurrent contradiction between on the one 
hand an “endless” accumulation of capital and on the other, the comparatively stable organisation 
of political space, this opposition expressing the contradictory (yet intertwined) logics of 
capitalistic and territorial expansion13.  
 
By way of his analysis of successive cycles of accumulation, Arrighi is able to identify certain 
patterns in the long run of capitalist development. For instance, he recognises that each capitalist 
state which has successively come to be hegemonic has encompassed in its metropolitan domain a 
larger territory and a wider variety of resources, while controlling internationally networks of 
power and accumulation of greater scale and scope, than its predecessors. Thus it may be said that 
the historical expansion of capitalist power has been associated with “the formation of political 
structures endowed with ever-more extensive and complex organisational capabilities to control the 
social and political environment of capital accumulation on a world-scale”14. Arrighi also 
concludes that each systemic cycle of accumulation (encompassing a successive long century) 
displays a similar structure consisting of three distinguishable periods. The first of these entails a 
phase of financial expansion which expresses the full expansion and contradictions of the old 
regime whilst providing the conditions for the development of the new regime as an integral aspect 
thereof. Next, there emerges a period of consolidation and development of the new regime of 
accumulation through the profitable promotion and instigation of the material expansion of the 
entire world-economy. Finally, we encounter a second period of financial expansion expressive of 
the limitations of the fully developed regime, these latter contradictions enabling and being 
exacerbated by the emergence of competing regimes, of which one will ultimately become 
dominant15. It is therefore clear that far from being a contemporary anomaly, financial expansion is 
a recurrent tendency of historical capitalism from its earliest beginnings. Moreover, developing 
Braudel’s observations, Arrighi understands financial expansions as a sign of the maturity of a 
particular phase of capitalist development, recognising that they operate to temporarily restore the 
fortunes of the leading capitalist agency of the epoch, yet ultimately result in a change of leadership 
in the centre of capital accumulation on a global scale. The beginning of a financial expansion 
might therefore be designated the ‘signal crisis’ of the dominant regime of accumulation, such 
expansion both allowing its organisers to prolong their leadership of the world economy, yet 
simultaneously prefiguring the coming ‘terminal crisis’ of the regime, entailing its ultimate 
12 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, pp. 29-32 
13 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, p. 34 
14 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, pp. 14-15 
15 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, pp. 219-220 
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collapse and supersession16. Phases of financial expansion are therefore, historically speaking, 
coincidental with periods of agentic and structural transformation of world-scale processes of 
capital accumulation17.  
 
According to Arrighi, the central factors which animate the process of financial expansion – the 
‘autumn’ of a particular phase of capitalist development18 – emerge from the intensification of 
inter-capitalist competition which is the result of the preceding phase of material expansion (what 
might presumably be designated ‘summer’). Drawing both on Adam Smith’s version of the 
tendency of the rate of profit to fall and upon John Hicks’ understanding of the dynamics of 
mercantilist expansion and contraction, Arrighi attempts to explain the fact that, historically, the 
stagnation of material expansions of the capitalist world-economy have always been accompanied 
by an escalation of competitive struggles19. Both Smith and Marx viewed the expansion of trade 
and production as inseparable from a continual increase in competition among its agencies, albeit 
that the latter introduced the complicating and countervailing factor of progressive concentration of 
capital. The impact of such intensification of competition upon profitability is subsequently 
explained by Arrighi through a (somewhat opaque) fusion of changing capital value-compositions 
and unfavourable alterations in supply-and-demand relations. Accumulation as recapitalisation of 
surplus in expanded means of production is accompanied in the competitive context by labour-
saving technological innovation. The latter, whilst productive for a temporary period of surplus-
profits for the innovator, results over time in an increased organic composition of capital (ratio of 
fixed to variable capital) in the sector, leading consequently – all other factors remaining stable – to 
reduced profitability. Moreover, the myopic and uncoordinated expansion of the scale of 
production in different enterprises, in a finite spatial domain limited by the organisational 
capabilities of the agency of expansion, leads ultimately to a situation of overaccumulation20. At 
this point, the aggregate supply of commodities by all producing capitals is greater than effective 
demand in the marketplace, such that the realisation of the capital values congealed in such 
commodities cannot be effected in total by any one capital without rendering un-exchangeable a 
portion of the commodity stock of other capitals. Consequently, no further accumulation is possible 
without reducing the average rate of profit. Arrighi understands the process generally as one of the 
material expansion of the global economy coming up against the limits of the particular 
organisational structure on which it was based, whilst – following Marx in Capital III – noting the 
changing competitive dynamic between rival capitals in the transition between rising or high 
overall returns and those which are falling or ‘intolerable’. An initial practical identity of interest 
structured by a relatively ‘cooperative’ competition dissolves in the latter environment into a 
16 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, postscript at 371-3 
17 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, p. 87 
18 F. Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century vol. III (New York: Harper and Row, 1984), p. 
246 
19 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century pp. 168-169, 227-246 
20 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century p. 230 
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fratricidal competitive struggle, as competition is transformed from a positive-sum to a zero-sum or 
even negative-sum game21. From a juridical perspective, the function of law in mediating the 
competitive interaction of capitals assumes an altogether different orientation at times of 
high/rising returns than in periods of falling/intolerable profitability, structuring in the first instance 
a tense but productive fraternity, whilst in the latter emerging as an arsenal for the zealous 
protection of market positions and shares, proprietary distribution networks and the rents associated 
with technological innovation which accompanied the now destabilising division of labour. As will 
be developed later, the situation is somewhat analogous to a matter discussed in Chapter 5 – that of 
law’s role in mediating the relation between capital and labour in different macroeconomic 
environments, operating in times of rising productivity and healthy profitability (and presuming a 
particular balance of political forces) to structure a certain mutuality of interest, whilst in times of 
stagnation or crisis becoming once more a weapon of class warfare wielded by capital.  
 
It is in the context of intensified inter-capitalist competition and reduced average profitability 
described above that Arrighi rationalises the withdrawal of capital from production in favour of 
financial speculation. We are reminded that the logic of capital is one of the endless expansion of 
money capital, not the extensive and technological development of the forces of production as an 
end in itself. Thus, at the point in which the returns which can reasonably be expected from re-
investment of surplus in commodity production begin to be outstripped by those associated with 
financial dealings, it becomes rational for well-placed capitals to short their circuits of money 
capital, redirecting surpluses into the sphere of circulation22. Indeed, the latter course of action is 
often incentivised by the coincidence of diminishing returns in production and trade with the 
synchronous expansion of demand for money capital as states seek liquidity to finance the 
increasing budget deficits which ensue from the slowdown in trade and production23. In turn, the 
“supply” conditions required to meet such demand are provided by the fact that in conditions of 
squeezed profitability in the productive economy, capitals are predisposed to keep a growing 
proportion of their incoming cash flow in liquid form. It might be said in general therefore, that the 
development of a crisis of over-accumulation results in the re-assertion of the fundamental 
contradiction between the self-expansion of capital and the material expansion of the world-
economy24. The result of the entire process is to effect “massive, system-wide redistributions of 
income and wealth from all kinds of communities to the agencies that control mobile capital”25. 
Capitals in the centre of the unravelling systemic cycle of accumulation are generally best placed – 
as a result of their location at the commanding heights of the extant trade and monetary system – to 
displace this contradiction through financial investment, and to thereby gain from developing 
21 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century pp. 231, 233  
22 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century pp. 235-237 
23 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century pp. 372-373 
24 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century pp. 372-373  
25 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century p. 373 
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world-systemic instability26. Moreover, it will often be the case that capitals attached to the 
dominant bloc which drove the initial material expansion will have among the more mature 
investments in fixed capital infrastructure, such that they will be especially vulnerable to 
competition from new, lower-cost manufactures in a context of intensified competitive struggle. 
The re-orientation towards finance may be sufficient to produce a ‘wonderful moment’27 of 
vertiginous profitability upon a narrow basis (and for a narrow section of the population at the 
centre of the regime), yet is ultimately likely to be short-lived in view of the fact that a reversal 
from trade and production to ‘eclecticism’ constitutes a de-coupling of the interests of dominant 
state-capitals from the material development of the global economy and a surrendering of 
leadership in relation thereto.  
 
The dynamic thus schematised provides an elementary mechanical understanding of the 
developmental pattern which emerges from Arrighi’s comparative analyses of successive systemic 
cycles of accumulation – that of financial expansion arising subsequent to phases of material 
development and the latter’s attendant intensification of competitive struggle. It provides a guiding 
explanatory framework for the analysis of recurrent financial expansions, from the withdrawal of 
the Dutch from commerce around 1740 to become “the bankers of Europe” and the retreat of the 
Genoese commercial diaspora to rule over European finances for some seventy-years from 1560, to 
the financial deployment during and after the Great Depression of 1873-96 of the British surpluses 
produced by the industrial revolution and the contemporary financialisation of US capital following 
the malfunction of Fordist-Keynesian regime28. It thereby provides the preliminary basis for our 
present argument – that the extant period of financial expansion should be understood not in terms 
of the decentring of the state relative to the rising prominence of finance capital, but rather as a 
response of dominant state-capital formations to the weakening of the structural basis in production 
and trade of their systemic cycle of accumulation. This response consists in an attempt, through a 
re-orientation toward finance and a purposive restructuring of the international financial and 
monetary regime, to nevertheless retain economic and political dominance. The growing power of 
finance capital has been facilitated by state actors whose interests largely interpenetrate with those 
of the financiers, as both a motor for and response to the dynamism of the sphere of circulation vis-
à-vis that of production in advanced capitalist economies. Moreover, dominant state-capitals have 
deployed their mastery of the international financial and monetary apparatus both to extract a 
substantial rent from more dynamic regions of the global economy and to render subservient socio-
economically weaker states in order to secure access to peripheral markets and obtain ownership of 
devalued fixed capital infrastructures. In this sense, global financial markets have been the coercive 
lever behind a process of neoliberalism which has entailed both the appropriation of the wealth of 
the periphery and social rationalisation in the core, processes which reveal the entrenched uneven 
26 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century p. 241 
27 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century p. 178 
28 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century p. 373 
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development characterising the inter-state system (rather than the weakening of the state qua state) 
and require for implementation efficient repressive apparatuses. Below, we will discuss the 
specificities of this project through an engagement with Peter Gowan’s understanding of the Dollar 
Wall Street Regime, after first considering more concretely the dynamics of the present economic 
conjuncture. 
 
The Limit of Post-War Material Expansion 
 
Robert Brenner, in his Economics of Global Turbulence provides an excellent empirically-
grounded overview of the contradictory development of the global economy beginning with the 
1965-73 transition between post-war long boom and emergent long downturn29. Brenner recognises 
that, fundamentally, the long boom was driven by the achievement between the late 1930s and late 
1940s of elevated rates of profit in the US, Europe and Japan and the maintenance of such healthy 
profitability in the following two decades. Conversely, what catalysed the descent of the global 
economy into an extended period of stagnation punctuated by recurrent bouts of financial 
turbulence was the sharp fall in profitability for the advanced capitalist economies considered both 
individually and together between 1965 and 1973. This crisis first expressed itself in the US, but 
quickly encompassed Western Europe and Japan, whilst expanding from its initial sectoral focus in 
manufacturing to affect the private economy as a whole30. Despite processes of neoliberalisation 
and financialisation, there has not subsequently been achieved a decisive recovery of the profit rate 
either secularly or in the US, Western Europe or Japan considered separately. In a manner 
thoroughly compatible with Arrighi’s understanding of the maturation of phases of material 
expansion of the global economy and their collapse into financial speculation, Brenner grounds his 
understanding of the trajectory of the profit rate in the historical pattern of uneven development of 
the global economy and the corresponding structure and intensity of international competition. The 
period 1965-73 was characterised by the intensification of competition between earlier-developing 
and dominant blocs of capital in the US and UK and later-emerging waves of productive 
investment focused on Japan and Germany, joined subsequently by parts of East Asia. This 
dynamic brought about stepped-up downward pressure on prices and rendered impossible the 
valorisation of large swathes of sunk fixed capital. The consequent emergence of over-capacity in 
the manufacturing sector internationally made for sharply-declining profitability system-wide, 
propelling the global economy from long boom to long downturn31. The persistence of such 
chronic over-capacity, rooted in manufacturing but affecting the overall private economies of the 
advanced capitalist economies has been responsible for the maintenance of secularly reduced GDP, 
investment, productivity and wage growth since the 1970s32. Across all of these macro-economic 
29 R. Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence (London: Verso, 2005) 
30 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, preface at xx 
31 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, pp. 37-40, preface at xxi 
32 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, preface at xxiv 
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indicators, economic performance in the US, EU and Japan has worsened, business cycle by 
business cycle since the end of the post-war boom, whilst there have emerged substantially higher 
rates of unemployment and recessions of much greater severity33. 
 
Considering in greater detail the dynamics thus outlined, Brenner charts the progressive penetration 
between 1965 and 1973 of the world market by German and Japanese goods which were lower-
priced than their American and British counterparts, having been produced by the combination of 
relatively advanced production techniques and relatively low-cost labour power. Japanese and 
German manufacturers were thus able to wrest significantly increased shares of the world market 
from their competitors, whilst imposing upon the market relatively reduced prices34. Competing 
capitals were consequently faced with reduced prices for their commodities without similarly 
reduced production costs – a situation which compelled some to withdraw and others to accept 
significantly reduced profit rates. Effectively, capitals in the earlier-developing blocs, especially 
those based in the US, were revealed to have over-invested insofar as the entry of lower-cost 
competitors prevented them from securing the established rate of return on their placements of 
capital and labour35. The aggregate result for the G7 economies was the emergence of over-
capacity and over-production leading to a reduced average rate of profit, insofar as there was 
insufficient demand to enable higher-cost firms to valorise their capital outlays at their former rates 
of profit. For Brenner, the failure of higher-cost manufacturers to withdraw from product lines 
where they faced stiffened competition and sufficiently diversify their investments was the 
condition under which the reduced rate of profit catalysed the long economic downturn36. The 
behaviour of such capitals, which generally preferred to withdrawal the option of retaining their 
market-shares at the expense of reduced profit rates, highlights for Brenner an attendant dynamic of 
over-production not adequately captured by neo-classical theories of the competitive “shakeout” of 
higher-cost firms. For economists such as Joseph Schumpeter, over-capacity constitutes merely a 
transitional moment of disequilibrium to which capitals will promptly adapt by leaving the line, 
duplicating the productive advance of the innovating cost-cutter or otherwise reducing production 
costs. Such actions would, in the short term, lead to the restoration of the previously established 
rate of profit in the line. Brenner recognises that in reality, however, capitals possessing fixed 
capital investments will find it rational to remain in a product line despite the entry of lower-cost 
competitors provided that they continue to realise the average rate of profit on their circulating 
capital (i.e. their recurrent advances of raw materials and labour power).  Whilst their fixed capital 
investments are inflexible costs in relation to which they are forced to accept reduced rates of 
return, such higher-cost capitals cannot be assumed to scrap these means of production unless and 
until competition from lower-cost manufacturers prevents them from securing the average rate of 
33 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, p. 99, preface at xxv 
34 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, p. 99 
35 Brenner notes that between 1965 and 1973, the return realised by US manufacturers on their capital stock 
declined by over 40 percent - The Economics of Global Turbulence, p. 99 
36 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, pp. 99-101 
60 
 
                                                     
return even on their circulating capital37. Sunk fixed capital thus operates both as a barrier to exit 
and as a deterrent to the entry of lower-cost competitors, since the latter may only increase their 
market share by coercing incumbents to yield by scrapping, requiring the imposition of prices so 
substantially below those prevailing as to reduce below average the rate of profit of higher-cost 
capitals on their circulating capital.   
 
Brenner identifies further dynamics which may militate against the adjustment of higher-cost firms 
in the context of over-production. First of all, fixed capital placements tend to be vulnerable to the 
entry of competing low-cost manufactures on account both of the enormous expenditure entailed in 
their development and implementation and due to the fact that such capital investments generally 
proceed in the form of waves constituting “large, technically interrelated developmental blocs”38. 
The technological development of the production process carried on by one capital depends upon 
the availability of inputs to its process and demand for its outputs, such that effective networks of 
fixed capital placements tend to perpetuate themselves at a particular technological level, with 
attendant problems of inertia and upgradability. The magnitude of capital invested in plant and 
machinery constitutes a significant barrier to exit for those firms involved, whilst the entrenched 
technological infrastructure formed by the interrelation of multiple units in a productive system 
operates to delay and deter the entry of lower-cost rivals. Consequently, such competitors will often 
prefer to develop new geographical regions, circumventing direct competition and perfecting their 
technological and organisational productive forms in relative isolation. When these producers 
expand their operations to such a degree that they are able to profitably penetrate occupied markets 
in addition to supplying newly-developing ones, markets become unified, direct competition erupts 
and the full extent of over-capacity is revealed39. In this manner, geo-political boundaries and the 
situatedness of fixed capital operates to modulate competitive relations such that they proceed 
neither by the pure calculus of cost-effectiveness, nor in line with orthodox theories of competitive 
‘shakeout’. Moreover, the capitals revealed as higher-cost in newly unified markets have rational 
reasons to remain in their present lines of production. As we have already mentioned, most can be 
expected to continue in production for so long as they are able to realise an average rate of profit on 
their circulating capital, forcing newcomers to further reduce prices below the average rate of profit 
to gain market share, thus contributing to the further reduction of the aggregate rate of profit. 
Additionally, through many years of business in particular lines, the firms of the older bloc will 
have accumulated valuable information about markets, formed favourable relationships with 
suppliers and purchasers and developed technical know-how, all of these advantages being 
rendered redundant by withdrawal and diversification. This dynamic was at play in the specific 
context of the emergence of overcapacity in manufacturing in the period 1965-73, when 
uncompetitive US firms had particular reason to remain in their established product lines given 
37 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, pp. 29-32 
38 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, pp. 32-3 
39 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, pp. 33-34 
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their vast accumulation of proprietary intangible assets40. In such a context, higher-cost firms may 
well seek not to withdraw but to defend their markets by speeding up innovative investment in 
fixed capital, provoking their cost-cutting competitors to themselves accelerate technical change 
and worsening the existing over-capacity and over-production. Finally, Brenner identifies further 
factors working against adjustment to over-production such as: the difficulty of diversification in 
situations of declining demand growth caused by the decelerated growth of discretionary incomes 
which must follow the decreased investment and wage growth accompanying falling profitability; 
the entry of still lower-cost producers who cannot ultimately be deterred by falling profitability, 
and; the availability of credit to firms with relatively high costs and low profits, facilitating their 
survival and the perpetuation of over-capacity and depressed aggregate profitability.    
 
For Brenner then, the emergence of crisis in the period 1965-73 constitutes a particular instance of 
a general tendency whereby technological innovation in search of surplus profits results in reduced 
aggregate profitability in a particular sector of the economy. The likely outcome is at least some 
fall in profitability for the economy as a whole, since while capitals external to the lowered-profit 
line gain on account of the reduced costs of their inputs, capital is not usually able to entirely 
prevent some of the benefit accruing to labour due to an increase in real wages on account of the 
reduced prices41. It is important to remember in all this that the explanation Brenner is advancing 
for the emergence of the crisis, grounded in the development of over-capacity and over-production 
on account of the irruption onto the market of lower-cost Japanese and German goods, is 
completely incompatible with supply-side explanations which focus on the failure of wage growth 
to pare down in tandem with declining productivity growth. Indeed, Brenner provides a thoroughly 
convincing conceptual and empirical critique of such ‘profit squeeze’ analyses, whilst basing his 
own theory not on a supposed vertical maldistribution of wealth/power between capital and labour, 
but more soundly upon the destructive effects of unplanned horizontal competition between 
capitals42. His attempt to explain the emergence and development of the secular downturn is thus a 
sketch of a theory of a ‘malign invisible hand’ (the counterpart to Smith’s benign one) which 
describes a self-generating series of steps resulting from the myopic, profit-maximising actions of 
individual capitals leading not towards, but away from adjustment43. In essence, it is an attempt to 
develop concretely an account of the tendency of producers to seek to deploy more and more 
advanced means and methods of production without regard for existing investments and their 
requirements for realisation, the result being decreasing aggregate profitability due to reduced 
prices in the view of downwardly inflexible costs44. 
 
40 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, p. 100 
41 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, p. 31 
42 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, Chapter 1 
43 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, pp. 25-26 
44 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, p. 26 
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Brenner provides a great deal of data to document the emergence of the long downturn in the US in 
the years after 1965. Between that year and 1973, the rates of profit in the manufacturing and 
private business sectors fell by 40.9 percent and 29.3 percent respectively, charting a trajectory 
which would not reach its nadir until the early 1980s45. This despite a fall in the annual growth of 
real compensation to 2.3 percent as compared with 2.6 percent for 1958-65 and 3.1 percent for 
1950-58, coupled with an increased rate of annual labour productivity growth, which reached 3.3 
percent compared with 2.9 percent between 1950 and 1965. Indeed, in terms of their own cost-
effectiveness, US manufacturers performed extremely well in the period 1965-73, with labour 
productivity growth up roughly 10 percent, real wage growth continuing to fall and capital 
productivity being maintained. As previously emphasised, the fall in profitability nevertheless 
suffered resulted not from an upward pressure on costs, but on the downward pressure on prices 
effected by the entry onto the market of lower-cost Japanese and German competition46. In a 
context of rapid material expansion of the global economy, with world exports growing 42 percent 
faster 1963-73 than they did in the previous decade, international competition intensified and the 
lower-cost, later-developing producers in Japan and Germany invaded markets previously 
dominated by the US and the UK47. This is reflected in the 33 percent drop in the US share of the 
manufacturing exports of the main industrial countries – from 24 percent in 1958-65 to 18 percent 
in 1965-73. Likewise, the increasing penetration of the US home market by foreign-made steel, 
automobiles, machinery and consumer electronics finds its statistical verification in average annual 
rates of import growth of 19.1 percent between 1965 and 197048. In the initial phase of the crisis, 
then, US producers experienced a dramatic fall in profitability on account of the rise of over-
capacity and over-production for the advanced economies in aggregate, whilst the weakening of 
returns in the US provoked, due to its share of global output, a reduction in the aggregate rate of 
return for the G-7 of 25 percent49. However, the weakening of US economic performance driven by 
sharply decreasing manufacturing profitability proceeded (to begin with) in parallel with increasing 
rates of profit in Japan and Germany, as the latter proceeded into the final phases of their respective 
post-war booms. Thus, while US manufacturers were suffering the onset of a crisis of profitability, 
the Japanese economy reached the apex of its incredible post-war explosion, growing at an average 
rate of 14 percent between 1965 and 1970, driven by an annual rate of export growth averaging 
17.2 percent. The contradictory nature of such expansion is revealed by the fact that some 54 
percent of Japanese export growth 1963-71 derived from its increasing share of the world market, 
with only 46 percent being achieved through the growth of that market, while virtually the entirety 
of Japan’s relative gain being made at the direct expense of the US and the UK50. The German 
economy followed a similar – though far less steep – trajectory, harnessing labour intensification 
45 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, p. 101 
46 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, pp. 102-109 
47 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, pp. 110-111 
48 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, p. 113 
49 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, p. 117 
50 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, p. 117-119 
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achieved by employers’ attacks, the large-scale recruitment of foreign workers and the collusion of 
the trade union movement in wage repression to achieve labour productivity growth averaging 5.7 
percent 1965-9 and export growth of 10 percent in the same period51.  
 
The foregoing analysis of the emergence of crisis between 1965 and 1973 might seem at first sight 
something of a diversion. However, an understanding of the development of over-production and 
over-capacity in manufacturing – resulting in the reduction of aggregate profitability for the 
advanced capitalist economies – is essential to understand the subsequent processes of 
financialisation and the restructuring of the international financial and monetary regime. In the 
remainder of this section, I will seek to concretise – by way of an analysis of the unfolding crisis 
and the reflexive policies of dominant state-capitals thereto – the import of such developments, 
which brought to new prominence international financial markets. In so doing, I will seek to 
confirm our present hypothesis that these processes should not be understood fundamentally in 
terms of a weakening of state power in the face of financial multinationals and ‘feral’ markets. 
Rather, they must be recognised as reflective of a purposive redesigning of the interstate system by 
dominant state capitals in response to the rising challenge to their fundamental economic 
supremacy.   
 
The Dollar-Wall Street Regime 
 
The weight of the emergence of over-production and over-capacity in international manufacturing 
between the mid 1960s and early 1970s fell initially upon the shoulders of US manufacturers, 
whose costs were high relative to their competitors in Japan and Germany. However, the US as the 
world’s largest economic and military power was unlikely to allow such an arrangement to persist 
and indeed moved decisively to reconstitute the dominance of its capitals. A key mechanism in this 
project was the institution of a new international monetary regime which would enable the US to 
wield ‘monocratic’ power over international monetary affairs52. The context in which such 
monetary re-engineering had to be undertaken was one of mounting speculative pressure on the 
dollar driven by the implosion of the US trade balance, the latter occurring on account of the 
collapse of US exports and the progressive penetration of its home market by foreign goods as 
explained above. In the late 1960s, the US economy was kept afloat in the face of falling 
profitability by growing federal deficits and the provision of cheap credit, which when coupled 
with the fiscal and monetary austerity of the Japanese and German export-driven models 
exacerbated the emergent structural trade imbalances. The consequent growth of substantial US 
current account deficits in parallel with major German and Japanese surpluses produced a 
51 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, pp. 120-121 
52 P. Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington’s Faustian Bid for World Dominance (London: Verso, 1999) , 
p. 19 
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succession of speculative runs on the dollar and ultimately, a world money crisis53. The collapse of 
the Bretton Woods system as the somewhat inevitable consequence of such enormous downward 
pressure on the dollar and corresponding upward pressure on the deutschmark and yen has often 
been presented in terms of defeat for US capitalism. However, Peter Gowan’s insightful analysis of 
the policy decisions of the Nixon administration during the international monetary crisis reveal the 
latter’s officials as deploying “far more strategic insight...than most political scientists would credit 
any government with”54. Indeed, US state actors and capitals were able to shape the end of dollar-
gold convertibility and the oil crisis of 1973 into moments of the re-entrenchment of US economic 
and political dominance.  
 
The dismantling of the Bretton Woods system began in earnest in 1968 when the US reneged on its 
commitment to sell gold to private parties at the set rate of $35 per ounce, such a guarantee 
remaining for central banks at a formal, hypothetical level. This ‘two-tier’ system was itself 
abolished in August 1971 when President Nixon formally suspended the convertibility of dollars 
into gold as part of his ‘New Economic policy’, thereby completing the demonitisation of gold and 
moving the world economy onto a pure dollar standard, with the latter currency becoming a purely 
fiat money55. The advantages of dollar seigniorage for US capital and state managers were 
substantial, especially when coupled with the new role carved out for private financial markets at 
the time of the oil price rise of autumn 1973. Far from the mainstream narrative which conceives 
the price rise as the result of anti-US and anti-Israeli policy around the Yom Kippur war, Gowan 
recognises the key role of the Nixon administration in influencing the oil states, the US having 
lobbied OPEC to greatly increase its oil prices for a full two years before it did so. The rationale 
behind this manoeuvre was based initially upon the recognition that the increased oil price would 
harm the competitiveness of European and Japanese exporters heavily dependent upon oil from the 
Middle East. However, there is evidence from at least 1972 that additionally, the US planned for 
the enormous increase in the dollar earnings of oil states (‘petrodollars’) to be recycled through US 
private banks, insofar as they could not be absorbed by the oil states’ own productive sectors56. The 
consequently swollen international financial markets, centred around Wall Street and its London 
satellite, would have an immediate role to play in financing the trade deficits of non oil-producing 
states, which emerged on account of the soaring costs of their oil imports. Subsequently, Nixon 
took steps to ‘liberate’ the enriched financial markets from the control of central banks through the 
abolition of capital controls in 1974 and by incentivising initially reluctant US banks to recycle 
petrodollars to countries in the South. The upshot is that private finance assumed a role in 
53 Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, p. 122 
54 Gowan, The Global Gamble, p. 21 
55 Gowan, The Global Gamble, pp. 19-20; Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence, pp. 125-8 
56 Gowan, The Global Gamble, p. 21 
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international monetary relations of a qualitatively different nature and scale than it occupied under 
Bretton Woods57.  
 
The complementary coupling of the two moves we have just discussed – the instantiation of the 
dollar standard and the instituted pre-eminence of private financial markets – formed the basis of 
the international financial and monetary system Gowan has called the “Dollar-Wall Street Regime” 
(DWSR). The fundamental strategy of the Nixon administration in fashioning the DWSR after the 
abandonment of the Bretton Woods system was to create a market-based or structural system for 
the maintenance of US political power in the context of increasing competition in commodity 
markets58. The US recognised that dollar seigniorage, combined with the operation of expanding 
financial markets as a ‘political multiplier’ of treasury moves with the dollar, could secure mastery 
over the “dominant” pole of the capitalist economy in a context of the relative erosion of its power 
in the “determining” productive sphere59. Indeed, for Gowan, the DWSR may be regarded as the 
“central nervous system” of globalisation, giving the lie to the narrative of the latter process as a 
purely techno-economic force separate from (and inimical to) state-political controls60. Moreover, 
the process of financialisation is revealed not as simply a gathering of economic momentum 
exogenous to the state, being rather directed and structured by institutional design, the latter 
operating both to determine the shape of the money-capital pole of the economy and also the 
effective balance between the money- and productive-capital poles. The operation of the DWSR 
and the consequent redistribution of the costs of the secular crisis of over-accumulation and 
profitability, as well as the unfolding of the tensions and contradictions inherent in the regime, will 
now be explored in greater detail.  
 
The key privileges afforded the US by the DWSR were: liberation from the balance of payment 
constraints which attended the Bretton Woods system and which continue to limit the macro-
economic policy of other states, and; unparalleled flexibility in the devaluation and revaluation of 
the dollar, the dollar price emerging as a potent weapon of political and economic statecraft. Under 
Bretton Woods, the credit-worthiness and currency stability enjoyed by a state was dependent 
principally upon the status of its current account, whilst the balance of payments deficit which the 
US could accumulate was ultimately limited by the guarantee of dollar-gold convertibility. These 
restraints started to chafe with the emergence of over-accumulation in international manufacturing 
between 1965 and 1973, as US capitals suffered a crisis of profitability and the US trade balance 
collapsed. As American gold reserves became insufficient to cover the dollar surpluses held by 
states such as Germany and Japan on account of their progressive penetration of the US market and 
increasing shares of international commodity markets, it was necessary for the US either to suspend 
57 Gowan, The Global Gamble, pp. 21-22 
58 Gowan, The Global Gamble, p. 23 
59 Gowan, The Global Gamble, pp. 12-15 
60 Gowan, The Global Gamble, pp. 4, 30 
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the free convertibility of the dollar or undertake structural adjustment to rein in its deficit. Choosing 
the former option, the Nixon administration sought to circumvent the US’s fundamental economic 
weaknesses by instantiating private international financial markets as the nexus mediating 
international currency exchange, replacing the oversight previously exercised by the IMF and 
national central banks. Thus, the currency stability of different national monies came to depend 
additionally upon the state’s creditworthiness in international private financial markets61. The 
partiality of this ostensibly neutral reform is revealed when for ‘international’ we read ‘Anglo-
American’ and we remember the status of the dollar as international reserve currency. In effect, the 
new regime allowed the US to decide quite freely upon the price of the dollar, and to direct 
proceedings in financial markets through the Treasury and Federal Reserve, whilst other States 
became increasingly dependent upon developments in such markets for the management of their 
international monetary relations62. Free from the hardship of earning dollars abroad, and with its 
imports and exports in dollar-denominated markets relatively insulated from exchange-rate 
fluctuations, the US thus inaugurated a period of financial turbulence, with profound consequences 
for those states with economies pivoting on the price of certain commodities and dependent upon 
access to financial markets. 
 
Gowan is critical of the use of the descriptor ‘global’ in relation to financial markets, insofar as it 
obscures the ‘power dimension’ of US financial dominance. Instead, the system should be 
recognised as a compartmentalised one dominated by Wall Street and its offshore servicing centre 
in the City of London63. The principal beneficiaries of financial market deregulation were therefore 
financial operators in New York and Washington, especially the large internationally-oriented US 
commercial banks. Such ‘liberation’ also unleashed a competitive dynamic between rival financial 
sectors, which effectively allowed the US, as regulator of the largest, most liquid and thus most 
competitive market, to prefigure the operative levels of financial regulation internationally. Indeed, 
competitive pressure from Wall Street not only urged the isomorphic restructuring of domestic 
financial markets, but also their progressive penetration by New York and London based actors64. 
Crucially, Gowan recognises that states retain the necessary capacities to regulate and restrict the 
activities of financial actors, displaying at various conjunctures remarkable success in reigning in 
problematic behaviour, such as with the Basle Accord in 1988. However, such projects are 
dependent upon US support, whilst conversely deregulation in New York would corrode regulative 
regimes elsewhere, as competing operators sought both to evade statutory restrictions and lobby for 
liberalisation65. A similar domino-effect could be seen in the case of interest rates, as Treasury 
moves with domestic rates largely dictate the cost of credit internationally. This latter area in 
particular gave the US administration a great deal of leverage over the productive activities of 
61 Gowan, The Global Gamble, p. 23 
62 Gowan, The Global Gamble, p. 24 
63 Gowan, The Global Gamble, pp. 26-27 
64 Gowan, The Global Gamble, pp. 26-27 
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foreign capitals and the macro-economic policy of states dependent upon funding from financial 
markets. The credit environment, shaped by a US government more committed to serving the 
interests of its own capitals than maintaining price stability internationally, would determine the 
viability of capital investments and public expenditures alike. Indeed, Washington’s dominance 
within the regime and the global economy afforded it relatively unfettered freedom of policy 
choice, such that the history of US dollar policy within the regime, whilst rational from the 
perspective of US capital, has been cavalier as regards the global economy, wild fluctuations in the 
dollar price and in commodity markets having catalysed recurrent financial crises in the global 
periphery. Somewhat paradoxically, these latter crises have functioned not to weaken the operation 
of the regime, but rather to strengthen it, intensifying the coupling of domestic financial markets 
with Anglo-American ones, and deepening the penetration of US financial (and non-financial) 
corporate influence in the affected regions. This has been achieved through a re-imagination of the 
Bretton Woods organisations, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank (WB), as 
levers for the redistribution of the risks of lending to weaker states: from US banking and financial 
systems/operators to the populations of the borrower countries66. This strategy was pioneered 
during the Latin American financial crisis which began as the US Treasury imposed between 1979 
and 1983 a harsh monetary austerity on the global economy. It essentially involves the leveraged 
imposition of ‘structural adjustment’ programmes which through fiscal reform and market 
liberalisation aim both to guarantee the repayment of debts to creditor institutions and more broadly 
to re-engineer the domestic economy in the interests of US financial and productive capitals67. 
 
The DWSR, considered holistically from its institution to its staggered reproduction and 
entrenchment through crisis, is revealed as an incredibly complex and potent weapon of US 
economic and political statecraft. The US, deploying its diplomatic and military influence in the 
Middle East, was able to procure a substantial increase in the price of crude oil, placing pressure on 
the public finances of states dependent upon imports from that region. The petrodollars generated 
by this process were recycled through Anglo-American financial markets, which were set to work 
(with the required coercion from the Treasury) in supplying credit to states placed in difficulty by 
the oil shock. Concurrently, the dismantling of the monetary system established at Bretton Woods 
moved the world economy onto a pure dollar standard, allowing the US to straddle its fundamental 
economic weaknesses by running huge deficits and using the dollar price to redistribute the costs of 
the emergent crisis of over-production. The effect of US government procured gyrations in the 
dollar price was an extreme volatility in currency exchange and commodity markets, wreaking 
havoc with state finances, particularly those of states dependent upon the export of a small number 
of commodities. Moreover, Treasury moves with US interest rates determined the cost of 
borrowing in international financial markets, which oscillated dramatically between the over-
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supply and violent contraction of credit. Consequently, projects involving productive investment or 
public expenditure would appear viable at one moment (even marginally so, but encouraged by the 
availability of extremely cheap credit), only to become impossible the next. These forms of 
instability promoted the strengthening and entrenchment of the regime in a regular manner by 
encouraging states to build up foreign reserves in dollars to stabilise their currencies and to hedge 
against currency fluctuations by investing in a burgeoning range of foreign exchange derivatives68.  
 
The regime received additional irregular strengthening through the periodic outbreak of localised 
financial crises, which propelled forward the coupling of domestic financial markets with Wall 
Street and allowed the US productive sector access to devalued fixed capital and relatively 
inexpensive labour-powers. The unfolding of these latter processes, whereby control of financial 
flows and thus of macroeconomic policy is progressively wrested from the control of state agencies 
in the affected localities, has been interpreted by some theorists in terms of the leakage of power 
from states to financial markets, often as a symptom of a more generalised decentring of the state in 
the world economy. Rather, given what we now know about the onset of the long downturn with 
the emergence of crisis between 1965 and 1973, and of the development of the DWSR as an 
innovative political and economic response driven by the US as the dominant state-capital, an 
alternative explanation is required. Instead of the decentring of the state as a moment in the 
production and circulation of (surplus-) value and therefore in the accumulation of capital, what has 
occurred should be understood principally in terms of a redistribution (and polarisation) of power 
and influence within the state system. Whilst the capitalist state always exists within a plurality of 
competing states, the relations between the latter are in a process of constant transformation which 
tends towards uneven development, rather than  convergence. As the rates of growth of productive 
investment and effective demand in the global economy fall, a fratricidal struggle develops 
between myopic state-capitals interested in their own accumulation. In such an event, the vastly 
asymmetrical allocations of economic, political and military advantage obtaining between states at 
different stages of development are likely to accentuate and entrench extant polarisations of wealth 
and power. In our present connection, as the post-war period of material expansion of the global 
economy stagnated, the competitive dynamic obtaining between rival state-capitals in the 
manufacturing sector intensified and was transformed in character from a positive- to a zero- or 
even negative- sum game, in which states could procure growth in their productive sectors only by 
increasing market-share at the cost of competitors. In such a struggle, states will deploy any and all 
the competitive advantages they possess – in the instant case the low unit labour costs of German 
and Japanese manufacturing came up against US military and financial pre-eminence. The 
construction of the DWSR allowed the US to improve its cost position by increasing the price of oil 
as a productive input for its competitors and by radically devaluing the dollar whilst escaping the 
consequences which would have attended such a move under the Bretton Woods system. Further, 
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the expanded role of Anglo-American financial markets allowed the US to appropriate a substantial 
rent from more productively dynamic regions of the global economy and to gain control over the 
macroeconomic policy and access to the markets of weaker states insofar as they struggled to adapt 
to international monetary instability. In all of this, the embedded centrality of the state to processes 
of value production and circulation has not at all been diminished. The state-political content of 
financial markets has, recognises Gowan, been obscured by ‘ideological blinkers’ entrenched in the 
academic division of labour between political science and economics69. If we are to hope to 
understand the unfolding dialectical relation between states and the world market, we must 
dispense with these blinkers.  
 
The US’ ‘Wonderful Moment’: the DWSR and the Development of the Long Downturn 
 
It will now be necessary to attempt to combine the work of Brenner and Gowan in an assessment of 
how the policy freedom afforded the US by the DWSR affected the development of the long 
downturn which began with the emergence of crisis in the mid 1960s. This will help to further 
situate the process of financialisation within the interstate system of competing state-capitals 
against a background of international over-production and over-capacity. Subsequently, in Chapter 
3 I will attempt to draw out the interrelation between the state-driven transformation of the 
international monetary and financial system and the changing domestic articulation of financial and 
productive sectors in the advanced capitalist economies. In so doing, I will engage with the 
commonplace observation of domestic state “capture” by corporate and especially financial 
interests in the neoliberal context. This apparent transformation will be explained in terms of a shift 
in power between capital and labour which has resulted from a combination of objective and 
subjective factors prefigured by the erosion of the manufacturing base and a transition to a regime 
of accumulation centred on finance. 
  
As has been discussed, the weight of the emergent crisis of over-capacity and over-accumulation 
between 1965 and 1973 was borne initially by US capitals insofar as they had relatively higher-
costs than their competitors in Germany and Japan. In the early stages, juxtaposed with the onset of 
crisis in the US was the final maturation of the long boom in Germany and Japan, whose capitals 
captured shares in export markets previously held by the US (and the UK), whilst deepening their 
penetration of the US home market. Between autumn 1965 and summer 1970, Japanese GNP 
increased at an average rate of 14 per cent, while manufacturing output grew 15.8 per cent 
annually. Such significant export growth was enabled by (and indeed was the condition for further) 
productivity advances, as Japanese manufacturers were able to combine high rates of productive 
investment (21.1 per cent in the private business economy between 1955 and 1961) with relatively 
low wage growth. Such conditions led to a 20 per cent increase in rate of profit in manufacturing at 
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precisely the time when profitability in the US was in freefall70. In Germany, the combination of 
cost-cutting, labour intensification and an agreement made between Social Democratic government 
and the trade-union movement to repress wages produced an annual rate of export growth of 10 per 
cent 1965-69, coupled with a recovery in profitability of 7.5 per cent71. This balance of forces, 
however, could not hold. The collapse in US exports had a hugely detrimental impact upon its trade 
balance, producing a concomitant explosion of its payments deficit which created ultimately 
unbearable pressure to reorder international rates of exchange72. The dismantling of the Bretton 
Woods system thereby prefigured was a crucial moment in the construction of the DWSR as 
discussed above. The latitude afforded by the regime allowed the US to maintain a low-dollar 
policy, which forced a significant realignment of relative costs between the competing advanced 
capitalist economies. Japanese and German capitals were forced to accept reduced rates of profit if 
they were to maintain their market shares, such that the costs of international over-capacity and 
over-production (which was not, of course, transcended) came to be more evenly distributed73. A 
key moment in this process was the signing of the Smithsonian Agreement in December 1971, 
which in responding to mounting pressure to re-order rates of exchange effected a devaluation of 
the dollar against gold, the mark and the yen by 7.89 percent, 13.5 percent and 16.88 percent 
respectively74. This agreement was however only a partial sedimentation of an underlying process 
which continued apace, as the Nixon administration maintained its pursuit of policies of Keynesian 
stimulus which resulted in the exponential growth of US balance of payments deficits and the 
export of inflation to Germany and Japan, driven by the flight of capital from dollars in search of 
marks and yen. These latter currencies recorded successive new high-water marks against the dollar 
in 1973, while their revaluation amounted cumulatively to 50 percent between 1969 and 1973 for 
the mark and 28.2 percent for the yen in the period 1971-7375. Such significant dollar devaluation 
effected a reordering of relative costs internationally, the competitiveness of US manufacturing 
improving in proportion to the reduction in relative wages brought about by the descent of the 
dollar, the increasing cost of imports and the decline of living standards. This process – expressed 
in an average annual reduction of US relative unit labour costs in manufacturing of 9.5 percent 
between 1971 and 1973 – procured a sharp turnaround in fortunes inasmuch as the spectacular 
decline in US manufacturing profitability recorded between 1965 and 1970 was arrested and even 
partially reversed, while the US trade balance moved back into the black76. However, the 
dismantling of the Bretton Woods system and the emergence of the DWSR could effect only a re-
ordering of relative costs between competing state-capitals within an unchanged broader 
international context of over-capacity and over-production. The only possible remedy would be the 
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destruction of capital (both as value and as a social relation) on a massive scale. This was mitigated 
against both by the logics discussed above concerning the rationality for higher-cost capitals to 
remain in their established lines of production and by the unwillingness of the Nixon 
administration and its Berlin and Tokyo counterparts to countenance the political and economic 
costs of such adjustment. The recovery of US manufacturing could therefore be only at the direct 
cost of German and Japanese capitals, which began to ‘shoulder the burden’ of the international 
profitability crisis between 1969 and 1973. In this period, German manufacturing profitability fell 
by 30 percent, firms being unable in an intensely competitive context to raise their prices in 
proportion to increasing relative costs without ceding market share, while also suffering reduced 
export growth. Meanwhile, Japanese manufacturing lost much of its competitive advantage as a 
result of sharp yen revaluation, descending into crisis as a result of two downwards steps in 
profitability, occurring 1970-71 and 1972-7377. 
 
The oil crisis which developed 1974-5 dealt a further blow to a Japanese economy which was 
heavily dependent upon imports from the Middle East. While increased energy costs had of course 
a less severe impact upon the oil-rich US, they lead across the advanced capitalist world to 
accelerating inflation and a further dip in profits, which was combated by the imposition of 
monetary tightness. This later move induced marked deflation, reduced profitability and catalysed 
what was at that point the greatest recession since the 1930s. In this fashion the advanced capitalist 
world entered a twenty-year period in which profitability in manufacturing and private business 
would remain below the already-diminished level of 1973 for the US, Germany, Japan and the G-7 
in aggregate. This long downturn, which today still remains to be transcended, registered in 
substantially reduced rates of growth of capital stock, labour productivity and international trade. 
Concurrently, average unemployment in the G-7 economies more than doubled from 3.1 percent in 
the period 1960-73 to 6.5 percent for 1973-1995, while governments retrenched social provision. 
Disciplined by a fraying safety net and a growing reserve labour army, the balance of power shifted 
in favour of capital and workers were forced to accept falling wages as employers attempted to 
displace the cost of the crisis78. Between 1973 and 1979, real wage growth in manufacturing in the 
G-7 countries averaged 1.4 percent and fell further to 0.5 percent 1979-89, compared with some 4.4 
percent between 1968 and 1973. Similarly as regards the socialised wage, the growth of real 
government final consumption expenditures fell from 3.2 percent 1973-79 to 2.4 percent 1973-
1979 and further to 2.2 percent 1979-89. These processes, prefigured by the attendant structural 
conditions, were specifically enabled in the US by direct attacks on labour organisation and in 
Japan by agreements between unions and employers to restrain wage growth and increase 
productivity79.  
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The sharp downwards adjustment of wages failed to revive profitability in manufacturing, which 
suffered a further significant fall in the G-7 countries in the 1970s, seemingly contradicting the 
profit-squeeze theory of the persistence of the long downturn. The private business economy 
outside of manufacturing however, relatively isolated as it was from international competition, was 
able as a result of wage repression to recover from the relatively minor reduction in profitability it 
suffered before 1973. Thus, between 1973 and 1978 and despite the deep recession 1974-75, the G-
7 non-manufacturing profit rate fell only 4 percent compared with some 25 percent for 
manufacturing, whilst the former sector was able by the 1980s to surpass its 1973 profit rate. 
Moreover, the private business economy outside of manufacturing was able to consistently achieve 
rates of output, employment and capital stock growth greater than or equal to pre-1973 rates 
throughout the long downturn80. The employers’ offensive that followed hot on the heels of the 
outbreak of crisis was able, therefore, to restore growth and profitability in the non-manufacturing 
sectors, but could not lift the global economy out of the long downturn, which was driven by 
chronic over-capacity and over-production in the manufacturing sector. The divergence in growth 
rates and profitability between the manufacturing and service sectors in the advanced capitalist 
economies was a tendency which would develop throughout the remainder of the twentieth century 
and into the new millennium. Incumbent high-cost productive capitals in the US, Japan and 
Germany chose to accept reduced profitability and defend proprietary intangible assets and invest 
in new means of production rather than exit product lines, while the ever-increasing share of export 
markets seized by the newly industrialising countries (NICs) in East Asia exacerbated over-
capacity. There occurred therefore a migration of capital in the US, UK, Germany and Japan from 
the productive sector to that of services – particularly finance, insurance and real estate – in search 
of improved profitability81.  
 
While the persistence of over-capacity and over-production in manufacturing continued to fetter the 
growth of the global economy and as the West in aggregate continued to cede market share to the 
fundamentally more competitive developing economies of the East, the burden of over-capacity 
shifted among the G7 economies, pivoting around the axis constituted by rates of exchange. In an 
attempt to overcome the 1974-75 recession governments returned to loose monetary policy and 
deficit spending, while the Carter administration exploited the DWSR to maintain a low dollar 
policy and maximise the competitiveness of US capitals vis-à-vis their international competitors82. 
The improvement in US relative costs brought about by dollar devaluation, the highly successful 
project of wage-repression in the US and the oil price hike allowed US exports to grow at an 
average of 5.8 percent between 1973 and 1979. Nevertheless, manufacturing profitability continued 
to fall – some 25 percent during the oil crisis and remaining even in 1978 some 12 percent below 
its 1973 level. The accumulation of fiscal deficits and the connected growth of private indebtedness 
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had provided a monetary form of Keynesian demand stimulus which once again prevented 
worsening over-capacity from producing its ultimate catharsis, as debt creation and loose monetary 
policy helped to bail the world economy out of the recession of 1974-75 and kept the wheels 
turning through the rest of the decade. The tenability of such temporary solutions was necessarily 
limited however, as deficit spending prevented the shakeout of high-cost capitals, stimulated 
inflation and placed such pressure on the dollar as, even with the buffer provided by the DWSR, to 
threaten its status as international reserve currency83. By 1979, the US was ready to abandon 
Keynesianism and lead an international volte-face in favour of inflation-busting monetary austerity 
and fiscal restraint84. 
 
Beginning 1979-1980, the governments of the G7 imposed an unprecedented monetary tightness 
combined with harsh fiscal austerity designed to discipline wage growth, shakeout uncompetitive 
capitals previously subsidised by deficit spending and reduce state expenditure85. The Atlantic 
alliance formed between Reagan and Thatcher was able to construct a hegemonic narrative of the 
crisis which laid the blame for weak economic performance punctuated by recurrent recessions at 
the door of irresponsible trade unions, high wages, restrictive regulation and burdensome taxation. 
The crisis was, supposedly, a supply side one – thus, the appropriate remedy was to remove 
‘political’ impediments to business in the form of labour organisation and government intervention. 
As revolutionary a figure as Thatcher or Reagan, Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volker 
dramatically increased interest rates and adopted a strong dollar policy in sharp contrast to the 
freefalling greenback of the early years of the Carter presidency. Effectively, the Fed was 
attempting to return to dominance one pole of functionality of the money commodity as against its 
opposing other – that of money as a measure of value in opposition (within a dialectical unity) to 
money as a means of circulation86. While loose monetary policy had lubricated circulation at the 
cost of inflation as the erosion of the national money, Volker’s policy aimed at restoring the dollar 
as a stable measure of value. The latter orientation would favour the financial sector inasmuch as 
controlling inflation secured returns for interest-bearing capital, while it would in contrast erode the 
international price position of US productive capitals. Logically enough, then, Volker’s monetary 
policy met with Reagan’s moves to deregulate the banking and financial sectors, and significantly 
reduce corporate tax rates in order to stimulate the valorisation of stock market values87. Here then 
is another example of a shift in the character and volume of flows of value in the sphere if 
circulation, and indeed of the balance between the latter sphere and that of production, arising as a 
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result of the deliberate action of state managers pursuing particular strategies of accumulation in a 
developing macro-economic and political context.  
 
While Reaganite monetary tightness and fiscal austerity was designed to catalyse a competitive 
dynamic that would cleanse the US economy of high-cost, low-profit firms, the pulling of these 
macro-economic levers proved to be like using a roller brush to paint a delicate watercolour. The 
induced reduction in aggregate demand did push many high-cost firms to the wall, effecting some 
degree of rationalisation of US manufacturing, yet it indiscriminately endangered cost-effective 
firms, while removing the purchasing power required to enable producers to move into new lines of 
production. Further, the result internationally was to push a fragile global economy into what was 
at that point the deepest recession since the 1930s, such that a backtracking Federal Reserve began 
to loosen the supply of credit, while the Reagan administration, elected on an austerity ticket, 
embarked upon the most extensive programme of deficit spending ever seen88. It was these record-
breaking US fiscal deficits which, in a re-run of the mid-1970s, pulled the global economy out of 
the recession of the early 1980s. If, like Brenner, we insist on applying to this policy the descriptor 
‘Keynesian’, it must be remembered that this was Keynesianism only for the rich – combined with 
Reaganite supply-side measures to weaken organised labour, restrain wage growth and cut taxation, 
the measures effected an enormous upwards redistribution of wealth, whilst the accumulation of 
public debt meant the effective alienation to investors of significant claims upon the surplus 
produced by the future exploitation of American labour89. Reagan’s policies certainly hurt working 
people and did help to produce a sustained cyclical upturn, but could not instigate a new cycle of 
capital accumulation inasmuch as it did not alter the underlying conditions of over-capacity and 
over-production in manufacturing which prefigured a zero-sum game for exporters in saturated 
markets90. 
 
While the 1980s saw the US government embrace the financiers domestically, Reagan also 
oversaw in the international sphere an extensive and intensive expansion of the DWSR. First of all, 
the US launched a campaign for the removal of capital controls in all the advanced capitalist 
countries, which achieved in the space of a decade the liberalisation of financial movements in 
Holland, Denmark, Italy, France and Japan, as well as playing a pivotal role in the creation of the 
European Single Market. Such developments facilitated huge inward flows of liquidity into US 
financial markets, these being necessary to avoid crippling US domestic interest rates arising as a 
consequence of the continuing high dollar policy91. Additionally, when the Latin American and 
East Central European debt crises broke (catalysed by the Federal Reserve’s high dollar and 
interest rate policies), the Anglo-American financial nexus was paradoxically strengthened due to 
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capital flight from affected countries and those fearing contagion. Further, in a financial form of 
Naomi Klein’s ‘Shock Doctrine’, the US began to capitalise upon the crises as an opportunity to 
increase the penetration of its capitals in these regions, using the affected states’ indebtedness as a 
lever to pry open domestic financial regimes and export markets. The US also encouraged crisis-
bound states to construct domestic stock markets and remove capital account controls, creating 
playgrounds for US-based speculators. All of these activities would be institutionalised and 
ideologically legitimated by the re-invention of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World 
Bank (WB) – cast initially into the wilderness by the development of the DWSR – as ‘facade-
cosmopolitan’ agencies working to advance the interests of US capital92. Beginning with the 
project of generalised structural adjustment launched at the IMF/WB meeting in October of 1985 in 
Seoul, these organisations came to function as defenders of the integrity of the international 
financial system – a system dominated by the US through exploitation of the DWSR. Debt-ridden 
Latin American state-capitals had become dependent upon financial markets for shelter from the 
commodity price and exchange rate turbulence prefigured by the move to the dollar standard and 
for relief from the sky-rocketing prices resulting from the oil crisis. Now, the only available route 
out of the immediate debt crisis would lead them into a decaying orbit around the core of the 
Anglo-American financial system, its irresistible gravitational force leading ultimately to the 
surrendering of control over domestic fiscal and monetary policy. States were forced to sell off 
public assets including privatised utilities and to liberalise their capital accounts in order to earn 
foreign currency with the aim of rebalancing current accounts and to attract inward flows of hard-
currency funds. The numerous abstract rules and norms of neoclassical economics provided a rich 
resource for rationalising these processes, inasmuch as there could always be selectively 
emphasised parts of the domestic regime which were incompatible with one or other of these 
mantric prescriptions93.  
 
Gowan describes the stilted and contradictory development of the DWSR in terms of a ‘dialectics 
of progress through blundering gambles’94 - clearly, this is not some unfolding of a meticulously 
prepared master-plan. Yet, as we have seen, neither can the deepening of international financial 
relations and the correspondingly central role played by financial markets and actors in mediating 
flows of capital internationally be understood in technocratic isolation from the antagonistic 
development of the inter-state system. The global economy, as a continuously developing and 
contradictory unity of production and circulation, is both the product of the interactions of 
competing state-capitals and the shifting context within which these capitals and state managers 
seek reflexively to (re-)orient their activities. The lessons learned by the Reagan administration – 
that the instability accompanying the new international financial and monetary regime could be 
productive inasmuch as localised crises provided opportunities for financially-levered 
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expropriation – were not lost on the incoming George H. W. Bush. The neoliberal experiments 
conducted in Latin America, now possessing the legitimacy of a ‘global development paradigm’, 
were rehearsed again in Eastern Europe amidst the ruins of the USSR. US financial operators 
acquired huge quantities of devalued Russian assets, earned stratospheric returns trading East 
European public debt in the bond markets and received large injections of flight capital of often 
dubious origin95. Additionally, and perhaps even more crucially, territories ceded by the US’ 
biggest international rival were drawn into a relation of debt dependence with Wall Street. 
Moreover, such dependence was mediated increasingly by short-term loans and debt securities 
which were insecure in comparison with the long-term syndicated bank loans that had characterised 
the initial recycling of petrodollars to the global south96. 
 
The DWSR which Clinton inherited in 1993 had already sustained itself for two decades and had 
been successful in increasing the influence of Wall St in the global economy and in eroding the 
regulative barriers obtaining between national financial systems and US-dominated international 
financial markets. Additionally, the evolving regime had found an increasingly central role for the 
IMF as a public authority charged with imposing the interests of the regime and supervising the 
effects thereof in the affected states of Latin America and Eastern Europe. Unwilling (and indeed 
unable) to rest on its laurels, the Clinton administration sought to radicalise the DWSR as an 
increasingly dynamic weapon of national economic statecraft and as a mode of instituting new 
restrictions on the domestic policy of states97. In order to understand the ‘radical activism’ of the 
Clinton regime, Gowan seeks to develop a rough analytical framework suitable to understand 
‘national interests’ – especially those of a dominant state-capital – in contemporary capitalism. In 
doing so, he addresses the commonplace assumption of mainstream political economy that 
international regimes coordinating national policies are essentially technical responses to regulative 
requirements operating within a fundamental context of ‘deep harmony’ between the economic 
interests of state-capitals98. For Gowan, this very Eden of free and equal exchange elides a 
competitive reality better understood by a re-emergent neo-mercantilist scholarship as grounded in 
a political struggle for national prosperity between hierarchically-organised states each seeking to 
manipulate its external environment for national advantage in trade99. However, whilst the neo-
mercantilist view correctly understands the development of the international division of labour as a 
path-dependent process obtaining between competing states whose strategic action modifies the 
theoretically posited ‘normal’ operation of international markets, it fails to account for the varieties 
and degrees of fratricide and fraternity that exist between permanent economic warfare and the 
idealised cooperation of the mainstream model. For Gowan, the development of a more nuanced 
model would require the conscientious explication of the social mediations connecting the 
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‘economic’ and the ‘political’ as emphasised by the concept of capitalism as a social system100. 
Proceeding on this basis and with the ultimate goal of analysing the development of the DWSR 
under Clinton, he outlines a number of ‘conceptual rules of thumb’ for identifying the interests of 
powerful capitalist states and addressing how these may be institutionally articulated in regimes of 
international competition and cooperation.  
 
Fundamentally, Gowan observes that as regards economics, the national interest must be 
understood as the national capitalist interest, inasmuch as capitalists are the economically-
sovereign social group owning productive labour and thereby mediating the access of elected 
politicians to productivity and growth. State managers must serve the particular interests of the 
employers of capital in order to create and sustain the economic conditions necessary to ensure 
(narrowly) electoral success and (broadly) the fiscal and political integrity of the state domestically 
as wells as its competitive position internationally. The fortunes of a state and its capitals are 
essentially intertwined inasmuch as the latter’s position in international markets informs the state’s 
trade balance and, by extension and in the long run, its capacity to maintain order at home and 
project its military and diplomatic power abroad. Beyond this fundamental symmetry however, at 
any particular time state interests and those of capitals (organised both as warring individual firms 
and rival fractions) are not un-problematically convergent, while much will depend on global 
macro-economic conditions and the related structure and intensity of domestic and international 
competition. Gowan is correct to emphasise the role of top civil servants101 in ascertaining and 
presenting the strategic interests of the state, their technical expertise and secure tenure enabling 
them to provide long-term perspectives in relative isolation from the cyclical imperatives of the 
political system. However, in my view he likely understates the extent to which national interest 
formation remains an open-ended discursive process undertaken among different fractions of the 
capitalist class, allied classes and contextually influential sections of the organised working class, 
or otherwise by the ideological and political representatives of these groups. 
 
Given the highly-monopolised character of the productive sectors in advanced capitalist economies, 
states are required domestically to facilitate the concentration and centralisation of capital, as well 
as to provide a vast range of infrastructural and labour-training support services for monopolistic 
companies102. In the international context, states are charged – in view of the developmental 
trajectory of global commodity markets and the cost position of their capitals therein – to intervene 
systematically to secure the strategic objectives of their monopoly capitals. Such activity being an 
essential requirement in conditions of monopolistic rivalry, the state is tasked particularly with 
using its geo-political influence to: secure access to raw materials important as productive inputs; 
to control international markets in intensely competitive contexts; and to make available sources of 
100 Gowan, The Global Gamble, p. 63 
101 Gowan, The Global Gamble, p. 65 
102 Gowan, The Global Gamble, pp. 63-64 
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both highly skilled labour in high productivity sectors and of cheap labour for labour-intensive 
processes103. However, far from being a full-spectrum war of one against all for materials, markets 
and labour-powers, this struggle is structured by an uneven international ‘division of capital’ 
whereby states develop path-dependent regimes of accumulation built upon different combinations 
of sectoral strengths. Thus, in a manner dependent upon developing macroeconomic and 
competitive conditions, states enter into more or less formalised associations based on their degrees 
of ‘capital fit’104, e.g. an economy specialising in machine tools and automobile manufacture may 
become symbiotically intertwined with another possessing competitive advantages in finance or 
agriculture. Of course, such forms of ‘international cartelisation’ are fundamentally unstable, 
inasmuch as competitive relations between associated states can quickly slide in nature from 
positive-sum to zero- or even negative-sum on account of stagnating effective demand and/or 
monetary tightness.  
 
Having sketched the conceptual outlines of an understanding of ‘national interests’ in the context of 
highly integrated and oligopolistic global markets, Gowan is in a position to identify the key 
strategic interests of the United States as the dominant capitalist state and to begin to understand 
the on-going reflexive re-configuration of the DWSR. To begin with, the world map is for the 
dominant capitalist state transfigured from an atlas identifying geographical boundaries and 
geological curiosities to a cartograph of capitalist geo-strategic priorities. Of particular import to a 
leading state-capital is: control over economically strategic raw materials, such as fossil fuels, 
minerals and rare metals; secured access to presently and prospectively crucial labour pools, and; 
command over the key markets for value realisation, especially in relation to strategically 
significant sectors. Consequently, even in a period marked by the geographical expansion and 
integration of financial and productive networks, really big markets remain confined to North 
America, Western Europe and Japan, wherein also resides the bulk of skilled labour. It is 
imperative therefore for the leading state to entrench its influence in these limited areas, whilst 
training a speculative eye on developing regions. Practically, the dominant state-capital would seek 
rationally to secure the ‘institutional openness’ of core markets and labouring populations to the 
operations of its capitals – by negotiating preferential tariff regimes, seeking to integrate domestic 
financial markets with Wall street and ensuring that local regulative regimes facilitate FDI and 
hostile takeovers – and to maintain privileged access to (or to otherwise control the supply of) 
essential raw materials. The remaining mass of the earth’s population and territory is then relegated 
to merely auxiliary significance, becoming the subject of extraordinary attention only insofar as it 
is necessary to prevent systemic contagion arising from localised political or military 
disturbances105.  
 
103 Gowan, The Global Gamble, p. 65 
104 Gowan, The Global Gamble, p. 66 
105 Gowan, The Global Gamble, p. 67-68 
79 
 
                                                     
CHAPTER 2 
 
States, Capitals and the Regionalisation of Production 
 
States and Capitals 
 
In this second chapter I will deepen the explanatory framework presented in Chapter 1 by 
developing an account of the elementary coupling which underlies an analysis of the global 
economy as the product of the competitive interaction of rival state-capitals – the functional 
interrelation of states and capitals. If the first chapter theorises the development of the global 
economy by surveying the interaction of state capitals as its atoms, this second chapter interrogates 
the nuclear force of these elementary particles. In doing so, I will seek to problematise the liberal 
conception of the fundamental opposition obtaining state and market, in order to recover an 
understanding of the ‘instituted’ nature of market relations and to emphasising the structural 
interdependence of states and capitals and the immanence of state functions to the production and 
circulation of value. This liberal conception may be seen to compromise the work of Boaventura de 
Sousa Santos, who in a discussion of the literature on ‘economic globalisation’, imports mostly 
uncritically the received wisdom on the rising prominence of MNCs and the concomitant 
usurpation of the nation state as the driving force behind global political and economic processes. 
According to Santos, MNCs – or for him, transnational corporations (TNCs) – have as a result of 
the globalisation of production and financial markets risen “to a new and unprecedented pre-
eminence as international actors”1. Indeed, TNCs should be regarded as the primary apparatus of a 
‘transnational capitalist class’, the emergence of which has contributed to the nation-state losing 
“its traditional centrality as the privileged unit of economic, social and political initiative”2. This 
corporate transnational bourgeoisie, operating through a network of institutions – including the 
IMF, World Bank and US corporate law firms – clustered around TNCs as its nucleus, has thus 
become the “principal actor in the globalization of the economy”3. William Twining, whilst 
hypothesising that nation-states might have more “staying power” than Santos suggests4, considers 
their continuing significance in terms of their being “among the most powerful kind of actors” in an 
increasingly diversified global arena characterised by a general (if not inevitable) decline in the 
importance of national and societal boundaries5. It seems then that for Santos and Twining, while 
the state may remain an important actor in a globalised (or globalising) capitalist system, its role 
has been relativised by the emergence of competing actors or networks thereof. Thus, the extent to 
which the state may be said to fulfil the function of directing or framing international economic 
processes has been to some degree diminished, with investment, production and trade being 
1 B. de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization and Emancipation 2nd Edn. 
(London: Butterworths, 2002), p. 178 
2 Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense, p. 168 
3 Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense, p. 183 
4 W. Twining, Globalisation & Legal Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 238 
5 Twining, Globalisation & Legal Theory, pp. 8-9 
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increasingly carried on across (and in defiance of) jurisdictional boundaries. In my view, this 
narrative – which appears elsewhere in a less measured, even hyperbolic form – is problematic 
insofar as it fails to understand, far less to describe, the connections between MNCs as economic 
actors and the developing architecture of the inter-state system. In this model, MNCs appear as de-
moored from the solid foundation of state power which allow their international projection, whilst 
their continuing dependence on juridical power to lubricate each moment of their capital circuits is 
veiled. As a consequence, globalisation (at least in this respect) may appear to be a technocratic 
process taking place in isolation from, and often in opposition to, the state system. My own view is 
substantially different insofar as I consider dominant state-capitals to be the central agency behind 
global developments in the epoch of financialised late capitalism, while there exists and is 
reproduced a profound (though sometimes tense) mutual penetration of interests between 
internationally-acting capitals and the international and domestic interests of their related state 
managers. In the opening chapter I attempted, drawing on Marxist political economy and world 
systems theory, to explain the present contingent structure of the international system by 
historically contextualising the extant state of global capitalist development. Within the framework 
of that discussion, I will in the present chapter map conceptually the dynamic relation between 
states and capitals and plot its contemporary unfolding. 
 
An initial problem which confronts an attempt to theorise the import of MNCs is definitional – 
what degree of geographical diffusion of activity is required before a capital may be regarded as 
trans- or multi-national? In characteristic fashion, many globalisation theorists neglect to define 
exactly what they mean by an MNC – indeed, neither Santos nor Twinning establish working 
criteria. The gravity of what might otherwise be considered to be merely a semantic problem is 
revealed when we consider Kevin Doogan’s findings that even amongst the largest of MNCs, the 
domestic economy provides the key market and base of operations. Strikingly, the average 
“transnationality index” for the top 100 MNCs has been since the 1990s only 50%, meaning that 
the domestic activities of even the largest MNCs – which account disproportionately for overseas 
employment, asset ownership and sales – are equally as important as their combined international 
activities, while of the 14.85 million employees of those corporations, some 7.37 were employed in 
the home country6. Moreover, studies of the distribution of domestic and global activities of US 
MNCs have shown that the ratio between the two spheres of activity has been the subject of only 
extremely minor variation in the decades between 1977 and 2006, despite this period being the key 
point of reference for much theorisation of globalisation7. Further research has suggested that 
corporate ‘globalisation’ may be better understood as ‘regionalisation’ insofar as such 
internationalisation follows the ‘triadisation’ of the global economy effected by advanced 
6 K. Doogan, New Capitalism? The Transformation of Work (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), p. 72. Sourced from 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) World Investment Reports 2001, 
2004 and 2006, available at: www.unctad.org [accessed 15 October 2011]  
7 K. Doogan, New Capitalism?, p. 74 
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accumulation in North America, Western Europe and East Asia. Alan Rugman has shown that to 
the extent that MNCs operate outwith their home market, they do so overwhelmingly on a regional 
rather than truly global basis, with 320 of the 380 largest firms in the world averaging 80% of their 
sales within their home region8. Further, as of 2001, only 9 enterprises met the criteria specified by 
Rugman as necessary for the firm to be characterised as truly ‘global’ – that of achieving at least 
20% of sales in each of the triad regions but less than 50% in any one region9.  
 
In addition to the revealing data produced by such researches, the methodology employed by 
Doogan, Rugman and others is instructive insofar as it re-couples the unbounded, fluid motion 
which characterises many accounts of globalisation with the materiality and territorial 
embeddedness of internationally networked production. It is no surprise for Rugman, grounded as 
his approach – based upon transaction cost economics – is in the practicalities of networked 
production, that eight out of the nine corporations he reveals as most genuinely ‘global’ deal in the 
manufacture and distribution of computer and electrical equipment, given the high value to weight 
ratio of such products10. It is perhaps trivial, but nonetheless vital to remember that however 
footloose and mobile capital may appear, it must ultimately refer to spatially and temporally 
bounded processes of production whereby variable and circulating capital are combined with fixed 
capital infrastructure in such a manner as to produce a socially viable (competitive) product in view 
of the coercive operation of the law of value in the global market. This is, as we have explored, is 
the case regardless of whether capital is one step (in the case of finance capital) or two steps 
(securities markets) removed from the productive processes of the real economy.  
 
The re-embodiment of the apparently weightless economy described by many globalisation 
theorists reveals a primary avenue of corporate dependence upon, and interconnection with, state 
apparatuses.  States, as the concentrated distillate of social power, harness in most territories 
unrivalled resources for the regulation of territory and population and are the glue which holds 
together the multi-dimensional social space required for the regular extraction and realisation of 
surplus value. While there are undoubtedly zones in which corporations, through the deployment of 
private security forces, internalise many of functions necessary to protect processes of resource 
extraction and commodity distribution, fundamental problems of efficiency and practicality arise 
when these are dissociated from a rationalising and legitimising juridico-political framework. 
Moreover, the revelation of the residual, and central, importance of the home market to the 
operations of even the largest MNCs, combined with an acknowledgement of regional-specificity 
of international networks of production, concretises the operation of transnational capital within 
8 A. Rugman & A. Verbeke, ‘Towards a theory of regional multinationals: a transaction cost economics 
approach’ (2005) 1(Special Issue) Management International Review 5 
9 A. Rugman, ‘Globalization and regional international production’ in J. Ravenhill (ed.), Global Political 
Economy (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2004), p. 264 See discussion in A. Callinicos, Imperialism and 
Global Political Economy (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), pp. 202-3   
10 A. Rugman, ‘Globalization and regional international production’, p. 284 
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specific processes of domestic economy-making and regional integration. Tony Smith, in his 
“systematic Marxist account” of Globalisation, provides a valuable discussion of the centrality of 
state regulatory and disciplinary capacities to corporate ‘globalisation’. To begin with, Smith 
reminds us that the state is an integral part of the social relations of capital, rather than existing 
outside those relations. It is thus necessary to unpack liberal commonsense assumptions regarding 
the antagonism between state and market – assumptions which when transposed into the 
international sphere have helped to generate the supposed opposition between states and MNCs. 
The most basic function fulfilled by the state in ensuring the reproduction of capital accumulation 
is the legislation and enforcement of the property rights which are presupposed and generated by 
commodity production and circulation11. The necessity of ensuring the protection of these rights is 
not diminished by the internationalisation of production – indeed, the issue may be seen to become 
all the more acute in the case of the insertion of capitalist enterprise into social contexts structured 
by mixed modes of production, where local populations haven’t necessarily been generationally 
disciplined into regimes of wage labour. Further, Smith emphasises the role played by the state in 
the institution and maintenance of the stability of the national monetary regime, highlighting 
additionally the role played by public debt in fuelling accumulation12. Michel Aglietta, in his 
classic work A Theory of Capitalist Regulation explicates the role of the state as bearer of the 
monetary constraint in modifying and temporarily displacing the effects of the latter in order to 
ensure the coherence of the extant regime of accumulation13. Following Aglietta, we should 
recognise the crucial role of the state in guaranteeing the authority of the central bank as lender of 
last resort and enforcing the currency of the central money it issues14. This situation is not 
fundamentally altered by policy decisions to place central banks such as the Bank of England on 
more or less independent organisational footings, which should in any event be seen as effecting a 
re-articulation rather than a substantial weakening of the relationship between government and 
central banks. Moreover, the centrality of public spending to capital accumulation in the context of 
the development of business cycles should be acknowledged, with Aglietta’s understanding of the 
incursion of public debt as a mode of securing consumption (and by implication, social cohesion) 
in light of the malfunction of the fordist regime of accumulation being particularly pertinent15. 
Aglietta’s point is negatively reinforced by the impact of the sovereign debt crisis upon financial 
markets and the likelihood that austerity measures will catalyse a descent into a new period of 
economic contraction. 
 
To return to Smith, in addition to the general role played by the state in securing the property rights 
presupposed and produced by generalised commodity production, the state performs a specific 
function in mediating by contractual regulation the alienation of that commodity which forms the 
11 T. Smith, Globalisation: A Systematic Marxist Account (Chicago: Haymarket, 2009), p. 222 
12 Smith, Globalisation, pp. 222-3, fn. 3 
13 M. Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation: The US Experience (London: Verso, 2000), pp. 328-379 
14 Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, p. 349 
15 Aglietta, A Theory of Capitalist Regulation, p. 427 
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pivot of the process of accumulation – labour. As will be discussed more fully in the following 
chapter, the state plays a crucial role in instituting the regime of wage labour and subsequently 
securing the continued availability of labour-powers in sufficient quantity and with the ability to 
work with the requisite degree of productivity. This latter task, whilst being an essential 
precondition for accumulation, lies outwith the circuit describing the motion of any individual 
industrial capital, and is generally accomplished either entirely or predominantly outside of its 
organisational domain. The MNC operating in an overseas territory is therefore reliant upon the 
state apparatus to regulate employment relations in such a manner as to balance accumulation and 
social cohesion, whilst more broadly coordinating social reproduction by the regulation of 
households and communities and the administration of the penal system16. Such a regulatory 
function will tend in periods of general overaccumulation to obtain an especially dynamic and 
coercive character, state apparatuses being the lever for the eradication of traditions and customary 
rights necessitated by the subsumption of ever greater depths of the natural and social world within 
circuits of accumulation17. Another state function required by progressive accumulation is the 
regular revisiting of categories of legal personality and permissible organisational and contractual 
forms in line with the developing concentration and centralisation of capital.  
 
In addition to those mentioned above, Smith considers several further state functions which have 
seemingly survived the latter’s relativisation under conditions of globalisation. Specifically, the 
state continues to play a central role in the discovery and implementation of technological advances 
by providing support for education and training, funding for infrastructure and research, whilst also 
instituting strategic partnerships with business for specific projects18. Indeed, Smith argues that the 
states which are most often held up as neoliberal success stories – such as Korea, Taiwan and 
China – may be better understood as having generated growth through the adoption of a ‘catalytic’ 
or ‘developmental’ state form. This involves the strategic nurturing of key sectors of industry 
through the provision of extremely cheap credit, the institution of protective regimes of tariff and 
non-tariff restrictions on trade, robust restrictions upon Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and the 
regulation of inflows of financial capital in order to maintain local control of banks and key firms19. 
While innovation is a key competitive weapon in the global market, enabling the appropriation of 
surplus profits, it is also the central component of Marxist theories of overaccumulation and the 
financial crises which are symptomatic thereof. It is in relation to such crises that Smith recognises 
a further role of the state, insofar as the latter in accordance with its ideological and political 
orientation can affect the unfolding of the crisis, deploying counter-cyclical relief measures or – as 
16 Smith, Globalisation, pp. 223-6 
17 Smith, Globalisation, pp. 226 
18 Smith, Globalisation, pp. 227-8 
19 Smith, Globalisation, pp. 88-96 
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is pertinent in the present context – displacing the cost of the crisis onto working people, the 
unemployed, the elderly and other disadvantaged groups20.  
 
Beyond specific functional delineation, Smith makes a more fundamental argument about the 
nature of the capitalist state, returning to the starting point that the state forms an integral part of 
the social relations of capitalist society, the organising principle of which is the self-valorisation of 
value. Proceeding from this foundation, Smith unpacks the dichotomy between particular and 
universal interests which grounds the widely-held understanding of the state as an institutional 
order established to pursue the ‘universal’ interest in the production of public goods and avoidance 
of public bads. For him, the operation of this dichotomy obfuscates the fact that the animating logic 
of capitalist society is the accumulation of money capital, while the location of the capitalist state 
in the sphere of the ‘universal’ is incompatible with its role in reproducing the fundamental social 
relation of capitalist society – the wage-labour relation – and the antagonisms which accompany 
it21. For Smith, the only truly ‘universal’ interests in capitalist society are those of the accumulation 
of capital, while the particular interests which are represented in any given state formation are the 
product of the discursive, reconciliatory interaction of different class fractions led by a dominant 
fraction of the capitalist class. For Smith, this latter alliance, understood in terms of the Gramscian 
concept of ‘ruling bloc’, operates primarily in the institutional setting provided by the state 
apparatus. Thus, it may be said that a further function of the state is to provide the discursive and 
organisational framework for the negotiation and institutionalisation of the reconciled inter- and 
intra-class interests of the ruling bloc with regard to the management of crucial preconditions for 
continued accumulation22.  
 
By way of the functional elaboration of the immanence of the state-form to capitalist relations of 
production, Smith provides a powerful corrective to the analysis of the state ‘decentred’ by 
globalisation. However mobile we perceive finance capital to be, however numerous are the exit 
options for industrial capital embedded in a particular locality, however developed is the 
regionalisation of production chains and however dense are networks of international trade – the 
reproduction of capitalist social relations in any environment requires the fulfilment of the essential 
functions of capitalist states described by Smith. Indeed, the operation of state apparatuses is 
necessary to facilitate the progressive internationalisation of commodity production and exchange. 
FDI presupposes the existence of a robust regime of protection for foreign investors in the host 
state, while cross-border subcontracting arrangements require legal regulation and the adjudication 
of disputes. Further, state fiscal and monetary policy provides a mediating framework for flows of 
commodities and investment, the management of the relation between national currencies and the 
20 Smith, Globalisation, pp. 228 
21 Smith, Globalisation, pp. 228-232 
22 Smith, Globalisation, pp. 230-2 
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international reserve currency(-ies) being especially crucial23. Moreover, state regulation 
fundamentally shapes the balance of power in the workplace, both in terms of the direct mediation 
of the wage-labour relation and more broadly with regard to state policy on foreign trade, foreign 
investment and immigration, these latter decisions determining the extent to which local labour-
power is subject to the disciplining force of the law of value in the global market. 
 
The State & Foreign Investment 
 
It is with recourse to patterns of foreign investment and the development of generalised and 
apparently obligatory parameters in relation thereto that many commentators seek to articulate their 
conception of the weakening of state boundaries and apparatuses. Familiarly, the ideological 
consensus of the neoliberal period propounds a development model presupposing the lowering of 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, the reduction of state economic activity by the privatisation of 
assets and the liberalisation of public services and the incentivisation of foreign investment through 
the maximisation of the rate of exploitation and the guaranteeing of returns. David Schneiderman, 
in Constitutionalizing Economic Globalisation24, provides a useful analysis of the formation of an 
international “regime” of investment rules which privileges the interests of foreign investors and 
operates to disable state-led development models and expansive welfare provision. Schneiderman 
considers regional trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
and the web of some 2500 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and their associated arbitration 
agreements which have grown up under the framework of the WTO as forming an interlocking 
network of rules and institutions which entrench free-market economics and debar redistributive 
policy options – in effect, a proto-constitutional neoliberal “investment rules regime”25. In the 
context of the coercive global political and economic environment thus conceived, one can 
understand the emergence of a narrative of weak, relativised states rendered subservient to all-
powerful transnational corporations, the latter enslaving local populations and expropriating natural 
resources under the noses of impotent governments. However, such an understanding collapses the 
power and resource asymmetries existing between different state-capital formations (and structured 
by processes of uneven and combined development at a global level) under the undifferentiated 
plural “states”, while flattening vastly divergent experiences of economic reforms into a monolithic 
conception of “neoliberal economic globalisation”. In reality, the period inaugurated and framed by 
the harsh monetary discipline imposed on the world by the US in 1979 has been characterised by 
heterogeneity insofar as it has entailed the super-exploitation of labour and expropriation of public 
resources in peripheral regions, whilst its implications for core economies may be better understood 
in terms of ‘social rationalisation’. The latter should be considered fundamentally in terms of the 
23 Smith, Globalisation, pp. 235-6 
24 Schneiderman, D., Constitutionalizing Economic Globalisation: Investment Rules and Democracy’s 
Promise (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
25 D. Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalisation, pp. 2-3 
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offsetting of reduced rates of profit by systematic wage repression facilitated by attacks on 
organised labour, the redistribution of the cost of labour reproduction onto labour itself by way of 
the re-commodification of otherwise relatively resilient welfare regimes, and generalised class 
parasitism exemplified by the re-orientation of commercial banking activities towards workers’ 
revenue26.  
 
Moreover, while the received wisdom of neoclassical economics is that the minimisation of state 
intervention and the opening of markets to free competition will bring generalised prosperity, states 
with the power to choose have been selective in their implementation of the prescribed policy 
options which they themselves have presented as being in the universal interest. As Arrighi has 
noted, the unilateral measures of trade liberalisation undertaken by the US in the neoliberal period 
have been very limited, reflecting the historically “anti-free-tradist” thrust of US hegemony. The 
US strategy has been one rather of “bilateral and multilateral intergovernmental negotiation of 
trade liberalisation, aimed primarily at opening up other states to US commodities and 
enterprise”27. Essentially, and somewhat unsurprisingly, the US approach has been to promote 
liberalisation in relation to markets and product lines in which it has a competitive advantage, while 
preferring protectionism where its capitals would be vulnerable to more competitive, lower-cost 
foreign enterprises. As Callinicos has recognised, neoliberalism has proved to be for “dummies”28, 
being imposed by the core upon peripheral states in the context of (and reproducing) the latter’s 
dependence upon international financial markets, with the core being reticent to itself adopt such 
reforms. Such a pattern inaugurates a vicious circle for the socio-economically weakened 
neoliberalised states, which become increasingly vulnerable to fluctuations in global currency and 
commodities markets, the latter producing localised economic crises which are subsequently used 
as leverage by the core to appropriate devalued assets and further exploit peripheral markets. 
 
The experiential asymmetry of foreign investment in the neoliberal period undermines the narrative 
of the weakening of state power relative to MNCs, being suggestive rather of the position which is 
advanced here – that neoliberal economic globalisation describes from one angle a global inter-
state system redesigned by and in the interests of dominant state-capitals led by the United States. 
David Schneiderman, it must be said, makes a better attempt than most to recover the agency of the 
state in structuring economic globalisation. However, his conception, similar to that of Santos and 
Twining, is ultimately one in which states are subsumed within a broader category of “globalising 
actors”29. In contrast, the position I hold and seek to develop here is that states remain the principal 
organisers of global capitalism. In my view, the position held by Schneiderman, Santos and 
26 P. L. dos Santos, ‘On the content of banking in contemporary capitalism’ (2009) 17 Historical Materialism 
180-213 
27 G. Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power and the Origins of our Times (London: Verso, 
2010), p. 72 
28 Callinicos, A., Bonfire of Illusions: The Twin Crises of the Liberal World (Cambridge: Polity, 2010), p. 9 
29 D. Schneiderman, Constitutionalizing Economic Globalisation, p. 7 
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Twining rests partly upon an analysis which privileges North-South relations in the analysis of 
economic globalisation. While this approach is in some respects desirable insofar as it is this 
dynamic which is so often responsible for the most deplorable human consequences of capitalist 
accumulation, it tends to be analytically disorienting insofar as it shifts the centre of gravity of the 
global economy. While it is certainly the case that core states in their negotiations with peripheral 
economies are likely to exploit the attendant power asymmetry to secure favourable terms for their 
investors, thus constraining the policy options of the host state, the great proportion of FDI occurs 
between advanced capitalist economies. Kevin Doogan, utilising the data published by the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Investment (UNCTAD), noted that in 2000 some 80% of FDI 
flowed into or between the advanced economies, while in 2005 the United Kingdom’s 18% share 
of global FDI inflows represented five and a half times the total investment received by African 
states. Moreover, it should be recognised that in general and even in the era of ‘corporate 
globalisation’, overseas investment remains a marginal economic activity, with world FDI flows 
accounting in 2004 for a mere 8% of global domestic investment30. Accordingly, it is arguable that 
any attempt to theorise a profound restructuring of the global economy on the basis of North-South 
FDI arrangements would be methodologically unsound. Additionally, it would seem logically 
flawed to ground an analysis of the decentring of the state in economic relations upon the restricted 
policy options of governments in under-developed peripheral regions of the global economy which 
have in recent history (whether conceived as post-, neo- or directly colonial) not known much 
political or economic autonomy. As previously argued, the experience of neoliberalism and the 
implications of inward FDI for advanced capitalist economies are much different than for the 
periphery.  
 
Beyond conjunctural analysis, it is difficult to overstate the importance of conceptual theorisation 
of the structural interdependence between states and capitals and the immanence of state functions 
to the production and circulation of value, both in its money and commodity forms. The state 
maintains a legal environment appropriate to generalised commodity production, providing the 
juridical and ultimately coercive power which guarantees the property rights generated and 
reproduced thereby. State power lubricates wage-labour and commodity exchange relationships, 
regulating the power of organised labour and securing a rate of exploitation that balances 
profitability, social reproduction and the maintenance of structures of consent. States have a central 
role in the reproduction of labour-powers in sufficient quality and quantity by the provision of 
healthcare, welfare and education. State agencies maintain and guarantee the money commodity 
which mediates exchange, altering the quantity of supply in response to fluctuations in the velocity 
of circulation and setting base rates of interest in an attempt to manage inflation and stimulate 
demand where necessary. The state provides protection for intellectual property rights, 
30 Doogan, New Capitalism?, pp. 67-69; UNCTAD World Investment Report 2005 (New York: United 
Nations, 2005) and preceding years  
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underwriting the surplus profits obtained by technological innovation and, by extension, that 
productive expenditure itself. Indeed, successful states tend to nurture strategically important 
industries by the provision of tax subsidies, the deployment of protective tariff structures and the 
supply of liquidity and resource inputs into research and development circuits. States regulate the 
value of their national monies relative to the international exchange currencies, weighing the 
interests of their export industries against the imperative of holding down wages by the import of 
cheap wage goods. States enter into bilateral, regional and global negotiations on trade and 
investment in an attempt to guarantee favourable conditions for their capitals, while providing the 
military power which ultimately secures the value of overseas investments. Powerful states use 
their military might both defensively and offensively to secure access to crucial raw materials and 
low-cost labour-power in unstable (or, often strategically de-stabilised) regions. In short, it is 
necessary to transcend the liberal misunderstanding of the opposition between private and public, 
representing respectively the realms of market competition and anti-market institutionalised 
altruism. The state is embedded in circuits of capital accumulation, while markets arise not 
organically, requiring for their construction and reproduction coordinated and sustained 
governmental action. Following Polanyi and more recently Doogan, it is imperative to reclaim the 
market as ‘an instituted process’31. 
 
Back to Bukharin 
 
As discussed above, far from diminishing in the epoch of globalisation, state functions remain 
crucial and in certain cases acquire even greater centrality. Indeed, it is even arguable that the place 
to begin in this context is not with Hardt and Negri’s neo-Kautskyite ultra-imperialist conception of 
Empire, but with Nicolai Bukharin’s 1915 recognition that the internationalisation of economic life 
leads to a progressive nationalisation of capital, entailing the further organisational integration (and 
we may add ideological coalescence) of the state apparatus and nationally-based capitals. For 
Bukharin, in the epoch of finance capital and imperialist politics, the state, having always acted as 
“defender and protector” of the ruling classes of its country, now assumes “colossal importance”32. 
As is well known, the empirical basis of Bukharin’s researches led him to focus unduly on the 
developmental specificities of German capitalism, while his analysis of the supersession of 
competition in the national sphere by increasingly intense and militarised international competition 
is a little overstated. Further, as John Rees notes in his introduction to the 2003 edition of 
Imperialism and World Economy, Bukharin’s articulation of the state as agent for an increasingly 
concentrated and centralised national bourgeoisie is over-simplistic, since it fails to account for the 
continuing function of the state as an institutional site for the mediation of the imperatives of 
different fractions of the capitalist class and their reconciliation with the interests of proximate and 
31 Doogan, New Capitalism?, p. 9 
32 Bukharin, N., Imperialism and World Economy (London: Bookmarks, 2003), pp. 130-1 
89 
 
                                                     
competing classes33. However, there is much about Bukharin’s analysis which is of value and may 
be considered to be prescient in light of contemporary developments.  
 
Bukharin’s understanding that the development of huge corporations, the rise of state-capitalist 
trusts and the cartelisation of national industries would lead to an increasing subordination of 
parliament to the interests of a centralised national bourgeoisie conducted by a leading financial 
fraction is instructive. Further, his recognition that the increasingly severe demands imposed by the 
operation of the law of value in the world market would necessitate progressively intensive state 
intervention in different spheres of social life in order to rationalise reproduction is particularly 
apposite. Moreover, Bukharin’s understanding that the international bourgeoisie is organised into 
‘national’ groups wedded to the military power of their respective states is useful in our connection. 
Indeed, this position would seem to be supported logically by our recognition of the overwhelming 
importance of domestic investment and production, even amongst the biggest MNCs. Further, 
Bukharin’s recognition that the internationalisation of economic life leads to a sharpening of the 
conflict of interest between these various national groups34 is a crucial corrective to Santos’ 
analysis of the emergent agency of a ‘transnational capitalist class’. Santos is joined by B. S. 
Chimni in charting the development of a transnational capitalist class (TCC) and attributing to it 
the role of protagonist in the development of globalisation35. For Chimni, the present period of 
‘global imperialism’ has led to the formation of a TCC integrating the international fractions of 
national capitalist classes and being driven primarily by international finance capital36. It is my 
contention that both Santos and Chimni underestimate the national stratification of the bourgeoisie, 
whose divergent interests map onto the entrenched uneven development of the global economy. A 
partial explanation for the latter theorists’ disorientation may be located in their primary 
deployment of the North:South lens in their analysis of imperialism. In contrast, while Bukharin 
notes that an intensifying scramble to exploit the resources of underdeveloped regions of the global 
economy is characteristic of imperialist politics, the advantage of his (and later Lenin’s) thesis is 
the location of its centre of gravity in the inter-imperialist relations existing between advanced 
capitalist economies.  
 
It is important to emphasise that in attempting to conceptualise the relationship between states and 
MNCs, we constantly confront an analytical bias which is generated by the liberal understanding of 
the state decoupled from class relations. Implicit in much theorisation of the decentred state is an 
assumption that a state is strong when it deploys a robust protective regime of labour regulation, 
maintains a system of redistributive taxation and offers generous welfare provision for citizens. 
Conversely, it is assumed that a state is weak when it practices fiscal discipline, privatises assets 
33 Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy, introduction at p. 6 
34 Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy, p. 60 
35 B. S. Chimni, ‘Prolegomena to a class approach to international law’ (2010) 21(1) European Journal of 
International Law 57  
36 Chimni, ‘Prolegomena to a class approach to international law’ at 67 
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and services previously within the public domain and provides tax breaks and other incentives to 
foreign multinationals in return for investment. However, as we have already seen, the “strong” 
state functions of progressive taxation, welfare provision and labour regulation are only one portion 
of a whole gamut of responsibilities the state has in relation to the institution of a market economy 
and the reproduction and accumulation of capital. Moreover, it is not remotely the case that the 
default orientation of the state is to protect labour and subsumed classes from the worst excesses of 
the capitalist system, operating in furtherance of some disembodied “universal” interest. From 
David Schneiderman’s analysis, one might be forgiven for thinking that the main obstacle 
preventing weaker states – say, in sub-Saharan Africa – from redistributing wealth and land 
resources in order to tackle poverty is the international investment rules which debar such options. 
In reality, the state in any period cannot be properly understood in abstraction from the balance of 
class forces operative in society, this in turn being structured by the objective conditions of the 
domestic economy in the context of the global market. The ratio of the capitalist state, speaking 
economistically, is ultimately the furtherance of capital accumulation. However, in order not 
merely to invert the liberal position, this underlying raison d’être does not find its political 
distillation simply in securing by brute force the egregious exploitation of labour and pillaging of 
natural resources. In advanced capitalist society, capital rules in general by a combination of 
consent and coercion and to some degree in combination with proximate classes against labour. 
Thus, the state becomes the primary institutional site for capital’s construction of an alliance of 
class forces over which it can exercise hegemony as a necessary correlate to its domination of 
labour37. The specific structure of capital’s hegemony and the operative balance between consent 
and coercion is dynamic and subject to a discursive process obtaining between subjective political 
actors, framed by objective economic conditions. Thus, as we have seen, in the specific context of 
the post-war long boom, tight labour markets in the US and UK undercut the function of the 
reserve labour army to discipline the wages and conditions of employed labour, while the latter 
seized this opportunity – and that provided by the ideological framework produced by the war 
effort – to organise politically. Additionally, healthy rates of profit and productivity growth 
conditioned by the competitive advantage enjoyed by the US and the UK provided the material 
basis for concessions to this movement which was growing in size and militancy. All of these 
factors coalesced to generate a structure of consent which ensured a solid basis for the healthy 
maintenance and reproduction of labour-powers in a context of relative labour scarcity, while 
providing material gains for labour, in effective return for the domestication of labour demands 
within a system of reformist collective bargaining and the maintenance of capitalist property and 
production relations38. However much capitalists and their apologists relied upon such reforms to 
ground the legitimacy of their system, they remained in a profound sense defeats for capital, as was 
37 P. D. Thomas,  The Gramscian Moment: Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism (Chicago: Haymarket, 
2010), pp. 161-165  
38 Remember Conservative MP Quintin Hogg’s famous statement in 1945: “If you do not give the people 
social reform they are going to give you social revolution”. C. Jones & T. Novak, Poverty, Welfare and the 
Disciplinary State (Oxford: Routledge, 1999), p. 123 
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later borne out when they were revealed as an effective ceiling for the rate of exploitation and thus 
a competitive disadvantage in relation to the emergence of lower-cost manufactures in the East. 
 
Law is a process through which is articulated the specific relational dynamics of consent and 
coercion generated in the political apparatus. Regulation glues together allied classes and engages 
the threat and actuality of coercion by the state apparatus against labour and oppressed groups, 
sustaining the structure of capital hegemony in a manner which seeks to concretise relations of 
production and reproduction, whilst delaying and otherwise controlling the unfolding of their 
internal contradictions. Law thus seeks to modulate the temporal horizon. In Capital II, Marx 
emphasises the importance of the temporal dimension to capitalist reproduction through surplus 
extraction, realisation and investment, it being of particular relevance in cases of capitals with long 
turnover periods and large amounts of ‘sunk’ fixed capital. Moreover, in relation to the territorial 
logic of the state, it is clear that a reliable and sustainable flow of revenue generated by taxation of 
principally variable capital (wages) and also surplus value is required in order to ground the 
accumulation and development of means of destruction. Additionally, it must also be mentioned 
that in the UK at least, law is specifically – both formally and substantively – part of the materiality 
of the hegemonic relation existing between capital and the beneficiaries or rentiers of the now-
skeletal feudal regime, whilst also operating as a discursive horizon to ground conversations 
between capital and “traditional” intellectuals decoupled (or relatively so) from the fundamental 
classes. The case of international law is analogous to the domestic situation insofar as legal regimes 
are structured by the hegemonic alliance of leading state-capitals and the domination of weaker 
formations, while the enactment and enforcement of particular provisions reflect clearly the extant 
balance of economic and geo-political forces. Moreover, the situation tends to be more clearly 
cognised at this level, with analysis of inter-governmental organisations such as the UN being 
somewhat less fetishised and mythologised than the welfarist traditions of advanced capitalist 
states, and the critical traditions of legal realism and Realpolitk having more purchase. The 
ostensible distinction between these two legal realms is that in the international sphere there is no 
“third party” enforcer of legal imperatives – yet, on close reflection, it would be wise not to make 
too much of this. For the capitalist state is not a third party in the sense that it can be considered to 
be substantially decoupled from the fundamental class antagonisms of capitalist society. Affirming 
Gramsci’s notion of the integral state, the state should be conceived as a dialectical unity of 
political society and civil society, whilst being concentrically underlain by the antagonistic 
economic relations of generalised commodity production39. To return to the purported decentring 
of states in globalisation, it is somewhat peculiar to argue that because weaker states have restricted 
freedoms of action relative to more powerful ones, that the state as such is becoming an outmoded 
agency. In addition to the arguments made above in relation to the continuing centrality of the state, 
we should be clear that the inter-state system presupposes imperialistic economic and geopolitical 
39 Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, pp. 137-43 
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competition between states, which tends towards uneven development as ‘free’ competition tends 
towards monopoly.  
 
Once we understand that law is generated by the antagonistic interaction of class forces in the 
economic and political arenas, we further recognise that individual legal provisions, and indeed 
cumulatively the whole orientation of the legal system in a particular epoch, cannot survive the 
sweeping currents of social unrest and political mobilisation which arise from a fundamental 
reconfiguration of the balance of class forces. Law is not, of course, an efficient transmission 
mechanism for public opinion, adjudication systems being generally – and in the older 
parliamentary systems particularly – insulated in archaic procedural catacombs and staffed 
overwhelmingly by the privileged, whether of old or new money. However, ultimately the legal 
outposts of aged political settlements will be overrun by the rising tides, discarded like a moulted 
snake’s skin, to be replaced by new arrangements which map more closely onto developing 
economic and political realities.   
93 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
Neoliberalism as Economic and Political Crisis 
 
In this third chapter I will consider the contradictory patterns of economic and political 
development which have unfolded in the advanced capitalist economies in conversation with the 
global macroeconomic conditions of the long downturn. While the first chapter revealed the state-
political content of the rise to prominence of international financial markets and actors, in this 
section I proceed to interrogate the social and political content of financialisation within national 
economies. In so doing I assess how the fiscal, monetary and regulative policies of state managers 
have come to privilege financial profits and entrench the developmental asymmetry obtaining 
between finance and industry. The predominance of such policy orientations is explained in view 
of the shifting balance of forces attending inter- and intra-class relations whose contradictory 
reproduction has been problematised by the persistence of a chronic crisis of over-accumulation 
and profitability centred on international manufacturing. It is further explained how the relative 
dynamism of the sphere of circulation, prefigured by the redesigning of the financial and monetary 
architecture of the inter-state system and increasingly enabling domestic regulatory environments, 
has propelled finance capital to political predominance within national political systems. The 
consequences of this rearrangement of the ruling strata are then explored in terms of social 
polarisation and fragmentation and the shifting character of the political power which has come to 
be reproduced in management of a fracturing body politic. 
 
I Neoliberalism as crisis of production 
 
It is clear that the period of the long downturn – which began with the emergence of a crisis of 
over-accumulation and profitability in 1965-1973 and continues today – has been a period of 
profound economic, political and social crisis for the advanced capitalist world. In the US, EU and 
Japan, economic performance measured by such macro-economic indicators as GDP growth, 
investment, productivity and wage growth has worsened business cycle by business cycle since the 
1970s1. This fundamental crisis of capitalist production, driven by over-capacity in international 
manufacturing, but affecting the overall private economies of the advanced capitalist countries, has 
found episodic expression in a series of financial, monetary and state fiscal crises, the greatest of 
which began with the Great Recession of 2008-9 and persists in the form of the Long Depression. 
These crises have been generally catalysed by the bursting of bubbles inflated by the expansion of 
credit and the formation of fictitious capital, both of which have permitted in the advanced 
capitalist countries the forced extension of capitalist reproduction beyond the limitations imposed 
1 R. Brenner, The Economics of Global Turbulence (London: Verso, 2005), preface at xxiv-xxv 
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by the fundamental relations of production2. The accumulation of sovereign debt (representing the 
alienation of future tax revenues) has allowed state-capitals to buy without selling in the world 
market, asset-price inflation has permitted homeowners to borrow (alienation of future wage 
revenue) to continue spending despite generalised wage repression, while the inflation of equity 
prices has fuelled accumulation despite a chronic crisis of profitability. In sum, the explosion of 
credit and fictitious capital (which must have as its consequence the deviation of prices from 
underlying values) has facilitated a profound disarticulation – mapped out geographically in 
connection with the uneven development of the forces of production – of the financial and 
monetary cycles of the economy from the production of commodity values. As we have seen, this 
decoupling (which has prefigured a period of extreme economic turbulence) has not occurred in 
technocratic isolation from the inter-state system, representing rather from one perspective the 
result of the conscientious project of state-capitals representing aged blocs of productive capital to 
obtain control over the dominant (financial and monetary) sphere of the global economy in 
response to their weakening competitive position in the determining (productive) sphere. Indeed, 
the expansion of credit and the formation of fictitious capital has at all times a thoroughly political 
content inasmuch as both the rate of interest and stock prices are both “irrational expressions” – 
nonetheless embedded within the process of capital accumulation – which rather than referring 
ultimately to embodied labour values (like commodity prices) express purely a relationship of force 
between creditor and debtor informed by the context of supply and demand. As Perelman has 
noted, there is here a parallel between the market values of financial assets and those of non-
produced real assets such as land. Just as land rent expresses nothing more than the ability of the 
land-owner to wrest a certain quantity of surplus value (unpaid labour) realised by the capitalist, the 
rate of interest is simply the price achieved by the creditor for the use of her money capital3.  
 
Internationally, the state-political content of the expansion of fictitious capital and the 
accumulation of sovereign debt is not limited to the role states and their capitals play as creditors 
and debtors. Rather, it is essential to recognise that the international monetary and financial system 
itself, as the formal product of the interaction of competing state-capitals, constitutes the 
underlying structure for the interplay of the forces of supply and demand of money capital. 
Needless to say, this structure does not have the character of a level playing field. Indeed, as I shall 
explore in depth in Chapter 3, the interaction of three factors crucially informs the variegated 
structural positions of competing state-capitals: the historical departure of oil prices from 
underlying values as a result of the cartelisation of production in the Middle East (achieved in 
conversation with US geopolitical strategy); the emergence of the Dollar as the de-metalicised, fiat 
money of the global economy, and; the strategic centring of private financial markets in the 
mediation of international monetary relations, coupled with the dominant position of Anglo-
2 For an insightful excavation of Marx’s provisional (but crucial) theory of fictitious capital, see M. 
Perelman, Marx’s Crises Theory: Scarcity, Labour and Finance (New York: Praeger, 1987), Chapter 6 
3 Perelman, Marx’s Crises Theory, 195-197 
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American markets as the largest and most liquid. These three factors in combination have had a 
profound effect upon the supply of and demand for credit internationally, these forces reflecting 
changing relations of domination and dependence within the inter-state system. Historically 
elevated oil prices have destabilised the state finances of economies dependent upon energy 
imports, whilst negatively impacting the cost-position of their exports given the primacy of crude 
oil and its derivatives to industrial production. Simultaneously, the increased surpluses of the oil-
producing states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), unable to be fully absorbed into domestic 
productive economies, have come to be recycled through Anglo-American financial markets. Thus 
demand meets supply as Anglo-American financial institutions come to mediate the deficit 
spending of states imperilled by high oil prices, these finance capitals thereby capturing as profits 
part of the surplus-value extracted from the working populations of these destabilised economies. 
To this arrangement is added the further destabilising factor of turbulence in international currency 
exchange and commodity markets, driven crucially by the effect of US Federal Reserve shifts in 
domestic interest rates (deployed rationally in the interests of US capital) upon the extant rates of 
interest in international financial markets. A sudden interest rate hike, such as that represented by 
the ‘Volcker shock’ of 1979, could impose a severe monetary austerity on the global economy, 
forcing structurally weakened economies to default on their debt obligations. As has been much 
discussed, such crises represent an opportunity for creditor states and their capitals to negotiate 
restructurings of the debtor state’s economy and financial system in addition to the restructuring of 
its debt. The resulting deals are likely in any event to involve the wresting of an increased 
proportion of future debtor state revenues by the creditor states and their capitals, whilst further 
prizes available individually or in combination include: preferential access to domestic markets for 
the creditor’s exports, such markets becoming more or less ‘sheltered’ from competition; the fire 
sale of de-valued fixed capital investments and public assets, and; the more general opening of the 
domestic economy to the foreign direct investment (FDI) and the removal of barriers to inward and 
outward monetary flows. These latter concessions represent the more direct access of foreign 
capital to domestic labour powers (and the value they produce) and to the mediation of the non-
socialised portion of the wage (such as through the privatisation of public services), as opposed to 
‘merely’ the socialised portion of labour revenue represented by the debtor state’s tax base. Finally, 
it is important to recall that while such profound restructurings are extraordinary opportunities 
emerging from state fiscal crises, the fundamental context of economic turbulence characterising 
the dollar epoch produces secularly increased financial profits, as states and capitals seek to 
‘hedge’ against fluctuations in commodity prices and exchange rates through all manner of 
financial instruments. It is in relation to this structural context that we should seek to explain the 
explosion of fictitious capital, instead of (or in addition to) the conjunctural ambition and 
technological ‘genius’ of the financiers. 
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While the above analysis highlights certain of the central dynamics animating the changing 
character of relations between state-capitals within the dollar zone, we may observe that similar 
patterns have emerged in the eurozone. Indeed, the project of European monetary integration can 
be understood in one register as a project to institutionalise the openness of European markets to 
the core EU export-economies and to entrench the competitiveness of the latter vis-à-vis the weaker 
economies of the eurozone. In sum, we may recognise the period of the long downturn as one of 
heightened imperial competition between rival state-capitals who have attempted to respond to the 
crisis of over-accumulation and profitability in international manufacturing by adopting a 
(financially and monetarily driven) ‘beggar thy neighbour’ policy, asserting a progressively 
exploitative dominance in their respective geographical spheres of influence. However, such 
intensified imperial aggression reveals not only an increasing polarisation of power and wealth 
within each node of the global economic ‘triad’, but also reflects the exacerbation of contradictions 
and distortions within the domestic economies of the leading state-capitals. For the long downturn 
has seen a reconfiguration of the ‘historical bloc’ leading-dominating each of the advanced 
capitalist societies – a shift driven by and further compounding specific forms of political crisis4. 
As productive capital has suffered falling returns, capitalists have turned in response to the sphere 
of circulation in search of profitability, investing in financial assets of various kinds and of more or 
less speculative character5. Since the 1970s, there has been in the advanced economies an 
asymmetry in the development of production and circulation, the financial sphere in particular 
growing relative to the rest of the economy and experiencing greater dynamism in employment 
growth and profitability as compared with a stagnating productive sector6. While the fundamental 
drivers of financial expansion are to be found in the unfolding of structural changes in the relations 
of production in the context of the long downturn, it has been enabled and entrenched by an active 
shift in state regulative orientation. The shifting centre of gravity of the advanced capitalist 
economies has found expression in powerful political forces animating the deconstruction of 
systems of financial regulation – including crucially the firewall separating investment and 
commercial banking activities – developed in view of the experience of the Great Depression of the 
1930s. The crucial point for our present connection is that finance capital has become progressively 
the dominant fraction of the capitalist class and thus also the predominant force within the 
historical bloc – that network of alliances between capital and proximate classes which is the 
prerequisite for and correlate of its domination of labour. In this respect it is important to note that 
the distinction between financial and industrial/commercial capital is primarily a functional one 
rather than one necessarily embodied in two completely discrete sets of economic agents. While 
there will have been to different degrees (and dependent upon particular national circumstances) an 
4 For an account of the lineage of the concept of ‘historical bloc’ in Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks, see 
Thomas, P. D., The Gramscian Moment: Philosophy, Hegemony and Marxism (Chicago: Haymarket, 2010) 
5 See C. Lapavitsas, ‘Financialisation, or the search for profits in the sphere of circulation’ (2009) Research 
on Money and Finance Discussion Paper 10 (available at: 
http://www.researchonmoneyandfinance.org/media/papers/RMF-10-Lapavitsas.pdf)  
6 Lapavitsas, ‘Financialisation, or the search for profits in the sphere of circulation’ at p. 9 
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actual replacement of leaders of finance for those of industry in privileged sites of state policy 
formation and administration, often a fair degree of personal and organisational continuity will 
have been maintained against a backdrop of changing strategies of accumulation. For since the 
1970s, non-financial capitals finding there to be insufficient investment opportunities in the 
productive sector for their surpluses, have increasingly diversified into financial activity.    
 
Those familiar with early-twentieth century analyses of the transition from classical ‘market’ 
capitalism to that of state-monopoly capitalism7 will note that the predominance of finance capital 
in national regimes of accumulation is not a novel idea. Bukharin recognised that state power had 
become “the domain of a financial oligarchy”8 which managed production in a context where the 
process of concentration and centralisation of capital had resulted in the organisation of industry 
into a small number of giant firms dominating increasingly cartelised domestic markets and 
requiring access to credit to enable large-scale investment. There was in other words “a very strong 
tendency towards transforming the entire national economy into one gigantic combined enterprise 
under the tutelage of the financial kings and the capitalist state”9. Finance capital sought to 
increase the profits of monopoly enterprises both through influencing domestic state policy and by 
advocating imperial aggression to capture markets, secure access to raw materials and open spheres 
of capital investment against a backdrop of a sharpening conflict of interest between increasingly 
nationalised blocs of capital in an increasingly internationalised productive economy10. However, 
the macro-economic conditions obtaining when Bukharin was writing were much different from 
those of the long downturn, within which I would argue there has occurred a profound re-
configuration of the relationship between industrial and financial capital in the advanced capitalist 
economies. While Bukharin describes the interrelated development of monopoly-capitalist trusts 
and finance capital, there operating a (no doubt still tense) mutuality of interest between the two in 
the pursuit of economic and military imperialism, these interests have become substantially dis-
articulated in those economies which have experienced long-term industrial decline. As David 
Harvey recalls, conflicts often surfaced in the 1960s between financiers and manufacturing 
corporations in the US, only for such tensions to disappear during the 1970s as large firms became 
increasingly financial in their orientation. By 1980, it was common for capitals to offset losses in 
production with gains from credit and insurance operations or speculation in currency and futures 
markets11, while significantly US Steel changed its name to USX, Chairman James Roderick 
explaining that “X stands for money”12. In the UK, the interests of finance capital had already won 
out, as was dramatically exemplified by a Thatcher government which accelerated industrial 
7 Cf N. Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy (London: Bookmarks, 2003); V. I. Lenin, ‘Imperialism: 
the Highest Stage of Capitalism’ in Essential Works of Lenin (H. M. Christman ed.) (New York: Dover, 
1987), pp. 177-270 
8 Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy, p. 111 
9 Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy, p. 75 [emphasis in original] 
10 Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy, pp. 60-61 
11 D. Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 32 
12 Cited in Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, p. 32 
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closures, redundancies and reorganisation, substantially withdrew state subsidies for industry and 
abolished much of the government funded skills training by closing the majority of the Industry 
Training Boards and privatising the Skillcentres, the latter mostly entering receivership within three 
years as the state withdrew funding13. At the same time, there continued a project of financial 
deregulation which had begun in earnest with a package of ‘Competition and Credit Control’ 
reforms brought forward the Bank of England in 1971. These reforms allowed banks to fix their 
own interest rates on deposits and loans and to thereby compete with building societies and foreign 
banks for new deposits, while the ending of exchange controls in 1979 allowed firms to borrow 
abroad and use retained earnings from overseas activities and in turn the Buildings Societies Act 
1986 permitted building societies to lend for non-housing purposes and to become banks with their 
members’ agreement. Such a shift in policy orientation enabled and accelerated the growth of the 
financial and business services sector, whose contribution grew as a proportion of British GDP 
from 3.9 percent in 1954, through 6.5 percent in 1964, 11.1 percent in 1974, 13.2 percent in 1984 
to 19.2 percent in 199414. 
 
The Social Content of Financialisation 
 
Crucial to an understanding of the disaggregation of financial and industrial capital is recognising 
that during the last three decades, large enterprises have become progressively less dependant upon 
banks for credit, investing instead out of retained earnings in a context of low productivity growth, 
or else looking to open markets to obtain finance15. In response, banks have sought alternative 
means of obtaining profit, re-orienting their activities towards consumer lending and mediating 
access to financial markets by both corporations and individuals16. In an insightful investigation, 
Paulo dos Santos has revealed both the extent of this re-orientation and its underlying social 
content. Across the OECD countries, bank-lending has declined in importance, as represented by 
rises in bank non-interest income as a proportion of total bank revenues: in the US from 24.9% in 
1980 to some 40.7% in 2005; from 14.9% to 33.2% in Spain, and; in France from 22.6% in 1990 to 
62.2% in 2005. At the same time, bank-lending has changed dramatically in composition as lending 
to enterprises has declined, such that by 2006 some 40.7% of resident bank lending in the UK was 
to individuals as against only 11.6% in 197617. Surprisingly, at precisely the same time as the 
activities of banks have become relatively dissociated from direct investment in the productive 
sector – coming instead to mediate worker’s consumption and the access of investors to financial 
markets – the significance of their profits in the advanced economies has substantially increased. 
13 E. Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire: From 1750 to the Present Day (London: Penguin, 1999), pp. 312-314 
14 Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, pp. 305-308 
15 C. Lapavitsas, ‘Financialised capitalism: crisis and financial expropriation’ (2009) 17 Historical 
Materialism 114-148; C. Lapavitsas, ‘Financialisation, or the search for profits in the sphere of circulation’ 
16 P.L. dos Santos, ‘On the content of banking in contemporary capitalism’ (2009) 17 Historical Materialism 
180-213 
17 dos Santos, ‘On the content of banking in contemporary capitalism’, pp. 183-184 
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For instance, bank profits as a proportion of GDP rose in the US from 0.72% in 1980 to 1.62% in 
2005, from 0.53% to 1.35% in (West) Germany and from 0.84% to 1.77% in Spain over the same 
time period18.  
 
For dos Santos, the relations banks have come increasingly to enter into with wage-earners as 
regards consumer- and mortgage-lending as well as the provision of pension-related saving services 
have a particularly exploitative character. In this connection, he recalls that as regards lending to 
capitalist enterprises, the interest payments the latter makes to the bank occur generally in the 
systemic context of an increased turnover achieved through the mobilisation of idle money to 
functioning circuits of capital. Thus, under normal conditions interest-bearing money capital loaned 
to an enterprise helps to generate the source of its own repayment with interest. More 
fundamentally, the social relation obtaining between lending bank and borrowing enterprise is one 
between social equals inasmuch as they both enter the transaction “on the basis of a profit-making 
calculus”, one which is generally in the case of the borrower informed by access to financial advice 
(whether in-house or contracted out)19. In contrast, lending to individuals has a distinctly 
exploitative social content insofar as money loaned for mortgages or consumption does not 
ordinarily generate the value from which it is to be repaid with interest. Interest-payments represent 
rather the appropriation of value borrowers have acquired independently of the loan – a form of 
direct appropriation revealed starkly by the practice (common in Latin America) of deducting loan 
payments directly from payrolls. The relation between bank and individual borrower can be seen to 
be fundamentally unequal inasmuch as one party is a financial specialist seeking to maximise 
profits, while the other is a wage earner who (often acting ‘irrationally’ by the standards of 
economic analysis) is trying to secure access to consumption. Such iniquitous social character is 
expressed numerically in the high relative profitability of individual lending, which accounted in 
2006 for 42.8% of HSBC’s profits whilst occupying only 29.4% of its total assets. Incidentally, 
such figures include (often controversial) money-dealing fees such as credit and account-service 
charges, which represented 27.9% of Barclays’ and 30.5% of Bank of America’s total revenue in 
2006. Moreover, we should remember that the structural context within which such exploitative 
relations have proliferated is one of wage repression, fiscal retrenchment and welfare (re-
)commodification, such that much of the increased demand for credit represents in large part the 
efforts of wage-earners to obtain access to increasingly-privatised basic social necessities. The 
growing costs of education to the individual student and her family, of housing in a context of 
reduced public provision and of energy as crude oil prices rise and services are privatised have 
resulted in increasing household indebtedness20. Add into the picture the hugely profitable banking 
activities of fund management, which in relation to pension schemes represents the mediation of 
future retirement-consumption and what you have – according to Santos – is the “unprecedented” 
18 dos Santos, ‘On the content of banking in contemporary capitalism’, p. 188 
19 dos Santos, ‘On the content of banking in contemporary capitalism’, p. 190 
20 dos Santos, ‘On the content of banking in contemporary capitalism’, pp. 190-195 
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transfer of value from households to the financial sector, a “large and systematic [appropriation] of 
value drawing on individual income”21.  
 
Productive and Unproductive Labour 
 
While these insights are telling in themselves, their primary relevance for our purposes is the 
manner in which they speak to the unravelling of the previously-articulated interests of financial 
and industrial capital and the connected privileging of the former in the new finance-driven regimes 
of accumulation. In order to draw this out, we must first return to the distinction Marx draws 
between ‘productive’ and ‘unproductive’ labour, which refers not to the abstractly social or moral 
worth of particular types of labour, but rather to the matter of whether or not they directly produce 
new value and thereby augment the mass of surplus-value appropriated by capital. As Mandel 
neatly expresses it in his introduction to Capital Volume 2, for Marx  
only that labour which either adds to or is indispensable for the realization and conservation of 
a commodity’s use-value adds to the total amount of abstract social labour embodied in that 
commodity (is productive of value)22 
 
Consequently, from the perspective of total social capital all value originates in the sphere of 
production, such that the forms of labour which may be considered productive are those involved in 
the creation of new commodities as well as in such storage and transportation as is socially 
necessary for the conservation and realisation of their use-values23. In contrast, labour pertaining to 
the sphere of circulation, facilitative of those activities of buying and selling commodities already 
produced, is unproductive insofar as it does not create any new value. Rather, the expenditure of 
such labour simply enables those formal metamorphoses (between commodity-capital and money-
capital) of already existing values which are essential to the process of reproduction as a whole24. 
Thus, the profits realised by commercial and interest-bearing capital represent acquired portions of 
the surplus-value extracted by industrial capital during the production process. This is not under 
ordinary conditions a mere one-sided expropriation, for the specialised functions of commercial 
and interest-bearing capital facilitate the realisation of surplus-value even if they do not in 
themselves directly create it. Retailers shorten the circulation time of commodities, thereby 
reducing the turnover time of industrial capital and facilitating an increase in the rate of profit 
realisable on the basis of a given quantity of invested capital. Further, these merchants enable the 
21 dos Santos, ‘On the content of banking in contemporary capitalism’, pp. 193, 210 
22 K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Vol. 2 (London: Penguin, 1992), introduction at p. 45. 
Cf Marx, Capital Vol. 2, pp. 209-11, 225-6; K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Vol. 3 
(London: Penguin, 1991), Chapters 16 & 17 
23 It is important to recall that Marx is not hereby drawing a distinction between ‘material’ and ‘immaterial’ 
forms of labour, since a commodity is any thing (corporeal or incorporeal) which satisfies human needs of 
whatever kind – K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 1990), Chapter 
1 
24 Marx, Capital Vol. 3, pp. 392-393 
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metamorphosis of produced commodities at a cost which is less than what which would be incurred 
if the industrial capital was to perform such activities itself, such that cumulatively there is reduced 
the part of total social capital applied to the circulation process, while that portion applied to 
production is correspondingly increased25. In the case of interest-bearing capital, the loaning of 
money capital to capitalist enterprise enables its expanded reproduction on a scale which would be 
impossible on the basis of the money capital possessed by the owners and managers of those 
enterprises themselves. Indeed, as Marx demonstrates in Capital Volume 2, accumulation as 
expanded reproduction requires a recurring disequilibrium between different sectors of the 
economy, such that the continuity of the production process depends upon “discontinuity or 
desynchronization of the turnover cycle of money capital, productive capital and commodity 
capital”26. Firms at different intervals require to buy without selling, or else to invest in new means 
of production whose value will only be realised over a long time-period – banks and other financial 
actors enable these activities (and consequently, accumulation) on a scale otherwise unimaginable 
by the mobilisation of idle money-capital (and progressively the unoccupied money capital of all 
social classes27). However, a theme which runs throughout Marx’s analysis is an understanding of 
the manner in which interest-bearing and productive capital can under certain conditions become 
disaggregated, the spheres of production and circulation being decoupled as capital is gripped by a 
speculative euphoria, seeking to bypass the sphere of production and make money directly out of 
money28. In this context, the emergence of crisis is the violent re-assertion of the integral unity of 
the spheres of production and circulation29.      
 
We can in light of the above discussion conclude that the process of financial expansion in the 
decades since the emergence of the long-downturn cannot in itself have produced new value. 
Moreover, as the activities of the largest financial institutions have become progressively 
dissociated from productive investments, they to an increasing extent fail even to refer to processes 
of value production, or at least to such of these processes as occur domestically. Internationally, the 
newly central role of financial markets in mediating international monetary flows and in funding 
state fiscal deficits represents in value terms the appropriation of a portion of the surplus-value 
extracted from the working populations of those state-capitals. The imperial nature of such activity 
is revealed by the interconnected predominance of Anglo-American financial markets and the 
particular structure of the international monetary and financial system, which is discussed at length 
in the first chapter. Domestically, as we have seen, the banks have responded to a reduced demand 
for loanable money capital by increasingly orientating their operations towards the appropriation of 
25 Marx, Capital Vol. 3, Chapter 16 
26 Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Vol. 2 (London: Penguin, 1992), introduction at p. 19 
27 Marx, Capital Vol. 3, p. 528 
28 “This explains why all nations characterised by the capitalist mode of production are periodically seized by 
fits of giddiness in which they try to accomplish…money-making without the mediation of the production 
process” – Marx, Capital Vol. 2, p. 137. This particular sentence was introduced by Engels in the second 
(1893) edition.  
29 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p. 209 
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labour revenues, a move so successful as to increase the significance of their profits even as the 
banks are ejected from the sphere of production. It is at this point that certain specific forms of 
antagonism between productive and interest-bearing capital internal to the neoliberal project appear 
in sharpest relief. For while under normal conditions the operations of interest-bearing capital 
facilitate an increase in the rate of profit for productive capital and accelerate its accumulation, it 
can be seen that the financialisation of worker’s consumption operates conversely to limit the rate 
of profit and retard productive accumulation. To understand this, we should recall that the rate of 
surplus-value (otherwise known as the rate of exploitation) is determined by the ratio of surplus-
value (unpaid surplus labour, s) to variable capital (paid necessary labour in its value form variable 
capital, v, in its money form wages)30, expressed 
s
v . To obtain the rate of profit one adds to the 
denominator constant capital (c)31
 
, representing the value congealed in the means of production 
including land, plant and raw materials, such that the fraction becomes 
s
c + v . The primary 
mechanisms by which the individual capitalist will seek to increase her rate of profit are by 
increasing the rate of surplus-value (the ratio of unpaid to paid labour) and by increasing the 
productivity of the labour process by investing in new means of production, which will generally 
cause the ratio of constant capital to variable capital (otherwise known as the organic composition 
of capital) to rise. It is only in the former case that the rate of surplus-value realised (provided it 
can actually be realised by the sale of the produced commodities) by total social capital rises, since 
the latter actually proportionately expels living labour as the source of value from the production 
process. The additional profit accruing to individual capitals as a result of productive investment as 
such (without the complementary hiring of additional labour powers) represents in value terms 
rather the appropriation of a portion of the surplus-value (which becomes for the appropriator 
surplus-profit) extracted by less productive capitals. Marx demonstrates that such appropriation is 
achieved within a particular sector by the improved cost- and (if necessary) price-positions of 
innovating capitals and in terms of the economy as a whole by the tendential adjustment of market 
prices towards prices of production32. 
 
The Degenerative Nature of Finance-Driven Regimes of Accumulation  
 
In neoliberal regimes of accumulation generally and under austerity in particular, the primary mode 
of shoring up profitability has been through labour devaluation, since productive investment has 
fallen in the context of a secularly reduced rate of profit and the interrelated de-regulation of 
finance. In value terms, this represents an increase in the rate of surplus-value, which can be 
achieved absolutely by the extension of the working day and/or intensification of the labour process 
30 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, Chapters 9 & 18 
31 Marx, Capital Vol. 3, Chapter 2 
32 Marx, Capital Vol. 3, Chapter 10 
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or relatively by the reduction of the labour time required to reproduce the value of labour power33. 
As Marx explains, the value of labour power is determined by the total value of those commodities 
which are required to reproduce the labour-power of the worker at a particular level of productivity 
and at a historico-politically determined standard of living. The determination of the value of 
labour-power contains therefore a “historical and moral element” which emerges out of a process 
of political struggle, such that it can vary widely in different contexts for similarly productive types 
of labour, provided that it is not reduced (at least for an extended period) below the level of basic 
subsistence, nor increased to such a degree that no surplus value can be extracted34. National 
regimes of accumulation driven by productive capital have historically been able to increase the 
rate of profit by reducing the value of labour power through the reduction in the value of wage 
goods – either by importing the latter from low-cost production zones or by cheapening their 
production at home through mechanisation. For instance, the value of the labour-power of a worker 
employed by Microsoft in the US may be reduced if she can obtain cheap clothing manufactured in 
Malaysia and consumer durables produced by extremely efficient firms in Japan. By such means 
and given particular structures of competition internationally it is possible for the rate of 
exploitation to rise at the same time as the general standard of living of the working population 
improves within a given national economy. While the socially-necessary labour time required to 
reproduce the labour of our freshly-clothed Microsoft worker may decrease, she may 
simultaneously be forced to work more intensively by technological innovation in her own 
workplace, or for longer outside of it as smartphones and tablets bring office life to the commuter 
train and dinner table. When we consider the transformation (or perhaps, degeneration) of post-war 
fordist regimes into finance-driven neoliberal regimes, we recognise the emergence of dynamics 
which offset the aforementioned processes reducing the value of wage-goods, tending therefore to 
make it more difficult for productive capital to raise the rate of surplus-value by the relative 
mechanism. The consequence of the de-regulated explosion of the financial mediation of workers’ 
consumption (especially at exploitative rates of interest and involving other inequitable terms of 
business) is that while households can spend more than they earn in the immediate term, over the 
medium and longer term they must actually spend less than they earn, for they must repay loans 
with interest. As future wage revenue is alienated and considering that loans for consumption do 
not in general directly result in higher future wage revenues35, workers will find their standard of 
living squeezed. Consequently, the value of labour power is reduced without increasing the rate of 
surplus-value for productive capital (the proceeds accruing instead to finance), while for industry to 
increase its profitability real wages must be further reduced, such reductions perhaps becoming 
progressively more difficult politically to effect. Essentially, as greater proportions of labour 
33 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, Chapters 11 & 12 
34 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, pp. 274-277, quotation from p. 275 
35 The exception to this may be indebtedness incurred to fund further and higher education, although the 
preponderance of graduates working in low-paid service sector jobs is in itself enough to suggest that the link 
between FE/HE study and higher wage revenues may be weakening in a context of structural youth 
unemployment. 
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revenue are directed towards the servicing of debt, the wage rate at which the politically-
determined basic standard of living can be achieved is increased and the minimum floor of 
necessary paid labour time for the productive worker is increased.  
 
Further, insofar as housing, energy, transport and communications are wage-goods, the structure of 
provision of these commodities will in large part determine the wage rate at which labour-powers 
can be reproduced at a given standard of living. In a period of material expansion, healthy 
profitability and (particularly) given tight labour markets, it becomes in the interest of total social 
capital to rationalise the reproduction of labour-powers, ensuring that no more capital than is 
necessary is engaged in this process and the surplus extracted from it is no greater than the average 
rate obtaining in the economy36. It may be rational as necessitated by competition from low-cost 
export economies and as enabled by a particular domestic balance of class forces for the rate of 
surplus-value extracted from state-organised reproduction to approach zero, or indeed even for 
state enterprises to run at a loss37. However, neoliberalism has brought the large-scale privatisation 
of transport and utilities, leading to often dramatic rises in their cost at the point of access and 
without commensurate reductions in their strain on the tax base (that is, without reducing the 
proportion of socialised wages for which they account). Under neoliberalism, charges for transport 
and utility services (which in large part represent natural monopolies) attain increasingly the 
character of a state-authorised rent upon householders and commuters as prices depart from 
underlying values and the profits of private service providers increase dramatically. Similarly and 
perhaps most crucially, the effect of the de-regulation of mortgage-lending combined with the 
retrenchment of social housing provision has led to historically significant increases in rents and 
asset-prices, dramatically increasing the cost at which labour-powers can be reproduced at a given 
standard of living. Cumulatively, the processes of financial de-regulation and public service re-
commodification which are so characteristic of neoliberalism accelerate powerful dynamics which 
– themselves emerging out of a profitability crisis in manufacturing – militate against the recovery 
of the productive sector. These state-authorised bonanzas of profitability in circulation and in social 
reproduction, enabled politically by the weight of capital ejected from the production process as 
industry declines, represent from a broader perspective the dismantling of a nationally rationalised 
system of labour reproduction. The profits realised by finance capital and by those firms providing 
36 See Ernest Mandel’s discussion of what he terms ‘subventionary’ state activity involving the subsidization 
of private capital by the transfer of responsibility for the indirect costs of the production and realisation of 
surplus-value to the state – E. Mandel, Late Capitalism (J. De Bres trans.) (London: Verso, 1978), pp. 552-
557 
37 In the 1950s, the notion of ‘social profitability’ described the rationale behind having state-run industries 
operate at a loss in order to support through their low-cost productive inputs the profitability of the rest of the 
economy - Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, p. 225. In general, Chapters 12 and 13 of this text usefully 
illustrate the dual significance of the public sector – as social service provider and wealth re-distributor and 
also as a (conjuncturally-significant) subsidiser of the private business economy and engine of technological 
development.  
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re-commodified public services appear again as costs for productive capital, whose relative decline 
is thereby accelerated.  
 
Moreover, as the state’s fiscal and monetary levers come progressively to be pulled in the interests 
of financial profitability, rising internal price levels may cease to be counter-balanced by currency 
devaluation as would be rational in a productively-driven economy. Jim Cuthbert, whose 
refreshingly straight-talking report provides a useful empirical analogue to our largely conceptual 
discussion, notes that in the late 1970s, the late 1980s and roughly from 2002-2008, the sterling 
exchange rate was allowed to appreciate at the same time as UK internal price levels were rising 
significantly. Whilst a strong currency operated to protect the value of financial assets by 
controlling inflation, these three periods did substantial damage to the competitiveness of the wider 
UK economy and broadly coincided with the significant worsening of its current account balance. 
Such periods represent particular moments within a long run decline – beginning 1972 – in the 
UK’s general international competitiveness, which has been further punctuated by marked short-
term fluctuations in competitiveness. For Cuthbert, these effects are conditioned by the startling 
growth of UK financial assets and liabilities relative to GDP and the “chronic long-term 
mismanagement of the economy” as policy-makers have taken decisions to benefit and protect the 
financial sector, without sufficient regard for the wider economy. Worryingly, Cuthbert concludes 
this model of economic development, which has amounted to the UK becoming something like a 
“very large bank”, is unsustainable and presents the likelihood of further potentially catastrophic 
crisis as a weakened underlying economy and reduced tax-raising capacity of the state become 
insufficient to support a crisis-prone financial sector38.       
 
It may be seen in light of the above discussion that finance-driven regimes of accumulation have a 
strongly path-dependent character, since the financial imperatives driving state fiscal and monetary 
policy as well as public sector liberalisation in a period of productive decline operate to further 
entrench the asymmetric development of production and circulation. Indeed, such regimes are 
crucially degenerative inasmuch as they involve the domestic economy adopting an increasingly 
introverted orientation, turning away from direct competition in global commodity markets and 
folding in upon itself. Profitability comes to rely not upon the production of new values through a 
dynamic process of productive investment and productivity growth, but on state-inscribed 
expropriations of values initially realised by labour as wages in socialised and non-socialised 
forms, these expropriations representing capital feeding upon the fruits of the last healthy cycle of 
accumulation. Further, in their international aspect, such regimes of accumulation can be regarded 
as parasitical inasmuch as the interests of the financialised state-capital become progressively de-
38 J. Cuthbert, ‘The mismanagement of Britain: a record of the UK’s declining competitiveness – and its 
implications’ Jimmy Reid Foundation Report, April 2013. Available at: 
http://reidfoundation.org/portfolio/the-mismanagement-of-britain-a-record-of-the-uks-declining-
competitiveness-and-its-implications [accessed 11 September 2013] 
106 
 
                                                            
coupled from the further material expansion of the global economy. Its interests are increasingly 
served rather by the strategic deployment of past accumulations of unpaid labour and of means of 
destruction to manipulate the price system and to control the supply and demand of money capital 
to secure inflated rents from more productive regions of the global economy.   
 
At this point, some caution is required to distinguish between the purely economic and more 
broadly political implications of neoliberal reforms. At first sight, financialisation and public 
service retrenchment may seem to recklessly privilege the short-term myopic interests of finance as 
against the short- to medium-term imperatives of productive accumulation, whilst perhaps 
sacrificing along with them the health of the current account and fiscal balance for the foreseeable 
future. However, it is of course ultimately in the interests of total social capital to de-value (and 
dis-empower) labour-power vis-à-vis capital in general, while financialisation has proven to be an 
expedient mode of achieving this end and finance capital its capable agent. The transfer of 
household incomes to financial institutions has effectively reduced real wages whilst causing the 
increasing divergence between the latter and rising living costs to appear in terms of profligate 
household spending. Moreover, as regards declining industrial powers operating trade in goods 
deficits, financialisation of consumption makes sense insofar as it is preferable for labour revenues 
(which might be considered from the perspective of capital to be historically inflated following the 
long boom) to be appropriated by domestic finance capital than for them to be spent on imported 
wage goods. Ultimately, financially-levered labour-devaluation could create the conditions for a 
new cycle of accumulation, provided of course that at some point state fiscal and monetary policy 
can be reoriented towards facilitating productive investment and protecting re-incarnated industries 
in the new reduced-cost labour environment. The difficulty becomes then (if the reader will indulge 
this degree of speculation) identifying precisely how and by what agency the imperatives of 
productive accumulation can dethrone the entrenched dominance of finance.  
 
1. Neoliberalism as political crisis 
 
It is appropriate now having outlined some of the specific economic dynamics of the crisis of 
advanced capitalism in the long downturn to proceed to discuss the more particularly political 
forms of crisis which have emerged in the same developmental context. To begin with, it is useful 
to remember that in seeking to understand the political implications of a rise of finance in the 
context of the exhaustion of a period of material expansion of the global economy, there are 
historical examples upon which to draw. Kevin Philips, in assessing the influence of finance in the 
1980s United States, Edwardian Britain, periwig Holland and Spain in the Age of the Genoese has 
noted a tendency towards social polarisation. According to Philips, preoccupation with finance and 
tolerance of debt, as “apparently typical of great economic powers in their late stages”, has 
significant implications for the lower and middle social strata of the financialised power. 
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Finance cannot nurture a [large middle] class, because only a small elite portion of any national 
population – Dutch, British or American – can share in the profits of bourse, merchant bank 
and countinghouse. Manufacturing, transportation and trade supremacies, by contrast, provide 
a broader national prosperity in which the ordinary person can man the production lines, mines, 
mills, wheels, mainsails and nets39. 
 
Giovanni Arrighi augments Phillips’ analysis in his reading of the rise and fall of a succession of 
systemic cycles of accumulation based around shifting geographical centres of productive 
accumulation. Indeed, for Arrighi the paradigm case of “social polarisation under the cumulative 
impact of a financial expansion” is Renaissance Florence, from which perspective “all subsequent 
financial expansions have been variations on a script first played out in the Tuscan city-state”40. 
High finance, Arrighi explains, is in its modern, capitalist form a Florentine invention which came 
of age in the latter fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries at the close of a Eurasian trade expansion 
which had begun in the late thirteenth century41. Florence’s financial pre-eminence was built upon 
the networks of high finance embedded in the dense web of transactions created by her wool trade, 
coupled with the continuing importance of her role in mediating ‘trade in religion’ on Rome’s 
account, the latter involving the collection of papal dues and such ‘invisible exports’ as 
pilgrimages, indulgences and dispensations42. When the growth of the wool trade began to slow 
and its returns fell, Florence’s merchant banks re-oriented towards providing the supply of mobile 
capital required to meet the demand of the developing power struggle between the territorialist 
states of Western Europe. The leading Florentine business enterprises, naturally indifferent as to 
whether the self-expansion of their capital was effected through manufacture of commodities or by 
way of fuelling the developing rivalries of an increasingly fractious world-economy, diverted cash 
surpluses from productive investment to the financing of domestic and foreign public debts43. The 
consequence was a de-industrialisation of Florence which was at first gradual in the early years of 
the fourteenth century (as manufacturers began to concentrate on high-value items) and then 
‘spasmodic’ between 1338 and 1378. Cloth production fell from over one hundred thousand pieces 
in 1308 to twenty thousand in 1378 and never again rose above thirty thousand in the fifteenth 
century44. The consequences for the cloth workers whose very existence tended to become 
redundant – and indeed for the population as a whole, around one third or some thirty thousands of 
which lived by the wages of the industry – were profound. The political rule of the merchant 
classes was destabilised as the lower strata of wage labour demanded higher wages, the 
39 K. Phillips, Boiling Point: Republicans, Democrats and the Decline of Middle-class Prosperity (New 
York: Random House, 1993), pp. 194, 197. Cited in G. Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century: Money, Power 
and the Origins of our Times (London: Verso, 2010), p. 325 
40 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, pp. 325-6 
41 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, pp. 92-93, 97 
42 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, pp. 97-98 
43 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, pp. 102-105 
44 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, p. 102 
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maintenance of production output and the right of independent organisation – a struggle whose 
high point was the seizing of state power in revolt of the Ciompi in 1378. 
 
The axis capital-labour was not the only one along which antagonisms ripened in Renaissance 
Florence however, there developing an increasing fragmentation within Florentine wage-labour, the 
upper strata of which, in contrast to the impoverished lower strata, were flourishing as their skilled 
labour produced high-quality goods to meet the demand of a European world-economy which 
increasingly transferred surplus capital to conspicuous consumption in addition to arms 
expenditure. The upper-guild workers were indeed crucial to the swift repression of the 1378 revolt 
and while they were quickly escorted from influence thereafter, the livelihoods of this privileged 
labour aristocracy found robust protection as the lower strata – stripped of all protection and rights 
of organisation – were cast adrift as a floating mass of surplus labour45. In parallel, the weight of 
influence within the Florentine ruling class shifted decisively from trade to finance as there 
emerged select capitalist elements which, having been ejected from the process of production, 
became a rent-seeking aristocracy. In 1434 the House of Medici, which had emerged propitiously 
from the great crash of the 1340s, took advantage of Florence’s fiscal crisis by taking over the 
republic and establishing de facto monarchical rule, thereby ending a half-century of oligarchic rule 
by the city’s merchant elite. The Medici had their moment during the Hundred Years’ War, as 
increasingly commercialised warfare between two powers of practically equal means presented 
fabulous opportunities for commercial and financial intermediation. Once hostilities ceased 
however, the Medici soon disappeared from European high-finance, while Florentine enterprise 
was left structurally de-coupled from the subsequent material expansion of the world-economy46.    
 
The finance-driven regimes of accumulation which have emerged in the advanced capitalist 
economies during the long downturn have brought with them pronounced forms of social 
polarisation. De-industrialisation has resulted in the persistence of structural unemployment as the 
services sector has failed to absorb the working masses which once mined coal, smelted steel and 
populated automotive production lines47. The subsection of the working population which can be 
materially integrated into processes of financial accumulation seems much narrower than that 
previously employed productively by industry, much as Phillips and Arrighi concluded. Moreover, 
financialisation has had consequences not only for the level of employment, but also for its 
45 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, pp. 102-5 
46 Arrighi, The Long Twentieth Century, pp. 105-11 
47 Apart from persistent unemployment, the marked increase in income and wealth inequality in most, if not 
all, of the advanced economies is well documented. For an initial assessment of the striking acceleration of 
wealth concentration in the hands of the top percentile of US earners since 2007, see E. Saez, ‘Striking it 
richer: the evolution of top incomes in the United States’, 3 September 2013. Available at: 
http://elsa.berkeley.edu/~saez/saez-UStopincomes-2012.pdf [accessed 11 September 2013]. For the 
underlying research methodology, see T. Piketty & E. Saez, ‘Income Inequality in the United States, 1913-
2002’ in A. B. Atkinson and T. Piketty, Top Incomes Over the Twentieth Century: a Contrast between 
Continental European and English Speaking Countries (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 
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geographical organisation and indeed for the very character and lived experience of work. Financial 
accumulation is typically centred around urban business districts, coupled with gentrified zones of 
high-end cafes, restaurants and nightclubs as well as the complementary residential areas of leafy 
suburbs and commuter towns. Outside of these islands of prosperity lie the silent dockyards, 
rusting industrial belts and eerie rectilinear jungles of the forgotten extractive villages and towns 
which formed the backbone of capitalist society during the long boom. Focusing on Britain, the 
state-capital most rudely denuded of her industrial base, the dismantling of the cross-border coal, 
steel and rail industries represented the collapse of the crucial material basis for both the territorial 
integrity of the British state and for the national unity of the British working class. In combination 
with the regulative off-shoring of the City of London48, these processes have prefigured dynamics 
of regionalisation formally articulated in devolution movements in Scotland, Wales and (thus far 
less successfully) the North of England. As regards the labour movement, the destruction of the 
industries representing its key ramparts of organisational strength, accompanied by the migration of 
labour-powers into unprotected service sector jobs (where union density is generally lower, 
productivity growth almost non-existent and the prospects for wage growth correspondingly poor) 
has formed the civil society basis for its tendential marginalisation in political society. The 
weakening of organised labour must be primarily understood in the context of a shifting balance of 
class forces as structural unemployment brings to bear the disciplinary force of the industrial 
reserve labour army upon those employed, while the erosion of the UK’s international cost-position 
has led capital to pursue a strategy more aggressive than accommodating. However, the character 
of work in a financialised economy presents particular challenges to the trade union movement 
which have not as yet been effectively overcome. In this regard, it is contended that the 
increasingly unproductive nature of labour in the advanced capitalist economies is not a matter 
merely for scholarly contemplation, but part of the lived experience of labour. On an automotive 
production line, a labourer might have a part in assembling several hundred cars per day, each of a 
value represented by x thousand pounds, while the worker’s annual salary might amount to O.9x49 
or perhaps optimistically after promotion to a supervisory position 1.5x. The work process thereby 
offers a clear window onto the process of value production and surplus-value extraction – the 
relations of production can be quite viscerally grasped. In contrast, financial accumulation presents 
48 Nicholas Shaxson describes a “layered hub-and-spoke array of tax havens centred on the City of London” 
which accounts for almost half of all international bank assets – N. Shaxson, Treasure Islands: Tax Havens 
and the Men Who Stole the World (London: The Bodley Head, 2011), p. 15. See R. Palan, R. Murphy and C. 
Chavagneux, Tax Havens: How Globalisation Really Works (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009), p. 
11 
49 This figure is based on the contemporary example of Toyota UK’s Burnaston plant in Derbyshire, which 
produced 109,502 vehicles in 2012 – some 300 per day assuming the plant operated every day of the year. 
Accounting for the different proportions in which different models were produced and taking a mean value 
based on the prices of different sets of specifications, each car retailed at an average of £20,906 in 2013 
prices. Compare the basic salary of £19,200 per annum of a production team vacancy advertised through the 
recruitment agency Blue Arrow. Toyota UK Facts and Figures 2013, available at: 
http://www.toyotauk.com/toyota-in-the-uk/overview-of-toyota-in-the-uk.html [accessed 20 August 2013]; 
Toyota Range Price List August 2013, available at: www.toyota.co.uk [accessed 20 August 2013]; Blue 
Arrow Toyota vacancies, available at: http://www.bluearrow.co.uk/toyota [accessed 20 August 2013].    
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the self-valorisation of value in its most abstract and irrational form – an IT technician, call centre 
operator, security guard or cleaner employed by a multinational bank or an associated hedge fund 
witnesses money made from money in relative disconnection from her own labour-process. As we 
have discussed, much of the value thereby appropriated does in fact originate elsewhere – from 
surpluses extracted from labour in other states and from the financialisation of labour revenues at 
home. Without over-stressing the point, there is likely to be a generalised experiential distinction 
between performing labour directly productive of value and labour ‘merely’ facilitative of the 
appropriation of value produced at a different place in time and/or space. The problem of how to 
unveil the underlying value relations is one with which the trade union movement and political 
progressives must continue to grapple.  
 
‘The Unravelling of the Keynesian Compromise’  
 
While the shifting balance between productive and unproductive labour in the advanced 
economies, within a broader context of stagnant investment, has created a new problem at 
workplace level in terms of how organised labour might leverage wage increases in abstraction 
from rising productivity, this puzzle is re-presented at a national political level. The crisis of over-
accumulation and profitability in international manufacturing (whose dynamics have been explored 
in Chapter 1) has led to the disintegration of the post-war regimes of accumulation based crucially 
upon collective bargaining and progressive taxation – what Duménil & Lévy call ‘the gradual 
unravelling of the Keynesian compromise in its early more egalitarian configuration’50. 
Neoliberalisation produced zones of untrammelled market freedoms and vertiginous profitability in 
privatised public services and de-regulated airlines, telecommunications and finance, while 
systematic attacks on organised labour enabled long-run wage repression. At the same time, a 
veritable tax revolt has been staged by capital and the salaried bourgeoisie, represented both by 
reductions in the official high-bracket income tax rates, capital gains taxes and corporation tax and 
further by the development of an extensive industry dedicated to tax avoidance, outright tax 
evasion and all the activities which populate the expansive ‘grey area’ in between51. David Harvey 
recalls that the reduction of the top personal tax rate in the US from 70 to 28 percent was billed as 
‘the largest tax cut in history’52, while Duménil and Lévy recognise the effect had upon the 
apportioning of the tax burden by the Bush administration’s phasing out of the estate tax and the 
diminution of taxation on investment income and capital gains as the taxation of labour revenue has 
50 G. Duménil & D. Lévy, ‘Neoliberal income trends: wealth, class and ownership in the USA’ (2004) 30 
New Left Review 105 at 128 
51 “There are offshore lawyers who sit in their offices all day, doing little more than dreaming up deviant new 
flavours of trusts” - Shaxson, Treasure Islands, p. 45. Chapter 6 of Shaxon’s book explores the construction 
of the UK’s ‘spider’s web’ of offshore jurisdictions incorporating its overseas territories, crown dependencies 
and ultimately the City of London itself; chapter 7 charts the US’ trajectory through initial regulatory 
hostility to the provision of a range of secrecy services at federal and state levels.  
52 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, p. 26 
111 
 
                                                            
been maintained53. Cumulatively, the top 0.1 percent of US taxpayers achieved the reduction in 
their effective tax rate from 60 percent in 1960 to 33 percent in 2007 as their income grew 
precipitously54, leading billionaire Warren Buffett to discover that he was paying a lower tax rate 
than his receptionist, indeed the lowest among his office staff55. In the UK, corporation tax rates 
fell from a 52 percent main rate and 42 percent small companies’ rate in 1973, through 35 percent 
and 25 percent respectively in the mid-1980s to a 23 percent main rate and 20 percent small-
companies’ rate in 201356. Further, after Gordon Brown’s 1999 budget, a starting rate of 10 percent 
applied to profits under ten thousand pounds, while marginal relief reduced to somewhere between 
10 and 19 percent the rate applicable to profits between ten and fifty thousand pounds. The process 
culminated in 2002, when the starting rate was reduced to zero, causing a 45 percent surge in 
incorporations and a growing controversy around the issue of tax avoidance by small businesses 
which led ultimately to the abandonment of the starting rate in 200657. As regards personal 
taxation, the top rates of 83 percent on earned income and 98 percent on unearned income were 
reduced by Chancellor Geoffrey Howe in 1979 to 60 percent and 75 percent respectively, while all 
rates above 40 percent were completely abolished by Nigel Lawson in 198858. Such tax reforms, in 
the context of a neoliberal globalisation characterised by relaxed capital controls, may have a 
domino-like corrosive effect upon the tax regimes of other states insofar as they generate 
competitive downward pressure on the tax rates on capital as the ‘mobile factor’ of production. 
However, in a fascinating working paper, Özlem Onaran and Valerie Boesch have revealed how 
the effects of exposure to globalisation59 upon the Implicit Tax Rates (ITR) on capital, labour and 
income and the share of total public expenditures dedicated to social protection are crucially 
modulated by the economic and political institutions of different forms of welfare regime. Thus, 
Onaran and Boesch conclude that the ITR levied on capital has fallen in the ‘liberal regimes’ of the 
UK and Ireland, while the ITR on labour has increased, partly to fund the increase in social 
expenditures occasioned by the social and political implications of globalisation60. In contrast, 
53 G. Duménil & D. Lévy, ‘Neoliberal dynamics: towards a new phase?’ in K. van der Pijl, L. Assassi and D. 
Wigan (eds.), Global Regulation: Managing Crises after the Imperial Turn (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004), pp. 41-63 
54 C. Collins, A. Goldberg & S. Pizzigati, Wealth for the Common Good Report: ‘Shifting responsibility: how 
50 years of tax cuts benefitted the wealthiest Americans’ (April 2010). Available at: www.ips-
dc.org/files/1675/ShiftingResponsibility.pdf [accessed 18 September 2013]. Referenced in Shaxson, 
Treasure Islands, p. 24 
55 Shaxson, Treasure Islands, p. 24 
56 HMRC Statistics Table A.6 ‘Rates of Corporation Tax’. Available at: http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/statistics/ct-
receipts/table-a6.pdf [accessed 18 September 2013]  
57 Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) Report ‘Companies in 2002-3’, July 2003. Available at: 
http://www.dti.gov.uk/files/file10724.pdf [accessed 18 September 2013]  
58 Institute for Fiscal Studies ‘Summary of main tax measures introduced in each budget since 1979’. 
Available at: http://www.ifs.org.uk/fiscalFacts/taxTables [accessed 18 September 2013] 
59 Measured using multi-dimensional KOF indices which account not only for trade, FDI, portfolio 
investments and restrictions on trade and capital flows but also for the political and social dimensions of 
globalisation 
60 Of course, increased expenditure is not at all incompatible with a qualitative decline in public service 
provision in a context of structural unemployment and especially given the tendency towards re-
commodification.      
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ITRs on capital have been rising in the ‘social-democratic’ regimes of Sweden, Denmark, Finland 
and Norway, although the ITRs applicable to labour (in general significantly higher than in the 
liberal regimes) have also risen as social expenditure has remained fairly stable. Different again is 
the experience in the Central and Eastern European New Member States (CEENMS), since social 
protection expenditures have fallen dramatically in the Baltic states and have also decreased 
substantially in the ‘post-communist European’ regimes of Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and Croatia. At the same time, in both the Baltic states and the post-communist 
regimes ITR levied on capital have fallen, while regressive taxes upon consumption have risen61.  
 
It can be seen therefore that the shift in the balance of productive and unproductive labour in the 
finance-driven regimes of the advanced capitalist economies, against the background of the 
historical disempowerment of labour in a context of structural unemployment, problematises the 
leveraging of wage growth by labour-powers in the workplace and the maintenance at a national 
political level of a regime of progressive taxation. In this regard, the tax revolt staged by capital 
and high-income earners – while doubtless inviting of moral reprehension – cannot be explained 
away in terms of the political inscription of a suddenly-predominant individualistic-egoistical 
philosophy in abstraction from the changing strategies of accumulation and interconnected 
structures of social reproduction. Rather, we should understand the startling redistribution of the 
tax burden partly as a result of a significant decoupling of accumulation and domestic labour 
reproduction reflected in a reconfiguration of the relationship between the public sector and the 
private business economy. Industrially-dynamic regimes which produce much of the value realised 
by their capitals domestically require a continuous (indeed continually increasing) supply of 
labour-powers replete with a broad range of skills. In contrast, in finance-centric regimes much of 
the value realised by capital is produced elsewhere (in time and/or space), while the associated 
processes of financial intermediation require a domestic labour-force of different size and 
composition. Finance capital, with its requirements for market analysts, hedge fund managers, tax 
lawyers and accountants can productively integrate into its circuits of accumulation only a 
relatively narrow and disproportionately highly-skilled sub-section of the working population, 
along with the labour-powers necessary to lubricate the consumption of this strata. Outside of this, 
there exists a reduced incentive to reproduce the residual mass of labour-powers at a high level of 
productivity, such that in a context of structural unemployment the requisite political balance of 
forces may effect progressively the transfer of the cost of social reproduction onto labour. The 
production and maintenance of an over-qualified workforce relative to the labour requirements of 
capital represents a pure loss for social capital, at least insofar as it is funded directly by taxation 
and indirectly by the valorisation of the socialised portion of the wage. It is rational therefore for 
the provision of education, healthcare and welfare to become in the context of finance-driven 
61 Ö. Onaran & V. Boesch, ‘The effect of globalization on the distribution of taxes and social expenditures in 
Europe: do welfare state regimes matter?’ University of Greenwich Business School Working Paper 
WERU3. Available at: http://gala.gre.ac.uk/id/eprint/9768 [accessed 18 September 2013]  
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accumulation to be linked more directly to gainful employment through re-commodification and 
localised corporate-sponsorship in abstraction from a degenerating system of mass-provision. Thus 
the relationship between the private and (formerly-) public sector is crucially re-configured in the 
transition from ‘Fordist’ to ‘post-Fordist’ regimes of accumulation. In the first case, the centrally-
administered and rationalised reproduction of labour-powers is efficient from the perspective of 
total social capital insofar as it reduces the proportion of such capital tied-up in reproduction and 
subsidises the private sector through the provision of labour-powers at a price close-to, at or below 
cost, thereby underpinning domestic capital’s international cost position. As such regimes 
degenerate however and capital’s requirements for labour-powers decrease quantitatively and 
change qualitatively, what had represented from capital’s perspective an investment in an essential 
productive input becomes rather a waste expenditure. In response, capital withdraws from funding 
directly the mass reproduction of labour powers through lobbying for reductions in business taxes, 
constructing mechanisms for the avoidance/evasion of taxation and even succeeds in appropriating 
through re-commodification portions of socialised labour revenue dedicated to public service 
provision. In the latter case, the privatisation of public services represents a form of accumulation 
by dispossession which produces a short-term and localised spike in profitability (a shot in the arm 
to an ailing economy), whilst in the medium to long term causes internal price rises which 
ultimately reduce the competitiveness of the domestic economy and which (as we have seen) are 
unlikely to be offset by currency devaluation.   
 
The Shifting Character of Bourgeois Supremacy 
 
Moreover, at the same time as a shift in the strategy for wealth production has reconfigured the 
process of social reproduction, so too has the form of reproduction of political power and the very 
character of that power been transformed. In order to understand this transition, we may make 
productive use of certain of the determinations developed by Antonio Gramsci in his carceral 
writings. Firstly, we should approach what Peter Thomas has identified as Gramsci’s key political 
concept62 and his novel contribution to Marxist political theory63, the notion of the integral state. 
The latter term expresses Gramsci’s understanding of the mutual interpenetration and 
reinforcement of ‘political society’ and ‘civil society’ within a unified and indivisible state-form64. 
The state in its integral form is not limited to the machinery of government and legal institutions of 
‘state’ understood in a narrow sense, representing rather a dialectical unity in diversity of the 
‘moments’ of civil and political society65. For Gramsci, ‘civil society’ is the terrain upon which 
social classes compete for social and political leadership over other classes, its ensemble of 
62 Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, p. 174 
63 Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, p. 137  
64 Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, p. 137 
65 Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, p. 137; C. N. Coutinho, Gramsci’s Political Thought (P. Sette-Câmara 
trans.) (Leiden: Brill, 2012), p. 83 
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organisms (“the Church, the trade unions, the schools etc”66) constituting “the ‘private’ apparatus 
of ‘hegemony’”67. Such hegemony or political leadership is “protected by the armour of coercion” 
– it is guaranteed by such “‘direct domination’ or command” 68 as is exercised through the juridical 
institutions of political society, amounting ultimately to the control of the legal monopoly of 
violence69. So articulated, these two diverse but unified spheres, this “equilibrium between political 
society and civil society”70 composes the state understood integrally, as “the entire complex of 
practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its 
dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules”71. Further, we can 
recognise that in articulating his understanding of the integral state, Gramsci is also describing that 
which must amount to the same thing – the character of bourgeois political supremacy, understood 
as a synthesis of hegemony (leadership) and domination (coercion). For him, the capitalist class 
exercises hegemony insofar as it is able to lead a consensual alliance of proximate classes as the 
correlate of and necessary condition for its coordinated coercive domination of labour as an 
opposing class. Thus, just as civil and political society are understood as two methodologically 
distinguished spheres of a unitary state, hegemony and domination are understood in this fashion as 
strategically differentiated forms of a unitary political power, as two poles existing in an 
unbalanced, shifting equilibrium72.        
 
Gramsci’s understanding of the integral state represents a critical inheritance of Hegel’s theory of 
the modern state, which “transcended pure constitutionalism and theorised the parliamentary State 
with its party system”, incorporating political and syndical associations as its “‘private’ weft”73. It 
should also be understood as a further concretisation in response to determinate historical 
experience of Marx and Engels’ affirmation of the class-nature of every state phenomenon, their 
fundamental ‘desacralisation’ and de-fetishisation of the state by the location and explanation of its 
apparent autonomy in the immanent contradictions of civil society as a whole74. As such, Thomas 
has argued that Gramsci’s development of Marxist state theory should not be understood either 
conceptually or historically in terms of the ‘expansion’ of the state into a society dogmatically 
asserted to have once been located ‘outside’ it. Rather Gramsci’s elaboration is conceptually a 
reassertion of the originally ‘expansive’ formulation found in Hegel and Marx as against its 
instrumental neo-Kantian limitation and historically a recognition of the nineteenth century 
66 A. Gramsci, Lettere dal Carcere (A. A. Santucci ed.) (Palermo: Sellerio, 1996), pp. 458-9. Reproduced in 
A. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks (Q. Hoare & G. Nowell-Smith eds.) (New York: 
International Publishers, 1971), p. 56f. Referenced in Coutinho, Gramsci’s Political Thought, p. 81 
67 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, pp. 12, 261 
68 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, pp. 12, 263 
69 Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, p. 137 
70 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 56f 
71 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 244 
72 Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, pp. 163-165 
73 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 251. See Coutinho, Gramsci’s Political Thought, pp. 
79-80; Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, preface at xxii, pp. 175-181   
74 Gramsci’s Political Thought, pp. 78-79 
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experience of the increasing sophistication of the internal articulation and condensation of social 
relations within a given state-form75. Pursuing this historical register, it is important to locate the 
emergence of Gramsci’s conception of the integral state in his analysis of the ‘long nineteenth 
century’, founded on social developments in continental Europe and focused especially on the 
region’s leading nation-state, France. In the period extending from the French Revolution to 1848, 
according to Gramsci, the French bourgeoisie undertook a class project of an unprecedented and 
thoroughly revolutionary nature, entailing a fundamental transformation of “the nature of the 
political and its concrete institutional forms”76. The victorious bourgeoisie were at this time 
capable of uniting French society as a whole behind the universal claims of its own particular class 
project, in a process of social and political ‘education’ and elevation. The ruling class, able to 
present itself as the bearer of “all the intellectual and moral forces…needed to organise a complete 
and perfect society” expanded its class sphere ‘technically’ and ideologically, posing itself as “an 
organism in continuous movement, capable of absorbing the entire society, assimilating it to its 
own cultural and economic level”77. The institutionalisation of this project produced a state-form of 
a qualitatively new type insofar as it unified ‘civil society’ and ‘political society’ in a relationship 
of mutual interpenetration and reinforcement. The capitalist state became thus not merely a 
repressive apparatus of coercion, but also a web of social relations embedded in all levels of society 
and operating for the production of consent78. 
 
However, the advent of Europe-wide revolts in 1848 and later the Paris Commune marked a period 
of transition in which the balance of class forces and the machinery of consent underlying the 
expansionary, universalising bourgeois project descended into crisis. For Gramsci, the crisis was of 
such profundity as to place the very foundations of bourgeois hegemony in doubt – it was in his 
terms an organic crisis79. As the entire social formation was thrown into turmoil, bourgeois 
hegemony shifted in character from an ‘optimistic magnanimity’ attended by a proportionate 
balance of consent and coercion to a ‘cantankerous parasitism’ resting on ‘coercive consent’80. The 
bourgeoisie, no longer a revolutionary class, presided in an increasingly despotic fashion insofar as 
it dominated without leading, whilst the class-particularity of its universalist claims was starkly 
illuminated. Gramsci came to refer to the nature of the bourgeois hegemonic project in such a 
period of organic crisis in terms of passive revolution or revolution without revolution, denoting on 
the part of the bourgeoisie a significantly reduced but persistent capacity of initiative, an ability to 
procure such socio-political transformations as are necessary to entrench both its own supremacy 
and the subalternity of labour, but without the capability of securing the proactive consent of 
75 Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, pp. 139-140 
76 Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, p. 143 
77 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, pp. 271, 260. Referenced in Thomas, The Gramscian 
Moment, p. 142.  
78 Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, pp. 141-143, p. 137 
79 Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, p. 145 
80 Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, p. 145 
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proximate and opposing classes in an expansionary project. To be clear, in an epoch of passive 
revolution the bourgeois project is able to endure and indeed to deliver in some sense real progress, 
yet the bourgeoisie – as it has become ‘saturated’, ceases to expand and indeed starts to 
disintegrate81 – suffers a significant loss of initiative and mobilising capacity. It is the lot of the 
bourgeoisie in such contexts to attempt to preserve by the adoption of a defensive orientation its 
increasingly tyrannical reign over a stagnating and disenchanted social order82. In this moment the 
bourgeois integral state reaches its zenith, whilst its underlying character is revealed – bourgeois 
freedom is transformed by dialectical inversion into its opposite, while the consensual networks of 
political and cultural elevation (always selectively functional) ossify into exclusionary defensive 
‘trenches’83.    
 
The immediate focus of Gramsci’s application of the concept of passive revolution was the 
Risorgimento and its aftermath, during which time the Italian bourgeoisie attempted to consolidate 
its power through the absorption of (principally) leading figures of subaltern classes and 
oppositional social movements and (laterally) entire organisations into the state apparatus and its 
‘representative’ organs in civil society. By such means, understood respectively in terms of 
molecular and organic transformism, the ruling class sought not directly to expand its own project 
but to inhibit the development of competing perspectives by co-opting the political and cultural 
representation of the popular masses, thereby excluding the latter from all effective historical 
protagonism84. The aim of such efforts is, pursuant of a logic of disintegration (and displaying the 
character of Jesuitical manipulation), to forestall the cathartic moment in the development of a 
subaltern class – to prevent the maturation of the emergent working class project from its 
‘economic-corporative’ moment to a truly ‘hegemonic’ stage85. Whilst Gramsci originally used the 
concept of passive revolution as an important criterion of interpretation in his analysis of the 
Risorgimento, he later afforded it a more general significance in describing the road to modernity 
trodden in those states which did not experience a radical-popular revolution – that characterised by 
state reform and modernisation from above. Passive revolution was a tool for interpreting entire 
historical periods – it captured the pacifying and incorporating nature of bourgeois hegemony in the 
epoch of imperialism, and was further deployed with reference to Fascism and (with less certainty) 
to ‘Americanism’ or ‘Fordism’. With regard to the latter regimes, Gramsci attempted to understand 
the complex dialectic of restoration and renewal which animated the attempts of these bourgeois 
projects to integrate/neutralise certain of the advances of the October revolution, including 
elements of the planned economy86. Coutinho emphasises that this restoration-renewal dialectic is 
81 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 260 
82 Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, p. 145; D. Losurdo, Antonio Gramsci: dal Liberalismo al “Comunismo 
Critico” (Rome: Gamberetti, 1997), p. 155 
83 Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, p. 148 
84 Coutinho, Gramsci’s Political Thought, p. 103 
85 Thomas, The Gramscian Moment, pp. 150-152 
86 Coutinho, Gramsci’s Political Thought, pp. 100-105  
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central to the concept of passive revolution as such, inasmuch as it implies the presence of both a 
conservative reaction to the prospect of an effective and radical transformation from below 
(restoration) and the acceptance of a certain number of popular demands, which are answered from 
above by means of compromises or concessions made by the ruling classes (renewal)87. Such 
ambivalence distinguishes passive revolution from the final determination which it is necessary to 
highlight for our purposes – that of counter-reformation, which describes moments of restoration 
pure and simple, when the moment of the old prevails over the moment of the new88. 
 
Welfarism as Passive Revolution; Neoliberalism as Counter-Reformation 
 
Having so introduced the Gramscian interpretive criteria of integral state, civil society and political 
society, hegemony and domination (leadership and coercion), passive revolution (revolution-
restoration), transformism (molecular and organic) and counter-reformism, we are much better 
placed to understand the character of political crisis which afflicts the bourgeois hegemonic 
projects of the advanced capitalist states in the neoliberal context. At the highest level of generality, 
this conceptual apparatus – especially when related to its moment of emergence in the historical 
analysis of nineteenth century Europe – allows us to recognise the profound formal and substantive 
fluidity of the bourgeois hegemonic project in more and less favourable historical conditions. Its 
development is attended in different contexts by different degrees of leadership and dictatorship, 
charts trajectories of expansion or stagnation and operates in different proportions by the 
progressive integration or casuistic assimilation of subaltern classes and perspectives. Proceeding 
simply from the understanding of bourgeois supremacy as an unstable synthesis of hegemony and 
domination and of the integral state as a unity in diversity of civil society and political society, we 
may recognise that the precise balance obtaining between consent and coercion is subject to 
contextual variation, while the latter finds expression in the changing character and intensity of the 
interpenetration of the civil and political terrains. Gramsci’s approach provides then a mode of 
integrating dialectically the structural transformations obtaining in civil society in changing macro-
economic and class-relational contexts with the shifting character of attendant bourgeois 
hegemonic projects, the latter understood as the mediated political condensation or concretisation 
of the former civil society transition. By way of such an examination of the articulation and re-
articulation of the relations obtaining between the fundamental and subsumed classes, in both their 
economic and political content (and crucially for our purposes in the evolving context of the world 
market as the domain of the ultimate social validation/invalidation of those relations) we may hope 
to find explanations of the changes in the nature and intensity of bourgeois parliamentary 
democracy that appear in other analyses to arise ex nihilo.   
 
87 Coutinho, Gramsci’s Political Thought, pp. 101 
88 Coutinho, Gramsci’s Political Thought, Appendix Two at pp. 157-158 
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More specifically, following Gramsci’s provisional reflections on ‘Americanism’ or ‘Fordism’ and 
considering contemporary work by Buci-Glucksmann and Therborn89 as well as Coutinho, we may 
affirm the utility of the concept of passive revolution in understanding the political dynamics 
underpinning the construction of the post-war ‘welfarist’ regimes in the advanced capitalist 
economies. We may recognise this form of old-style social democracy as displaying precisely the 
dialectic of renewal and restoration which animates a period of passive revolution inasmuch as 
structural reforms were undertaken from above in fulfilment of the “inherent necessity to achieve 
the organisation of a planned economy”90 whilst reproducing such objectively socialised 
production within the fundamental structure of private appropriation. In this manner, the 
bourgeoisie was able to entrench its own supremacy whilst reproducing the subalternity of labour, 
the latter imprisoned as an economic-corporative force within the integral state of the capitalist 
class. Consequently, capitalism was able to ride out an organic crisis occasioned by the inter-war 
economic collapse and the political challenge of the October Revolution, while the demands of a 
historically-powerful labour movement were passively integrated in the neutralised form of social 
rights, collective bargaining, mass consumption and direct state intervention in the economy. The 
contradictory and class-inflected nature of the Keynesian compromise which emerges from this 
substitution of the interventionist policy of the capitalist state for the direct historical protagonism 
of the subaltern classes – the placation of the demands of labour within the system of reproduction 
of bourgeois supremacy – is captured by Michal Kalecki’s 1943 analysis of the ‘Political aspects of 
full employment’91. Kalecki recognised that the consensus which had emerged around the efficacy 
of preventing large-scale unemployment during a slump by means of debt-financed public 
investment met peculiarly with the persistence (even heightening) of opposition to the maintenance 
by state intervention of full employment during the subsequent upturn. The key to this seeming 
contradiction lay at the heart of the Keynesian compromise, understood as a mode of controlling 
the social and political consequences of crisis-ridden capitalist economic development whilst 
protecting the role of capital as the dominant factor of production driving such development. 
Deficit spending could be used to insulate the bourgeois hegemonic project (both as such and in its 
liberal parliamentary configuration) from the political implications of the mass unemployment 
which accompanied cyclical downturns and which had been revealed in all its explosive power by 
both the revolutionary period following October 1917 and also by the rise of fascism. However, the 
economic imperative of stable growth and profitability had ultimately to remain subservient to the 
political necessity of defending the commanding heights of the economy from the advance of 
organised labour, which threatened in a period of relative strength to wrest increasing control over 
surplus extraction and investment. As against this advance, the coercive force of the reserve labour 
89 C. Buci-Glucksmann & G. Therborn (eds.), Le Défi Social-Démocrate (Paris: Maspero, 1981)  
90 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 279 
91 M. Kalecki, ‘Political aspects of full employment’ (1943) 13(4) The Political Quarterly 322 
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army – underpinning the efficacy of the ‘sack’ as disciplinary measure92 – remained an 
indispensible lever.  
 
Returning to the period with which we are most directly concerned, we may recognise that the 
close of the post-war long boom and the emergence of the long downturn was the prefiguring 
context in which emerged, through a series of interrelated and mediating processes, a change in the 
character and form of bourgeois hegemony in the advanced capitalist economies. As there 
crystallised a new regime of accumulation centred on the financial sector and driven by finance 
capital as the emergent leading/dominant fraction of the capitalist class, there materialised an 
interrelated shift in the balance of leadership/domination underpinning the bourgeois political 
project and a re-configuration of the structural interconnection of civil and political society. 
Following Coutinho’s tentative lead, it is contended that this neoliberal age is best understood not 
in terms of passive revolution but rather as counter-reformation93. Neoliberalism is not animated 
by a dialectic of restoration and renewal within which capital acquiesces to certain subaltern 
demands whilst entrenching its own dominance – rather it is a moment of restoration pure and 
simple involving a dramatic upwards redistribution of wealth and a dismantling of the civil rights 
and social protections accumulated during the period of passive revolution bookended by 
Americanism and the welfare state94. The neoliberal project is characterised by a demonstrative 
prevalence of the old over the new, the “vast preponderance of conservation (or even restoration) in 
the face of any novelties, however timid”, ‘reforms’ in areas such as social security, labour-law, 
criminal justice and the privatisation of formerly public enterprises and assets representing the 
attempt “to radically suppress the victories of the political economy of labour”95.   
 
Neoliberalism represents from one perspective the crucial degeneration of bourgeois hegemony: 
the erosion of the ability of the capitalist class to lead society forward in a historical process of 
genuine social and political elevation; the dismantling or exclusionary re-configuration of the civil 
society institutions which once constituted an ‘organic passage’ into the expanding technical sphere 
of the capitalist class96; the de-socialisation of politics represented by the disintegration of the mass 
social-democratic parties, the secular fall in voter registration and turnouts and the collapse in trade 
union membership, and; the stark revelation of the class-particularity of bourgeois economic and 
political initiatives. The worker learning of soaring stock prices on the FTSE 100 no longer 
recognises the identity of her interests and those of capital – howsoever affective the relevant news 
coverage – for increasing asset values have long since ceased to represent productivity growth 
positively articulated with rising wages and job market buoyancy, reading rather as an index of 
92 Kalecki, ‘Political aspects of full employment’ at p. 326   
93 Coutinho, Gramsci’s Political Thought, Appendix Two  
94 Coutinho, Gramsci’s Political Thought, Appendix Two at pp. 160-161 
95 Coutinho, Gramsci’s Political Thought, Appendix Two at p. 161 
96 Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, p. 260 
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domestic parasitism and international imperialism. Capital is increasingly unable to secure rising 
standards of living in an upturn, to effectively subsidise social reproduction in a slump, to 
guarantee a dignified retirement or appropriate care for the disabled and temporarily incapacitated. 
This profound erosion of the materiality of consent97 has been accompanied by a multiplication and 
intensification of the machinery of coercion. In the UK, at the same time as there has registered a 
long run decline in political party and trade union membership, accompanied by an “unprecedented 
fall in public trust in government, the media, corporations and other central institutions in British 
society”98, the material means of coercion available to the police in the maintenance of public order 
have accumulated, while the legal framework within which these may be applied has been 
qualitatively transformed.  
 
An Expanded Machinery of Coercion – The Emergence of the Police State 
 
Hobsbawm has noted the expansion and militarisation of a police force which increased by thirty-
five percent 1971-2007 (making for 34 police officers per ten thousand citizens, as opposed to 
24.4), as well as the significant expansion of the private security industry99. In 1978, Tom Bowden 
recognised a generalised increase in the role of the police in the maintenance of public order 
throughout Europe since the disturbances of 1968, noting specifically in the British context that 
there had developed an increasing coordination between police and military activities in public 
order matters subsequent to the confrontations of the 1972 miners’ strike100. Following a Cabinet 
Office Committee review of internal security in the spring of the latter year, there were introduced 
three schemes of coordinated police-military action grouped under the collective term Military Aid 
to the Civil Authorities: provision was made for military assistance in combating armed terrorism 
under the Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP) scheme, thereby placing military units such as 
the Special Air Service on a permanent alert and call to the police; Military Aid to the Civil 
Community (MACC) provided for military relief in the aftermath of a natural disaster or major 
incident, and finally; Military Aid to the Civil Ministries (MACM) – now Military Aid to other 
government departments – enabled the deployment of the military to maintain services and supplies 
during protracted industrial disputes101.  
 
97 Nicos Poulantzas explains that “the relation of the masses to power and the State – in what is termed 
among other things a consensus – always possesses a material substratum” – State, Power, Socialism, 
introduction at p. 31 
98 Adrian Cousins has usefully synthesised a significant amount of statistical data in ‘The crisis of the British 
regime: democracy, protest and the unions’. Available at: http://www.counterfire.org/index.php/theory/37-
theory/14906-the-crisis-of-the-british-regime-democracy-protest-and-the-unions [accessed 8 October 2013] 
99 E. Hobsbawm, Globalisation, Democracy and Terrorism (London: Abacus, 2007), pp. 141, 149 
100 T. Bowden, ‘Guarding the state: the police response to crisis politics in Europe’ (1978) 5 British Journal 
of Law and Society 69 
101 Bowden, ‘Guarding the state’ at 83 
121 
 
                                                            
In parallel as the interpenetration of police and military activities deepened, there occurred a 
restructuring within the police forces with the expansion of a ‘squads’ system of intelligence 
sections and specialist armed response units tasked primarily with countering terrorism but 
possessing a creeping remit which came in effect to include the more general maintenance of 
public order. The operations of Special Branch have long been shrouded in secrecy, escaping 
largely the evaluative purview even of parliament, while the police more generally have remained 
“the cinderellas of political science”102. In February 1975, the Minister of State for Home Affairs 
John Harris explained to the Lords that the “subversive activities” with which Special Branch was 
concerned were those “which threaten the safety or wellbeing of the State, and which are intended 
to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means”, 
before mentioning by name such subversive organisations as the Communist Party of Great Britain, 
the International Marxist Group and the International Socialists103. This definition was reiterated by 
Home Secretary Merilyn Rees in the Commons in April 1978 in response to concerns raised by 
Robin Cook that forms of legitimate political activity might fall under it, Rees adding that “The 
Special Branch does an excellent job. I think that it would be wrong to bring the political aspect of 
their work into this matter…it is something which, quite properly, one does not talk about”104. All 
this confirms Tony Bunyan’s assertion that “An historical study of the [Special] Branch (and other 
agencies) shows only one consistent criterion – for ‘subversive’ read ‘all those actively opposed to 
the prevailing order’”105. Bunyan’s organisation Statewatch has reported the expansion of Special 
Branch from some 1,638 officers in 1978 to at least 4,247 officers by 2003, arguing consequently 
that “domestically the political police – Special Branch and MI5 – are more intrusive in every day 
political activity than at any other point in British history”106.  
 
As regards armed response units, the infamous Special Patrol Group (SPG) had been formed in 
1965 and by 1972 was on twenty-four hour heavily-armed patrol in London, while the Merseyside 
and Greater Manchester police forces created analogous units in 1974 and 1977 respectively. The 
SPG – which grew from four units to six and later to eight before being replaced in 1987 by the 
Territorial Support Group (TSG) – was implicated in a number of controversies, not least the death 
of protestor Blair Peach at a 1979 Anti-Nazi League demonstration in Southall. With regard to the 
latter incident – a cause célèbre revealing something of a world of political policing generally 
shielded from public knowledge and accountability107 – a series of internal reports compiled by 
Commander John Cass in 1979 and 1980 were released by the Metropolitan Police in April 2010. 
102 Bowden, ‘Guarding the state’ at 70 
103 HL Deb 26 Feb 1975, vol 357, cols 946-949  
104 HC Deb 06 April 1978, vol 947, cols 618-620 
105 T. Bunyan, The History and Practice of the Political Police in Britain (London: Quartet, 1977), p. 134 
106 Statewatch report, ‘Special Branch more than doubles in size: analysis of the Special Branch’s role in 
conducting surveillance for MI5 and on public order’, September 2003. Available at: 
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2003/sep/SB.pdf  [accessed 17 October 2013] 
107 R. Reiner, ‘Tony Bunyan “The History and Practice of the Political Police in Britain”’ (Book Review) 
(1980) 13 Crime and Social Justice 55 
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These revealed that Peach had almost certainly been killed by an SPG officer and that a number of 
SPG officers had lied to Cass in order to cover up the actions of their colleagues, whilst further 
documenting Cass’ unearthing of a stash of unauthorised weapons (including illegal truncheons, 
knives, crowbars, a whip and a three foot wooden stave) as well as Nazi regalia during a raid on 
SPG headquarters108. The replacement for the SPG, the TSG, has itself become quite notorious, 
such that its own management team identified in 2009 that public complaints against its officers 
had become unacceptably high109. A 2012 Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) 
review concluded that the TSG had historically generated higher numbers of recorded complaints 
of excessive force and oppressive behaviour than their Territorial Policing colleagues, whilst 
highlighting that a disproportionate number of such complaints came from people of a black and 
minority ethnic (BME) background and in the majority of cases related to unplanned stop-and-
search encounters110. The IPCC review followed the publication by the Guardian in 2009 of the 
results of a Freedom of Information (FOI) request which had revealed that since August 2005 there 
had been lodged 5,241 complaints against TSG officers, of which only 9 had been substantiated – a 
situation which led Jenny Jones of the Metropolitan Police Authority (MPA) to conclude that the 
TSG was “practically immune” from criticism111. Particularly visible incidents involving the TSG 
have included: the alleged brutal beating of Anthony Abramson in June 1997, an attack which 
apparently only ceased when the victim pretended to be unconscious112; the perpetration in 
December 2003 by six TSG officers (who together had already been the subject of seventy-seven 
complaints) of a prolonged, gratuitous attack on Babar Ahmad which the Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner admitted in March 2009 constituted “grave abuse amounting to torture”113, and; the 
death of Ian Tomlinson during the 2009 G20 summit protests in London, in relation to which the 
Metropolitan Police admitted to using “excessive and unlawful” force114. 
 
108 P. Lewis, ‘Blair Peach killed by police at 1979 protest, Met report finds’ The Guardian, 27 April 2010. 
Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/apr/27/blair-peach-killed-police-met-report [accessed 17 
October 2013]. Commander Cass’ reports, along with others by two former Detective Chief Inspectors are 
available at: http://www.met.police.uk/foi/units/blair_peach.htm [accessed 17 October 2013] 
109 Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC), Metropolitan Police Service Territorial Support 
Group: a review of complaints data and IPCC cases 2008-2012, December 2012, at p. 17. Available at: 
www.ipcc.gov.uk [accessed 18 October 2013] 
110 IPCC, Metropolitan Police Service Territorial Support Group, pp. 9-11 
111 P. Lewis & M. Taylor, ‘Scotland Yard riot squad faces calls to end “culture of impunity”’ The Guardian, 
6 November 2009. Available at: www.theguardian.com/politics/2009/nov/06/police-scotland-yard-riot-squad 
[accessed 18 October 2013] 
112 See V. Dodd, ‘Police beat up man then lied on oath, police told’ The Guardian, 5 October 1999. Available 
at: www.theguardian.com/uk/1999/oct/05/vikramdodd [accessed 18 October 2013] 
113 F. Murphy, ‘Babar Ahmad’s principled stand shames the IPCC’ The Guardian, 5 June 2011. Available at: 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/jun/05/babar-ahmad-metropolitan-police-ipcc [accessed 18 
October 2013]. Statement from Fiona Murphy (Babar Ahmad’s solicitor), 18 March 2009. Available at: 
http://www.freebabarahmad.com/press-and-media/press-releases/item/33-statement-from-fiona-murphy-
babar-ahmads-solicitor-18/03/09 [accessed 18 October 2013] 
114 M. Taylor, ‘Ian Tomlinson’s family win apology from Met police over death in 2009’ The Guardian, 5 
August 2013. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2013/aug/05/ian-tomlinson-apology-met-
police [accessed 18 October 2013] 
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The findings of the IPCC review mentioned above are in many respects unsurprising, insofar as 
allegations of institutional racism and public opposition to what has been perceived as gratuitous 
deployment of stop and search powers have accompanied at every juncture the development of 
political policing in the long downturn. The Notting Hill Carnival riot of 1976 was sparked by an 
expansive police stop and search operation which was perceived to involve the arbitrary 
harassment and arrest of young black people, while the Brixton uprising of 1981 broke out amidst 
“Operation Swamp 81” which “flooded” the Lambeth area with police officers under instruction to 
question suspects “persistently and astutely”115, there being in the ensuing confrontations “little 
doubt that the police regarded all blacks as potential rioters”116. In September 1985 riots returned to 
Brixton after the shooting by police of Dorothy “Cherry” Groce during a raid on her home, an 
incident followed a week later by the eruption of the Broadwater Farm riot following the death of 
Cynthia Jarrett in disputed circumstances during a similar raid. In 1999 the Macpherson inquiry 
into the Metropolitan Police’s investigation of the murder of Stephen Lawrence reported that the 
case had been marred by institutional racism117, while the following decade saw in fact an 
increasing disparity in stop and search rates for black people as opposed to the white population118. 
The anger and resentment bred by such persistent coercive intrusion into the lives of an increasing 
sub-section of the working class which faces almost complete social exclusion in the context of 
structural unemployment, wage repression and public service re-commodification/retrenchment 
was all too apparent in the riots of August 2011. Thousands of people resident disproportionately in 
the most deprived areas of England119 and expressing in great number frustration regarding 
disrespectful and discriminatory policing in their communities120 took to the streets in disturbances 
115 R. Behrens, ‘The Scarman report: II – a British view’ (1982) 53(2) The Political Quarterly 120 at 125-156 
116 Hobsbawm, Globalisation, Democracy and Terrorism at p. 150 
117 W. Macpherson of Cluny, Sir, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report of an Inquiry (London: Stationary 
Office, 1999), para. 46.1. Available online at: www.archive.official-
documents.co.uk/document/cm42/4262/4262.htm [accessed 24 October 2013] 
118 Black people were in 1999 six times more likely to be stopped and searched under Section 1 of the Police 
and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, while by 2006/7 they were seven times more likely – House of Commons 
Home Affairs Committee, The Macpherson Report: Ten Years On HC 427 (2009), p. 4. See also V. Dodd, 
‘Minorities stopped disproportionately in decade after Macpherson report’ The Guardian, 22 April 2013. 
Available at: www.theguardian.com/law/2013/apr/22/ethnic-minority-britons-stop-search-white [accessed 24 
October 2013] 
119 Of two thousand riots cases processed by the magistrates courts by December 2011, 58 percent of those 
appearing identified their residential location as being within the 20 percent most deprived areas in England – 
S. Rodgers, ‘England riots: was poverty a factor?’ The Guardian, 6 December 2011. Available at: 
www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2011/aug/16/riots-poverty-map-suspects [accessed 25 December 
2013]. Of those suspected rioters arrested in the West Midlands, six out of ten (61 percent) were 
unemployed, while of those arrested by the Metropolitan Police, 40 percent were unemployed and 28 percent 
students – Home Office, An Overview of Recorded Crimes and Arrests Resulting from Disorder Events in 
August 2011, October 2011, at p. 18. Available at: 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/116257/overview-disorder-
aug2011.pdf [accessed 25 October 2013] 
120 Of the 270 people interviewed during the study jointly conducted by The Guardian and the London 
School of Economics and Political Science, some 85 percent said policing was an “important” or “very 
important” factor in why the riots happened, while a full 73 percent of interviewees had been stopped and 
searched in the previous twelve months – P. Lewis, T. Newburn et al., Reading the Riots: Investigating 
England’s Summer of Disorder (London: The Guardian and LSE, 2011), at pp. 18-19. Available at: 
eprints.lse.ac.uk/46297 [accessed 25 October 2013]  
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which – described by the Metropolitan Police as “unprecedented in the capital’s history” – affected 
twenty-two out of thirty-two London boroughs and later spread to other areas including Gloucester, 
Liverpool, Nottingham and Birmingham. There was a certain familiarity about the incident which 
represented the riots’ proximate cause – the police shooting of Tottenham resident Mark Duggan in 
circumstances obscured by the circulation of misinformation121, followed by the failure to officially 
inform Duggan’s family of the death122 and the perceived failure of the police to respond 
adequately to community concerns or issue an apology.    
  
The Duggan shooting should be seen in the broader context of an historical increase in police 
deployment of firearms, as well as in connection with the controversy surrounding the Metropolitan 
Police’s ‘shoot to kill’ policy – formerly codenamed ‘Operation Kratos’ – which involves shooting 
suspected suicide bombers in the head without warning and resulted on 22 July 2005 in the death of 
the misidentified Jean Charles de Menezes. Tony Bunyan noted the doubling of the number of 
occasions on which officers were issued with guns between 1970 and 1972, these figures being 
1,072 and 2,237 operations respectively and further highlighted the re-equipping of officers with 
more powerful weaponry – including the L39A1 high-velocity rifle which had been rejected by the 
New York police on account of being too dangerous for use in urban areas – following the report of 
a Home Office working party in 1972123. By comparison, in 2010/11, there were 17,209 operations 
in which firearms were authorised, the annual average between 2002 and 2011 being 17,778 
operations124. Moreover, CS incapacitant spray was introduced in 1996 and had by 1998 been used 
more than ten thousand times125 despite the death of asylum seeker Ibrahima Sey126 in the first 
month of the weapon’s trial period and the Association of Chief Police Officers’ (APCO) January 
1996 recognition of health risks and the lack of comprehensive research127; there has been 
subsequently recorded the occurrence of ‘adverse’ symptoms such as blisters and dermatitis whilst 
121 The IPCC admitted to leading journalists to the erroneous belief that shots had been exchanged between 
Duggan and the police in the immediate aftermath of the incident – IPCC, ‘Release of information in early 
stages of Mark Duggan investigation’, 12 August 2011. Available at: http://www.ipcc.gov.uk/news/release-
information-early-stages-mark-duggan-investigation [accessed 25 October 2013]. Such misinformation was 
circulated uncritically by the media, which has also been criticised for portraying Duggan as a “well known 
gangster” despite his lack of a criminal record – N. Abbey, ‘How the media shamefully manipulated Mark 
Duggan’s death’ The Voice, 8 October 2011. Available at: www.voice-online.co.uk/article/how-media-
shamefully-manipulated-mark-duggans-death [accessed 25 October 2013] 
122 The IPCC admitted in February 2012 that neither it nor the Metropolitan Police had informed Mr 
Duggan’s parents of their son’s death – IPCC, Report of the Investigation into a Complaint Made by the 
Family of Mark Duggan about Contact with them Immediately After His Death, 27 February 2012. Available 
at: www.ipcc.gov.uk [accessed 25 October 2013], at p. 3 
123 Bunyan, The History and Practice of the Political Police in Britain, p. 93 
124 Home Office, ‘Statistics on police use of firearms in England and Wales 2010-11, July 2012. Available at: 
www.gov.uk/government/publications/statistics-on-the-police-use-of-firearms-in-england-and-wales-2010-
to-2011 [accessed 28 October 2013] 
125 ‘UK safety fears prompt CS spray review’ BBC News, 24 September 1998. Available at: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/179451.stm [accessed 28 October 2013] 
126 Inquest report, Death in Police Custody: Report on the Death of Ibrahima Sey (London: Inquest, 1997). 
Available at: http://inquest.gn.apc.org/pdf/Ibrahima%20Sey%20briefing.pdf [accessed 28 October 2013] 
127 Inquest report, Death in Police Custody, at p. 3 
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noting the persistence of effects more than six hours after exposure128. Further, a perhaps yet more 
controversial weapon, the taser, was introduced in 2004 for the use of authorised firearms officers 
and their deployment widened to some thirty thousand non-firearms officers in 2008, while the 
2011 riots have led the Metropolitan Police to undertake work “on the use of more assertive tactics 
in a public order context”, including the potential use of water cannon and Attenuating Energy 
Projectiles (AEPs) or ‘baton rounds’129. 
 
Essentially, what is being argued is that the crystallisation in the context of the emergence of the 
long downturn of a regime of accumulation dominated by finance capital has engendered economic 
conditions (characterised by structural unemployment, wage repression and public service re-
commodification) in relation to which sections of the working class have tended to withdraw from 
civil society organisations and have become tendentially alienated from parliamentary politics. In 
this regard, the reconciliation – often rationalised in terms of the ‘Third Way’130, or for the German 
Social Democrats die neue Mitte – of social democratic parties to a neoliberal policy horizon is 
crucial, while the question of whether certain of these processes might be productively approached 
using the Gramscian notion of transformism131 is interesting, yet beyond the scope of the present 
work. In any event, it is contended that the relation by which increasing proportions of the working 
population are bound to the hegemonic bloc represented by the alliance of capital and proximate 
classes obtains a progressively more coercive character as the means of consensual integration 
erode. The above discussion has highlighted the increasing size of the police force, its deepening 
interconnection with the military, the expansion of intelligence operations and riot control squads 
and the increasing deployment of firearms and other less-lethal weaponry to exemplify the 
accumulation of the means of coercion. Much more could be drawn from the explosion of Closed-
Circuit Television (CCTV) and the developing sophistication of intelligence operations including 
the activity of Forward Intelligence Teams (FITs), while the introduction of Anti-Social Behaviour 
Orders (ASBOs) as a form of systematic petty intrusion into working-class social reproduction132 
and the very fact of the increased rate of incarceration is significant133.      
128 E. Euripidou, R. MacLehouse & A. Fletcher, ‘An investigation into the short term and medium term 
health impacts of personal incapacitant sprays. A follow up of patients reported to the National Poisons 
Information Service (London)’ (2004) 21 Emergency Medical Journal 548 
129 Metropolitan Police Service, 4 Days in August: Strategic Review into the Disorder of August 2011, March 
2012, paras 6.5-6.7 Available at www.met.police.co.uk [accessed 28 October 2013] 
130 “…adapting Lenin’s maxim that ‘the democratic republic is the ideal political shell of capitalism’, we 
could say that the Third Way is the best ideological shell of neo-liberalism today” – P. Anderson, ‘Renewals’ 
(2000) 1 New Left Review 1, at p. 7. See A. Callinicos, Against the Third Way (Cambridge: Polity, 2001) 
131 Coutinho has opined that “transformism as a political phenomenon is not exclusive to processes of passive 
revolution, also having possible connections with processes of counter-reformation” – Gramsci’s Political 
Thought, Appendix Two at p. 162 
132 See A. Rutherford, ‘An elephant on the doorstep: criminal policy without crime in New Labour’s Britain’ 
in P. Green & A. Rutherford (eds.), Criminal Policy in Transition (Oxford: Hart, 2000) 
133 While the prison population in England and Wales has risen steadily since the early 1940s, there was a 
marked increase in the mid to late 1980s and following a marginal reduction in the early 1990s, a dramatic 
rise thereafter – House of Commons Library, Prison Population Statistics (2009) Standard Note: 
SN/SG/4334, p. 3. Available at: www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/sn04334.pdf [accessed 29 October 
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 The expanding and developing role of policing in the long downturn has been accompanied by the 
facilitative development of the legal apparatus commanded by police forces. Following the miner’s 
strike of 1984-5, in relation to which it was widely believed that the police operated as “an 
organised force of strike-breakers” – a position described Sarah McCabe and Peter Wallington as 
“an exaggerated, but not fundamentally erroneous, view of the situation”134 – police powers were 
strengthened by the enactment of the Public Order Act 1986. Similarly as the Public Order Act 
1936 authorised the expanding role of the police in controlling unemployment marches and anti-
fascist demonstrations (as well indeed as enforcing the de-militarisation of the British Union of 
Fascists) during the Great Depression, the 1986 Act clarified and crucially expanded the powers of 
the police to control civil unrest in the context of the long downturn. In particular, section 5 of the 
1986 Act significantly increased the discretionary powers of the police (and threatened to reinforce 
a “do as I say” policing style135) insofar as it aimed in terms of the White Paper to tackle minor 
nuisances such as kicking over dustbins and swearing at people in bus queues136. The startlingly 
vague section, which A.T.H. Smith considered “comes perilously close to offending against the 
requirements of due process”137 provides that: 
A person is guilty of an offence if he: 
(a) uses threatening, abusive or insulting words or behaviour, or disorderly 
behaviour, or 
(b) displays any writing, sign or other visible representation which is 
threatening, abuse or insulting, 
within the hearing or sight of a person likely to be caused harassment, alarm or 
distress thereby. 
 
The 1986 Act also gave parliamentary approval to police powers to prohibit and regulate 
processions (which now required six days’ written notice) and expanded powers to control these 
processions as well as the location, duration and size of public assemblies of more than twenty 
people138. Further, s.13 of the Act enabled chief police officers to apply to a local authority for an 
order banning all public processions in a district for up to three months. Subsequently, the Criminal 
Justice and Public Order Act 1994 introduced a s.14A into the 1986 Act, providing that a chief 
officer of police may apply to the local council for an order prohibiting for a specified period 
“trespassory assemblies” which he reasonably believed were intended to be held on a piece of land 
2013]. Consequently, the prison population was seen to rise by 98% between June 1993 and June 2012, 
driven by “tougher sentencing and enforcement outcomes, and a more serious mix of offence groups coming 
before the courts”  – Ministry of Justice, Story of the Prison Population: 1993-2012 England and Wales, 
January 2013. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/story-of-the-prison-population-
1993-2012 [accessed 29 October 2013] 
134 S. McCabe & P. Wallington, The Police, Public Order and Civil Liberties: Legacies of the Miners’ Strike 
(London: Routledge, 1988), p. 3 
135 McCabe & Wallington, The Police, Public Order and Civil Liberties, p. 117 
136 White Paper, Home Office and Scottish Office, Review of Public Order Law Cmnd 9510 (1985). 
Referenced in A.T.H. Smith, ‘The Public Order Act 1986. Part 1: the new offences’ 1987 Criminal Law 
Review 156, at p. 164 
137 Smith, ‘The Public Order Act 1986’, at p. 164 
138 Public Order Act 1986 ch. 64, ss11-14 
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to which the public had no or only a limited right of access. Additionally, s.2 of the Protection from 
Harassment Act 1997, which had been originally intended for use in relation to incidences of 
stalking, began to be redeployed in the prosecution of protestors139. These statutory powers were 
complimented by “immensely broad and bewilderingly imprecise powers” available under the 
common law doctrine of breach of the peace, which Helen Fenwick has recognised as having had a 
long history of deployment in relation to public protest. Being largely dependent upon police 
perceptions informed by unpublished guidelines, and thereby handing the police an “extraordinarily 
wide discretion”, Fenwick argues that the doctrine is an unsuitable basis for striking the sensitive 
balance between the protection of the freedoms of expression and assembly and keeping the peace 
in cases of mass protest140. 
 
An interrelated matter is the development of anti-terrorism legislation from the introduction of 
measures intended to deal with members and supporters of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) 
following its bombing campaign of the early 1970s to the frantic legislative wave which swept 
through the British legal system as in many others subsequent to the World Trade Centre attack of 
11 September 2001. I say interrelated because the dilution of constitutional rights, even in respect 
of a restricted category of legal persons and in specified circumstances, is likely to have the 
consequence of destabilising the structure of liberties more generally enjoyed in a given 
jurisdiction – history does not look kindly upon populations who surrender basic rights in respect 
of enemies of the state. Further, the enactment of anti-terror legislation may be considered a key 
moment in the developing articulation between the shifting foreign policy imperatives engendered 
by the changing position of the advanced capitalist economies in the global division of capital and 
the development of repressive powers (and modes to ideologically rationalise these) suitable to 
manage the necessarily coercive domestic realities of finance-driven accumulation. The terror 
threat constituted the permanent state of emergency141 which justified a substantial extension of 
police powers and a corresponding curtailment of civil liberties142. Finally, many of the new anti-
terror powers and terror-related offences are framed in extreme breadth and have been quite 
regularly used to discipline protest movements, partly illustrating the substantial conceptual and 
tactical continuity that obtains in the handling of terror suspects and so-called ‘domestic 
extremists’. Indeed, according to Mark Curtis, “Britain has been leading the international 
139 See R. Furlong, ‘The law of public protest’ (2011) 175 Criminal Law and Justice Weekly 733 at 734 
140 H. Fenwick, ‘Marginalising human rights: breach of the peace, “kettling”, the Human Rights Act and 
public protest’ 2009 Public Law 737  
141 C. Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (G. Schwab trans.) 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005); G. Agamben, State of Exception (K. Attell trans.) (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2005) 
142 Human Rights Watch reported in 2002 that “the anti-terror campaign led by the United States is inspiring 
opportunistic attacks on civil liberties around the world”, explaining that “some countries, such as Russia, 
Uzbekistan, and Egypt, are using the war on terror to justify abusive military campaigns or crackdowns on 
domestic political opponents” while “in the United States and Western Europe, measures designed to combat 
terrorism are threatening long-held human rights principles” – Human Rights Watch, ‘Anti-terror campaign 
cloaking human rights abuse’, 17 January 2002. Available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2002/01/15/anti-
terror-campaign-cloaking-human-rights-abuse [accessed 28 November 2013]  
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community in promoting a legal definition of terrorism that may stifle domestic political 
dissent”143.  
 
With regard to specific enactments, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Acts 
(PTAs), through several iterations suspended habeas corpus between 1974 and 2001, the 
juxtaposition of such longevity with the Acts’ avowal of temporariness capturing neatly the logic of 
permanent exceptionality144. The PTAs introduced on the British mainland the twin ‘noncoercive’ 
strategies of detention without charge and the proscription of specified organisations which had 
been central components of anti-terrorism legislation in Ireland from the 1920s onwards145. Under 
the PTAs, it became a criminal offence to be a member of a ‘proscribed organisation’ as specified 
by the Secretary of State or otherwise to solicit or invite support for such an organisation, or to 
assist in the organisation of its meetings, these offences carrying a maximum penalty of ten years’ 
imprisonment and an unlimited fine146. It became further an offence to provide financial assistance 
for terrorism or to proscribed organisations147 or indeed to show public support for such 
organisations by wearing clothes or displaying articles which would arouse ‘reasonable suspicion’ 
that you were a member or supporter thereof148. The PTAs also introduced ‘exclusion orders’ by 
which the Secretary of State could prohibit persons suspected of being involved (or seeking to 
become involved) in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism from being in, 
or entering Great Britain, Northern Ireland or the United Kingdom, unless such persons were 
citizens of those jurisdictions and had been ordinarily resident there for three years149. Persons 
suspected of any of the offences above or of failing to comply with an exclusion order could be 
arrested and detained for forty-eight hours without charge, or on application to the Secretary of 
State, for up to seven days in total150. The powers provided by the PTAs were placed on a 
permanent foundation and further extended by the Terrorism Act (TA) 2000, which broadened the 
definition of ‘terrorism’ itself from the “use of violence for political ends” of the PTAs to include 
the use or threat of ‘action’ where this is designed to influence the government or intimidate the 
public and to advance a political, religious or ideological cause. Activities which would constitute 
action in this sense are those involving serious violence, the endangerment of life or the health and 
safety of the public, and even serious damage to property or serious interference with or disruption 
of an electronic system151. TA 2000 also gave British courts a near-universal jurisdiction to try 
suspected terrorists in view of action taking place outside of the United Kingdom and directed 
143 M. Curtis, Web of Deceit: Britain’s Real Role in the World (London: Vintage, 2003), p. 89 
144 See J. Ip, ‘Sunset clauses and counterterrorism legislation’  (2013) Jan Public Law 74 
145 B. Brandon, ‘Terrorism, human rights and the rule of law: 120 years of the UK’s legal response to 
terrorism’ (2004) Criminal Law Review 981 at 982 
146 Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1989 ch. 4 (repealed), ss1, 2 
147 PTA 1989, Part III 
148 PTA 1989, s3 
149 PTA 1989, ss5-7 
150 PTA 1989, s14 
151 Terrorism Act 2000 ch. 11, s1 
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against other governments152 and people, enabling the proscription of international organisations – 
meaning in effect the addition of groups of Islamic origin to the Irish terrorist groups which had 
previously been the exclusive targets of proscription153. Further, and perhaps most controversially, 
TA 2000, s44 conferred upon police the power to make authorisations specifying an area or place 
within which for a period of up to twenty-eight days pedestrians, drivers and their vehicles could be 
stopped and searched without the usual requirement of reasonable suspicion that an offence had 
been committed154. Section 44 powers, couched in such breadth as almost to invite abuse, came to 
be regularly used as a mode of disciplining and restricting peaceful protest155, their deployment 
producing remarkably few terror-related arrests156 and coming to resemble more “a general stop 
and search without suspicion power – not specifically linked to counter-terrorism measures, but 
used disproportionately on ethnic minority groups, peaceful protestors and photographers”157. In 
2011, the operation of sections 44-47(1) of TA 2000 was suspended and replaced by a new section 
47A re-introducing the requirement of ‘reasonable suspicion’ following the decision of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Gillan and Quinton v United Kingdom158 that the powers 
unlawfully interfered with the right to privacy in violation of Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights (ECHR). 
 
Subsequent to 11 September 2001 and redoubled by the London bombings of 7 July 2005, there 
unfolded a legislative furore which profoundly transformed the landscape of UK counter-terrorism 
law and which according to David McKeever illustrates on the part of the British Government “at 
best, ambivalence towards the current legal framework for the protection of human rights”159. 
There have been created a significant number of new terrorism related offences (numbering forty 
between 2000 and 2005), often so vaguely defined as to offend against the principle of legal 
152 Ben Brandon has noted that crucially, there is no requirement in TA 2000, s1 that the government against 
which such action is directed be democratic or legitimately established, nor is there any distinction made 
between groups which target exclusively military targets and those that attack civilians. Such a definition of 
‘terrorism’ protects therefore ‘any foreign government however oppressive’ and criminalises “potentially all 
liberation movements whether or not those groups are fighting against undemocratic regimes that do not 
respect human rights” - ‘Terrorism, human rights and the rule of law’ at 988-990 
153 TA 2000, s1(4); Brandon, ‘Terrorism, human rights and the rule of law’ at 987-989  
154 TA 2000, ss44, 46. Section 45 gave constables the power to seize and retain any article which he 
‘reasonably suspects is intended to be used in connection with terrorism’   
155 See Joint Committee on Human Rights, Demonstrating Respect for Rights? A Human Rights Approach to 
Policing Protest HC 320-I (London: Stationary Office, 2009) 
156 A. Travis, ‘No terror arrests in 100,000 police counter-terror searches, figures show’ The Guardian, 28 
October 2010. Available at: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2010/oct/28/terrorism-police-stop-search-arrests 
[accessed 17 November 2013]  
157 From War to ‘Law’: Liberty’s Response to the Coalition Government’s Review of Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Powers (London: Liberty, 2010). Available at: www.liberty-human-
rights.org.uk/pdfs/policy10/from-war-to-law-final-pdf-with-bookmarks.pdf [accessed 17 November 2013], p. 
49 
158 Gillan and Quinton v United Kingdom, no. 4158/05, ECHR 2000  
159 D. McKeever, ‘The Human Rights Act and anti-terrorism in the UK: one great leap forward by 
parliament, but are the courts able to slow the steady retreat that has followed?’ (2010) Public Law 110 at 
139 
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certainty160, while the definition of ‘terrorism’ itself – already following TA 2000 so broad as to 
“cast doubt on whether the police and security service attention could ever be directed at all the 
possible activities that come within its ambit”161 – was enlarged by the Terrorism Act (TA) 2006 to 
encompass threats/actions aimed at influencing an international governmental organisation162. TA 
2006 made it an offence to encourage terrorism by publishing (in print or online) a statement likely 
to be understood as a direct or indirect encouragement or inducement to the commission, 
preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism, provided that the person publishing the statement 
intended such encouragement/inducement or was otherwise reckless as to whether it would have 
that effect163. Such statements include those glorifying the commission of acts of terrorism, it 
becoming further under section 2 an offence to disseminate publications of the same character or 
those which would be useful in the commission/preparation of terrorist acts. In this regard, it is 
important to remember once again that on account of the broad definition of terrorism in effect, 
statements or publications produced in reference to resistance to any regime, anywhere in the world 
and howsoever constituted, potentially fall foul of TA 2006, ss1-2, even if the actions encouraged 
amount only to sabotage as in the offences tried in the infamous ANC Rivonia trial164. TA 2006, s5 
also made it an offence to engage in any conduct in preparation for the commission of acts of 
terrorism or assisting in such commission, irrespective of whether this preparation related to any 
particular acts or acts of terrorism more generally. McKeever has criticised this latter provision on 
account of its moving beyond the basic principles of English criminal law, which finds punishable 
only such action as constitutes an ‘attempt’ to commit an offence, thereby requiring more than 
mere preparation. It is doubtful whether the criminalisation of these “precursor offences” can be 
justified given the dilution of the definition of terrorism to include threats to damage property165.  
 
The anti-terrorism regime was further reinforced by the extension of the maximum period of pre-
charge detention for persons suspected of terrorism from seven to fourteen166 and later to twenty-
eight days167, Tony Blair’s New Labour government having argued for a full ninety days in 2006 
and including in the Counter-Terrorism Bill 2008 a forty-two day provision which was defeated in 
the Lords. Moreover, the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act (ATCSA) 2001, described by 
Adam Tomkins as “surely the most draconian legislation Parliament has passed in peacetime in 
160 In A v HM Treasury [2008] EWHC 869 (Admin); [2008] 3 All E.R. 361, the court held in relation to anti-
terrorism asset freezing that the very wide definition of “economic resources” made it impossible for 
members of the designated person’s family to know whether they were committing an offence. Referenced in 
McKeever, ‘The Human Rights Act and anti-terrorism in the UK’, at 116, fn40  
161 N. Whitty, T. Murphy & S. Livingstone, Civil Liberties Law: The Human Rights Act Era (Oxford: OUP, 
2001), p. 127. Referenced in McKeever, ‘The Human Rights Act and anti-terrorism in the UK’, at 116  
162 Terrorism Act 2006 ch. 11, s34  
163 TA 2006, s1 
164 McKeever, ‘The Human Rights Act and anti-terrorism in the UK’ at 128 
165 McKeever, ‘The Human Rights Act and anti-terrorism in the UK’ at 119 
166 Criminal Justice Act 2003 ch. 44, s306 
167 TA 2006, ss23-24 
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over a century”168, provided for the indefinite detention without charge of any foreign national 
certified by the Secretary of State as a ‘suspected international terrorist’ who nonetheless could not 
be deported169. Following the House of Lord’s – rather restrained – decision of December 2004170 
that ATCSA 2001, Part 4 was incompatible with ECHR, Article 5 when read together with Article 
14 – thereby holding indefinite detention without charge to be unlawful on account of 
discriminating between British nationals and foreign nationals, rather than due to its infringing the 
right against arbitrary detention as such – it was replaced by a regime of ‘control orders’ under the 
Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) 2005. This empowered the Secretary of State (or the court 
where derogation from the ECHR is required) to make an order imposing obligations on any 
individual for the purposes of protecting the public from a risk of terrorism, such obligations being 
any considered necessary to prevent the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity171. 
Section 1(4) includes in particular: prohibitions on movement; the restriction of association or 
communication with specified persons or persons in general; restrictions in respect of the 
individual’s place of residence and on the persons she receives there; requirements in relation to the 
electronic monitoring of her movements and communications; and the requirement to report to a 
specified person at specified places/times. The absurd situation created by PTA 2005 was summed 
up concisely by Victoria Brittain172:  
the rounding up, imprisonment and indefinite house arrest of a number of Muslim men resident 
in the UK, in a situation analogous to Guantánamo. Held for years without charge, under 
restricted regimes of twelve to twenty-four hour curfews, with virtually no access to the wider 
world and kept in ignorance of the alleged evidence against them, the impact on them and their 
families has been devastating. 
 
There were to be yet further human rights casualties of the legislative war on terror: the Serious 
Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 made it illegal to hold even a static demonstration within one 
kilometre of Parliament Square and in other designated areas including Downing Street and 
Whitehall without police authorisation following the provision of six days written notice173; the 
Extradition Act 2003 – implementing the UK-US extradition treaty of the same year – allowed for 
the removal to the US of persons living and working in the UK on account of alleged offences 
committed in the UK and on the basis only of ‘reasonable suspicion’ as opposed to prima facie 
168 A. Tomkins, ‘Legislating against terror: the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001’ (2002) Public 
Law 205 at 205 
169 Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 ch. 24, s23 (repealed) 
170 A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department, X and Another v Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2004] UKHL 56; [2005] 2 A.C. 68. In the Lord’s decision, Lord Hoffmann’s dissenting 
opinion at paras 96-97) that “Terrorist violence, serious as it is, does not threaten our institutions of 
government or our existence as a civil community…the real threat to the life of the nation…comes not from 
terrorism but from laws such as these” represented a ray of light in a pitch dark night.  
171 Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 ch. 2, s1 
172 V. Brittain, ‘Besieged in Britain’ (2009) 50(3) Race and Class 1, abstract. For a sobering investigation of 
the reality of life under a control order, see the documentary Taking Liberties (London: Revolver 
Entertainment, 2007) 
173 Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 2005 ch. 15, ss132-138; Serious Organised Crime and Police Act 
(Designated Area) Order 2005 no. 1537 
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evidence, and; the House of Lords in A v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No.2) held 
in relation to the ATCSA 2001 detention regime that with reference to the inadmissibility of 
evidence obtained by torture, the standard of proof to be applied by the Special Immigration 
Appeals Commission was whether on the balance of probabilities the information relied upon by 
the Secretary of State was obtained by torture174. In relation to the latter majority judgment, Lord 
Bingham of Cornhill opined in dissent that “It is inconsistent with the most rudimentary notions of 
fairness to blindfold a man and then impose a standard which only the sighted could hope to meet”, 
while Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead argued that the majority decision “…would largely nullify the 
principle, vigorously supported on all sides, that courts will not admit evidence procured by 
torture”175.   
 
The extension of the apparatus of coercion and its correlative legal machinery described above is 
presented in support of the proposition that the political project of the British bourgeoisie has come 
in the context of the long downturn to be underpinned increasingly by coercion. The interventions 
of police – as well as of social workers and Jobcentre Plus employees as such public services 
become in a context of structural unemployment and labour devaluation themselves increasingly 
coercive – appear progressively less as concretisations and confirmations of consensual civil 
society relations, but as external encroachments. For that increasing proportion of the working 
class whose mode of civil society integration may be defined only negatively, as exclusion (yet 
which simultaneously plays a positive load-bearing role in relation to the sharpening contradictions 
of the civil remainder), the stable public sector employ of representatives of the state is from a 
different world, while the atomising, individualising logic of bourgeois legality tends to falter on 
the rocks of social immobility. These developments, necessitated by the reduced capacity for 
consensual integration presented by a finance-driven regime of accumulation – and mirrored 
elsewhere in the advanced capitalist world in proportion as economies have become financialised 
and as otherwise mediated by national particularities – represent from a certain perspective a 
crucial decline of bourgeois hegemony. Capital rules most effectively when it can in great 
proportion consensually integrate the subaltern classes; the increasing pre-eminence of the state as 
narrowly defined in opposition to its civil society correlate – the preponderance of dictatorial forms 
of supremacy to the detriment of hegemonic forms176 – marks a significant, if only prospective, 
weakening of the regime.  
 
Labour’s Parallel Crisis 
 
However, political leadership is not a zero-sum game, such that the waning of one leading class’ 
capacity of initiative and ability to generate pro-active consent does not automatically result in the 
174 A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (no.2) [2005] UKHL 71; [2006] 2 A.C. 221 
175 [2006] 2 A.C. 221 at 273, 278 
176 Coutinho, Gramsci’s Political Thought, Appendix Three at p. 178 
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equal and opposite ascent of a rival class. Indeed, we may recognise that the British labour 
movement – in a manner again demonstrative, with certain peculiarities, of a secular trend in the 
advanced capitalist world – has been experiencing its own interrelated conjunctural crisis. Similar 
to the experience of financialisation in Renaissance Florence described by Arrighi, the decline of 
manufacturing and the turn to financial strategies of accumulation has in the UK tended to harden 
stratifications within the working class. Hobsbawm has noted that the return of mass 
unemployment in the 1970s and 1980s, combined with the neoliberal undermining of welfare 
policies and ‘corporatist’ systems of industrial relations, led to the revival of the old Victorian 
division between the ‘respectable’ and ‘unrespectable’ poor177. Between 1973 and 1988 there was 
shed 35% of the British manufacturing workforce (some 1.8 million jobs being lost in the first half 
of the 1980s alone), leaving pockets of residual strength in the high-value chemicals, 
pharmaceuticals and armaments sectors178. In relation to this changing job market, there diverged 
the fortunes of: on the one hand workers possessing the monopolisable skills indispensible to high-
tech production, the education and corporate-familial connections required for the management of 
financial rents, or otherwise occupying supervisory roles which assumed increased significance in 
the context of labour de-valuation and intensification, and on the other; the sections of labour 
forced during subsequent contractions out of manufacturing jobs and into relatively low-paid and 
un-organised service sector employment. In Thatcher’s Britain, the disparity between the incomes 
of the top and bottom quintiles of workers outstripped that of the late 19th century179, while the 
labouring elite tended to secede from the Labour party and came increasingly to resent their 
effective subsidisation of a growing section of the working class – in relation to which the 
derogatory term ‘underclass’ gained currency180 – who became structurally unemployed and 
therefore dependent upon welfare. Such segregation was reflected geographically in the flight of 
the skilled and upwardly mobile from inner cities to satellite towns, leaving the former urban areas 
to become the ghettoised “settlements of the marginal, the socially problematic and welfare 
dependent” or otherwise to be (more or less successfully) gentrified181.  
 
Such fermented divisions were further expressed in the changing composition of the trade union 
movement, which suffered a 37.7 percent fall in membership between 1979 and 1994182 as the 
Thatcher and Major governments legislated to restrict union activity and otherwise maintained a 
177 E. Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes: The Short Twentieth Century, 1914-1991 (London: Abacus, 1995), pp. 
307-308  
178 K. Williams, J. Williams & C. Haslam, ‘The hollowing out of British manufacturing and its implications 
for policy’ (1990) 19(4) Economy and Society 456 at pp. 461-467 
179 Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, p. 308 
180 Owen Jones has described how in the context of “the Thatcherite assault on many of the pillars of working 
class Britain” whereby “the power of working class people has been driven out of workplace, the media, the 
political establishment, and from society as a whole”, there has developed a pernicious culture scapegoating 
the socially excluded via “the chav caricature [which] has obscured the reality of the working class majority” 
– Chavs: the Demonization of the Working Class (London: Verso, 2012), preface at x, pp. 247-249 
181 Hobsbawm, Age of Extremes, pp. 308-9 
182 Reflecting a reduction in total membership from 13,289,000 to 8,278,000 – Hobsbawm, Industry and 
Empire, p. 304 
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militantly anti-union position. This fall reflected an increasingly disorganised private sector, whose 
union density by 1995 was only 21.3 percent as opposed to a public sector density of 61.4 
percent183. According to government statistics, by 2012 union density in the private sector had 
decreased to only 14.4 percent as against 56.3 percent in the public sector, while unionisation of the 
workforce in aggregate stood at 26 percent184. In fifteen years from 1980 the blue-collar 
organisations among the largest ten British unions suffered a decline in membership from 4.8 to 2.7 
millions, as by contrast public sector strength remained relatively resilient and became 
concentrated following the 1993 UNISON merger in what was then the biggest trade union in the 
country185. The trade union movement came therefore quite inevitably to represent 
disproportionately the perspectives and interests of public sector workers, whose job security, 
conditions and pay (despite coming under sustained attack in the neoliberal context) compared 
favourably with the majority of non-supervisory workers in the private sector. This dynamic has 
been dutifully seized upon by conservative commentators, whose conclusion that public sector pay 
and conditions should be levelled down –  whilst quite obviously regressive – is powerful because 
it has some limited basis in objective reality. It may be seen then, that in parallel with the erosion of 
the hegemony of capital’s historic bloc, transformed by the increasing domination of finance 
capital and correspondingly unable to consensually integrate subaltern classes en masse, the 
political leadership of organised labour – and consequently the prospects for working class 
catharsis – have been crucially undermined in the context of economic crisis and industrial decline 
by the cessation of highly-skilled workers, decreasing private sector unionisation and the 
domination of the (weakened) union movement by public sector workers in conversation with a co-
opted New Labour. In consequence, as the coalition government elected in 2010 pursues a 
determined project of austerity, the prostration of a trade union movement directed by an isolated 
public sector leadership is all too apparent, while the frustration of the growing ranks of the 
disenfranchised and completely un-represented finds only unstructured and episodic expression as 
in the riots of August 2011. In this connection, one is reminded of Gramsci’s reflection that in 
consequence of the absence of a “unitary popular initiative” in the development of Italian history, 
“this development took place as the reaction of the dominant classes to the sporadic, elementary 
and non-organic rebelliousness of the popular masses”186.  
183 Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, p. 304 
184 Department for Business, Innovation & Skills, Trade Union Membership 2012: Statistical Bulletin 
(London: Stationary Office, 2013). Available at: 
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/204169/bis-13-p77-trade-union-
membership-2012.pdf [accessed 27 November 2013], p. 5 
185 Hobsbawm, Industry and Empire, p. 232 
186 A. Gramsci, Further Selections from the Prison Notebooks (D. Boothman ed.) (London: Lawrence & 
Wishart, 1995), pp. 373-4. Referenced in Coutinho, Gramsci’s Political Thought, p. 101  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
Redeeming the Crisis – the Formation Flights of Neoliberalism and Postmodernism 
 
Having outlined the crisis tendencies embedded in the political and economic structure of 
neoliberal capitalism, it falls now to connect this structure to the methodological shape and 
substantive content of the contemporary economic – and more broadly, social – theory which 
attempts to represent it and in turn underwrites its affirmative reproduction. Crucial in this regard is 
the recognition of the material rootedness of ideology in the social processes through which social 
relations are reproduced1 - the fact of, in Poulantzas’ terms, the secretion of primary and 
‘spontaneous’ forms of the dominant ideology by the social division of labour and the direct 
embodiment of these in the state apparatuses and the practices of power2. When in our present 
connection we refer to contemporary economic theory, we speak therefore of a “second-order 
ideology” which has already been “constituted, systematised and formulated by the organic 
intellectuals of the bourgeoisie”3. It is immediately apparent then the crucial role which 
intellectuals play in the systematic integration and scholarly elevation to a properly ‘theoretical’ 
level of the conceptions of individual capitalists emerging directly from their concrete experience 
of the social processes through which are reproduced (in a necessarily context-dependent manner) 
the fundamental relations of capitalist production (and through which their capital is reproduced as 
capital). This formalised articulation of the dominant ideology is an essential aspect of the role 
which Gramsci recognised as being fulfilled by intellectuals “in the aggregation or disaggregation 
of a relation of hegemony, and in the formation or conservation of an ‘historic bloc’”4. An organic 
intellectual who played a pivotal role in the formulation of an ideology suitable to understand and 
further entrench the forms of state intervention necessary to reproduce capitalist relations of 
production under the rule of an historic bloc transformed by the domination of finance capital in the 
context of the long downturn was Friedrich August Hayek. The rise to prominence of this Austrian 
School economist, who had been marginalised in a post-war world whose trajectory through state-
managed capitalism he described in terms of ‘the road to serfdom’, is an index of the centring of a 
previously-peripheral laissez-faire radicalism which replaced the post-war consensus around 
Keynesian economic management with a generalised acknowledgment of the efficiency and 
desirability of the unfettered market. Hayek, who would share the Nobel Memorial Prize for 
Economic Sciences with Stockholm School adversary Gunnar Myrdal in 1974, grasped the mantle 
as Keynesianism (at least intellectually) crumbled in the face of the emergence of a crisis of over-
accumulation and profitability between 1965 and 1973, the latter eroding the developmental 
1 On the distinction between ‘social relations’ and ‘social processes’ and an understanding of ‘social 
phenomena’ as the unity-in-determination of both, see G. Carchedi, Behind the Crisis: Marx’s Dialectics of 
Value and Knowledge (Chicago: Haymarket, 2012), chapter 1 
2 N. Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism (P. Camiller trans.) (London: Verso, 1980), pp. 66-67 
3 Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, p. 66 
4 Coutinho, Gramsci’s Political Thought, p. 45 (Coutinho’s words) 
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context in which macro-economic management had produced results in the advanced capitalist 
world. Hayek’s critique of corporatism and his visceral distaste for trade union ‘monopoly’ was of 
especial utility for politicians who sought to generalise a supply-side ‘profit-squeeze’ analysis of 
the economic crisis and deconstruct ‘political’ impediments to market efficiency. Margaret 
Thatcher, British flag-bearer of the Anglo-American neoliberal axis, became a devotee of Hayek, 
whose Constitution of Liberty she strategically produced in direct confrontation with the ‘wets’ in 
the Conservative Party’s Research Centre in 1975, proclaiming in relation to the volume “this is 
what we believe”5.        
 
In a timely 1968 intervention, Hayek had given a lecture at the University of Kiel entitled 
‘Competition as a discovery procedure’6. Moving onto the offensive, Hayek argued that economic 
planning was necessarily inefficient insofar as it suffered from a data deficit, being unable to 
discover (far less deploy) factual information revealed only by the process of competition. The 
outcomes of competition are unpredictable and unknown in advance, such that it is only through 
the competitive process as such that there can be disclosed the particular content of transitory 
circumstances unavailable to any general theory of the market7. The latter can predict only the type 
of structure or abstract order that will result from the process of competition, whilst participatory 
engagement in the process itself is necessary to reveal a greater level of detail about such 
contingencies as what use-values – at any given moment – can be sold as commodities and what 
values (understood as an expression of relative scarcity) these will have. Such information is 
transmitted to individual participants via price signals in relation to which they reflexively orient 
their behaviour, discovering further facts about themselves (their particular skills and abilities) 
which again cannot be fully known in advance8. The discovery by individuals of embedded 
information during competitive interaction is the motor of the process of spontaneous adjustment 
whereby the market reorders itself in response to changing circumstances. For Hayek, this form of 
economic order has crucial advantages, insofar as it allows for the gathering and deployment of the 
knowledge possessed by all the individual participants – knowledge which in a society based on an 
advanced division of labour is widely diffused and cannot be known to any centralised 
bureaucracy. Furthermore, according to Hayek a spontaneous market order can serve the 
“particular objectives of all its participants in all their diversity and polarity”, in contrast to a 
consciously managed economy which must serve a uniform hierarchy of objectives. Indeed, this 
distinction is so pivotal for Hayek that he suggests its terminological demarcation – since an 
‘economy’ presupposes the direction of effort toward a uniform order of objectives, a spontaneous 
5 R. Cockett, Thinking the Unthinkable: Think-tanks and the Economic Counter-revolution, 1931-1983 
(Waukegan: Fontana, 1995), pp. 173-174. Referenced in K. R. Hoover, Economics as Ideology: Keynes, 
Laski, Hayek and the Creation of Contemporary Politics (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), pp. 208-
209  
6 Hayek, F. A., ‘Competition as a discovery procedure’ (2002) 5(3) The Quarterly Journal of Austrian 
Economics 9  
7 Hayek, ‘Competition as a discovery procedure’, at p. 11 
8 Hayek, ‘Competition as a discovery procedure’, at p. 13 
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market order, as a complex structure consisting of many individual economies, is better described 
as a ‘catallaxy’9.  
 
According to Hayek, managed economies face a debilitating disadvantage inasmuch as they disable 
the very process – competition – by which participants in an economy discover information about 
that order and realise their own set of skills and abilities in adjusting to such discovered facts. 
These economies are necessarily fettered by the ignorance of their managers relative to the totality 
of diffused knowledge acquired by individuals in a catallaxy. The planned economy, dedicated to 
the fulfilment of a uniform set of objectives, debars the process by which the enterprising 
individual discovers a mode of providing consumers with better or cheaper goods, catalysing a 
process of necessary adjustment on the part of her competitors. The crux of Hayek’s argument is 
therefore epistemological, resting on the claim that innovation is most likely realised through the 
competitive activity of entrepreneurs constantly searching for unexploited opportunities, while 
knowledge of the self is most profoundly disclosed in the process of necessary adjustment to 
changed circumstances. This argument has profound implications not just for managed economies, 
but for economic theory in general. Indeed, Hayek makes an impassioned case for the primacy of 
microeconomic theory over macroeconomic theory, arguing that not only is the latter less 
‘scientific’ than the former, it can “in the strictest sense...make no claim to the name of a 
theoretical science”10. This moment in Hayek’s argument is of far greater import in our present 
connection than the fact of his call to arms against the entrenched ‘rigidities’ impairing market 
functionality, which when viewed as one part of a never-ending iterative oscillation between 
interventionist and lassiez-faire orientations is blinding in its banality. Hayek’s critique of 
macroeconomics and his denunciation of any attempt to manage economic processes at such a level 
of generality resonates thematically with the guiding logics of many ‘postmodern’ texts. Using the 
suggestive descriptors ‘fine’ and ‘coarse’ to denote different levels of analytical abstraction, Hayek 
argues that the ‘truth’ of the economy is to be found at the micro-level, since “the coarse structure 
of the economy can exhibit no regularities that are not results of the fine structure, and...those 
aggregates or mean values, which alone can be grasped statistically, give us no information about 
what takes place in the fine structure”11. The concrete data produced at the micro level is, we are 
told, too diverse and complex to be adequately acknowledged at the macro level, such that 
macroeconomic theory is necessarily limited to the derivation of very general statements or ‘pattern 
predictions’ useful solely for generating predictions in the absence of sufficient information and 
expressed in statistics – “aggregates and averages” – which represent an “obscure” image of 
reality12. Hayek thereby argues for a linear contemplation of the micro and the macro, whereby the 
fine structure of the economy in its inexhaustible and unfathomable complexity operates as the 
9 Hayek, ‘Competition as a discovery procedure’, at pp. 13-14 
10 Hayek, ‘Competition as a discovery procedure’, at p. 11 
11 Hayek, ‘Competition as a discovery procedure’, at p. 11 
12 Hayek, ‘Competition as a discovery procedure’, at p. 12 
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cause producing effects at a macro-level which can only be crudely and figuratively understood by 
statistical data and speculative projections which fail to grasp the detail of micro-economic 
processes.  
 
The implications of Hayek’s argument for the budding economic theorist are profound, since her 
role can be no more than to observe and approximate economic interactions and behaviours at the 
micro-level, whilst perhaps indulging herself – in a vacation from science proper – in macro-
economic speculation, proposing general predictions as rules of thumb in a context of data-
deficiency. The policy-maker fares little better, resigned as she is to guaranteeing “conditions under 
which any randomly selected individual has prospects of pursuing his goals as effectively as 
possible”13. Any more ambitious, purposeful intervention would be hopelessly ineffective 
inasmuch as it, implemented from a position of near-blindness, necessarily distorts the process by 
which actual information about its object is gathered and utilised. Such ‘political’ intervention 
inevitably: inhibits the discovery of techniques for producing better and cheaper goods; truncates 
the individual’s process of self-discovery by removing the moment of coerced adjustment by which 
her particular merits and demerits are revealed, and; substitutes for the diversity and polarity of 
individual goals a (implied) uniform system of objectives. To accept Hayek’s argument then, is to 
admit that rational human behaviour is possible only at the micro-level of individual object-
oriented behaviour – there can be no broader scientific comprehension of the structure of society 
nor rational intervention therein, beyond the exceedingly-modest (yet itself immediately 
problematical) task of ensuring the conditions under which rational individuals can pursue their 
goals. As radical as this argument is, it has nevertheless become mainstream in the last four 
decades, generalised on the political right, accepted in practice by formerly social-democratic 
politicians and organisations and recited in transposed form – as a “left harmony to the neoliberal 
chorus”14 – by a browbeaten and self-disciplining postmodern left.           
 
If the acceptance of Hayek’s position is inhibiting to the policy-maker, it is thoroughly devastating 
to projects of systematic critique and the activity of political agents seeking to actualise such 
critique. If we are unable to construct more than minimally useful understandings of macro-
economic processes, then the Marxist understanding of capitalism’s macro-irrationality (issuing 
from the micro-rational behaviour of capitals) is not only unprovable, but indeed fundamentally 
nonsensical. If we are unable to know capitalism in the aggregate, what could it mean to say that it 
was irrational? However, thankfully for all of us who are more optimistic about the possibility for 
human societies to meaningfully and beneficially manage economic activity (though not ultimately 
capitalist economic activity) in the aggregate, Hayek’s understanding of the interrelation of multi-
13 Hayek, ‘Competition as a discovery procedure’, at p. 14 
14 This phrase is borrowed from Kevin Doogan. K Doogan, New Capitalism? The Transformation of Work 
(Cambridge: Polity, 2009) 
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scalar economic processes seems to be quite seriously flawed. For one can only truly understand 
the relation between the micro and macro levels as one of mutual interpenetration and constitution, 
the activity of capitals at the micro level unfolding reflexively in the developing context of the 
macro, the latter comprising the mediated unity of micro-situations. Indeed, it would be perfectly 
possible to stand Hayek’s macro-scepticism on its head and argue that the capitalist who acts on 
price signals at the micro level looks only through a glass, darkly at a refracted image of economic 
facts which have their essential truth in their macro-level completeness. However, our goal is not to 
replace one form of reductionism with another, but rather to recover an understanding of the 
movement of capital as the competitive interaction of a plurality of capitals, the truth of the two 
levels being found in the mediated unity of both.  
 
It is of course the case that there is a level of detail in micro-economic activity which is left behind 
in the process of abstraction, yet it cannot be the case that such abstraction is synonymous with 
obfuscation, since a theoretical reconstruction built upon real abstractions can reveal the essential 
contradictions which drive the development of determinate reality. Moreover, to criticise 
macroeconomic theory on the basis of its data deficiency relative to the hypothetical totality of 
information available in every micro-situation taken together is to miss the point – macroeconomic 
theory (as with any form of theoretical enquiry built on abstraction) is capable of revealing truths of 
a calibre unavailable to she who stares only at her shoelaces. To state as Hayek does that “the 
coarse structure of the economy can exhibit no regularities that are not results of the fine structure” 
is not to prove that macroeconomic inquiry is of a secondary importance or that macroeconomic 
‘facts’ are but dull reflections of microeconomic realities. Human consciousness may be recognised 
as the product of electro-chemical processes in the brain, yet the former is not thereby reducible to 
the latter, nor is the best way to understand a person’s psyche necessarily to chart in detail the 
totality of synaptic pathways connecting her many billions of neurons. This is the old adage of the 
whole being more than the sum of its parts, or better – the whole is the transformed (and 
transforming) unity-in-contradiction of its parts. Such a reintroduction of motion and contradiction 
is necessary to recover the Marxist notion of alienation, designating the process whereby the self-
conscious activity of human beings produces social forces which escape their control, rising to face 
them as alien externalities. The most profound misunderstandings may result from an attempt to 
analyse the micro whilst abandoning any attempt to cognitively map the macro, from studying the 
organ whilst disavowing the organism, from poring over detail without acknowledging its context. 
Unfortunately, such dislocations are structurally embedded in the development of social theory in 
capitalist society, of capitalist society’s self-understanding. Indeed, as we shall see, the present 
disorientation characterising economic and political thought in late capitalism (articulated in a tight 
nexus of neoliberal and postmodern ideas which undercuts political debate) has developed in a 
context of the specific spatial and discursive dislocation of capital from its integrally-opposed 
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other, labour and of finance capital from its - functionally differentiated, yet systematically 
integrated – commercial and industrial brethren.  
 
Returning to the central thrust of the present section, we may recognise that the peculiar framing of 
Hayek’s articulation of the neoliberal rejection of the managed economy nods suggestively towards 
the logical interpenetration of certain guiding neoliberal and postmodern ideas. We require now to 
draw out in greater detail this interface, which crucially drives the discursive conjuncture of late 
capitalism, before attempting to relate this epistemological environment with the changing 
economic and political structure of the period – that is, to map out the historical conditionality of 
the emergence of those ideas. To begin with, there is a clear parallel between Hayek’s dismissal of 
macroeconomic theory as the crude, unscientific approximation of economic processes which exist 
as a multitude of micro-level activities of unmanageable detail and complexity and 
postmodernism’s animating logic of “incredulity toward metanarratives”15. Hayek’s economic 
managers operate necessarily on the basis of a reductive theory which fails to account for the 
complexity of micro-economic processes, such that they thereby frustrate the diverse interests of 
individual economic actors in their assimilation to a set of uniform objectives. Similarly, from a 
postmodern perspective, the modern totalising theorist is guilty of reducing the diversity and 
relativity of the lived experiences of a multitude of groups to a set of abstract determinations which 
ultimately embody certain privileged perspectives and serve particular interests. Indeed, Fredric 
Jameson, in a critique of postmodernism which may be read equally as a reply to Hayek, notes the 
loss in the postmodern context of the “global dimension” which is “very precisely the dimension of 
economics itself, or of the system” and argues for vigilant attention to be paid to “the waning of the 
visibility of that global dimension, to the ideological resistance to the concept of totality”16. For the 
neoliberal, the truth of the economy is to be found in the fine detail of micro-economic interactions 
which can only be disfigured by the macroeconomic theorisation of managers pursuing certain 
goals; for the postmodernist, the ‘real’ is to be found in the variety of authentic local experiences 
which face the constant threat of assimilation by the collective and the political, the latter “as 
unreal, as a space onto which subjective and private obsessions are noxiously projected”17. The 
effect in each case is to locate social reality in a multitude of discrete local situations, transforming 
economics into the practice of guaranteeing the autonomy of individual economic actors and 
decomposing politics into “a properly interminable series of neighbourhood issues”18. 
David Harvey notes that neoliberalism has “proved more than a little compatible with that cultural 
impulse called ‘post-modernism’”, explaining that “[neoliberalism] had to be backed up by a 
practical strategy that emphasised the liberty of consumer choice, not only with respect to 
15 J. F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge (G. Bennington & B. Massumi trans.) 
(Minneapolis: Minnesota Press, 1984), introduction at xxiv. Referenced in A. Callinicos, Against 
Postmodernism: A Marxist Critique (Cambridge: Polity, 1989), p. 3 
16 F. Jameson, Postmodernism, Or, The Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (London: Verso, 1991), p. 330 
17 Jameson, Postmodernism, p. 335 
18 Jameson, Postmodernism, p. 330 
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particular products, but also with respect to lifestyles, modes of expression, and a wide range of 
cultural practices”. In other words, “neoliberalization required both politically and economically 
the construction of a neoliberal market-based populist culture of differentiated consumerism and 
individual libertarianism”19. For Harvey, the arrival of post-modernism as a cultural and 
intellectual dominant was both central to (and an expression of) the active construction of consent 
for neoliberalism as the displacement of embedded liberalism. At the same time as neoliberalism – 
often in postmodern coding – penetrated common-sense understandings and came be to be 
regarded as the ‘natural’ way for the social order to be regulated, a wedge was driven between 
movements organised in pursuit of social justice and those based upon the realisation of individual 
freedoms. As Harvey explains “neoliberal rhetoric, with is foundational emphasis upon individual 
freedoms, has the power to split off libertarianism, identity politics, multi-culturalism, and 
eventually narcissistic consumerism from the social forces ranged in pursuit of social justice 
through the conquest of state power”20. Ever the geographer, Harvey locates spatially the 
emergence of this particular constellation of social forces, regulatory policy and cultural 
expression, identifying 1970s New York as its epicentre. In a manner recalling Arrighi’s 
exploration of the capture of Florence by the House of Medici, Harvey explores how financial 
institutions seized the opportunity presented by New York’s fiscal crisis to launch a coup against 
the city’s democratically elected government. De-industrialisation and a process of suburbanisation 
had produced an ‘urban crisis’ in the 1960s as social unrest exploded in impoverished inner city 
areas, requiring expanded public employment and provision backed by federal funding. However, 
when Nixon imposed fiscal austerity in the early 1970s, a growing budget deficit had to be funded 
by financial institutions, a conglomeration of which – led by Walter Wriston of Citibank – pushed 
the city into technical bankruptcy in 1975. The terms of the subsequent bail-out – which placed 
new institutions in charge of the city budget and made bondholders preferential creditors – 
necessitated public sector redundancies and wage freezes as well as service cuts and the imposition 
of tuition fees for higher education. Further, New York’s municipal unions were required to invest 
their pension funds in city bonds, creating a dynamic whereby demands over present wages and 
conditions were set against the security of their pension entitlements21. The New York fiscal crisis 
may be regarded retrospectively as an early and significant battle in a new war, the mechanisms of 
crisis management being symptomatic in the words of Robert Zevin of “an emerging strategy of 
disinflation coupled with a regressive redistribution of income, wealth and power”22. Providing a 
blueprint for Regan’s domestic policy (which William Tabb described as “the New York 
scenario…writ large”) and the ‘development’ model implemented through the IMF in the 1980s, 
19 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, p. 42 
20 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, pp. 40-41 
21 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, pp. 44-45 
22 R. Zevin, ‘New York City crisis: first act in a new age of reaction’ in R. Alcalay and D. Mermelstein 
(eds.), The Fiscal Crisis of American Cities: Essays on the Political Economy of Urban America with Special 
Reference to New York (New York: Vintage Books, 1977), pp. 11-29. Referenced in Harvey, A Brief History 
of Neoliberalism, p. 45 
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the New York crisis established the primacy of bondholders’ returns and the integrity of financial 
institutions over the well-being of citizens, whilst emphasising the primary role of government in 
guaranteeing a favourable investment climate23.  
 
If the management of New York’s fiscal crisis blazed the neoliberal trail in the dismantling of the 
city’s social and physical infrastructure and in the emasculation of the city government, labour 
movement and working class more generally, the triumphant elites further led the way in the 
promotion of a cultural climate suitable to rationalise and redeem these structural transformations. 
Simultaneously as the city economy was restructured around financial activity, business services 
and the media, its leading firms and institutions promoted the city as a tourist destination and 
cultural centre, a gentrified Eden of diversified consumerism gathered under the freshly penned “I 
Love New York” logo. A neoliberalising New York became “the epicentre of postmodern cultural 
and intellectual experimentation” as lifestyle diversification and the development of niche 
consumer markets compensated for the destabilisation of social reproduction. As the “narcissistic 
exploration of self, sexuality, and identity became the leitmotif of bourgeois urban culture”, 
‘delirious New York’ erased the collective memory of democratic New York. The consumptive 
production of a demographically small yet culturally predominant subsection of the population 
working in finance, business services and the media took centre stage as the city’s working-class 
and immigrant populations retreated into the shadows, brutalised by an increasingly mean civic 
culture, their progressive criminalisation and the cocaine and AIDS epidemics of the 1980s and 
1990s24. One may be inclined to doubt the adequacy of this compensatory dynamic given the 
profundity of that which is lost in the marginalisation of working class organisation and the 
retrenchment of universal public services, while no doubt there persists alongside consumerist 
euphoria a lingering unease, an unsettling anxiety about the direction of travel and that which is left 
behind. However, it would be foolish to entirely discount the integrative power of a market-based 
populist culture, whose purchase we may begin to locate – following Habermas’ discussion of 
Joachim Ritter – in the process by which the modern world decouples and re-couples historical 
orders with social being. Modernity in the first place represents the end of previous history, as it 
abstracts its own evolutionary dynamism from the historical transmission of tradition and breaks 
the forces of tradition in their objective, social validity. The second, complementary movement 
involves the recovery of history by the subjective, privatised powers of belief and expression. The 
realisation of personal freedom becomes the mechanism by which the outwardly interrupted 
continuity of history becomes inwardly rejoined, how the subject locates herself as an historical 
person, a participant in historical traditions of religion, aesthetics and ethical life which have been 
objectively dissected. The market mechanism thereby comes to mediate – most obviously but not 
exhaustively in the consumption of ‘roots’ culture, of ‘heritage’ clothing and of ‘folk’, ‘urban’ and 
23 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, p. 48 
24 Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, pp. 47-48 
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‘street’ music – a social-historical existence no longer accessible by other means; viewed in this 
light, the instruction against consumerism issued by romantic anti-capitalists of many varieties 
requires of the instructed nothing less than her social suicide and historical self-dissolution25.      
 
Perhaps the most basic level at which the compatibility of neoliberal and postmodern thought 
becomes visible is in their shared anti-Marxism. Hayek was of course a principled critic of 
corporatism, while the rigidities at which he takes specific aim (the political impediments he most 
despises) reveal that his main preoccupation is with working class corporatism. The final section of 
his 1968 lecture is wholly given over to a call to arms against wage inflexibility, yet there cannot in 
contrast be found a single mention of the profound rigidities represented by the transfer of property 
by inheritance, the arbitrary hierarchies produced by private education or the manifold practices by 
which associations of capitals suspend and supersede market competition. Corey Robin describes 
the primarily anti-Marxist and anti-socialist character of the Austrian school as a whole, recalling 
Wieser’s 1891 contention that “The most momentous consequence of the theory…is, I take it, that 
it is false, with the socialists, to impute to labor alone the entire productive return”26. As for 
postmodernism, Alex Callinicos has identified its fusion with post-Marxism following the 1976-7 
denunciation of Marxism by the ex-Maoist nouveaux philosophes, the latter marking the transition 
of the French intelligentsia – largely marxisant since the Popular Front and the resistance – into the 
ranks of social-democracy and neoliberalism27. The crushing implosion of the French Communist 
Party in the face of Mitterrand’s revived Socialist Party was the specific context in which there 
played out the more generalised disillusionment of the “children of ‘68”, whose political odyssey is 
for Callinicos crucial to the widespread acceptance of the idea of the ‘postmodern epoch’ in the 
1980s28. Amidst the retreat of Western labour movements and the disintegration of the far left in 
Europe at the end of the 1970s, postmodernism – “of interest primarily as a symptom of the current 
mood of the Western intelligentsia”29 – came to express the contradictory class position of an 
upwardly mobile group of intellectuals who, decoupled from labour in the context of the 
emergence of a split-level economy, progressively replaced the political content of ‘resistance’ 
with a stylised aesthetism prefigured by the ‘over-consumptionist’ dynamics of the Reagan-
25 J. Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: Twelve Lectures (F. Lawrence trans.) 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1987), pp. 71-72 
26 C. Robin, ‘Nietzsche’s marginal children: on Friedrich Hayek’ The Nation, 7 May 2013. Available at: 
www.thenation.com [accessed 25 June 2013], p. 6. Incidentally, Robin also reveals a contradiction in 
Hayek’s work between the value agnosticism he expresses in The Road to Serfdom and his later contention in 
The Constitution of Liberty that old money secures more reliable sensibilities, claiming as he does there that 
“the grosser pleasures in which the newly rich often indulge have usually no attraction for those who have 
inherited wealth” – (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), p. 192. Our present purposes will be best 
served if we take Hayek’s contentions as to the radically relative nature of value and his repeated invocations 
of liberty in good faith, leaving at this moment to one side the evidence presented by Robin that freedom is 
for Hayek in reality a contingent and instrumental good, useful primarily insofar as it produces in the idle 
rich the “heroic legislator[s] of value”.   
27 Callinicos, Against Postmodernism, pp. 4, 85, 165 
28 Callinicos, Against Postmodernism, p. 168  
29 Callinicos, Against Postmodernism, p. 9  
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Thatcher era30. Whilst this type of micro-sociological critique cannot replace a substantive 
conceptual interrogation of any given intellectual trend, it is important to bear in mind the 
“particularly tight nexus of knowledge and power” – focused around the École Normale Supérieure 
and the lifelong relationships of friendship and competition formed between normaliens31 – at play 
in the emergence of the postmodern turn. Moreover, to fail to locate the essential political 
movement animating a triumphant neoliberalism and the ascent of postmodernism as a cultural 
dominant is to crucially misunderstand these projects. No neoliberal political project has ever really 
countenanced the abandonment of all forms of strategic macroeconomic management – rather the 
notion of the “free market” is best understood as a spectre which has been used to discipline very 
particular forms of corporatist project – namely labour movements in the West and would-be 
projects of bourgeois national economy-making elsewhere. Similarly, postmodern theory as a 
“search and destroy” operation has most often targeted only certain forms of ‘totalisation’ found to 
be particularly confining or unsatisfying, such that it has in reality represented in Jameson’s words 
only a “very modest or mild apocalypse”32.  
 
30 Callinicos, Against Postmodernism, pp. 162-171 
31 A. Callinicos, Social Theory: A Historical Introduction 2nd Edn. (Cambridge: Polity, 2007), p. 312 
32 Jameson, Postmodernism, introduction at xiv 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
Juridification and social transformation: legal mapping and the unity of capitalist   
(re-)production 
 
In this final chapter I develop a theoretical and historical account of how the state, by way of the 
legal form, maps the social totality and structures the contradictory reproduction of capitalist social 
relations in different developmental contexts. The ensuing discussion builds upon the foundations 
prepared in Chapter 2, which problematised the liberal conception of the opposition obtaining 
between state and market and unpacked the humanist social ontology underpinning much 
conventional state theory. The discussion is also importantly related to the argument which 
unfolded in Chapter 3, which examined how the global macroeconomic environment of the long 
downturn prefigured a shift in the balance of forces from labour to capital and between industry 
and finance, the interests of the latter being crystallised in a state policy nexus which facilitated the 
financial mediation of labour revenues and the expropriation of the socialised wage. In the 
following pages I develop a more general theoretical and historical account of this process by 
which the law-state institutionalises particular sets of class-relational dynamics, the latter 
developing in conversation with the fundamental validation/invalidation of domestic social 
relations at the level of the world market.    
 
I Theorising the Law-State 
 
A specific appreciation of the state-form is essential to any theorisation of the role of law in the 
emergence and reproduction of capitalist social relations. In societies founded on private ownership 
of land and productive resources, coercion is embedded in and presumed by their fundamental 
economic relations inasmuch as the ownership of a thing by one person entails by definition the 
exclusion of others. The nature of such ‘embeddedness’ is important. The fundamental character of 
compulsion in capitalist society is economic, the mass of direct producers being propelled by their 
displacement from the means of production time and again into the waiting arms of the minority 
owners. Yet of course this basic situation is not a ‘natural’ or trans-historical state, emerging rather 
out of a definite process of historical development entailing the deployment of extra-economic 
compulsion, that is political force. Thus the ‘economic’ compulsion operative in capitalist society 
is but the transposed form of the earlier ‘original sin’ of primitive accumulation, such historical 
violence being the recurrent condition for the reproduction of relations of exploitation by means of 
the ostensibly peaceable and consensual exchange of commodities in the marketplace. Moreover, 
coercion of a political character is not only present in capitalist society by means of its absence 
(and thereby relegated to capitalism’s pre-history), but is continually recalled in the necessary 
adjustment and readjustment of the content of its exploitative relations of production in view of the 
requirements of the technologically and organisationally dynamic process of capitalist 
development. The mode by which such content is realised, the form of articulation of political 
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power, is of great importance in mapping the interpenetration of the economic, political and legal 
moments in the process of capitalist reproduction.  
 
Much of the disciplinary activity required to effect the reconfiguration of the content of the 
relations of production is deployed by the individual owners of the means of production 
themselves, who employ a staff of managers to oversee and regulate the labour process of the direct 
producers and develop such modes of education and training as are necessary to mould labour-
powers to their specifications. Yet the fundamental political conditioning of the mass of labour-
powers is in advanced capitalist society performed in significant part by state institutions, while the 
enforcement of the employer’s right to extract from the labour time purchased the greatest possible 
quantity and quality of labour is insofar as physical violence is concerned largely transferred to the 
state as a third-party. Indeed, it might be said that the essential novelty of political development in 
capitalist society consists in the progressive consolidation in a centralised state apparatus of a 
monopoly over the legitimate use of physical force. How this situation develops from the 
fundamental relations of production in civil society (or depending upon one’s basic theoretical 
orientation, appears above and against the same or is even constitutive thereof) and the nature of 
the subsequent interaction of the coercive force thereby concentrated with these basic productive 
relations are the fundamental questions animating discussion of the state-form. 
 
In orienting ourselves it will be useful to introduce in rudimentary form three basic approaches to 
these questions: that pursued by the positivist school of legal philosophy, most notably by Hans 
Kelsen; that emerging from an analysis of modern specialisation and rationalisation as exemplified 
by Max Weber’s reading of the development of the bureaucratic state, and; those approaches 
grounded in the historical materialist method of interpreting the development of the state and law. 
With regard to the final branch of this typology, the discussion will begin with an appraisal of the 
legacy of the Bolshevik jurist Evgeny Bronislavovich Pashukanis before proceeding to consider 
how the contradictions of his understanding of law and the state as concretely expressed may be 
overcome on the basis of the fulfilment of the very method which he correctly pursues.  
 
Kelsen’s State-Law Identity Theory 
 
Kelsen, in his Pure Theory of Law sets out to deconstruct the – for him, entirely untenable – 
dualism between state and law which is assumed by traditional legal theory and which has come to 
dominate modern legal science. For him, this opposition has no logical basis, being rather the 
necessary product of the ideological operation by which the state as a “bare fact of power” is 
transformed into a legal institution justified by reference to an external order of right1. According 
to Kelsen, the state is rather identical with law – the state is a relatively centralised legal order 
1 H. Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1967), pp. 284-286 
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possessing organs which, in accordance with a specific division of labour, create and apply the 
norms constitutive of that order2. In support of this proposition, Kelsen argues that the central 
elements traditionally considered to compose the state – its people, its territory and its ‘power’ – 
can be comprehended only in terms of the validity and spheres of validity of a legal order3. As 
regards the state’s population, Kelsen explains that there exists no criterion which unites all 
individuals belonging to a state whilst excluding all others except the fact that their behaviour is 
regulated by the same legal order; the population can be conceived only as “the personal sphere of 
validity of the national legal order”. Similarly the state territory does not exist as a natural, 
geographic unity, but is composed of the space enclosed by its juridical frontiers, intersected as it 
may be the high seas or the territories of other states; the state territory is determined solely by the 
spatial sphere of validity of the national legal order. In relation to so-called ‘state power’, Kelsen 
holds that the relationship designated thereby can be distinguished from other power relationships 
only on account of its being legally regulated, i.e. by its having a normative character. Insofar as 
those individuals exercising such power are authorised to do so by creating and applying legal 
norms, state power is nothing other than the validity of an effective national legal order. From this 
perspective, the repressive machinery of prisons, guns, policeman and soldiers are merely ‘dead 
objects’ which are transformed into tools of state power only insofar as they are deployed in 
accordance with orders issued by the government as normative authority. 
 
The problem which immediately arises for Kelsen’s approach is the appearance of the state itself as 
a legal person, as a subject of rights and obligations within the order with which it is apparently 
identical. The apparent re-emergence of the dualism of state and law at this moment is discounted 
by Kelsen on the grounds that the state does not exist in reality as an acting legal person, but 
appears as such only metaphorically, as an auxiliary construction of legal thinking. For him, the 
attribution to the state of a given function is merely a mode of expression of the referral of this 
function to the unity of the legal order which determines it. Consequently, Kelsen holds that any 
action determined by the legal order can be imputed to the state as the personification of the order 
as a whole, such imputation signifying only the determination of that action within the legal order 
constituting the state community4. Conversely, any action which is not authorised by the legal 
order – which is in violation of the law – is not attributable to the state, a wrong-doing state being a 
contradiction in itself. Since the state can do no wrong, illegal actions become the preserve of 
individuals or organisations operating outside of the sphere of legal behaviour authorised by the 
state5. 
 
2 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, pp. 286-287 
3 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, pp. 287-290 
4 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, pp. 290, 292-293 
5 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, p. 305 
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Kelsen’s state-law identity theory necessarily leaves open only an internal, self-referential form of 
legitimation whereby the ‘individual’ norms created by acts of administration, judicial decisions 
and legal transactions are justified by reference to ‘higher’ general norms produced in the manner 
determined by the constitution. In turn, the reason for the validity of these general norms can only 
be located in the validity of a further norm which is still higher yet. In order to avoid slipping into 
an infinite regression, Kelsen asserts the operation of a presupposed final and highest norm, the 
basic norm (grundnorm) to which the validity of all the norms in a given legal system may be 
traced6. This basic norm constitutes the unity of the multiplicity of norms belonging to a given 
coercive order, being the common source of validity of all such norms. It may therefore be seen 
that for Kelsen the state appears as a self-generating relatively centralised legal order which cannot 
be justified by reference to any external system of norms or principles. Its emergence may not be 
located in any given constellation of economic or political relations, since the state as a legal order 
exists as a hierarchy of norms within which the movement of validation and determination 
proceeds from the basic norm as the presupposed highest norm, through the constitutionally-
regulated general norms to the individual norms created by judicial decisions and individual 
contracts. The state is in Kelsen’s reading prior to the legal norms produced by the interaction of 
private individuals and the source of their normativity. The ‘law-ness’ of a legal norm, which is for 
Kelsen a matter simply of whether a formally undifferentiated authoritative command is binding, 
consists in its authorisation by the state, such validation occurring either statically by way of the 
subsumption of the norm’s particular content under the more general content of higher norm, or 
dynamically on account of its creation by an identified norm-creating authority as stipulated by the 
basic norm7. In the latter case, which is most relevant to the creation of law by nation-states insofar 
as they are considered sovereign, the validity of a norm depends only on whether it was the 
outcome of a properly applied procedure. Since the state ‘creates’ legal rules by an act of will, 
grounded ultimately in a presupposed prior utterance which by design may not be historically or 
politically interrogated, the question of the efficacy of a given rule is a purely procedural question.  
 
To summarise, essentially in Kelsen’s view the state and law are identical, while the state as a 
relatively centralised legal order is related to social life more generally only in the unidirectional 
manner of its normative pronouncements operating to regulate human behaviour. The state enjoys 
autonomy from developments in other spheres of social life, or else the character of the influence 
the latter have on law’s form and development have no bearing on the theory of law as such. Such a 
complete insulation of law from ethical and political influence was for Kelsen – railing against the 
influence of natural law theory which he saw as encumbering positive law with content of 
ambiguous metaphysical, theological and political origins – the only direction of development of 
legal science appropriate to the study of modern law. 
 
6 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, pp. 193-195 
7 Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, pp. 195-196 
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Weber, Formal Rational Law and Legal Domination 
 
Weber’s broad project, outlined succinctly in the introduction to The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit 
of Capitalism, was a historical sociology of the emergence of modern Western rationality in a 
plurality of forms. In his account, this process was fundamentally driven not by capitalism as such 
– understood in terms of the “pursuit of…forever renewed profit, by means of continuous, rational, 
capitalistic enterprise”8 – which he considers to have existed in all civilised countries, but by the 
particular form – peculiar in quality and extent – which developed in the Occident and nowhere 
else9. For Weber, the essential novelty of this type of capitalism inheres in the rational capitalistic 
organisation of (formally) free labour, the development of which finds only ‘suggestion’ elsewhere. 
The predominant features of this form include, in addition to rational industrial organisation 
calibrated to regular market exchange and free from irrationally speculative activity, the separation 
of business from the household (expressed legally by the delineation of corporate and personal 
property) and the normalisation of rational book-keeping10. Ultimately, these specificities could be 
traced back to the rational organisation of labour in the form of a mass of un-indentured wage 
labourers, since according to Weber only on this basis was the precise calculation required for the 
rationalisation of enterprise possible.  
 
Weber argues that the emergence of in the West of this type of “sober bourgeois capitalism” both 
depended on the existence of modern science for the calculability of technical factors and further 
stimulated the latter’s development. At this point Weber is anxious to avoid conceiving a causal 
relation between specifically Western capitalist development and increasing scientific 
sophistication, although he is clear that it was only in the Occident that there emerged the “rational, 
systematic and specialised” pursuit of science carried on by trained, specialised personnel11. 
Indeed, much is made of the predominance of science in Western culture and with it the tendency 
for the state and economic life to become entirely dependent upon a trained organisation of 
officials. The difference resided in the unparalleled tendency in the West to make technical use of 
accumulated scientific knowledge, this trait being rooted not solely in the economic system but also 
in the specific forms of Occidental law and administration, which were peculiarly formalised12. In 
turn, these specific legal and administrative forms of rationalisation are traced back to the broader 
phenomenon of the peculiar rationalisation of Western culture. It is with reference to the latter that 
Weber stresses the essentially plural nature of rationalisation in Western society – the existence of 
the process as a plurality of rationalisations which unfold in different ‘departments’ of life, 
pursuing divergent values and ends and even appearing to one another as irrational. In attempting 
8 M. Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (T. Parsons trans.) (London: Routledge, 2001), 
author’s introduction at xxxi-xxxii 
9 Weber, The Protestant Ethic, at xxxiii-xxxiv 
10 Weber, The Protestant Ethic, at xxxv 
11 Weber, The Protestant Ethic, at xxxvii, xxx  
12 Weber, The Protestant Ethic, at xxxviii 
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to explain these forms of rationalisation, Weber recalls the centrality of economics, insisting that 
we “above all” take account of economic conditions, yet is once more keen to stress the opposing 
influence had upon economic relations by other modes of social rationalisation13.  
 
Central among the forms of rationalisation discussed by Weber, then, are those obtaining within the 
spheres of law and political administration. His reading of legal rationalisation is set out primarily 
in the section on the sociology of law in Economy and Society, in which he reaffirms his 
fundamental position that rationalisations of economic behaviour – which in attaining the form of a 
market economy produce increasingly complex conflicts of interests – have stimulated the 
systematisation of law and intensified the institutionalisation of the polity but have not determined 
the specific form of either process14. Indeed, Weber maintains that “modern capitalism prospers 
equally and manifests essentially identical economic traits under legal systems containing rules and 
institutions which considerably differ from each other…”15 At the same time and perhaps a little 
contradictorily, he argues that aspects of law, conditioned by political factors and the internal 
structure of legal though, have exercised a “strong influence” on economic organisation16. The 
essential point however is that the process of Western legal development has been animated by its 
own particular internal logic of specialisation and rationalisation. Weber is clear that the direction 
of rationalisation pursued in a given legal system is conditioned directly by “intrajuristic” 
conditions, i.e. by the particular qualities of the technically trained specialists who in their 
professional work shape the law, and only indirectly by general economic and social conditions17. 
Thus we return once more to the crucial significance of the body of trained specialists, whose 
decisive cooperation is the conditio sine qua non of the elaboration of law as a rational 
constellation of rules applied consciously in deciding particular cases18. Through the work of these 
legal professionals, the body of law undergoes specific processes of formalisation and 
rationalisation in addition to a necessary codification. In this regard, rationality refers to the 
generality of the rules employed by the system (their universal application) and the systematic 
character of the legal order – in other words the degree of internal consistency of the legal system. 
Formality is by distinction a measure of the degree in which the criteria deployed in reaching legal 
decisions are intrinsic to the legal system itself, relating therefore to the extent of formal 
articulation of the system’s norms and its autonomy from political or religious institutions and 
influences. For Weber, the history of Western law is a history of the increasing rationalisation of 
legal thought and the triumph of formal rational law. 
 
13 Weber, The Protestant Ethic, at xxxviii-xxxix 
14 M. Weber, Economy and Society: an Outline of Interpretive Sociology (G. Roth & C. Wittich eds.) 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 655 
15 Weber, Economy and Society, p. 890 
16 Weber, Economy and Society, p. 655 (emphasis mine) 
17 Weber, Economy and Society, p. 776 
18 Weber, Economy and Society, p. 775 
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In view of the above, it may be recognised then that while for Kelsen the law-state is by definition 
immediately and necessarily autonomous from developments in other spheres of social life, Weber 
understands the unfolding of a particular, independent legal rationality as a specific historical 
process. This may be more clearly understood with reference to his discussion of the different 
modes of norm creation which are typical of legal systems in different stages of development. In 
contrast to Kelsen, Weber recounts that Law is produced not solely by imposition from above, but 
may also emerge out of customary practice. Indeed, he maintains that at certain stages in history the 
notion that legal rules could be intentionally created as ‘norms’ – that they could be the product or 
even the possible subject matter of legal enactment – was completely unknown19. Traditionally, 
Weber argues, actions which constituted in the first instance just plain habit could by way of a 
process of psychological ‘adjustment’ later be experienced as binding. Still later, in accordance 
with an awareness of the generalisation of this conduct among a particular group, it could be 
incorporated as ‘consensus’ into people’s more or less conscious expectations, the final stage being 
the imposition of coercive enforcement20. While such a process of emergence of legal rules from 
regularised practices might be thought to give rise to a rigid, unchanging body of norms, Weber 
argues rather that such law-making may possess a degree of innovation insofar as new lines of 
conduct are pursued by individuals interested in the protection of their interests in the context of 
changing external conditions, or else simply concerned with more effectively advancing them 
under existing conditions. These new behavioural practices might produce new consensual 
understandings and ultimately generate new types of customary behaviour21. With regard to such 
practices, interested parties could achieve enforcement by way of self-help, the individual deemed 
to be ‘in the right’ in view of the operative consensus obtaining the aid of others in procuring 
compliance on an obstinate party. The supersession of this informal means of enforcement by the 
formal institutional ‘legal’ guarantee of the relevant norm would therefore represent merely the 
exchange of functional equivalents22. In sum, it may be seen that for Weber, in accordance with 
particular modes of norm creation predominant at particular stages of legal (under-)development, 
the body of law exists simply as a collection of regularised social practices (with all their economic 
and political contents) which on account of psychological adjustment, the formation of consensus 
and the application of coercive enforcement, have been transmuted into legal norms. At this stage, 
the legal, political and economic spheres have yet to be differentiated – they remain closely 
coupled. 
 
From the historical condition of customary norm-creation thus described, Weber traces the 
development of law and procedure through a logical (if not in all cases historical) series of stages: 
19 Weber, Economy and Society, p. 760 
20 Weber, Economy and Society, p. 754 
21 Weber, Economy and Society, p. 755 
22 Weber, Economy and Society, p. 756 
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charismatic revelation by ‘law prophets’ – “the parent of all types of legal ‘enactment’”23; 
adjudication on a case-by-case basis and adherence to precedent; imposition by enactment of 
secular or theocratic powers, and; systematic elaboration and specialised administration of justice 
by formally educated professionals24. The latter stage, characteristic of modern Western legal 
systems, is the point of arrival of a process of maturation of a specific logic of legal rationality and 
the crystallisation of a certain autonomy of the law from broader social processes. The different 
forms of norm creation are also articulated with the changing character of political authority, 
representing moments in the development of the system of political domination which, while 
intensified by the emergence of the system of rationally organised free labour, unfolds in 
accordance with its own rational logic. An understanding of such political rationalisation is 
developed in Weber’s ‘Politics as a Vocation’ lecture, in which he begins by defining the state in 
the modern context as “the form of human community that (successfully) lays claim to the 
monopoly of legitimate physical violence within a particular territory”. Although the right to use 
violence may be delegated to other individuals or organisations, the source of this right is the state 
alone, while ‘politics’ becomes purposeful activity aimed at obtaining a share of power or 
reconfiguring the distribution thereof25. The state as a relationship of political domination is 
founded on the legitimate use of force, while the operative mode of establishing such legitimacy 
assumes various forms which Weber approaches by the identification of three ideal types. The first 
of these, customary or ‘traditional’ authority is exercised by old-style patriarchs and patrimonial 
rulers and undergirded by habitually reproduction of sanctified immemorial traditions. Secondly, 
‘charismatic’ authority is wielded by persons of an exemplary character, who in possessing 
extraordinary leadership qualities and grace inspire a personal devotion and trust translatable into 
compliance with the normative patterns she ordains. The final form of authority, which is the 
predominant mode of legitimation of the modern state, is a rationalistic form founded on a belief in 
the competency of authority to issue commands under the enacted rules and in turn a recognition of 
the legality of those rules26.  
 
If the form of legitimation of the political domination exercised by the modern state assumes a 
rationalistic legal form, the development of its specific internal organisation is animated by a 
rationalising logic under which formally trained specialists operate in demarcated spheres of 
authority as part of a rule-bound hierarchy27. This modern, ‘bureaucratic’ form of state originates in 
the monarchical dispossession of the ‘private’ agents of administrative power who, in the type of 
political organisation subdivided into estates which was typical of the feudal period, own 
independently the means of administration. Interestingly, Weber draws an analogy between this 
23 Weber, Economy and Society, p. 761 
24 Weber, Economy and Society, p. 882 
25 M. Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’ in D. Owen & T. B. Strong (eds.), The Vocation Lectures: ‘Science as a 
Vocation’; ‘Politics as a Vocation’ (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2004), at p. 33 
26 Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, p. 34; Weber, Economy and Society, p. 215  
27 Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 217-223 
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process and the development of a capitalist enterprise through the progressive expropriation of the 
independent producers – indeed, we may playfully (if incautiously) extend this metaphor to 
conceive of feudal administrators as formally subsumed within the logic of state power, real 
subsumption obtaining in the transition to the modern state with the separation of its administrators 
from the material resources of administration28. The administrative staff of the modern state, bound 
to it by belief in its legal legitimacy as well as by material reward and social prestige, form a 
highly-trained, specialised apparatus whose technical activity becomes increasingly indispensible 
for the operation of the national economy. There develops a power struggle between a specialised 
officialdom which comes to play the predominant role in the execution of everyday business and 
the elected political leader who tended to become something of a dilettante, the pursuit of this 
struggle driving the formation of such institutional innovations as the ruler’s cabinet of personal 
confidants29. The struggle was re-configured in the context of emergence of parliamentary 
democracy, which necessitated the emergence of a single parliamentary leader who stood atop what 
became the sole decisive political force – the party which could command a majority in 
parliament30. 
 
In Weber’s account, the processes of rationalisation obtaining in the legal and political spheres are 
articulated by an emergent affinity between formal rational law and legal domination. The political 
domination of the state is legitimised on account of its authority being competent under the enacted 
rules, while this system of rules, having assumed under a specific logic of legal rationalisation a 
deductive rigor in its formal qualities combined with an increasingly rational technique in 
procedure, operates simultaneously to restrict the operation of state power. There is however a 
tension in this relation insofar as the legal system, on account of the disintegration of natural law, 
has dispensed with the external reference to a given substantive body of norms or principles, 
retaining ‘metajuristic’ axioms which even at their most convincing appear too subtle to effectively 
ground the system. In consequence, legal positivism advances ‘irresistibly’, a de-sanctified law 
coming to be regarded as merely the product – or indeed means – of compromise between political 
interests31. Political bureaucracy is oriented to law instrumentally – legal means serving political 
ends – such that the law-state relation comes to attain a lop-sided character, law becoming 
increasingly transparent to political power. The demarcation of legal and political spheres – upon 
which legal domination is based – is thereby radically de-stabilised and tends to collapse. Indeed, 
the political manipulation of law, driven by the influence of commercial and industrial pressure 
groups and by the desire to expeditiously settle individual cases, injects new forms of particularism 
28 Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, pp. 36-37 
29 Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, pp. 44-46 
30 Weber, ‘Politics as a Vocation’, p. 49 
31 Weber, Economy and Society, p. 874 
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into law and thereby tends to roll back the process of rationalisation and formalisation32. Formal 
rational law is revealed to be an inherently unstable form.  
 
In sum then, while for Kelsen the law-state possessed a definitional autonomy from other spheres 
of social life, under Weber’s reading law and politics in a process of historical development 
(catalysed but not determined by the emergence of sober bourgeois capitalism) develop, from an 
original close coupling with economic forms as traditional practices, relative forms of autonomy on 
the basis of the unfolding of their specific rationalising logics. This process culminates in the 
emergence of a legally legitimised modern bureaucratic state and a formalised, rationalised 
codified legal system, while the affinity of the two emerges precisely as the mechanism by which 
the legal sphere tends to collapse into political imperative.     
  
Pashukanis’ Legacy 
 
The most sophisticated Marxist theory to infiltrate Western legal philosophy is that propounded by 
Pashukanis, whose recognition of the deep structural interconnection of the legal form with the 
social relations pertaining to capitalism as a system of generalised commodity production 
represented a significant advance in the materialist analysis of the juridical. While Pashukanite 
thought is currently experiencing something of a revival in specific relation to international law33, 
his work has more generally operated as a bridge between critical legal theory and the critique of 
political economy developed by Marx, primarily in Capital. Indeed, in his major theoretical work, 
The General Theory of Law and Marxism34, Pashukanis seeks to emulate the dialectical approach 
pursued by Marx in his magnum opus, inasmuch as he first isolates the most fundamental and 
abstract legal categories, investigating their inner relation before proceeding to introduce further 
derivative determinations in a process of rising from the abstract to the concrete level of social 
phenomena. It is no surprise that for Pashukanis the ‘cell-form’ of law35 – the legal subject – is 
simultaneously the juridical correlate of the commodity owner, given that the commodity is in 
Capital the elementary form in which is condensed all the contradictory dynamics of capitalist 
development. Such an approach of identifying and interrogating the basic building blocks of the 
legal form marked a departure from crude, instrumentalist attempts to posit the direct 
correspondence of the content of particular laws and legal institutions with the material interests of 
the bourgeoisie. It allowed Pashukanis to sharply delineate the legal from other spheres of social 
life and further to distinguish the particularly legal modulation of social relationships from social 
regulation more generally. As is more fully explained in the following two sections of this chapter, 
32 Weber, Economy and Society, pp. 882-889 
33 See C. Miéville, Between Equal Rights: a Marxist Theory of International Law (Leiden: Brill, 2004); S. 
Marks (ed.), International Law on the Left: Re-examining Marxist Legacies (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011)   
34 E. B. Pashukanis, ‘The general theory of law and Marxism’ in P. Beirne, & R. Sharlet (eds.), Pashukanis: 
Selected Writings on Marxism and Law (London: Academic Press, 1980) 
35 C. J. Arthur, ‘Towards a materialist theory of law’ (1977) 7 Critique 31 at 35 
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the essential novelty of legal regulation lay for Pashukanis in the opposition of individual private 
interests, the legal moment commencing when – with the emergence of controversy – such 
individualisation and opposition begins. If, for instance, the legal regulation of the movement of 
trains might assume the form of a law on the liability or rail carriers, thereby structuring their 
relation between passengers and freight shippers, the technical regulation of the same would be 
premised on a unity of purpose, assuming the form of the railway timetable36. For Pashukanis, the 
historical relativisation of the legal form through its clarification and distinction from modes of 
social regulation more generally was the key to escaping from the narrow bourgeois horizon within 
which legal categories are held to be of universal significance in abstraction from the historically 
contingent generalisation of commodity production and exchange.  
 
Pashukanis’ contribution to the development of a properly historical and materialist understanding 
of law is without parallel. However, the specific conception of the state-form operative in his work 
is more uncertain, reflecting both the contradictions of his intellectual development and the 
particular historical and political context in which his ideas fermented. The General Theory was in 
part a rejoinder to Piotr Stuchka, the founder of Soviet legal philosophy and later the leader of the 
‘moderate’ wing of the commodity exchange school in the Communist Academy, who had since at 
least 1919 been arguing for the revolutionary role of ‘Soviet’ law in the period of transition from 
capitalism to communism37. For Stuchka, Soviet law could be distinguished from bourgeois law by 
the particularity of its social content, its situation within the broader context of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat and its putatively active role in the construction of this project of political supremacy 
– in a certain sense then, the content of Soviet law came to overdetermine its form. By contrast, for 
Pashukanis, to hold that Soviet law had transcended the bourgeois legal form and required for its 
analysis the identification of new generalising concepts, was to tear that form from the definite 
historical conditions of its development and to proclaim its immortality. Reiterating his 
commitment to the basic Marxist conception of the ‘withering away’ of law, Pashukanis 
emphasised that the transition to developed communism entailed not a transition to new forms of 
law, but the withering away of law in general – “the gradual disappearance of the juridic element in 
human relationships”38. Thus insofar as Soviet economic policy was implemented by means of the 
legal form, the project – which Pashukanis’ went as far as to describe as ‘proletarian state 
capitalism’ – necessarily remained wedded to the narrow bourgeois horizon39, the situation being 
akin to that formulated by Lenin in The State and Revolution as the persistence of bourgeois law 
without the bourgeoisie40.  
 
36 Pashukanis, ‘The general theory of law and Marxism’, pp. 58-60 
37 See Pashukanis, Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, Editors’ Introduction at pp. 21-22 
38 Pashukanis, ‘The general theory of law and Marxism’, pp. 46-47 
39 Pashukanis, ‘The general theory of law and Marxism’, p. 89 
40 Pashukanis, ‘The general theory of law and Marxism’, p. 27fn9; V. I. Lenin, ‘The state and revolution’ in 
H. M. Christman (ed.), Essential Works of Lenin: “What is to be Done?” and Other Writings (New York: 
Dover, 1987) at p. 346 
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The debate between Pashukanis and Stuchka turned fundamentally on the role of state and law in 
the lower phase of communism, i.e. on the proper relationship of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
to its law and to law in general41. While we may wish to side with Pashukanis on the question of 
the character of the Soviet regime and the necessarily bourgeois form of Soviet law as against 
Stuchka’s conception of its particular, revolutionary quality, the stark formulation adopted by 
Pashukanis in his most important work is unable to account for the role of the state, as the formal 
centralised concentration of civil society relations, in the restructuring of capitalist relations of 
production in different stages of capitalist development. In The General Theory Pashukanis 
identified an essentially derivative role for the state inasmuch as conceived the legal form as 
emerging quite directly out of the civil society relations of commodity exchange which constitute 
its real foundation. For Pashukanis, the property relationships which form the kernel of the legal 
system are so closely contiguous with the economic structure of society that they are in fact the 
very relationships of production expressed in legal language. From such definite relationships of 
production and property the political superstructure including the state apparatus emerges as a 
“secondary, derivative element”, state power operating only to “[inject] clarity and stability” into a 
legal structure whose preconditions are more deeply rooted42. While Pashukanis revisits the 
question in his 1929 Economics and Legal Regulation, appearing to ‘correct’ this ‘defect’ in his 
earlier work in view of the increasing significance of state regulation in economic development 
presupposed by the emergence of the imperialist stage of capitalist development43, it is unclear 
whether such statements reflect genuine intellectual development or merely represent political 
forbearance in an increasingly coercive context. In any event the latter formulation, quite apart 
from the question of the role of the state in the construction of socialism, is better equipped to 
interrogate the crucial functioning of the bourgeois state in catalysing, concretising and 
generalising the reconfiguration of the content of domestic class relations in response to the 
changing dynamics of global capitalist development.  
 
China Miéville has recently challenged the idea that the Pashukanis of The General Theory may be 
seen to develop an understanding of the ‘derivation’ of the bourgeois state. Miéville stresses that 
what Pashukanis demands is not a necessary, but a sufficient theory of the bourgeois state, such that 
while he uses the language of ‘derivation’ his theory is not a ‘strong’ derivationist one44. Indeed, it 
is recalled that for Pashukanis public authority is actually contingent to the legal form, the 
existence of external coercive force operating to guarantee and safeguard the legal relation but in 
no way constituting its legal-ness45. While Miéville’s argument is relatively convincing as far as it 
goes, and further unfolds with an eye particularly on the analysis of international law, it is 
41 Pashukanis, Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, Editors’ Introduction at p. 23 
42 Pashukanis, ‘The general theory of law and Marxism’, pp. 66-68 
43 E. B. Pashukanis, ‘Economics and Legal Regulation’ in P. Beirne, & R. Sharlet (eds.), Pashukanis: 
Selected Writings on Marxism and Law (London: Academic Press, 1980), pp. 237-240 
44 C. Miéville, Between Equal Rights: a Marxist Theory of International Law (Leiden: Brill, 2004), pp. 124-
125 
45 Miéville, Between Equal Rights, pp. 128-130 
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contended that Miéville’s reception of Pashukanis is a little too generous, reading in as it does 
understandings of the dialectical interrelation of form and content in the development of capitalism 
which are only suggested by Pashukanis’ method rather than being concretely present in his 
analysis. It is the case that the discussion in The General Theory proceeds to a certain stage 
dialectically insofar as it conceives the emergence of the legal form in terms of the crystallisation 
of the form of the content of the specific exploitative relations which come to predominate in the 
transition to capitalist society, the legal norm emerging effervescently from the concrete 
multiplicity of legal relations through which it is woven. However, in my view this dialectic later 
tends to collapse at the stage of the emergence of law in its fully developed form, the articulation of 
this form entailing the negation or obliteration of particular contents. Pashukanis’ incompletely 
dialectical approach is borne out in what Beirne and Sharlet recognise as the implicit emergence of 
a ‘dual state’ in terms of which the political operations of the state in pursuing the particular 
context-driven imperatives of the capitalist class become dissociated from the legal state as third-
party guarantor of impersonal commodity exchange46. Thus Pashukanis comes to delineate the state 
as the organisation of class domination, which operates on the principle of naked expediency 
(raison d’état) and admits of no legal interpretation, from the state as guarantor of the market, such 
authority appearing “as law and only law”47. It is contended that these limitations in Pashukanis’ 
exposition may be traced back ultimately to his decision to focus on the sphere of commodity 
circulation rather than proceeding from the basis of the capitalist economy as a contradictory unity 
of production and circulation. This perspective, I would argue, prevents him from fully 
apprehending the role of law in the production and reproduction of capitalist social relations, 
especially as far as this process entails the reproduction of political leadership and domination. It is 
only much later in 1932 – when the more general process of emasculation of the original insights of 
Pashukanis’ theory was undoubtedly in evidence – that he concedes that the productive sphere is 
determinate in the final analysis and re-conceptualises the unity of form and content48. 
 
A Re-animation of the Form-Content Dialectic? 
 
The primary relevance of Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law is from the perspective of the present work 
the manner in which it clearly demonstrates the dependence of a positivistic jurisprudence, in 
attempting to explain the development of law, on the postulation of a pre-existing political 
authority whose constitution cannot be historically or politically interrogated. Such an 
understanding of the legal sphere must necessarily universalise the fundamental categories of law, 
ripping them unceremoniously from the specific historical context of their emergence. Weber’s 
reading, inasmuch as it is grounded in an (admittedly schematic) appreciation of the historical 
46 Pashukanis, Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, Editors’ Introduction at p. 11 
47 Pashukanis, ‘The general theory of law and Marxism’, p. 92 
48 E. B. Pashukanis, ‘The Marxist Theory of State and Law’ in P. Beirne, & R. Sharlet (eds.), Pashukanis: 
Selected Writings on Marxism and Law, pp. 275-301 
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unfolding of the organisational specificity of modern legal systems as stimulated by the increasing 
importance of commerce, is more significant. Indeed, the interconnection he posits between the 
increasing sophistication of formal rational law and the rational organisation of free labour under 
‘sober bourgeois’ capitalism is particularly relevant. Nevertheless, while his understanding of the 
tendential destabilisation of the demarcation between politics and law may have an immediate 
resonance with the contemporary reader, his anxiety to avoid conceding a close coupling of legal 
and economic developments prevents him from ascertaining the context-driven imperatives 
underlying such political intrusions. Weber’s conception is of a unilinear divergence of law and 
economics – from a situation of an historical close coupling – in accordance with the development 
of law’s specific logic of rationality by formally-educated legal specialists. This understanding 
cannot account for the phenomenon of the collapse of all the haughtily independent fiefdoms of 
capitalist society into the basic imperatives of the capitalist class – or the leading fraction(s) thereof 
– as necessitated by the process of (in-)validation of domestic productive relations at the level of 
the world market. Pashukanis’ method, being grounded in a Marxist political economy which 
provides a much more sophisticated understanding of the emergence of capitalist social relations 
and their subsequent contradictory development, is more promising. It may certainly be regarded as 
the proper task of the Marxist legal philosopher to deconstruct the positivistic sacralisation of legal 
categories, revealing their historical contingency by tracing their emergence in conjunction with the 
generalisation of commodity exchange. In this regard, Pashukanis’ approach is exemplary – indeed, 
moving forward his precise delineation of the legal form must be maintained if we are to make 
further progress. However, when presented with the divergent legal realities facing labour and 
groups oppressed under capitalism in phases of capitalist development understood in terms of 
welfarism, neoliberalism and austerity, Marxists must have prepared fuller answers than those 
entailed by a simple restatement, in a formally-articulated and substantively-evacuated manner, of 
the structural interconnection of law and the capitalist economy. Only when the legal form is re-
coupled with – and recognised as the effervescent expression of – the content of social and political 
struggles which drive the contradictory reproduction of capitalist society, will we arrive at a 
materialist conception of the legal sphere which can challenge mainstream accounts of legal and 
political theory. In this connection, Miéville – however generous his reading of The General 
Theory – points us in the right direction. He rightly emphasises that while Pashukanis’ emphasis on 
the legal form is a corrective to content-driven analyses, it is not thereby inimical to examinations 
of particular legal contents. Indeed, the further development of an understanding of the operation of 
the legal form as a moment in the dynamic and contradictory development of capitalist social 
relations requires a precise examination of the mechanisms of the relation between form and 
content49. In this regard, Miéville correctly identifies that law, by virtue of its very form, embeds 
the particular class content of capitalist exploitation inasmuch as it articulates the exchange of a 
particular commodity – labour-power – the value of which is the very index of the shifting balance 
49 Miéville, Between Equal Rights, p. 118 
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of forces of capital and labour underpinned by conditions of supply and demand50. To this we may 
add that the legal form also structures the determination of the rate of interest, and the tendential 
gravitation of market prices towards prices of production, these pivots articulating respectively the 
functional and fractious interrelation of productive and financial capital and the competitive 
interaction of rival state-capitals. The present work attempts to take a small step forward in 
understanding how the state, by way of the legal form, structures the determination of these 
‘irrational expressions’ (nonetheless embedded within capitalist production) and by such 
mechanism modulates the contradictory re-production of capitalist social relations. 
 
II. The Public/Private Dichotomy and the Unity of Capitalist (Re-)Production 
 
Much political and legal theory, including that of the positivist school of legal philosophy 
represented by Kelsen in the foregoing discussion, is animated by an understanding of the public 
sphere as a space or moment which exists independently of and prior to the private. The ‘public’ is 
regarded as containing – or otherwise facilitating the production of – democratically generated 
imperatives which may be deployed to structure or limit the activities of political and economic 
actors. According to this account, the ‘private’ appears as a secondary, derivative realm which is 
framed and constituted by the public. Neil Walker has recently developed a sophisticated and 
updated version of this position51. In the following discussion, I will appeal to the analytical tools 
of Marxist political economy in order to investigate the operative relevance of the public/private 
dichotomy from the perspective of capital accumulation. The latter is in capitalist society a 
privileged vantage point, since in a system of generalised commodity production and exchange, the 
imperative of the self-valorisation of value systematically subordinates the goal of the satisfaction 
of human needs. In such a system, capital appears as a totalising subject, a ‘self-moving substance’ 
of individual circuits and the organising principle of society as a whole52. The argument will 
proceed with an assessment of the organic interconnection of capitalist production and social 
reproduction, with the aim of developing the understanding that in accordance with the intensive 
development of capitalism, the commodity form comes progressively to structure both production 
and reproduction. I will further contend that as the commodity form penetrates relations of 
economic production and concomitant processes of social reproduction, similarly the legal form as 
its juridical reflex is coherent across the fields of private and public law. From this perspective, it is 
revealed that all law is fundamentally of a bourgeois character, its deep structure and logic being 
that of the commodity form, whilst the dichotomy between public and private appears as a first 
order distinction operating to facilitate and rationalise the reproduction of the social conditions 
which ground capital accumulation. This analysis is based upon – and will attempt to develop – a 
particular understanding of the dialectical relation of states and capitals, both domestically and in 
50 Miéville, Between Equal Rights, p. 119 
51 N. Walker, ‘On the necessarily public character of law’ in C. Michelon, G. Clunie et al. (eds.) , The Public 
in Law: Representations of the Political in Legal Discourse (Surrey: Ashgate, 2012) 
52 T. Smith, Globalisation: A Systematic Marxist Account (Chicago: Haymarket, 2009), pp. 180, 189 
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the world market. This latter, global level is the one at which abstract labour, value, money and 
capital are ultimately defined53. Consequently, it will be necessary to touch on how forces of 
competitive accumulation operating in the global economy give rise to a process of uneven and 
combined development, the latter producing patterns of territoriality which re-structure the relation 
between states and capitals at the domestic level.  
 
If the validity of this analysis is upheld, there are serious implications for the transformative 
potential of public law and its strategic operationalisation in political projects. If law’s inner logic 
mirrors that which structures the system of generalised commodity production and exchange 
through which social wealth in capitalist society is produced and distributed, it follows logically 
that legal mechanisms will be of limited utility in rectifying the social contradictions which emerge 
out of this process. “The public” which appears in law will be recognised as formally structured by 
the logic of commodity exchange, whilst being in substance restrained by its subordination to the 
maintenance of conditions facilitative of capital accumulation. In addition to these substantive 
points, I seek to argue for and attempt to demonstrate, albeit imperfectly, a particular 
methodological approach. It is my view that Marxist political economy provides the sharpest set of 
analytical tools with which to interrogate contemporary economic and political processes. In our 
present connection, the detailed account of capitalist property and production relations supplied by 
Marx’s Capital allows us to develop an understanding of the interrelation of capitalist production 
and social reproduction. Marx’s project also provides us with a set of abstract tendencies of 
capitalist development which form the starting point for an analysis of concrete historical trends. 
More broadly, the historical materialist method facilitates the situation of the legal within the fluid 
and contradictory totality of social relations. In my view, law may only be properly understood in 
the historical context of its material development as a sub-set of social relations unfolding as part of 
a dialectically integrated whole. 
 
Capitalist Production and Social Reproduction 
 
It is vital to understand the state not as external to and constitutive of economic relations, but rather 
as an important moment in the very process of commodity production and circulation. The coercive 
power of the state apparatus is presupposed at every stage of the circulation of capital, from the 
purchase of labour-power and means of production, through the regulation of the production 
process to the sale of the commodities produced on the market. Viewed historically, the state serves 
as a crucial mechanism in the inauguration of the capitalist mode of production, being a coercive 
lever in the process of social upheaval understood in terms of ‘primitive accumulation’, a function 
effected through an extensive and intensive expansion of its repressive apparatus. Subsequently, the 
state has an enduring role to play in the reproduction of social conditions facilitative of capital 
53 Smith, Globalisation, p. 190 
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accumulation, these conditions being informed by the coercive effects of the operation of the law of 
value in the world market. At this point, a degree of analytical confusion can arise insofar as the 
state mediates the ‘vertical’ antagonism between capital and labour, whilst simultaneously forming 
part of the state system which articulates the ‘horizontal’ competitive interaction of capitals at the 
international level. The latter process of competitive accumulation gives rise to a tendency towards 
the dynamic technological and sociological development of the production process, this entailing a 
continual adjustment of the quantity and quality of the required objective and subjective factors of 
production. Historically, the state has played a central role in ensuring the availability of sufficient 
labour-powers possessing the degree of physical and mental dexterity appropriate to the extant 
level of development of the productive process. The coercive power of the state has also been 
projected internationally to ensure control over economic territory, facilitating access to raw 
material inputs and markets for surplus realisation. In addition to technological innovation, the 
process of competitive accumulation also instantiates a tendency towards the concentration and 
centralisation of capital which leads progressively to uneven and combined development in the 
geography of the global capitalist system. As a result, national economies become oriented towards 
the fulfilment of particular functions within an international division of labour articulated through 
the interrelation of heterogeneous regional contexts. Specifically, the antagonism between industry 
and agriculture is played out at a global level, as advanced industrial economies seek an agrarian 
“economic supplement” by the military and financial subjugation of countries with predominantly 
agrarian economies54. In the context of the global dominance of finance capital and its international 
institutionalisation in the interests of dominant state-capital blocs, the economic and geopolitical 
competitiveness of different state-capital formations informs the policy options that are available to 
state managers with regard to the regulation of economic production and social reproduction within 
their territory.  
 
At this stage, it is necessary to pre-empt a familiar criticism by recognising that the requirements of 
capitalist production cannot be said to mechanistically generate appropriate social forms, this 
translation being mediated by a political process through which are articulated conflicting class 
interests. Indeed, as Kevin Doogan as recognised, the labour market is itself an inefficient 
mechanism for the transmission of the requirements of production, insofar as it is structured by 
embedded class relations inflected with historical and cultural contingencies which change within a 
generational time-frame55. However, it would be a mistake of a similar magnitude to attempt to 
understand politics in abstraction from the cleavage between capital and labour, which is not 
confined, nor is confinable within relations of production as narrowly conceived, rather inevitably 
coming to structure the social and political environment in its totality. This is captured from one 
perspective by Tony Smith when he contends that “the choices of state officials...are made within 
structural constraints systematically rewarding behaviour furthering the accumulation of total social 
54 N. Bukharin, Imperialism and World Economy (London: Bookmarks, 2003), p. 108 
55 K. Doogan, New Capitalism? The Transformation of Work (Cambridge: Polity, 2009) 
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capital and penalising all other modes of action”56. Further, at a more visceral level, the 
subordination of social and political demands to the imperatives of capitalist economy is especially 
apparent in the context of the current global financial and economic crisis.              
 
Society exists as an ensemble of social relations through which is articulated a process of economic 
production, this presupposing and interpenetrating with relations of social reproduction. In the form 
of society characterised by generalised commodity production, i.e. capitalist society, social wealth 
appears as an immense collection of commodities57, while social relations assume the form of 
exchange relations between commodity owners. The commodity form thus comes to structure not 
only relations of production as narrowly conceived, but also concomitant processes of social 
reproduction. The continuation of surplus value production, and consequently of capital 
accumulation (its reproduction on an expanded scale), requires the availability of an adequate stock 
of labour-powers possessing the degree of physical and mental skill and dexterity appropriate to the 
level of technological development of the production process. Recalling the analysis of Marx in 
volume two of Capital, the circuit of money capital, which most starkly reveals the valorisation of 
value, money-making and accumulation as the driving motive of capitalist production, may be 
represented by the formula M–C< Lmp...P...C’–M’. Here, M is capital value in the functional form 
of money capital, C represents value wrapped in the material shell of the commodity, L and mp 
stand for labour power and means of production – the subjective and objective factors of the 
production process –, the sum of the two forming productive capital P. The circuit of money capital 
interacts with the individual consumption of the worker insofar as M–L is for her L–M (or C–M), 
the first phase of the circulation which mediates her consumption: L–M–C, where C is the means 
of subsistence58. The second phase, M–C of the circuit by which the worker reproduces herself is 
thus not contained within the circuit describing the motion of the individual industrial capital in 
relation to which her labour is employed. However, such consumption, insofar as it is essential to 
her physical regeneration and consequently her existence on the market as exploitable material for 
the capitalist, is an essential precondition for even the simple reproduction of that capital – indeed 
its very existence as capital, understood as value in motion. Further and in logical consequence, the 
motion of the sum of individual capitals, or total social capital is conditional upon the reproduction 
of labour powers in general. From the perspective of capital accumulation, social reproduction 
appears as an evanescent (or fractally related) process accounting for the renewal of the production 
input L.  
 
The availability of adequate stocks of labour is not the only precondition for capital accumulation, 
as is immediately evident from the summary analysis above. Indeed, labour-power (L) becomes 
capital in the hands of the buyer only as a component part of productive capital (P). Thus, the 
56 Smith, Globalisation, p. 242 
57 K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 125 
58 K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Vol. 2 (London: Penguin, 1992), chapters 1-4 
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production process requires that the capitalist has access to means of production (mp) – comprising 
raw materials, energy, machines, buildings, etc – of an appropriate nature and quantity to facilitate 
the production of surplus value through the consumption of labour-power. The means of production 
will often themselves be products of the movement of other individual capitals, revealing the 
intertwinement of the metamorphoses of individual capitals in the totality of social production59. 
Furthermore, the entire enterprise will be futile if there exists not the market for the sale of the 
commodities produced by the capitalist, this exchange being the mechanism for the realisation of 
the value embodied therein. In the exposition of these basic prerequisites for capitalist production, 
we may recognise that they each presuppose a number of other social and environmental 
conditions. For instance, the availability of labour-powers depends on the wage-labour relation 
being the most convenient way for the worker to gain access to the means of subsistence, while the 
realisation of surplus value through the sale of the commodities produced presupposes adequate 
protection against the expropriation of such commodities by way other than exchange, i.e. theft.  
 
The social conditions facilitative of capital accumulation are, from a historical perspective, quite 
contingent. One need only recall the tragic ordeal of the earnest entrepreneur Mr Peel to recognise 
the difficulties of carrying on capitalist production in the absence of the political and legal 
environment necessary to institute and reproduce the requisite relations of production60. The social 
foundations for the interaction in the marketplace of capital and labour, figures which arise neither 
naturally nor a-historically, are lain by a process of ‘primitive accumulation’. This entails the 
forcible expropriation of the mass of the population from the means of production and their created 
dependency upon money wages. While primitive accumulation follows different modalities and 
chronologies in different countries, we may using the classic example of the agricultural revolution 
in England – which is explored in detail in the following section – identify as central dynamics the 
creation of new forms of property rights, the extinguishment of customary rights and perquisites, 
legal regulation of the wage-labour relation and a restructuring of welfare provision61. In all of 
these respects, the transition from feudal to capitalist modes of production is facilitated by the 
operation of the state, as the concentrated and organised force of society. Further, once the rule of 
capital has been established, the state plays an enduring role in the institution and reproduction of 
the social conditions necessary for accumulation. While this entails a variety of activities, we will 
maintain our focus on the reproduction of labour-powers. The latter, being directly related to the 
welfare of the population and falling within the ambit of the ‘public’ sector as opposed to the 
‘private’ economy within the ontological framework of the liberal dichotomy, is especially relevant 
in our present connection. We can through historical analysis chart the continual evolution of state 
59 Marx, Capital Vol. 2, p. 178 
60 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, pp. 931-933 
61 Marx, Capital Vol. 1; M. Overton, Agricultural Revolution in England: the Transformation of the 
Agrarian Economy 1500-1850 (Cambridge: CUP, 1996); E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: Europe, 
1789-1848 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1962); E. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: the Origin of the 
Black Act (London: Allen Lane, Penguin, 1975), Customs in Common (London: Merlin Press, 1991); 
Doogan, New Capitalism?  
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functions and responsibilities in response to the productive requirements of the developing forces 
of production62. The technological dynamism entailed by this process of competitive accumulation 
and the consequent revision of the conditions of labour require a continual adaption of the physical 
and intellectual abilities of labour powers. While this may be facilitated to some degree by 
individual capitals themselves, their restricted sectoral and temporal outlooks often limit the extent 
to which they may take actions which are rational from the perspective of total social capital. For 
example, the industrial practices in Britain of the late 18th and early 19th centuries led to the 
premature exhaustion and untimely death of factory workers, threatening to undermine the 
reproduction of labour-powers at the existing level of productivity. In this context, the factory 
legislation of 1853-1860, which achieved a remarkable physical and moral regeneration of labour-
powers63 could be understood as the state acting to mediate the myopic actions of individual 
capitals in the interests of total social capital. Indeed, as Doogan has commented, the period from 
the early 1830s to the 1880s saw the emergence of a body of legislation marking a shift from 
orthodox economic liberalism towards social and national protectionism, the government 
increasingly intervening to mitigate the worst social effects of nascent industrial capitalism. Thus 
the state “assumed overall responsibility for the reproduction of the next generation of labour”64. 
 
The physical maintenance of the workforce is crucial not only to ensure the future supply of waged 
labour necessary to facilitate reproduction of capital on an expanded scale, but may also be of 
import in relation to the military articulation of a state’s imperialist pretensions, particularly where 
the extant military paradigm is especially labour-intensive. Thus, following the experiences of the 
Boer war and First World War, changes in government healthcare policy significantly improved 
levels of medical fitness by the beginning of World War II65. Here, then, we witness the 
intersection of the State’s responsibilities in reproducing in a domestic context social conditions 
facilitative of capitalist production and the labour implications of the military action required 
internationally to gain and maintain control over economic territory. Moving from healthcare to 
education, the industrial revolution necessitated a dramatic turnaround in the responsibilities of the 
state at all levels, demonstrated by the fact that while in 1818 only 7% of children attended day 
school, by 1880 schooling had been made compulsory for all five to ten year olds. Further, 
following the emergence of a skills gap between the British workforce and those of other Western 
European countries including Germany, state funding for higher education was introduced66.  
 
A period of particular import in relation to the development of state responsibility for social 
reproduction is that of the ‘golden age’ of Western capitalism, beginning in the aftermath of the 
62 Doogan, New Capitalism?, p. 110 
63 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, pp. 406-408 
64 Doogan, New Capitalism?, p. 108 
65 Doogan, New Capitalism?, p. 110; N.  Timmins, The Five Giants: A Biography of the Welfare State 
(London: Fontana Press, 1996) 
66 Doogan, New Capitalism?, pp. 109-110 
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Second World War and continuing until the 1960s in the US and the 1970s in Western Europe and 
Japan67. This was a period of economic growth of unprecedented longevity and consistency, 
something explicable at least in part by the mass devaluation of capital effected by the destruction 
of the war and the operation of the ‘permanent arms economy’, the latter functioning to offset the 
rising organic composition of capital68. An economic environment characterised by a high rate of 
profit and the relative productivity of capital in the US and Western Europe provided the necessary 
objective conditions for concessions to labour in the form of welfare policies and social security 
schemes which together represented a ‘socialisation’ of labour costs. Of course, these 
developments were not automatic, being rather driven by the subjective articulation of the demands 
of labour in a favourable context of historically low levels of unemployment and at times acute 
labour shortage69. In order to perform the function of nourishing the suddenly finite number of 
labour-powers in a context of scarcity driven by expanding production, the state apparatus 
underwent a profound reorganisation in its re-configuration as the “welfare” state. Unsurprisingly, 
this period also marked the high point of the reformist political and ideological project of social 
democracy, which sought in contradistinction to its demographically and geographically limited 
material basis, to provide a universal solution to the social impact of capitalist economy. As we 
have seen however, the boom did not continue beyond 1973, when the crisis which erupted in the 
advanced capitalist countries and a large part of the third world marked the return of traditional 
economic cycles of boom and bust. Chris Harman seeks to understand the end of the golden age in 
terms of the victory of the dynamic of market competition over that of inter-imperialist military 
competition. The uneven global distribution of arms expenditure allowed economies with relatively 
low levels of expenditure to invest proportionately more in industry and achieve faster rates of 
growth than the militarised economies of the US, Russia and (to a lesser degree) the UK and 
France. These latter countries were consequently forced to scale-back their military expenditure in 
view of economic competition from the increasingly productive economies of Japan and Germany. 
In this way, the permanent arms economy ceased to operate as an escape valve for the 
accumulating pressure of the global economy70.  
 
Following the crises of the 70s, we saw the emergence of the political and economic project of neo-
liberalism which, driven by the ‘Dollar-Wall Street Regime’, sought to promote policies favourable 
to the interests of US investment banks and transnational corporations. This relied on US 
dominance of the international financial architecture and was prefigured by the harsh monetary 
discipline imposed on the world economy by the ‘Volcker shock’ of 197971. The social impact of 
these developments has been experienced extremely unevenly, with processes of welfare re-
67 C. Harman, Zombie Capitalism (London: Bookmarks, 2009) 
68 Harman, Zombie Capitalism, chapter 9; A. Callinicos, Bonfire of Illusions: The Twin Crises of the Liberal 
World (Cambridge: Polity, 2010); M. Kidron, Western Capitalism Since the War (London: Penguin, 1970) 
69 Harman, Zombie Capitalism, pp. 172-5 
70 Harman, Zombie Capitalism, pp. 191-201 
71 A. Callinicos, Imperialism and Global Political Economy (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), p. 191; P. Gowan, 
The Global Gamble: Washington’s Faustian Bid for World Dominance (London: Verso, 1999) 
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commodification and retrenchment proceeding with widely varying speed and intensity in different 
regional contexts. Thus, welfare regimes in Western Europe were seen to be relatively resilient72, 
whilst in many peripheral economies there were experienced profound social changes which often 
appeared as wanton destruction. Crucial to understanding the complexities of the neoliberal project 
is to recognise that it is driven by a bi-linear attempt to redistribute the costs of the emergent crisis: 
firstly from capital to labour and secondly; from the powerful state-capital formations comprising 
the core of the global economy to the weaker peripheral economies. With regard to the latter, the 
international financial system can be seen as the transmission mechanism by which the effects of a 
crisis of over-accumulation and profitability are spatially displaced and diffused from the core to 
the periphery, like the concentric rippling of a puddle in the rain. Further, the resilience of welfare 
provision in one form or another demonstrates that such services do not represent pure loss for 
capital, but are rather indispensible to the extraction of surplus-value insofar as the latter is 
dependent upon the reproduction of labour-powers. To bring our historiography up to date, the 
emergence from behind the veil of financialisation of a chronic crisis of over-accumulation and 
profitability in the global financial and economic crisis precipitated by the US sub-prime mortgage 
crash of 2008 has generated a generalised politics of “austerity”. This entails a policy package 
which seeks to redistribute to labour the costs of its own reproduction and to increase the rate of 
exploitation by disciplining the wage-labour relation through strategic retrenchment of welfare 
provision. Moreover, in a UK context David Cameron’s “big society” appears little more than a 
thinly veiled attempt to squeeze increasing amounts of unpaid labour from the pores of society, 
further reducing the proportion of the costs of social reproduction borne by capital. Once again, we 
must be careful to avoid implementing a crudely economic-functionalist understanding of state 
action, since the specific reforms mentioned must be recognised as the outcome of a process of 
political contestation. However, logically, the range of policy options available to the capitalist 
state are informed by the necessity of maintaining social conditions facilitative of capital 
accumulation, whilst the environment in which political contestation occurs is profoundly 
structured by the capital relation. 
 
The crucial point which must emerge from this discussion is that the process of capitalist 
production presupposes and is interconnected with processes of social reproduction. The 
continuation of capital accumulation is dependent upon the reproduction of labour powers at a level 
of productivity informed in different local contexts by the international division of social labour. 
The global organisation of capitalist production into a plurality of different capitals which are 
structurally connected to states also gives rise to a competitive dynamic which requires that the 
organisation of social reproduction be rational and cost-effective from the perspective of surplus-
value generation. For instance, if a capital in state A is able to access labour-powers of a particular 
productivity at a price to it which is below that at which labour-powers may be obtained in state B, 
72 Doogan, New Capitalism?, pp. 119-122 
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then the state A-based capital will have a competitive advantage over capitals based in state B. In 
this regard, premiums extracted from capital by taxation to cover costs of reproduction – such as 
National Insurance in the UK – can be considered as augmenting expenditure on wages, or variable 
capital (v), thus impacting the rate of exploitation: s/v, where s represents surplus value. However, 
it would be a mistake to infer from this that the interests of total social capital necessarily lie in a 
neoliberal agenda entailing the reduction of corporate taxation to a minimum and the privatisation 
of public services, since the latter may detrimentally affect general profit rates by another 
mechanism. While the privatisation of healthcare and educational provision may hold prospects of 
substantial profits for capitals operating in relevant sectors, such enterprises do not lend themselves 
to decentralised organisation, such that there will exist a tendency for these fields to become 
quickly dominated by a small number of very large capitals. The latter may ultimately use their 
monopoly power to effect a redistribution of surplus from other sectors, impacting upon the general 
rate of profit and the ability of capitals elsewhere in the economy to compete internationally. By 
way of example, it is certainly open to argument that the premiums extracted by healthcare 
providers in the US erect a ceiling for the rate of exploitation for industrial capital, under which 
conditions for instance, the Detriot-based General Motors may be out-competed by Japanese 
automobile manufacture. Ultimately, the centralisation and rationalisation of social reproduction 
entailed by its administration by the state apparatus may in certain circumstances represent the 
most efficient mode from the perspective of total social capital. Further, it may be contended that 
the public/private dichotomy grounds the organisational framework within which public bodies 
may facilitate the reproduction of social conditions which, despite being essential to the 
valorisation circuits of individual capitals, lie outwith both such circuits and the organisational 
capacities of the individual capitals concerned.        
 
Beyond the requirements that labour-powers be reproduced with the requisite skills determined by 
the spatial and temporal location of production and that such reproduction is effected in a manner 
that facilitates the maintenance of an internationally competitive rate of exploitation, there remain 
of course a multitude of organisational methods by which labour could be appropriately 
reproduced. These economic considerations thus form only a framework within which there rages 
continual political contestation over the financing and delivery of social services, key issues being 
the distribution of cost between surplus value (s) and variable capital (v) and the extent to which 
provision is linked directly to employment. Note however that the interconnection between 
capitalist production and social reproduction under capital is not exhausted by the requirements of 
the former operating as a substantive limit to the organisation of the latter. Additionally, the form of 
social relation which accompanies capitalist production, i.e. the relation of commodity exchange, 
comes inevitably to profoundly structure reproductive processes as it structures social relations in 
their entirety.        
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The commodity-form theory of law and the public/private dichotomy 
 
The bourgeois epoch is not the first in which society has been fragmented into classes, the 
consumption of the ruling class being fuelled by the extraction of surplus labour from a subordinate 
social grouping. However, under capitalism such exploitation assumes a specific form, surplus 
labour appearing as surplus value generated by the consumption of labour-power mediated by the 
mechanism of the wage-labour relation. In contrast to economic systems founded upon 
enslavement or indenture of a direct, personal nature, the wage-labourer remains formally free 
insofar as she sells not herself, but her capacity to labour for a limited period, while the person of 
her employer is subject to periodic change. Coercion, as the pivot between economics and politics, 
also undergoes a reorganisation under capitalism, insofar as the use of force is progressively 
divested from the person directly implicated in the extraction of surplus labour, such power being 
congealed instead in the body of an institutionalised collective public authority. Capitalist society 
might be described then as class society par excellence insofar as labour is exploited as a class by 
capital organised collectively and operating coercively through the mechanism of constituted 
public authority. This is of course not to make a crude or conspiratorial assessment of the influence 
of the agency of capital over parliamentary politics, but rather to recognise that under capitalism, 
society is capitalist society inasmuch as social relations in their totality are structured by the logics 
of commodity production and exchange and subordinated in substance to the maintenance of this 
specific form of organisation of social production.  
 
Whilst the most fundamental form of regulation of social relations in capitalist society is economic, 
being grounded in the coercive effects of a class-inflected organisation of the means of production, 
this is supported by regulatory mechanisms of a political and legal nature. The latter attains in 
bourgeois society a particular significance, the legal form here achieving its most universal and 
consummate articulation. For Pashukanis this is no mere coincidence, since the deep grammar of 
the legal form, entailing a specific legal modulation of social relations, forms a logical unity with 
the relations of commodity production and exchange which characterise capitalist society. Now, of 
course, commodities were produced in pre-capitalist societies, yet it is only in bourgeois society 
that commodity production becomes generalised – that use-values are increasingly produced 
primarily for exchange, and progressively, the entirety of social wealth passes through the 
mechanism of commodity circulation. It is under these conditions that the legal form obtains 
universal significance and legal ideology can obtain a firm grip on human consciousness. 
Pashukanis argued that there is an “indissoluble internal connection” between the categories of the 
economy based on the commodity and on money, and the legal form itself. This connection is 
borne out by the category of the legal subject, which can be regarded as “the indispensible and 
unavoidable complement of the commodity”. The legal subject, as the “abstract bearer of all 
possible legal claims”, can be compared directly with, and indeed recognised as the juridical 
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reflection of, the commodity owner, as an “abstract, impersonal subject of rights in things”73. The 
definition and attribution of legal personality, being the mechanism by which individuals are 
represented or instantiated in the legal process is a crucial aspect of the broader process of 
juridification. The latter can be understood in terms of the assimilation of social relations to a set of 
standard forms, providing for the observation and regulation of those relations by specified 
corporate social organisations which are empowered to modulate those relations by the deployment 
of defined coercive actions. The place to begin in attempting to understand the consequences of 
such regulation for social development is an analysis of the manner in which those forms of 
modulation facilitate the production and distribution of use-values and, by extension whether they 
presuppose a particular method of effecting the latter. 
 
The juridical persona is a mask which constitutes the legal subject, simultaneously signifying her 
existence and mystifying the contours of the face beneath. One of the primary logics which informs 
the operation of legal personality is abstraction, insofar as the complex material and social context 
which grounds the relation between individuals is reduced to the rational interaction of legal 
persons who are considered (from the perspective of the legal) to be free and equal. Whilst the legal 
person is in general an abstract bearer of subjective rights, crucially in the context of the present 
discussion there do exist certain operative distinctions between legal persons, not least that which 
differentiates ‘public’ and ‘private’ persons. Organisations designated as ‘public’ are, in general 
terms, legally constituted corporate social entities which emerge from constitutionally-structured 
political processes, charged with the performance of more or less loosely defined ‘public’ 
functions. They can be thus seen as mediating the actions of private persons in such a manner that 
their individual, narrowly focused actions can be accommodated to the maintenance of the 
operative socio-economic order, the latter grounding the power and maintenance of the state 
apparatus. The distinction between public and private persons grounds the derivative dichotomy 
between public and private law, the two spheres being distinguished primarily by the extent to 
which the interests of legally constituted ‘public’ persons are implicated – such that they are 
permitted certain freedoms of action – within that realm. Upon a detailed analysis, the 
public/private boundary is revealed as porous, whilst it may also be seen to shift in location when 
mapped across different legal disciplines, which are themselves internally and inconsistently 
demarcated. Similarly, the categories of ‘public’ and ‘private’ personality are not watertight, there 
being many organisations which straddle the boundary or are otherwise difficult to locate relative 
to it.  
 
A particularly privileged perspective from which to understand the operation of the legal 
public/private dichotomy is the perspective of capital accumulation, informed by the dialectic of 
state and world market in the context of the coercive operation of the law of value in the global 
73 E. Pashukanis, Law and Marxism: A General Theory (London: Pluto Press, 1983), pp. 14, 42 
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economy. Whilst this is not the only manner in which the public/private divide can be cognised, it 
is of particular resonance given that in a system of generalised commodity production and 
exchange, the imperative of the self-valorisation of value systematically subordinates the goal of 
the satisfaction of human needs. Capitalism is driven by accumulation for accumulation’s sake, 
production for production’s sake, whilst social reproduction assumes organisational and procedural 
forms which are oriented towards the achievement of optimal conditions for accumulation. In this 
regard it is useful to recall Tony Smith’s criticism of the “humanist social ontology” underlying 
much political economy when he asserts that it “fails to grasp the inversion whereby humanly 
created social forms generate an inhuman subject whose end (‘self-valorisation’) comes to have 
precedence over human ends”74. A similar critique could apply to constitutional and administrative 
law scholarship which presupposes that the institutional and procedural articulation of political 
authority is primarily informed by humanist-functional imperatives. Drawing again from Smith, it 
might be said that constitutional law scholarship “fail[s] to comprehend how the property and 
production relations of capitalism define a social order in which valorisation, not human 
flourishing, is the ultimate end of social life”. Under a system of generalised commodity 
production, capital appears as a totalising subject, a ‘self-moving substance’ of individual circuits 
and the organising principle of society as a whole75. This entails the real (as opposed to formal) 
subsumption of labour by capital, effecting a restructure not only of the activities of labour within 
the narrow spatiality and temporality of employment, but of the existence and reproduction of 
labour in its entirety. The “capital fetishism” which inevitably accompanies this process of 
inversion veils the subordination of human needs to valorisation, transforming capital from a 
contingent, evanescent product of a particular organisation of property and production relations 
into the driving force behind social development and the satisfaction of human wants. Capital is 
thus understood not as congealed past labour parasitically exploiting the creative energies of living 
social labour, but as the well-spring of social wealth and productive human endeavour. When we 
couple the recognition that in a capitalist social order valorisation becomes the immanent end of 
social interaction, with an understanding that the legal form unfolds in harmony with the 
development of generalised commodity production, we may begin to understand that the legal 
system in its entirety is deeply structured by the logic of capitalist accumulation. In this context, the 
public/private dichotomy is revealed as a first order distinction which facilitates and rationalises the 
development of organisational forms which support accumulation in a context of global 
competition. Specifically, as we have discussed in some detail here, it allows for the rational and 
efficient organisation of social reproduction on a large scale.  
 
The public/private divide operates to sever the fluid and contradictory totality of social relations 
into two spheres within which legally constituted ‘public’ organisations are given different degrees 
of influence and the legal regulation of social relations differs in quality and intensity. Far from 
74 Smith, Globalisation, p. 178 
75 Smith, Globalisation, pp. 180, 189 
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being an unmarked space in which collectively and democratically generated imperatives are 
imposed upon a bounded (and derivative) private realm, the public sphere rather displays the 
birthmarks of its origin in the genesis of the public/private dichotomy, being deeply structured by 
the logic of the commodity form. This may appear counter-intuitive to the legal thinker who 
regards legal relations as deriving from overarching legal norms and civil society as a product of 
the will of an institutionally-grounded sovereign power. Following Pashukanis, we must turn these 
conceptions on their head, recognising that the norm cannot exist but in the concrete multiplicity of 
legal relations, these being the fabric through which the norm is woven, whilst appreciating that the 
state, far from producing civil society, rather grows out of it, whilst the latter in turn rests upon a 
foundation of economic relations76. 
 
Given an historically grounded understanding of the development of the legal form which 
recognises its intertwinement with the generalisation of commodity production and exchange, the 
logical unity of private and public law follows necessarily. If in capitalist society valorisation 
becomes the overriding goal in view of which social relations are structured, whilst valorisation 
requires concrete labour employed in a particular locality to pass the test of social utility overseen 
by the operation of the law of value in the world market, then public bodies must act in such a way 
as to facilitate the maintenance of a rate of exploitation which is internationally competitive. In this 
context, it would appear that the burden of proof shifts to representatives of those schools of 
thought which insist upon a substantive independence of the public sphere to show how the latter 
maintains its insulation from the central dynamics of capital accumulation. This being said, it will 
be useful here to invoke some evidence to reinforce our analytically-generated conclusion 
regarding the logical unity of private and public law. Firstly, the structural cohesion of private and 
public law is apparent at a fairly superficial institutional and procedural level. In the UK, the 
superior civil courts exercise jurisdiction over all justiciable disputes, irrespective of whether they 
concern private citizens or public authorities. Further, in England the practice is to avoid a hard and 
fast demarcation between public and private law in the determination of procedural matters, whilst 
in Scotland the structure of remedies does not require a distinction to be drawn between public and 
private law. Public bodies are a subspecies of a broader category of legal persons, which 
Pashukanis has taught us to understand as the juridical reflex of the commodity owner. Constancy 
of form is also apparent at a basic doctrinal level, the rule of law requiring equality before the law 
of all legal persons whether designated as ‘public’ or ‘private’, while logics of private interaction 
inform theoretical understandings of constitutional and administrative regimes – note for instance 
the ubiquity of the “social contract” metaphor. More profoundly, the centrality of human rights 
discourse and the institutionalisation of the latter in regional and international regimes reflects a 
structuring of the public sphere and articulation of questions of the distribution of social wealth in 
accordance with the conflict of egoistically generated private interests. This structural framing of 
76 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, pp. 85-88 
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profound political questions already presupposes the type of “asocial sociality” formed by the 
interaction of dissociated private producers77. Thus, the citizen is in a position formally analogous 
to that of the commodity owner, her bundle of rights against a legally constituted public authority 
being the mirror of the owner’s rights in her commodity in respect to all those who may make 
competing claims. The structural rigidity of public law is further revealed in contexts which do not 
lend themselves comfortably to the form of regulation presupposed by this structure. For instance, 
anti-discrimination legislation, as a form of public, administrative law approaches the problem of 
the inequality of remuneration received by male and female workers by treating women as a series 
of abstract individuals, each possessing the formal right to equal pay. This attempt to formalise the 
marginalised group as equal is founded upon the “subsumption of a particular category – women – 
into a formal, abstract, juridical one, and to insist upon its abstract equality”78. Insofar as this form 
of administration displays a fidelity to the legal form by attempting to emulate or approximate the 
latter’s abstraction, it will necessarily be limited in its substantive efficacy. 
 
One criticism of the account developed here might be that it fails to recognise that the legal 
subjects which animate public law are not merely isolated individuals, but corporate entities such 
as associations, trades unions, utilities and public corporations. However, as China Miéville has 
convincingly argued, such a shift in legal subjectivity does not represent a change in the basic 
ontological structure of law, but rather “a shift in the atoms of the juridical relationship on the basis 
of the commodity relationship under changing conditions of mass industrialisation and the 
commodification of labour-power itself”. Just as Marx recognised that the legalisation of capital 
and labour as collectives results from the very nature of labour-power as a commodity, the 
developments in legal subjectivity in accordance with the changing conditions of late capitalism 
must be understood as a development of the legal form on the basis of that form itself79. Indeed, as 
Tony Smith has recognised, the definition of what constitutes a corporate ‘person’ and the forms of 
legally permissible interactions which can be undertaken by those persons must be regularly 
revised by state judicial apparatuses in light of the shifting organisational forms adopted by capital 
as a result of the tendencies towards concentration and centralisation, especially in a global context 
where these trends are articulated in cross-border mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures and 
subcontracting arrangements80. Similarly, public institutions charged with the maintenance of 
social conditions facilitative of capital accumulation may assume varying organisational forms in 
different economic and political contexts. These adaptations are driven by factors including the 
tendency for the commodification of new areas of social life (‘accumulation by dispossession’) to 
increase in importance in the context of crises of over-accumulation in other sectors, and the 
necessity for states to intervene in research and development programmes and networks of 
77 Smith, Globalisation 
78 Miéville, Between Equal Rights, p. 111 
79 Miéville, Between Equal Rights, pp. 101-113 
80 Smith, Globalisation, p. 237 
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knowledge production in order to create ‘innovation systems’ in sectors with potentially high rates 
of profitability. The changing organisational forms assumed by capital emerge out of the 
commodity form as the shifts in legal subjectivity represent an evolution of the legal form on the 
basis of that form itself.           
 
‘The public in law’ 
 
In this discussion I have attempted to illustrate the interpenetration of relations of production and 
reproduction in capitalist society, arguing that the commodity form comes to structure the emergent 
totality. I have further argued that this unity is mirrored by the formal coherence of public and 
private law, the distinction between the two forming the juridical framework for the establishment 
of organisational forms which both maintain the existence of capital as a plurality of capitals and 
provide for the rational reproduction of the social conditions of accumulation. Consequently, the 
space provided by the ‘public’ in law is revealed as formally structured by the logic of commodity 
exchange, whilst being in substance restrained by its subordination to the maintenance of 
conditions facilitative of capital accumulation. Public and private law form the poles of a first-order 
distinction which is subsumed within the ‘legal’ as a formally coherent mother category, the logic 
of which is the logic of the commodity form. These conclusions place in a different perspective 
Walker’s aim of establishing the second-order ‘publicness’ of law, whilst revealing the futility of 
the broader ideological tug-of-war between the ‘civilists’ and ‘publicists’ for mastery over the 
jurisprudential universe. We have established not the second-order ‘publicness’ of law, but rather a 
second-order bourgeoisness. We may thus conclude either that Walker is wrong, or perhaps more 
frighteningly, that he is right. For as have discovered, in a profound sense, the subject which 
animates capitalist society is not the human being, but capital itself, whilst the corresponding public 
is not a corporate association of human beings, but total social capital. The only manner in which 
we may reverse the dialectical inversion by which the human being was supplanted by an alien 
pseudo-subject as the organising principle of society as a whole is by effecting a profound 
restructuring of the mode by which society produces its means of subsistence, such that it ceases to 
simultaneously reproduce the antagonistically related estates of capital and labour. Legal 
mechanisms are not sufficient to procure such a revolutionary transformation, insofar as “it is 
totally impossible to reconstitute society on the basis of what is merely an embellished shadow of 
it”81. This is not to underestimate the importance of the legal reforms which in limited historical 
and geographical contexts have assuaged some of the worst social consequences of capitalist 
development. Rather it is to recognise that the momentum and energy crystallised in such 
enactments is not of legal origin, being born rather of the conflict of antagonistically related 
classes. Law is a mechanism which mediates social relations which return ultimately to economic 
and political dynamics as their centre of gravity. 
81 K. Marx, ‘The poverty of philosophy’ in D. McLellan (Ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings Second Edn. 
(Oxford: OUP, 2000), at p. 215 
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 III. Juridification and social transformation: law as sword, shield and fetter 
 
The existence of history presupposes the existence of material life, something which can be 
sustained only by the production of the basic means of subsistence. Such production must 
continually be fulfilled and is necessarily constitutive of a double relation: natural insofar as it 
entails a particular metabolism between humans and nature, and; social in that it requires the 
cooperation of human individuals82. The production of the means of subsistence, indeed of life 
itself, involves the appropriation and transformation of nature through labour. This working-over of 
the objective world is what constitutes the human’s “species-being”, her essence, the process of 
production being her vital activity or her “active species life”83. The human can be distinguished 
from the animal insofar as she makes her vital activity an object of her will and consciousness – her 
vital activity is thus conscious vital activity84. Humans are consequently able to reflect upon their 
vital activity and alter its natural and social form. For Marx, different epochs in human history can 
be distinguished by the manner in which the means of subsistence are produced, this mode of 
production presupposing a particular set of natural and social relations. The relation between man 
and nature develops symbiotically with the productive relations between men, each definite stage 
of development of the “forces of production” corresponding to a set of definite social relations. 
These social relations are, naturally, regulated by economic and political forces. However, at a 
certain stage of development, the social regulation of human relations assumes a specifically legal 
character, such that spontaneously arising reified relations are transformed into legal relations, a 
process we may designate juridification. 
 
Juridification is the window through which we will attempt to locate the legal system relative to 
broader processes of economic production and social reproduction. It is by way of a discussion of 
what is entailed by, and what is at stake in, the legal mediation of social relations that we are able 
to investigate the role of law in the development of processes of economic production and 
consequently, in the unfolding of human history. For Marx, class struggle – the conflict of social 
groupings unified by their common relation to the means of production and labour – is the driving 
force of history, such conflict each time ending either in the revolutionary reconstruction of society, 
or in the common ruin of the contending classes85. The question of the function of the legal system 
in processes of social transformation is thus also a question of how law frames and mediates the 
political struggle between classes – in bourgeois society, capital and labour. In attempting to 
answer these questions, the argument proceeds by way of the invocation of three figures – those of 
82 K. Marx, The German Ideology in D. McLellan (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings (Oxford: OUP, 2000), 
pp.181-182  
83 K. Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts in McLellan (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings, pp. 90-
91  
84 Marx, Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, p. 90 
85 K. Marx & F. Engels, The Communist Manifesto (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 219 
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the sword, the shield and the fetter. Each of the figures captures from a different perspective the 
role of law in the institution and reproduction of the relations of production, whilst casting in a 
different light the legal modulation of the wage-labour relation. It is essential to note in this 
connexion that the functions represented by these figures are neither clearly delineated nor 
mutually exclusive – rather, they presuppose and interpenetrate one another. All three figures are 
always present in the operation of the legal system, though at different social and historical 
conjectures one or other is brought more sharply into focus and tends to predominate. As a 
consequence, the analysis cannot be understood as proceeding in a linear manner, it being 
necessary to understand each of the three perspectives before any one can be grasped fully. 
 
Law as Sword 
 
The capitalist mode of production requires the interaction in the marketplace of two figures which 
arise not naturally nor a-historically, but rather as a result of definite and tumultuous processes of 
economic and social transformation. Capital exists as a social relation between owners of means of 
production and subsistence on the one hand, and owners of labour-power willing to sell it in return 
for access to means of subsistence, on the other. Both persons arise out of the demise of the peasant 
and small-holding farmer, the artisan and journeyman, though while the capitalist hoists himself up 
upon the broken and bloodied bodies of the peasantry, the labouring poor are their emaciated, 
skeletal offspring. To dig beneath the rational, symmetrical edifice of the market, built of a million 
free and equitable commodity exchanges, is to unearth a foundation of violent and merciless 
expropriation. The pre-history of capital is a bloody tale of the forcible severance of the mass of the 
people from the means of production, the clearing of pastures and enclosure of common lands, the 
driving of the agricultural population by threat of starvation into the arms of the waiting 
agricultural, mercantile and ultimately industrial capitalists. Whilst “Force is the midwife of every 
old society which is pregnant with a new one”86, coercion is in different historical periods 
articulated through a variety of institutional frameworks and clothed in trendy new ideological 
fabrics. The transition from feudal to capitalist modes of production is facilitated by the operation 
of the state, as the concentrated and organised force of society87, while Law, as the lingua franca of 
the state, lubricates the gears of history. Ever since the Glorious Revolution and the enlistment of 
the state apparatus in the service of the emerging bourgeoisie, legal machinery has been employed 
to ensure the institution and reproduction of the social conditions necessary for the accumulation of 
capital, including principally the availability of adequate stocks of “free and rightless” proletarians.  
 
The proletarian experiences freedom in a double sense: freedom from being tethered to a particular 
master, and to sell her labour-power (in such quantity as she pleases) to whomsoever she pleases, 
and; freedom from (in the sense of being unencumbered by) any means of production of her own 
86 K. Marx, Capital: A Critique of Political Economy Vol. 1 (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 916 
87 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, pp. 915-916 
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and any control over the conditions of her labour88. In one sense then, the dissolution of the bands 
of feudal retainers served to emancipate the serf from the regime of the guilds and their restrictive 
labour relations; yet, such a movement was coincidental with the robbery of all her own means of 
production and the stable arrangements which guaranteed her subsistence and survival89. This 
history of expropriation, of great masses of men being “suddenly and forcibly torn from their 
means of subsistence, and hurled onto the labour market as free, unprotected and rightless 
proletarians”, is “written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire”90. Whilst this process 
of “primitive accumulation” follows different modalities and chronologies in different countries, 
what is common is that law operates as a key mechanism in the expropriation of the agricultural 
population from the soil.  
 
In Britain, the birthplace of the industrial revolution and the first country in which the wage based 
labour market came into prominence, the commodification of labour power was effected by the 
reduction of the labouring poor to a complete dependency upon money wages91. Such a 
development required the establishment of new forms of property rights, the extinguishment of 
customary rights and perquisites, legal regulation of the wage-labour relation and welfare 
restructuration. Land enclosures, crucial to the commodification both of the land and labour power, 
occurred in two main stages in the three centuries from c. 1550, such that by 1850, private property 
rights had been established on almost all the arable land in England92. The first stage, the “Tudor 
enclosures” of the late fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries, was carried out predominantly using 
the mechanism of “enclosure by agreement”, whereby arrangements which were to a greater or 
lesser degree voluntary were ratified by actions in the Court of Chancery in the form of fictitious 
disputes which enabled the legal recognition of changes in property rights93. The second great wave 
of enclosures occurred between 1760 and 1830, when the transformation of agriculture was 
effectively completed by the enclosure of six million acres of common land in a process officially 
sanctioned by acts of parliament94 - something described by Marx as a “parliamentary coup 
d’état”95. In this manner, landowners used the mechanism of “Enclosure Acts” to annex great 
expanses of common land, swallowing up open-field villages in the creation of large enclosed 
lordships96.  
 
88 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p. 874 
89 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p. 875 
90 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p. 875-6 
91 K. Doogan, New Capitalism? The Transformation of Work (Cambridge: Polity, 2009), pp. 104-5 
92 M. Overton, Agricultural Revolution in England: the Transformation of the Agrarian Economy 1500-1850 
(Cambridge: CUP, 1996), p. 147 
93 Overton, Agricultural Revolution in England, pp. 148, 156-157 
94 Overton, Agricultural Revolution in England, pp. 148; Doogan, New Capitalism?, pp. 105-6  
95 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p. 886 
96 E. Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution: Europe, 1789-1848 (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1962), p. 
46; Marx, Capital Vol. 1, pp. 885-887  
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The process of enclosure and the concomitant extinction of common rights landed a fatal blow to 
the English peasantry and may be seen as a key factor in the development of the rural proletariat97. 
Legal enactment and process not only provided the legitimating framework for this process of 
expropriation, but further, provided a mechanism by which the repressive state apparatus enforced 
the profound changes to rural life that the developments presupposed. The Black Act of 1723, 
purportedly a response to the ‘emergency’ occasioned by instances of organised poaching in the 
forests of Windsor and Hampshire, created fifty new capital offences and “signalled the onset of 
the flood-tide of eighteenth-century retributive justice”98. The 1723 Act operated primarily to 
criminalise the hunting or stealing of deer, the poaching of hares, conies or fish and the cutting 
down of trees in forests, parks and enclosed grounds, offences which became capital if the 
offending persons were armed or disguised99. The Act contained various provisions designed to 
expedite the legal process, overriding customary procedure and the defences of the subject, 
including a section enabling persons failing to surrender upon order by the Privy Council to be 
presumed guilty and sentenced to death without trial100. The Black Act, amended by subsequent 
enactments and evolving through a process of creeping judicial interpretation, became a malleable 
instrument of repression used to punish by example those displaying malice to the gentry and 
thereby strengthening the resources of stability in a time of popular disaffection101. Moreover, the 
1723 Act must be seen as part of a broader process whereby the independent livelihoods of the 
rural poor, based upon the survival of pre-capitalist use-rights over land, were eroded by legal (as 
well as economic) forces. As Edward Thompson remarks, the foresters were seeing “the very roof 
beams which housed their practical economy...being eaten away” as successive legal decisions 
“signalled that lawyers had become converted to the notions of absolute property ownership, and 
that...the law abhorred the messy complexities of use-right”102. What was in effect occurring in 
many instances was the redefinition of age-old offices, rights and perquisites as criminal offences, a 
process which increased the dependency of the emerging proletariat upon money wages and one 
which could be ideologically rationalised in the context of the uncoupling of labour from the land 
and the consequent emergence of the product of labour as a discrete commodity103.       
 
The developments outlined above, whilst necessary, are insufficient to establish a basis for the 
capitalist mode of production, it being further required to institute such disciplinary practices as are 
necessary to domesticate the worker into the regime of wage-labour, and to regulate the conditions 
of labour – including such matters as the length of the working day and the level of wages – in such 
a manner as to facilitate capital accumulation. Legal mechanisms are central to the achievement of 
97 Overton, Agricultural Revolution in England, pp. 192 
98 E. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: the Origin of the Black Act (London: Allen Lane, Penguin, 1975), pp. 206, 
23 
99 Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, pp. 21-22 
100 Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, pp. 22 
101 Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, pp. 201-2, 256 
102 Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, pp. 240-1 
103 Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, pp. 207 
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all of these objectives, the power of the state being employed “to hasten, as in a hothouse, the 
process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten 
the transition”104. The transition to industrial society required “a severe restructuring of working 
habits – new disciplines, new incentives, and a new human nature upon which these incentives 
could bite effectively”105. Enclosure and agricultural improvement entailed “the efficient husbandry 
of the time of the labour-force”, requiring crucially the synchronisation of labour, a shift from task-
orientation to timed labour and a sharper demarcation between “work” and “life”106. Pre-capitalist 
modes of production had been characterised by the intermingling of social intercourse and labour, 
borne out in irregular work patterns punctuated by alternate bouts of intense labour and idleness – 
practices which would have to be overcome in order to fuel the advance of industrial capitalism107. 
The problem for the capitalist was the acquisition of a sufficient quantity of labour-powers 
possessing the right qualifications and skills and being sufficiently habituated to the rhythm of 
regular unbroken daily work108. Unsurprisingly, workers were often unwilling to accept the shift in 
temporality entailed by the transition from the “seasonal ups and downs of the farm or the self-
controlled patchiness of the independent craftsman” to the monotonous rigidity of timed labour 
presided over by the deadening “tick-tocks” of the devil’s mill. The answer was found, as 
Hobsbawm has recognised, in a draconian labour discipline articulated in the form of a ‘Master and 
Servant’ code mobilising the law on the side of the employer109.  
 
The Master and Servant Law of 1823 instituted a profound asymmetry in the rights and obligations 
of employers and workers, providing for instance that a breach of contract on the part of a master 
constituted a civil offence, while the violation of an agreement by an employee was a criminal 
offence subject to retribution of up to three months imprisonment with hard labour110. There is 
evidence to suggest that some 10,000 prosecutions per year occurred under the 1823 Act111. 
Moreover, the Master and Servant Law was only one of a succession of enactments which 
regulated wage-labour in such a manner as to create and reproduce conditions of exploitation, 
something which is hardly surprising given Adam Smith’s observation that “Whenever the 
legislature attempts to regulate the differences between masters and their workmen, its counsellors 
are always the masters”112. The Statute of Labourers of 1349 aimed at a compulsory extension of 
the working day, whilst prohibiting on pain of imprisonment the payment of wages higher than 
those fixed by the statute. The penalties were greater for the worker receiving such wages than the 
employer paying them, a lopsidedness mirrored by Elizabeth’s later Statute of Apprentices, which 
104 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, pp. 915-916  
105 E. Thompson, Customs in Common (London: Merlin Press, 1991), p. 354 
106 Thompson, Customs in Common, pp. 358-9 
107 Thompson, Customs in Common, pp. 358-369 
108 Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, p. 66 
109 Thompson, Customs in Common, pp. 356, 360; Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolution, p. 66 
110 Doogan, New Capitalism?, p. 106 
111 Doogan, New Capitalism?, p. 106  
112 A. Smith, Wealth of Nations Vol. 1 (Edinburgh, 1814), p. 142. Referenced in Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p. 900 fn 
3  
179 
 
                                                          
set the penalties at twenty-one days and ten days imprisonment respectively113. Further, from the 
fourteenth century until 1825, worker’s combinations were regarded as “heinous crimes”, notable 
enactments including the Mutiny Act of 1797, the Seditious Meetings Act of 1817 and the 
Combinations Act of 1799-1800, the latter extending prohibitions on organisation to all trades 
which previously only applied to specific occupations. Indeed, it was not until 1875 that there was 
established formal legal equality between capital and labour, in contradiction with the vintage of 
platitudes regarding the “freedom and equality” of market exchanges114. 
 
The final piece in the puzzle as regards the institution of the market in labour and the created 
dependency of the working population was a program of social reforms which punished those new 
proletarians who, having been forcibly expropriated from the soil, were transformed by 
circumstance into vagabonds and paupers. The nascent manufactures had a limited capacity to 
absorb this new surplus population, such that those unable to find employment were forced to 
scrape a living by different means, these latter practices being chastised under a system which 
regarded such criminality as ‘voluntary’115. In the reign of Henry VIII, some seventy-two thousand 
“great and petty” thieves were put to death under a succession of legislative enactments which 
provided for the whipping, disfigurement and ultimately, capital punishment of vagabonds116. 
Similarly terroristic laws were passed under Edward VI and Elizabeth I, permitting the 
enslavement, flogging, branding and execution of idlers and unlicensed beggars, whilst provision 
was made in the reign of James I for the public whipping, imprisonment and hanging of “rouges”. 
The latter legislation remained in force until the beginning of the eighteenth century and was 
mirrored by laws of similar substance in the developing capitalist economies of France and the 
Netherlands117. Beyond the criminalisation of pauperism and the grotesque punishment of those 
subjected to it, profound social changes were engineered by the social welfare reforms of the 
Speenhamland Act of 1797 and the Poor Law of 1834, enactments Doogan has described as 
“milestones in state social policy which finally completed the establishment of the labour 
market”118. The 1797 Act modified the parish-based system of poor relief established by the Poor 
Law Act of 1601 and the Settlement Act of 1662, supplementing wages from the poor rates on a 
flexible scale varying with the price of bread119. However well-intentioned, the Speenhamland 
system functioned in such a manner that those property owners not employing labour effectively 
subsidised those that did – as a consequence, farmers were encouraged to lower wages and workers 
became demoralised. Conditions worsened under the Poor Law of 1834, which entitled paupers to 
poor relief only within the newly established workhouses, where workers were paid wages below 
113 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p. 900-1 
114 Doogan, New Capitalism?, p. 106; Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p. 901  
115 See Marx, Capital Vol. 1, chapter 28 
116 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, pp. 896-7 
117 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, pp. 897-9 
118 Doogan, New Capitalism?, p. 107 
119 Overton, Agricultural Revolution in England, p. 187 
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market rates, systematically separated from their families and subjected to deliberately inhospitable 
conditions120.  
 
The above study outlines the dynamics of the creation of the wage labour system using the 
illustrative example of the agricultural revolution in England. The process is one of the forcible 
expropriation of the mass of the population from the means of production and their created 
dependency upon money wages. Law is crucially implicated in this transformation, which is 
accomplished by means of the establishment of new forms of property rights, the extinguishment of 
customary rights and perquisites, legal regulation of the wage-labour relation and welfare 
restructuration. Central to this project is an expansion of the coercive powers of the state apparatus, 
which is facilitated and legitimised by legal enactment. The role of law with regard to such violent 
social transformation can be understood in terms of the sword. It must be emphasised at this point 
that the process of primitive accumulation is not merely an historical curiosity, but rather has 
recurring, contemporary relevance. Such acts of appropriation are embedded within extant 
economic relations, providing the foundational framework for each and every market transaction. It 
can be appreciated that the modern worker’s lack of control over the means of production and 
access to independent means of subsistence is what compels her to sell her labour to the capitalist 
and buy his wage goods on the market. In this regard, the legal form operates to veil the 
asymmetrical power relations created by the “original sin” of primitive accumulation behind the 
idealised equality of commodity exchange. Law can thus be seen as legitimising and ideologically 
rationalising economic interactions which are inherently exploitative. Does Justicia’s blindfold 
spare her from the irony of the juxtaposition of delicate scales and bloody sword? Moreover, we 
may witness the occurrence of contemporary processes of primitive accumulation as populations in 
the periphery of the capitalist economy are progressively integrated into the system of generalised 
commodity production. Indeed, one Marxist position on imperialism would attempt to assimilate 
recent imperialist projects and even neoliberal globalisation with primitive accumulation, as part of 
an evolving organic interrelation between processes of accumulation by exploitation and 
accumulation by dispossession121.  
 
Law as Shield 
 
Law is centrally involved in the institution and reproduction of such social conditions as are 
necessary to facilitate the accumulation of capital through the extraction of surplus value from the 
working population. The legal system is constitutive of the labour market, provides the coercive 
foundation for the system of private property and operates to lubricate the multitude of commodity 
exchanges which form the basis of the distribution of social wealth under a capitalist system of 
120 Doogan, New Capitalism?, p. 107; Overton, Agricultural Revolution in England, p. 187 
121 See for instance D. Harvey, The New Imperialism (Oxford: OUP, 2005); R. Luxemburg, The 
Accumulation of Capital (A. Schwarzschild trans.) (London: Routledge, 1951) 
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production. However, the legal system is to some degree institutionally insulated from the direct 
control of the bourgeoisie and moreover, must in order to effectively perform its ideological 
function maintain an appearance of operational consistency and conceptual coherence. Legal 
education inculcates in practitioners a complex disciplinary apparatus, coupled with an ideological 
commitment to the core values and presumptions of legal thought, the latter generally being 
severed from any systematic critical understanding of the role of law within processes of economic 
production and social reproduction. The logic and values of the legal system are projected outwards 
in society through a combination of symbolic imagery and ceremonial procedure. Legal actors may 
not conceive themselves as behaving in the direct interests of capital, yet their actions, taken in 
furtherance of the logic of the legal system and in accordance with its core principles, may have 
precisely that effect as a result of the structural interconnection between the legal form and 
capitalist economy122. However, it is the insulated (autopoietic?) and internally coherent systemic 
logic of the law which provides the opportunity for the progressive operationalisation of legal 
machinery by labour and social groups oppressed under capitalist production. Law provides a 
rationalised normative system for market exchanges, producing stable expectations for capital as 
regards the production and realisation of surplus value and entrenching the gains made by the 
bourgeoisie during processes of primitive accumulation. Yet at the same time as law is constitutive 
of the social basis of capitalist exploitation, it may also be seen to frame and limit such domination 
in crucial ways. Thus, whilst the legal system permits the hiring of wage labour, it may prohibit the 
physical coercion and punishment of workers, or compel capital to contribute to the reproduction of 
labour-power through the enforcement of a designated minimum level of monetary remuneration. 
These concessions generally arise as a result of the social mobilisation of labour, the latter using its 
leverage in the process of production to exert pressure upon capital. When this action is coupled 
with appropriate interventions in the political and legal spheres, labour may be able to achieve the 
crystallisation of the gains of such struggle in legal enactment. Thus, it may be possible to legally 
entrench the victories occasioned by collective organisation and action, constructing a legal “high 
water mark” against further encroachment by capital. 
 
Lenin was acutely aware of the progressive potential of the strategic deployment of legal 
machinery, encouraging the use at given historical stages of those ‘legal opportunities’ which the 
enemy is forced to provide when placed on the back foot by political mobilisation123. Indeed, 
argues Pashukanis, he strongly opposed the degeneration of revolutionary tactics into the “fetishist 
denial of legality” which in the mind of the petit bourgeois revolutionary “supplants both the sober 
calculation of the forces and conditions of struggle and the ability to use and strengthen even the 
most inconsequential victories in preparing for the next assault”124. The task of the revolutionary is 
122 See part three of this paper – ‘Law as Fetter’  
123 E. Pashukanis, ‘Lenin and Problems of Law’ in E. Pashukanis, Selected Writings on Marxism and Law (P 
Beirne & R. Sharlet eds.) (London: Academic Press, 1980) 
124 Pashukanis, ‘Lenin and Problems of Law’  
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therefore not solely to overthrow and unmask the legalistic fetish of the system, but also in certain 
periods to engage in the “dirty, thankless work” of struggle within the law, articulating demands in 
the form of the legality which, imposed by the enemy, “is re-imposed on him by the logic of 
events”125. Edward Thompson gives a similar warning against legal nihilism in Whigs and Hunters, 
stressing that it would be an error to “give up the struggle against bad laws, and to disarm ourselves 
before power” since to do so would be “to throw away a whole inheritance of struggle about law, 
and within the forms of law...”126. Thompson provides a sophisticated analysis which recognises 
that whilst law can be seen as mediating and reinforcing extant class relations, indeed ideologically 
legitimating the latter, there remains a limit to the pliability of the legal form which restricts its use 
as an instrument of power. For the legal system to effectively function as ideology, it must display 
a sufficient degree of systemic integrity, maintained by way of respect for its internal logic and 
criteria of equity. The translation of the demands of political power into legal enactment is thus a 
frictional process, the syntactic structures and limitations of the legal form imposing restrictions 
upon political whim. In this way, rulers can be seen as “prisoners of their own rhetoric”, moving 
within an actional framework which fundamentally reinforces the class structures which brought 
them to power, yet considerably limits their freedom of movement – whilst the rules suit the rulers, 
they must not be seen to be wilfully broken, or the game is up127. For Thompson, the restrictive 
conditions imposed by the legal mediation of political force create opportunities in certain limited 
circumstances for class conflict to be played out in a legal forum. The working class and other 
political agents may operationalise legal mechanisms, exploiting the performative contradiction 
between the formal equality of the law and the material inequality of the underlying economic 
structure, to secure meaningful material concessions. Thus, law may on occasion be seen to inhibit 
power and afford some protection to the powerless – law has become shield.  
 
It is crucial to note that the two functions of law we have outlined thus far, those of sword and of 
shield, exist together in symbiotic relation. To the extent that the legal system limits the exercise of 
power through the subjection of the latter to the substantive and procedural logic of the legal form, 
law also provides the framework of legitimation and consent that underwrites and consolidates 
such power. This paradoxical coupling of law’s restricting and enabling functions leads to the 
perverse effect that struggles within the law which seek to defend labour against the most 
inhumane effects of its exploitation by capital can actually help to stabilise the capitalist mode of 
production, strengthening the foundation upon which future exploitation rests. Such stabilisation 
occurs both at ideological and structural levels. As regards the former, legal victories for labour 
help bolster the appearance of impartiality and legitimacy of the legal system.  The stabilisation 
which we have called “structural” refers to the effect which reforms, in regulating the conditions of 
exploitation without undermining its basis, may have in securing the sustainable reproduction of a 
125 Pashukanis, ‘Lenin and Problems of Law’  
126 Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, 266 (emphasis in original) 
127 Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, pp. 258-269 
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healthy and sufficiently content working population. In this regard, labour movements, perhaps 
intersecting with bourgeois reformist movements underlain by notions of “civilised morality”, can 
function to offset the tendency of capital, motivated by the coercive pressures of competitive 
accumulation, to increase the rate of exploitation to levels which threaten to undermine the 
reproduction of labour-powers at their current level of productivity. Marx, in discussing this matter, 
grounds his analysis in the experience of the passing of the factory legislation of 1853-1860. These 
enactments, in regulating industrial practices which had led to the premature exhaustion and 
(ultimately) death of factory workers, achieved a remarkable physical and moral regeneration of 
labour-powers128. Hence, the concessions achieved by class struggle may work to safeguard the 
vitality of the labouring population, ensuring the sustainable reproduction of that material source of 
value which the class of employers of labour, despite their dependence upon it, have failed to guard 
and cherish. From a slightly different perspective, the crystallisation of the concessions gained 
through class struggle in legal enactment may be regarded as examples of the state apparatus 
working to mediate the egoistic interests of individual capitals in favour of total social capital.  
 
It would be a mistake to conclude from the above that movements which seek progressive reform 
within the capitalist mode of production are incapable of achieving a trajectory which leads beyond 
the narrow horizon of bourgeois right, being condemned instead to reinforce – and ‘perfect’ – the 
exploitation of labour by capital. Firstly, the experience of collective organisation and activity of 
the working class in opposition to capital leads to the progressive development of class 
consciousness, whilst the achievement of even minor victories, especially those achieved in 
alliance with other social forces, boosts confidence and strengthens labour’s power of attack129. 
Moreover, building on Hegel’s Logic, it may be discerned that quantitative differences at a certain 
point pass over by a “dialectical inversion” into qualitative distinctions130. Thus, in a manner 
analogous to the transformation of liquid water into solid ice as a result of an accumulation of small 
changes in temperature, the progressive reduction in the length of the working day would 
eventually reach a “tipping point” at which the accumulation of capital would cease due to the 
impossibility of the extraction of surplus value. It would of course be a mistake to infer from this 
that the capitalist mode of production could be overthrown “quietly” or discretely as a result of a 
succession of progressive reforms. Such a route would be blocked by the deployment of 
reactionary forces, including crucially the coercive state apparatus, such instruments operating with 
an increasing intensity as the point of transformation is neared. Hence, the working class must 
achieve sufficiently powerful political and military organisation to facilitate the overthrow of the 
bourgeois state. 
 
128 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, pp. 406-8, full discussion in chapters 10 & 11 
129 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p. 409 
130 Marx, Capital Vol. 1, p. 423; A. Callinicos, The Revolutionary Ideas of Karl Marx (London: Bookmarks, 
1996), p. 60 
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Whilst some of the insights provided by Edward Thompson in Whigs and Hunters interface 
productively with the notion of law as Shield developed here, he at certain stages goes further than 
the present analysis. For instance, Thompson contends that the notion of the inhibition of power by 
law and the regulation and reconciliation of conflict by means of the rule of law should be regarded 
as a “cultural achievement of universal significance”. Indeed, he suggests that the rule of law itself 
is an “unqualified human good”131 and finds it impossible to conceive of any society without 
law132. Now, it must certainly be recognised that there is much to distinguish the rule of law from 
the arbitrary exercise of power and that the development of the legal system was progressive in 
view of the struggle against royal absolutism in the 16th and 17th centuries. However, in my view it 
is a mistake to conclude that the legal form is of universal significance and that it has an enduring 
utility which will guarantee its perseverance in any imaginable future society. Indeed, the analysis 
Pashukanis provides of the formal specificity and historical contingency of the legal system 
(discussed at length in part three of this paper) seems more convincing. Ultimately, a lot hinges on 
the notion of law that is operative in analysis, whether it be the relatively thin concept preferred by 
Thompson, which seems at times to amount to little more than the inhibition of power by rules, or 
the thicker notion employed by Pashukanis, which builds in a greater degree of formal particularity 
and contrasts specifically legal regulation to other forms of social control. In my view, the latter 
approach is preferable insofar as the former is susceptible to charges of legal imperialism, since it 
is likely to result in the juridification of social life in its entirety. Moreover, the incisiveness, 
purchase and particular relevance of a legal analysis is eroded when law is severed from the 
concrete, historical context of its formal and institutional development. This problematic is 
evidenced by Thompson’s analysis of the interaction between the “moral economy” of the foresters 
and the notions of exclusive property right promulgated by the process of enclosure, which he 
describes in terms of the forester moving within “visible or invisible structures of law” which are 
“deeply imbricated within the very basis of productive relations”133. This effectively pluralist 
analysis is premised upon an abandonment of a clear analytical distinction between ‘law’ as 
legislated under the officially constituted political order – and backed by the coercive power of the 
state as the concentrated and organised force of society – and the informal, customary regime 
underlying the eroding moral economy. In my view, this is a conceptual move which is both 
analytically disorientating and impoverishing. 
 
Another analysis which is instructive with regard to the development of the notion of law as shield, 
yet must ultimately be departed from in important ways, is that provided by Alain Supiot in his 
Homo Juridicus134. Supiot sets out to develop an understanding of the operation of the legal system 
from an anthropological perspective, emphasising the role which law plays in constituting the 
131 Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, pp. 265-6 
132 Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, p. 260 
133 Thompson, Whigs and Hunters, p. 261 
134 A. Supiot, Homo Juridicus: on the Anthropological Function of Law (London: Verso, 2007) 
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individual and situating her within an epistemological universe which makes sense of material 
reality. For him, law is a technique of “inter-diction”, a communicative mechanism which mediates 
the person and her representation of the world, interposing a realm of shared meaning which 
transcends the individual135. The effect is to subject social interaction to the rule of reason, binding 
human society together by the imposition of responsibilities, or limitations upon action, justified by 
reference to a set of dogmatic resources embedded within law136. In this way, the legal system 
operates to instantiate a set of beliefs, an ideological system which, despite being founded upon 
indemonstrable “certainties”, nevertheless forms an inter-subjective reference point by virtue of 
which the worth and particularity of the human individual can (to some degree) be guaranteed. The 
result of this mode of reasoning is to impose a narrow dichotomy between legality and barbarism 
which is somewhat reminiscent of Hobbes’ Leviathan. People cannot live “freely and peaceably” 
without the instituted principles of the law, whilst juridical personality becomes a last refuge of 
humanity and a final defence against descent into “scientific absolutism” and totalitarian 
domination137. From this perspective, Supiot attacks all those intellectual and political positions 
which fail to respect the sanctity of legal values. Indeed, he even goes so far as to assimilate, on the 
one hand, the fascistic destruction of legal personality as a prelude to authoritarian repression, with 
on the other, the materialist analysis of the historical contingency of the legal form and the 
projection that in post-capitalist society, law will ultimately wither away having outlived its 
utility138.  
 
Supiot’s analysis is compromised by crucial methodological weaknesses which derive in part from 
a failure to maintain a clear distinction between essential and phenomenal relations. Further, his 
investigation, proceeding in the spirit of the Hegelian dialectic, appears to understand social history 
in terms of the progressive refinement of consciousness, mental conceptions being severed from the 
material context of their development and reified as abstract categories which act as determinate 
forces upon historical processes. This type of reasoning is manifested in Supiot’s attempt to sever 
the “idea” of law from its institutional instantiation, isolating the notion of “obligation” from the 
web of contractual relations which constitute the market. This approach can be usefully contrasted 
to that of Pashukanis, who contends that the norm cannot exist but in the concrete multiplicity of 
legal relations, these being the fabric through which the norm is woven139. Moreover, Supiot 
investigates technological development as an autonomous social phenomenon disconnected from 
the structural antagonism between capital and labour. Hence, he attacks the excesses of techno-
science and “scientism” as a substitute for the coercive effects of competitive accumulation, which 
compel the capitalist to innovate in such a manner as to increase productivity and maximise the rate 
of exploitation. It is in large part due to the intertwinement of technological innovation and 
135 Supiot, Homo Juridicus, prologue at xxiv 
136 Supiot, Homo Juridicus, prologue 
137 Supiot, Homo Juridicus, prologue at xv, xviii-xix 
138 Supiot, Homo Juridicus, pp. 31-4 
139 E. Pashukanis, Law and Marxism: A General Theory (London: Pluto Press, 1983), Chapter 3 
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capitalist relations of production that scientific development, itself containing enormous potential 
for human progress and emancipation, becomes instead a weapon for the intensified exploitation of 
labour. Further, the competitive process of the diversification and repulsion of capitals140 is a key 
mechanism in propelling scientific research into areas with the greatest potential for profitable 
investment, rather than those which might most benefit humanity. 
 
Despite the limitations summarised above, there may be salvaged from Supiot’s analysis certain 
insights which are useful in our connection. Most valuable is his recognition that law can operate as 
a social hermeneutic, an open epistemological framework which evolves in an iterative manner 
through a dialogical process of (re-)interpretation and application141. In this way, Supiot argues that 
human rights can become a flexible resource which may be adapted in a manner which allows their 
deployment in a diverse range of cultural and institutional environments. This analysis captures 
from an interesting perspective the role that law, as a mode of social communication and 
representation, can play in the cross-fertilisation of political struggle, enabling the communicability 
of victories achieved in different contexts. Law provides a powerful rhetorical arsenal which can in 
periods of heightened class struggle and political consciousness be deployed in a manner which 
juxtaposes the avowed ideals and principles of the legal system with the materiality of their class-
inflected realisation. Thus, the idea of universal rights embodied in the legal form emerges as “one 
of the greatest emancipatory ideas in world history”, insofar as it enables bourgeois society to be 
challenged by those it suppresses “according to its own logic, caught out in a performative 
contradiction between what it [says] and what it [does]”142. A concrete example of this process may 
be seen in the manner in which the French revolution and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and 
the Citizen of 1789 gave impetus to and galvanised the Haitian slave revolts of 1791-1804. The 
principles of universality and equality embedded in the Declaration and the subsequent 
constitutions of 1793 and 1795 brought into sharp relief the political and economic asymmetries 
underlying imperial domination in the French colonies. Thus, however useful ideas of universal 
right and equality might have been to the French bourgeoisie with regard to domestic struggles 
against the white cockades and the system of privileges and perquisites which characterised the old 
regime, these ideas possessed a transformative power which escaped direct control. Instead, they 
could be seen as part of a (relatively) open system of thought which would be deployed as a 
rhetorical weapon by the revolutionary movement in Haiti.  
 
At this point, it is crucial to avoid slipping into a form of idealism which might suggest that 
developments of consciousness, of political and legal thought, operate as the determinate factor in 
processes of social transformation. In order to circumvent this danger, we must effect a change of 
140 See Marx, Capital Vol. 1, pp. 776-7 
141 Supiot, Homo Juridicus, Chapter 6 
142 T. Eagleton, The Illusions of Postmodernism (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996). Referenced in N. Davidson, 
‘Enlightenment and anti-capitalism’ (2006) 10 International Socialism  
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analytical perspective from that which appears to underlie Supiot’s argument in Homo Juridicus – 
we must bring political struggle centre stage. It may be discerned that progressive political 
movements tend not to have a legal genesis – they cannot be said, generally, to arise from 
developments in legal thought, the operation of legal institutions or the specifically legal actions of 
legal, political and economic actors. Rather, the analysis which I have attempted to outline here is 
of law acting as a medium for the articulation and crystallisation of victories occasioned by broader 
processes of political and economic struggle, and as a mechanism for communicating and 
transposing these into different social contexts. I would contend, by implication, that while legal 
mechanisms may allow the entrenchment of material concessions exhorted by struggle, thus 
providing some degree of protection against their erosion by reactionary forces, such guarantees are 
not self-activating insofar as they are produced and powered by social forces operating 
predominantly outside of the official procedures of the legal system. Returning to Haiti for 
instance, it was only the material context of the bloody struggles of the Haitian rebels against 
French colonial rule which destabilised existing social relations and widened the scope of political 
possibility, opening a space within which the status quo could be placed in contradistinction with 
the principles of the French revolution. Moreover, the Declaration of the Rights of Man derives its 
power not from its literary elegance or grammatical accuracy, but rather because it symbolises 
profound social changes which cannot be wholly perceived through a legal lens. The continued 
effectiveness of legal guarantees thus depends on the maintenance of the balance of class forces 
which effected their enactment – the erosion of this foundation will allow labour’s gains to be 
rolled back or subverted. This may occur especially during periods of economic crisis, which the 
bourgeoisie may attempt to countervail by way of the increased exploitation of labour and the mass 
devaluation of capital. The legal shield must be held fast to the body of the proletariat if it is not to 
be prised from its grasp and transformed once more into an instrument of domination by capital.              
 
Law as Fetter 
 
The third figure which it is useful to invoke in our thematisation of the role of the law relative to 
processes of social transformation is that of the fetter. In this regard, the analysis is based crucially 
upon an understanding of the historical contingency of the legal form, on recognition of the 
correspondence of the specifically legal form of social regulation to the capitalist mode of 
production. Given that the legal form grows out of the system of generalised commodity 
production which characterises bourgeois society and is intertwined with the social relations of 
production which correspond thereto, it must ultimately be abandoned together with those relations 
in the transition to a more advanced form of economic organisation. Since law supports and 
reproduces capitalist relations of production, it is imbricated in the process by which the latter, at a 
particular historical conjecture, come to operate as a limit upon the further development of the 
forces of production and their deployment in the interests of humanity. In this regard, the legal 
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form may be seen to suffer a similar fate to those ideas and institutions of feudal society which 
were torn asunder in the transition to the capitalist mode of production.  
 
Again, it is important to emphasise that the function of law as fetter does not prejudice its role as 
sword and as shield outlined above, rather the figures should be seen as three perspectives or 
windows from which to view the integrated operation of the legal system. Law (as sword) is 
crucially implicated in the construction and reproduction of those social conditions which are 
required for the accumulation of capital by the extraction of surplus value. This notwithstanding, 
legal mechanisms may be operationalised (as shield) by labour and oppressed groups under 
capitalism to consolidate their struggles against the worst effects of their exploitation, holding the 
avowed principles of the legal system in contradistinction with the inequities presupposed by 
capitalist production. The entrenchment of political gains in legal enactment must certainly be 
recognised as a substantial achievement, indeed one with the potential to greatly improve the health 
and living standards of the working class143. However, the articulation of the victories of labour in 
legal form is problematic insofar as it imposes upon those demands a syntactic structure and inner 
logic which, as we shall see, is closely coupled with the logic of the commodity form. Legal 
reforms, by their nature, tend not to challenge the central dynamics of the capitalist system, indeed 
at times operating to stabilise the process of accumulation at both structural and ideological levels. 
The ability to operate the legal machine may be of substantial political advantage to agents working 
strategically within the bounds of capitalist economy. Nevertheless, it may be foreseen that, 
following the transition – driven by the political activity of those oppressed under capitalism – to a 
new form of social and economic organisation, legality will ultimately outlive its usefulness. The 
legal form, as a historically specific mode of social regulation corresponding to the system of 
generalised commodity production, will start to restrict the unfolding of the new political order. 
Thus legality appears now as a limit, a restraint under which society, liberated from the exploitation 
and alienation of capitalist production, starts to chafe: law has become fetter.   
 
In order to further develop the notion of law as fetter, it will be necessary to examine in further 
detail the analysis provided by Pashukanis in A General Theory of Law and Marxism144. As we 
have seen, Pashukanis sought to develop an elementary framework for the elaboration of a 
revolutionary dialectical and materialist method of jurisprudence. In this connection, he was careful 
to avoid the crude, instrumentalist approach which would attempt to demonstrate the direct 
correspondence of the content of particular laws and legal institutions with the material interests of 
the bourgeoisie145. Rather, he aimed to provide an analysis of the fundamental characteristics of the 
legal superstructure through an interrogation of the most basic and abstract juridical concepts - the 
143 Marx himself celebrates the advances occasioned by the enactment of the Factory Acts of 1853-1860 – 
Capital Vol. 1, pp. 406-8, 416 
144 E. Pashukanis, Law and Marxism: A General Theory (London: Pluto Press, 1983) 
145 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, editor’s introduction at p. 11, preface to the German edition at p. 35 
189 
 
                                                          
legal subject and legal norm – and an evaluation of the operational modalities of the legal 
relation146. In this regard, Pashukanis’ argument proceeds in a manner which is reminiscent of 
Marx’s analysis of political economy in Capital, beginning as it does with an appraisal of the 
fundamental categories of the legal form, before branching out in a process of dialectical expansion 
to investigate both the inner relation between these concepts and the manner in which associated 
social phenomena can be explained in light of their operation. Given that the most fundamental 
juridical concepts can be seen to maintain their logical and systematic meaning across multiple 
legal spheres147, Pashukanis’ approach is able to produce insights which have relevance for the 
legal superstructure in its entirety. He could, employing this method, address the “particular 
problematic” of the legal form, doing justice to law’s specific internal structure, which other 
approaches are apt to dissolve away “into some vaguer notion of social control”148.       
 
Crucially, Pashukanis proceeds from the premise that the development of the legal superstructure 
cannot be understood merely as the formation of an abstract schema of legal ideology, but rather as 
an actual process of the transformation of human relations into legal relations, embodied in 
“profound, universal changes of an objective kind”. Thus, legal relationships are not merely 
mystified mental conceptions of economic relations, masking the ‘despotism of the factory’ behind 
the ‘republic of the market’149, but have a concrete existence in real social forces150, as evidenced 
by such developments as: the progressive dominance of relations of liability; the disintegration of 
organic patriarchal relations and their replacement by legal relations between formally equal 
subjects, and; the precipitation of a political authority as a separate power and the resultant 
differentiation between the spheres of public and private relations151. Expressing the point 
succinctly, Pashukanis remarks that “Law as a form does not exist in the heads and the theories of 
learned jurists alone. It has a parallel, real history, which unfolds not as a set of ideas, but as a 
specific set of relations”152. It is important to note at this point however that these two parallel 
existences of the legal form – ideological and concrete – are not completely coincidental, there 
existing a cleavage of sorts between the actual legal mediation of the relations of production and 
the theoretical reflection of the legal system expressed by juridical concepts as logical abstractions. 
For Pashukanis, actual legal mediation of economic relations is accomplished only in the instant of 
the contract, the moment at which the legal relation as a psychological phenomenon (by virtue of 
which the commodity owner is aware of himself as a commodity owner) becomes an objective 
economic fact – “an economic relation which is inextricably linked to its similarly objective legal 
form”. Such legal mediation has objective consequences which escape the consciousness or will of 
146 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, preface to the second Russian edition at p. 40, p. 47 
147 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, p. 47 
148 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, editors introduction at p. 11-12  
149 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, preface to the second Russian edition at pp. 39-40 
150 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, preface to the second Russian edition at p. 59 
151 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, preface to the second Russian edition at pp. 40-41 
152 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, p. 68 
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the commodity owner, organised instead by a complex legal machinery consisting of criteria, 
statutes, law courts and the compulsory execution of court decisions153. 
 
Pashukanis is extremely critical of those Marxist theorists who, in seeking to develop a notion of 
“proletarian law”, unwittingly remain within a narrow bourgeois horizon, insofar as they implicitly 
accept the form of law as “supra-historical and capable of constant renewal”154. While in bourgeois 
society, the legal form may be seen to attain universal significance, such that legal ideology 
becomes the ideology par excellence155, Pashukanis recognises that the legal system, as with any 
social form, has a historical dimension, and sets out to analyse law in its social and historical 
materiality. For him, any attempt to elaborate a theory of law in general, abstracted from the 
objective processes of its historical development, will be fruitless insofar as it must inevitably 
result in “empty scholastic verbal formulae”156. Pashukanis attempts rather to examine the legal 
system as it exists in bourgeois, capitalist society, this being the point at which legal relations 
achieve their most highly developed, most universal and most consummate expression157. It is 
important to note that Pashukanis is not thereby suggesting that law did not exist in earlier 
societies, but rather that it did so only in embryonic or rudimentary forms, the true nature and 
orientation of which was only revealed by the consequent refinement of the legal relation158. For 
Pashukanis, it is no mere coincidence that law attains its most developed form in bourgeois society. 
Instead, he asserts that there is an “indissoluble internal connection” between the categories of the 
economy based on the commodity and on money, and the legal form itself. This connection is 
borne out by the category of the legal subject, which can be regarded as “the indispensible and 
unavoidable complement of the commodity”159. Thus, the legal subject, as the “abstract bearer of 
all possible legal claims”, can be compared directly with, and indeed recognised as the juridical 
reflection of, the commodity owner, as an “abstract, impersonal subject of rights in things”160. 
Now, of course, commodities were produced in pre-capitalist societies, yet it is only in bourgeois 
society that commodity production becomes generalised – that use-values are increasingly 
produced primarily for exchange, and progressively, the entirety of social wealth passes through 
the mechanism of commodity circulation161. It is under these conditions that the legal form obtains 
universal significance and legal ideology can obtain a firm grip on human consciousness. 
 
At this point, it will be useful to take a step back and examine exactly what Pashukanis is 
proposing. Essentially, he is contending that in the juridical concepts and categories of the legal 
153 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, preface to the second Russian edition at pp. 43-44 
154 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, editor’s introduction at p. 18 
155 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, preface to the second Russian edition at p. 45 
156 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, p. 57 
157 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, preface to the second Russian edition at p. 44 
158 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, p. 70 
159 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, preface to the second Russian edition at p. 42 
160 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, editor’s introduction at p. 14 
161 Marx, Capital Vol. 1 
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superstructure there are reflected, or expressed, certain modalities of social interaction, certain 
objective relationships, which are grounded in the materiality of the economic structure and which 
determine the existence of their “counterpart” legal relationships. He is seeking to demonstrate the 
inextricable interrelation of the development of the legal form and that of the economic system in 
which social relations of production are expressed in the form of the exchange (and cumulatively, 
circulation) of commodities, as the objectification of a specific quantity of socially necessary 
labour time (value). Thus, legal regulation is revealed as a particular – and necessarily contingent – 
historical form, whilst juridical categories, in spite their apparent universality, are now seen as the 
specific reflex of the economic actors and relations which characterise bourgeois commodity-
producing society. Law itself cannot be regarded as an appendage of human society in the abstract, 
but rather “as an historical category corresponding to a particular social environment based on the 
conflict of private interests”162. 
 
The implication of Pashukanis’ argument is that as bourgeois relations of production come to be 
replaced by those corresponding to a developing post-capitalist mode of production, we will see the 
disappearance of the juridical factor from social relations, and ultimately the withering away of law 
altogether163. During the transitional period, social relations will to some extent continue to be 
constrained by the “narrow horizon of bourgeois right”, such vestiges of the legal form being part 
of the heritage of the bourgeois epoch from which the population must eventually be liberated, a 
fetter from which they must be set free. The case thus developed by Pashukanis is controversial 
among theorists working both within and outside the Marxist tradition of enquiry. While there is 
insufficient space for an exhaustive account of the arguments here, it should be said that much 
confusion can be avoided by the retention of a firm grasp upon the specific understanding of “law” 
that is operative in Pashukanis’ analysis. For him, law entails something more specific than a 
system of normative regulation or mode of social control, this being most clearly expressed in the 
distinction he draws between legal and technical forms of regulation. 
 
To say that law will wither away is not to suggest that human conduct in a post-capitalist society 
will be entirely free from subjection to particular rules or frameworks of action. It is rather to 
suggest that the specifically “legal” form of regulation that has developed symbiotically with 
bourgeois relations of production will disappear. Thus, we may see for instance a rationalisation of 
the social response to acts of interpersonal violence, involving a transition from the retributive, 
individualist approach which characterises bourgeois justice to a pedagogical, socialistic model 
which accounts for and attempts to undercut the contextual nexus which underlies the behaviour. 
“Punishment” is thereby transformed from the taking of a pound of flesh as equivalent to the 
gravity of the contravention into “a measure of expediency for the protection of society”164. 
162 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, pp. 70-72 
163 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, p. 61 
164 Pashukanis, Law and Marxism, p. 185 
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